


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Current Events In
Historical Perspective



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
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
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ORIGINS

Current Events in
Historical Perspective

July 1993

Volume I—Number 2

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A Guided Tour of *Origins*

"For insight into the complicated and complicating events..., one needs perspective, not attitudes; context, not anecdotes; analysis, not postures. For any kind of lasting illumination the focus must be on the history routinely ignored or played down or unknown." [Toni Morrison, *Racing Justice, Engendering Power* (Pantheon, p. xi)]

It is the mission of *Origins* to provide this context, perspective and history so frequently avoided by today's popular press. The world is a complicated place, yet the news tries so often to simplify it into sound-bites or single-faceted opinions. To truly grasp contemporary events, a grounding in the history and the context is essential.

Here is a tour of what you will find in *Origins*.

Origins' main articles will focus on the long-term trends and patterns, search for the foundations of today's events, and explore the multi-faceted nature of a particular problem. They will provide the reader with a non-partisan base of knowledge from which to develop an informed opinion. These articles will complement the day-to-day news provided by the television and newspapers. Main articles, diverse in both subject and scope, will be divided topically between International ("Around the World") and North American ("Here At Home").

In addition to the principal articles, *Origins* will regularly run a series of other columns. "Reviews and Commentary" will include reviews of books and films that illuminate aspects of contemporary issues. Rather than regular reviews ("I liked this book because ..."), *Origins'* reviews will act as springboards for a discussion of the larger questions brought forward by the work in question.

"Questions and Comments" will be the one column in which overt, direct opinions are voiced. It is also where letters to the editor (and responses thereto) will be printed.

"On the Road" will be an occasion-

al column that will include stories and memoirs of people's travels. As the world becomes increasingly smaller, the understanding and insight that submersion in a country or a culture can provide is essential. "On the Road" articles will bring out an understanding of regions of the world that cannot always be found in textbook explanations.

"Talking About Today" will delve into the nature of life in the contemporary world. It will examine larger trends and movements as well as explore the details of individuals' lives.

Origins will regularly include a column called "Milestones." "Milestones" will celebrate and explore the anniversaries of past events that have made an impact on the world of today. They will strive to "grasp the moment" both for the people involved and for the world around them.

Each issue of *Origins* will be rounded out by "Continental Divide." On the lighter side, this column will look at quirky, off-the-beaten-track topics as well as natural and social oddities.

Origins is designed with the reader in mind. Each article will include photographs, drawings, maps, charts and graphs that will visually elucidate important concepts in the articles; will begin with an abstract of its subject matter; and will include a section of further or suggested reading that will provide the reader with the opportunity to delve deeper into issues of particular interest.

Finally, *Origins* is interested in what you think about current events. Please send along comments you may have about *Origins* and its articles.

Are We In Need of Perestroika Too?

“Where have all the leaders gone?” It is certainly a common question these days. Around the world, popular discontent with heads of state has resulted in almost unprecedentedly low approval ratings: François Mitterand 46%, Bill Clinton and Helmut Kohl 38%, Kim Campbell 32% (Brian Mulroney 13% before he stepped down), John Major 19%, Kiichi Miyazawa 9%, to name just a few. Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao has been called by local critics “the Prime Muddler of India.”

Common sentiment says that we are living through a difficult time of transition, one which cries out for enlightened leadership and tough decision making. The litany of problems is immense: deficits, poverty, crime and violence, dysfunctional educational systems, dilemmas with health care, ethnic strife, unemployment (above 10% in many Western European countries), bureaucratic stalemates, and internecine war in Bosnia and Somalia. Yet, none of the chosen leaders seem to be able to fill the shoes of their role. They are criticized for lack of defining vision and for emphasizing political over concrete gains.

On top of this, what the public finds most disheartening is that the opposition provides no viable alternative. They appear cut from the same faulty leadership cloth as the people in power and, often, they voice almost indistinguishable platforms. Each side offers a warmed-over brand of the same unsuccessful politics and the electorate is left wanting come election time.

But, are approval ratings alone enough to demonstrate a crisis of leadership? Such ratings are public impressions, not necessarily leadership reality. Many political pundits now point to an electorate that maintains inordinately high standards for its elected officials and an unreasonable desire to have their cake and eat it too. Rather than leaders, the public is looking for miracle workers to produce overnight successes.

However, at some point in the midst of this leadership crisis—whether real or simply in the public’s collective mind—the question must be asked: Are the failings of the individual leaders really the problem or is there something wrong with the structure of the system itself? After ‘fighting’ the so-called cold war, the Western world has finally been forced to come to terms with the condition of its own house. Since the Second World War, the development of democracy and capitalism were measured not against absolute conceptions of how society should be, but rather in terms relative to the path of communism. For forty-some years the West could be happy that they were outstripping their competition in all the areas that they deemed most important. Now, with the competition gone, the Western world is facing the fact that all is not how they would like it—that post-WWII democracy and capitalism has left a legacy of seemingly unsolvable dilemmas.

In the modern political process, the skills that bring an individual to office are not always the ones that serve the

nation best once in office. Moreover, the combination of democracy and capitalism hold inherent obstacles that no leader can ever fully eradicate: obstructionism, localism, apathy, deficits, disproportionate wealth distribution, the inability to account for race, and periodic recessions. Consensus decision making strings out the time it will take to be put an act in place. Leaders must answer to their specific constituencies or interest groups before answering to the society as a whole. Is the contemporary Western system of government, regardless of leadership, up to the challenge of the problems that it now faces? Or are we too in need of perestroika—a restructuring and rethinking—of how our system functions?



Congratulations on producing an insightful and relevant publication that will undoubtedly inspire intelligent thought and dialogue.

We wish to take this opportunity to commend the magazine for the accuracy of information in the article *Unity in Diversity* which profiled the Baha’i Faith.

Brit-Karina Regan, Assistant Director
Baha’i Community of Canada, Thornhill, Ont.

This is quite an undertaking and judging by the first number, it appears that you will deliver.

Allow me however to question a few statements: The origin of the word Slavonic. It certainly does not come from a swamp in Poland called Slave. More likely from the word *Slowo* meaning ‘word’ or *Slawa* meaning ‘glory.’ Macedonia certainly does not come from the bishop Macedonius (300 AD.). The reverse is probably true. The grandfather of Alexander the Great was King Philip of Macedonia in 300 BC. The bishop was probably from Macedonia and was thus called Macedonius. You also make a definite statement that Michailovic’s Chetniks often collaborated with Germans. This fable was, I believe, a useful excuse for an abhorrent abandoning of the allies by Churchill, a small bit of treachery politically motivated to please “Uncle Joe.” Others would follow in Yalta.

K.J.M. Godlewski, Barry’s Bay, Ont.

[And a personal letter to one of our writers:]

Congratulations on your new magazine. I like it. I am pleased to see that you write as well as your father, which is almost as good as I.

Sidney Wallach, Buffalo, NY

In Praise Of The Remembered Story

By Lorne Brown

One cold winter's day long ago when my father was a young man and working as a travelling salesman for Ganong's Chocolates, he checked into a hotel in Perth, Ontario. He was to visit a customer some ten miles away, and so he hired a horse and sleigh from the local livery. Five minutes into his trip, however, he realized that, despite being wrapped in bear rugs, he would soon freeze to death. He then jumped off and ran behind the sleigh the entire way. After he drew up the customer's order, he turned around and ran all the way back to the livery stable, to the amusement of all and sundry.

I was thinking of this story the other day as I read yet again in the newspaper the daily litany of hardships we face in these troubled 1990s—downsizing, plant closures, food banks, unemployment, the list goes on. For just about everyone, coping skills have assumed a monumental importance. It's a wonder that universities haven't started to offer "Coping 101" as a general interest course.

And it seems to me that we have lost an important weapon in our coping arsenal: the remembered story.

Family stories were an important part of my growing up. In the evening after the day's work, my family of seven would sit at the dinner table, and the stories would flow. Stories of what happened during the day gave me, the baby of the family, an opportunity to know what was going on out there in the "real" world. More importantly, I heard stories about my relatives, some long gone. Others, while still alive, were living in the Ottawa area, and I rarely got to see them. But the stories connected me to a tradition. I realized that I had a past before I was even born, and that I will have a future after I die.

My family didn't tell folktales, but my mother told me nursery rhymes, and with my grandmother, quoted various proverbs. Coming through the Depression, they lived what they preached. In the recession of today these old proverbs have a peculiar resonance. "A stitch in time saves nine," said mother as she darned socks on a Saturday night, listening to Foster Hewitt describe the Toronto Maple Leafs of Syl Apps and Turk Broda. "A penny saved is a penny earned," said grandma, putting a penny thoughtfully into the piggy bank. "Waste not, want not," said father, carefully flattening a tin can which he would then cut into thin strips, meticulously twisting them to make "tin can icicles" to hang on our Christmas tree. I didn't realize it then, but I was developing my coping skills.

Later, I found myself plunged into the world of the folk tale and the folk song. The old stories and songs became a part

of me, affecting my life in ways I never thought possible. I began to realize that, in times of adversity, the world's peoples had the resources of their folk culture to draw on. The slaves from Africa could bring no possessions with them across the ocean, but they always had their remembered songs and stories. In the face of unbelievable hardships, these stories gave them strength and hope. The grey goose who was shot, plucked, and roasted, could still go flying across the ocean with her goslings behind her. Br'er Rabbit, hand and foot stuck to the tar baby, could still outwit the fox into throwing him into the briar patch where he was born and bred instead of drowning him or boiling him in oil.

The natives of North America saw their land and their way of life taken from them by the white man, but he couldn't take away their stories. The Apaches, for example, still had their tales of Coyote, a trickster figure. They told this story: A white man on horseback comes across Coyote and asks if he is the clever Coyote who tricks people. "Not me," says Coyote. But the man insists on a match of wits, and begs Coyote to trick him. Coyote insists that he has left his trick medicine at home, and asks to borrow the horse to get it. While trying to mount, he deliberately jabs the horse, and says it won't let him mount because he's not dressed in the white man's clothes. The man obligingly gives him his clothes. Finally, all dressed and riding the man's horse, the trickster says, "You know it now, white man; I am clever Coyote."

In the Middle East there is a beloved wise fool with several names, Hodja being one. One day the Hodja, while walking along, discovered an old rusty coin lying on the road. Thinking it might be valuable, he took it to a coin dealer who gave him twenty pieces of silver. With his new wealth he bought quantities of felt at a good price, and was delighted to sell the cloth for one hundred silver pieces to the army who desperately needed new uniforms. A silver smith offered him fifty gold pieces for the silver coins, but unfortunately, on his way home, he was robbed of the gold coins. His wife asked him what he had lost in the robbery. "Oh," said the Hodja, "Just an old rusty coin."

Coping skills.

The famed psychiatrist Bruno Bettelheim tells us how remembering fairy tales kept him alive during the holocaust. When the going becomes tougher for me, I remember the story of the Jew who lived with his family and in-laws in a cramped little house. Unable to stand the noise and confusion any longer, he went to the Rabbi for advice. The Rabbi told him to bring his cow, goat, and chickens into the house as well. The chickens made such a mess that he had to return to the Rabbi the next day for help, and was told to take the chickens out of the house. When the goat was causing so much trouble, the Rabbi told him to take the goat out as well. Which still left the

*Lorne Brown is a Toronto storyteller and editor of *Appleseed Quarterly*, the Canadian journal of storytelling.*

cow, who was turning the house into a stable. "Take out the cow!" cried the Rabbi, and the next day the man returned to the Rabbi beaming, "My house is now so quiet and roomy and clean ... it's a pleasure to live there." And so I learn that things could always be worse.


Coping skills.

When women hear the stories of the ancient goddess in her triple aspect (maiden, mother, crone) they learn the power of their gender and can come to terms with their lives. Rather than longing to stay forever in the maiden stage, as TV and magazine ads would have them believe, they can rejoice in each stage. Men hearing the same stories can appreciate women in ways undreamed of, and can understand how much the male culture has taken away from women.

Told and remembered stories, whether personal family tales or the universal folk tales, have been with us since the beginning of time. They have sustained and nourished us, have given us strength to cope in difficult times. But today we

can dismiss the whole story as a "fairy tale." The real Cinderella story, Tattercoats, Thousand Furs, whatever, is an inspiring coping skills story.

The remembered story has such power and beauty that it will never die out completely, but it is gasping for breath. So all hail to today's storytellers who are retelling the old tales. I find myself increasingly drawing on these stories to help me cope with a world gone mad. When I hear one economist or politician explain that we must spend our way out of the recession, and then another say that is wrong and that we must reduce the deficit at all costs, I am reminded again of the Hodja, who was once asked to settle an argument. After hearing one side, he said, "You're absolutely right!" The other person said, "You haven't heard my side yet," and went on to explain it. "You're absolutely right!" the Hodja said. Upon hearing this, the Hodja's wife rushed out of the house and said to him, "They can't both be right, you fool!" To which the Hodja replied, "You're absolutely right!"



David Wysotski

have families where both parents, or a single parent, are working so hard the family doesn't ever sit down together at meal time to share stories. Common "wisdom" tells us that with a TV and VCR, who needs stories anyway? Storytelling is only for children, they say, but even children are increasingly being fed a diet of pop culture. Will the Trumps get divorced? Who is Madonna's latest squeeze? Who is doing what to whom in the current soap opera? At a time when we desperately need the strength of the old stories, we are being told that they are unimportant, merely kid's stuff.

Worse, the great old stories that do make it into popular culture often get changed in fundamental ways. Cinderella is perhaps the most universal of folk tales, an inspiring story found everywhere from ancient China to our own Algonquin Indians. The cinder maid is really a princess to begin with, and through her own strength of character regains that which was rightfully hers, and becomes a princess again. But most of us know it from the Walt Disney movie, and Disney, despite his genius, never properly understood the fairy tales. In the screen version, Cinderella needs the help of a fairy godmother. Since most of us don't have such a magical creature to help us, we

And when I try to distinguish good from bad, right from wrong, good luck from bad luck, the old Chinese story springs to mind.

A farmer's horse escaped from his stable one night, and the next day his neighbours commiserated with him on his bad luck. "It is not for me to know whether it is good luck or bad luck," the farmer said. Sure enough, the next day his horse returned, bringing a whole herd of wild horses with him. "What good luck!" the neighbours cried, but the farmer said again, "It is not for me to know whether it is good luck or bad luck." And the next day, his son broke a leg while trying to ride one of the wild horses. "Such bad luck," cried the neighbours, but the farmer said, yet again, "It is not for me to know whether it is good luck or bad luck." And the next day, the press gang came through the countryside, conscripting all able-bodied men into the army. Because of the son's broken leg, he was left alone. The story could go on and on, but a fundamental, comforting truth has been recognized.

Coping skills.

Like my father had when he ran twenty miles behind a sleigh to keep from freezing to death.

Keeping the Peace: The U.N., Canada and the Quest for International Security

International peacekeeping efforts are increasingly coming under public scrutiny and criticism. Yet, as Canada's peacekeeping history attests, perceived failures in the peacekeeping process result most often from a combination of the constraints placed on peacekeeping forces and the recalcitrance of the antagonists involved. Today, with the Cold War over, the U.N. is being asked to become an ever more visible actor on the world stage. Are new definitions of peacekeeping and collective security in order?

by Russell Field

July, 1993 marks a special moment in the annals of Canadian peacekeeping: the one-year anniversary of the airlift of humanitarian aid to Bosnia, the longest continuous airlift in human history. However, the anniversary is receiving surprisingly little media attention. Found instead are reports of the scandal in Somalia and of a Canadian soldier wounding two of his comrades while cleaning his weapon in Bosnia. In the former case, two Canadian soldiers have been charged with murder, and two others face charges of torture, in the death of a Somali civilian. The fallout from this incident has been such that the Prime Minister of Haiti has gone so far as to characterize Canadian peacekeepers as "a pack of Nazis...with swastikas on their arms."

'Incompetent neo-fascists' is hardly the image Canadians have cultivated during their 45 years as leaders in international peacekeeping. Canada's standing on the international stage (and especially her self-perception of her own stature) is based in large part upon the leading role taken in peacekeeping missions. British Brigadier General Michael Harbottle, former leader of Britain's U.N. detachment in Cyprus, was impressed that Canadians "take peace-keeping very seriously and have extremely strong ideas on how it should be carried out."

There are currently 4,382 Canadian peacekeepers serving in 14 different operations around the world. With Canada's full military complement standing at only 80,000, such involvement represents a rate of participation unprecedented and unmatched on the international scene. In fact, on the home-front, the Canadian military has been repeatedly charged with over-extending itself by involving its forces in many operations simultaneously.

A recent recruiting poster highlights Canada's unique commitment to peacekeeping. The photograph depicts a running, blue-helmeted soldier carrying to safety a young child (teddy bear in tow). The implicit reason to join the Canadian

forces (and subliminally the *raison d'être* of the military itself) is not the defense of the nation, as is traditionally the case, but, rather, the preservation of international peace and the provision of humanitarian aid.

Peacekeeping, Not Peacemaking

Over the past 45 years, there have been few U.N. peacekeeping missions considered unqualified successes. In fact, many are viewed as unequivocal failures. Today, Somalia remains in upheaval; Bosnia appears forever shattered and antagonistic; and, despite successful U.N. overseeing of the May elections, Cambodia continues on, a country divided. The popular press took Canada's recent withdrawal from Cyprus as an opportunity to highlight the failure of peacekeeping efforts there.

Yet, insufficient distinction has been made between *peacekeeping* and *peacemaking*. As two well-known Canadian historians have remarked, "the chief object of peacekeeping is to keep two potential combatants separated while diplomatic efforts are mounted to resolve their conflict..." Peacekeeping is a military function, *peacemaking*, a diplomatic one. Nonetheless, peacekeepers are repeatedly expected to take on the role of *peacemakers*—a role that is often outside of their mandate and capabilities.

On top of the apparent failures of peacekeeping missions to make peace in troubled regions, much criticism of the whole peacekeeping process has stemmed from the deaths of U.N. troops and the involvement of peacekeepers in pitched battles and local skirmishes. Most recently, on June 5, 1993, 23 peacekeepers of Pakistani origin were killed in Somalia. Washington-led retaliation actions left five more U.N. troops and some 100 Somali militia dead. Mogadishu was bombed as blue helmeted soldiers led house to house searches for targeted warlord Mohammed Farrah Aidid. Civilians were wounded and frightened and the local power balance was tilted towards Aidid's rivals. Questions arose immediately in response. Are the peacekeepers in fact keeping the peace? Is the cost in lives and dollars too high for the return in security? Should the very manner in which peacekeeping and peacemaking are carried out be re-thought?

Russell Field has a B.A. in Canadian history and an M.B.A. from Queen's University. He is currently editor of the Canadian baseball magazine Dugout.

The Origins of U.N. Peacekeeping

When the drafters of the U.N. Charter in 1945 considered the organization's role in collective security they envisioned a large military force, kept at the ready, and capable of moving against an act of aggression anywhere in the world. This notion, however, had little practical application in a Cold War world. The veto power in the Security Council held by both East and West realistically precluded any multilateral cooperation against acts of aggression regardless of their origin. In addition, no member state was willing to finance a standing military.

As a collective security force quickly became an unattainable dream, the idea of U.N.-sanctioned peacekeeping missions was born. If the U.N. could not deter acts of aggression through the threat of its own force, at least it would be able to maintain a short-term peace while a more lasting solution was worked out.

Canadian historians are quick to point to the leading role played by Canada in the development of the peacekeeping concept. In 1950, External Affairs Minister Lester Pearson proposed that U.N. member states should earmark military units for peacekeeping service and that such military operations should be coordinated by the Secretary-General. Later that same year, the Cold War stalemate in the Security Council was circumvented when a resolution was passed that gave the General Assembly (rather than the more narrow Security Council) responsibility in matters of collective peace initiatives. The success of the U.N. emergency force in stabilizing the Suez Crisis in 1956—the first serious international crisis confronted by the U.N.—proved the validity of Pearson's formula. The age of U.N. peacekeeping had begun.

Why Canada? Canada's Peacekeeping History

Since 1947, Canada has participated in 32 different peacekeeping missions around the world [see map, page 10]. From the supervision of Korean elections in 1947 to providing humanitarian aid in Somalia in 1993, tens of thousands of Canadian military and diplomatic personnel have served the cause of peace, with 89 losing their life.

The reason most often cited publicly for Canada's significant role in international peacekeeping centres around her belief, as a nation, in peace and humanitarian aims. External Affairs Minister Paul Martin, in 1964, enunciated this 'higher

principle' while discussing Canada's involvement in a variety of peacekeeping operations:

It is a long and expensive list and it is politically difficult at home because of the risks; and we get small thanks abroad for our work. We do it not for the glory but as our duty, since there are not many of us willing and able to move in quickly with an effective force.

Outside this abstract, perhaps somewhat altruistic, justification, there was a more pragmatic rationale. Geographically situated between the world's two greatest nuclear powers, peacekeeping represented not only Canada's contribution to collective security but also served in her own defence.

Moreover, the U.N. considered Canada an attractive participant in peacekeeping operations. Outside of the "great powers"—the five permanent members of the Security Council (France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the U.S. and China)—Canada could offer the greatest number of battle-tested troops and the most sophisticated military hardware. In addition, while a Western democracy with strong ties to the U.S., Canada had an international reputation for impartiality and few strategic interests in other parts of the world.

Attempting to understand Canada's contribution to international peacekeeping—and, in fact, peacekeeping itself—is difficult. Each mission is different in scope, intent and mandate. The U.N. has overseen elections in Cambodia, inspected biological and chemical weapons sites in Iraq, and monitored a cease-fire in Angola. However, two well-known Canadian peacekeeping missions—the U.N. force in Cyprus and the international deputation in Vietnam—speak to the variety of 'types' of peacekeeping


and of the mandate and limitations of each mission. In Cyprus, Canada was actively involved in maintaining peace, while in Vietnam, Canada's role was that of overseer and supervisor.

Cyprus

"If you forced these people back together again, you could have another Bosnia"

- British resident in Cyprus (1993)

For nearly 30 years, the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has attempted to preserve peace between the



Canadian Armed Forces recruiting poster, 1993.
[Canadian Armed Forces]

Greek and Turkish populations on the small Mediterranean island. Since its inception in March of 1964, Canada has been a substantial contributor of personnel, equipment and financing to UNFICYP. What was originally viewed as a three-month peacekeeping mission became a regular tour of duty for Canadian military personnel. There have been incidents of serious hostilities as well as long periods of relative calm.

Tensions between Greek Cypriots and the Turkish ethnic minority (about twenty percent of the population) date back several centuries. Cyprus has been ruled by practically every principal Mediterranean power—from Assyria, to Egypt, Persia, Greece, Rome and the Ottomans. At the start of the First World War, Britain annexed Cyprus because of its strategic importance in southern Europe. It was not until 1959, with colonial empires around the world crumbling, that Cyprus achieved its independence.

The treaty that created the independent state of Cyprus, however, also created the conditions for the re-emergence of age-old tensions on the island. Under the agreement, Britain, Turkey and Greece consented to respect the sovereignty of Cyprus. Complex constitutional checks and balances were installed to satisfy both ethnic groups—i.e. the President was to be a Greek Cypriot; the Vice President, a Turkish Cypriot. But all three powers were granted the right to intervene unilaterally if these conditions no longer existed.

In November of 1963, the president, Archbishop Makarios, attempted to amend the Cypriot constitution. Under his proposals the President and Vice President would lose their mutual veto powers, a majority from both ethnic communities in the House of Representatives would no longer be needed to enact laws, and the proportion of Turkish-Cypriots in the military would be reduced. As a result, in late 1963 and early 1964, there was an outbreak of civil violence between the two communities on the island and Turkey threatened military intervention.

In the hope of forestalling an open conflict between Greece and Turkey, Britain proposed a NATO peacekeeping force—as both nations were NATO members. This was strongly opposed by the Soviet Union, who openly supported Greece during the conflict. Makarios maintained that he would only agree to peacekeeping efforts if they were carried out under the auspices of the United Nations. The U.N. had failed to act when hostilities began in December 1963, but, with NATO efforts stymied, the U.N. reconsidered the issue. On

March 4, 1964, the Security Council approved a temporary peacekeeping mission in Cyprus.

Secretary General U Thant asked Canada, Brazil, Ireland, Sweden and Finland to contribute personnel to the the mission. On March 11, Turkey again threatened to invade Cyprus unless U.N. peacekeepers arrived on the island. The next day, Prime Minister Lester Pearson confirmed Canada's participation and External Affairs Minister Paul Martin went about gathering additional support for the peacekeeping force.

Canada was the first nation to commit to UNFICYP and the first to arrive on the scene. This readiness to participate did not mean that Canada entered into the fray without serious reservations. Pearson told the House of Commons that Canada would only send troops to Cyprus if the duration of the mission was fixed in advance and a mediator was appointed to negotiate a peace between the two sides. In reality, however, the threat of a Turkish invasion meant that Canadian troops were committed to UNFICYP before Pearson had received adequate assurances on these matters.

By the end of April, 1964, the Canadian contingent in Cyprus numbered 1150 personnel in a U.N. force of 6500. Canada was assigned the task of demilitarizing the 'Green Line' (a buffer zone that extended through the capital of Nicosia and served to separate the city into distinct ethnic communities), and of protecting the route from Nicosia to Kyrenia (an important port city on the northern coast). The lack of authority granted the peacekeepers—force could only be used as a last resort—and the lack of respect shown them by the warring factions, made these tasks extremely difficult. Canadian troops were forced, in many ways, to be diplomats rather than soldiers.

From Poisoned "Polsson" to the Turkish Invasion

Although little had been done by the U.N. to effect a lasting peace, by the end of 1964, the situation in Cyprus had been stabilized. Life for the peacekeepers settled into a routine and, by 1969, the Canadian contingent was reduced to 480 personnel. Canadian forces rotated out every six months, and a tour of duty in Cyprus became standard practice for every Canadian soldier.

Minor disputes between Cypriots, as well as the alarmingly high rate of venereal disease among UNFICYP troops, represented the greatest problems facing the peacekeepers. Often the toughest decision facing Canadian troops was whether or



CYPRUS: Tanks roll through Nicosia, patrolling the 'Green Line.'
[Canadian Armed Forces]

not to spend the day at "Nipple Beach," a topless stretch of sand on the southern coast. At one point, the most serious diplomatic dispute centred around a crate of rancid sardines disposed of by the Canadian contingent and marked 'poison'. A Greek-Cypriot militia unit found the crate, interpreted 'poison' as being French for 'fish,' and consumed the contents. The illnesses suffered were a source of some strain between the Canadian peacekeepers and the local Greek military.

This torpid pattern was shattered during the summer of 1974. On June 15th, the military junta in power in Greece supported a coup that overthrew the Makarios government and installed a president who supported the unification of Cyprus with Greece. On July 20th, Turkey responded. An invasion force of 40,000 ground and air troops invaded northern Cyprus. The UNFICYP commander was instructed to minimize casualties, offer humanitarian support to civilians, and maintain a U.N. presence in the situation. Neither side in the dispute was inhibited by the U.N. banner and Canadian forces came under heavy fire in their command headquarters at a hotel in Nicosia.

When the final cease-fire went into effect August 18th, the Turks controlled forty percent of the country. The 'Green Line' was extended to cover the entire 180 km width of the island and effectively divided it into two distinct ethnic enclaves. Mass migration and repatriation was required to reach this end. The line now separates the Greek and Turkish republics—the former claiming to govern the entire country and the latter considering itself a distinct state.

Since the cease-fire, life for the peacekeepers has returned to the routine of the 1964 to 1974 period. Open hostility still exists between the two ethnic groups, but the presence of the UNFICYP troops keeps it in check. Today, as former Canadian Prime Minister Joe Clark prepares to mediate a new round of U.N.-sponsored negotiations designed to unite Cyprus, a three-month mission has become a thirty-year commitment and little has happened to improve relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In June, 1993, the Canadian government—arguing that not enough had been done to ensure a lasting solution and in the belief that it had done its part in keeping the peace—withdraw its commitment to UNFICYP and Canadian troops left the island.

Vietnam

The goals of Canada's peacekeeping mission in Vietnam stand in marked contrast to U.N. efforts in Cyprus. Canada did not enter the situation to keep the peace actively, but rather to oversee the execution of a peace treaty. The mission was not carried out under the auspices of the United Nations, but under

an independent supervisory commission. Canada was not expected to be an impartial observer to the peace, but rather to represent Western interests in the region.

When the 1954 Geneva peace conference was convened to discuss the end of the Korean War, the future of the French colonies in Indochina was also put forward for discussion. The French had regained control of these territories—which included present-day Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos—after the defeat of the Japanese that had ended the Second World War. France had hoped to maintain control of the colonies but nationalists in all three nations, as well as an emerging communist movement in Vietnam, rose up to challenge French dominance. Combined with France's war weariness in the early-1950s, these conditions left France looking for a way to withdraw from Indochina.

Agreements reached at Geneva in 1954 created the conditions for this withdrawal. In the case of Vietnam, the country was divided into two sections (North and South) and the International Control Commissions (ICC) were created to oversee the peaceful transfer of power in the region. The mandate of

the ICCs was to supervise the cease-fire agreement that had been reached in Geneva. Safe transport was to be provided for French troops and personnel leaving Indochina as well as for Vietnamese moving between the North (a 'communist' territory) and the South (a 'democratic' region). In addition, the ICCs were to monitor military arsenals and maintain them at 1954 levels. It was hoped that democratic elections for a unified Vietnamese government would take place by 1956.

The commissions were three-member bodies, with representatives of the West, the East, and a neutral third country. The parties to the Geneva agreements requested that Canada, Poland and India,

respectively, take part in the ICCs. Canada was not present at these discussions and, in fact, the Department of External Affairs learned of this request through its publication in the media. There were three separate commissions established—one each for Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. The ICCs for Cambodia and Laos were relatively small peacekeeping operations. By far the most significant commission, because of its involvement in a full-scale conflict, was the Vietnam ICC.

A "Partisan Peacekeeper"

The ICCs were divided into teams of observers, with representatives from each of the three participating nations. The role of these observers was to investigate any reported violations of the Geneva agreements. Canada began its membership on the ICC intending to be as impartial as the situation would allow. It soon became evident, however, that the Poles were examining every situation from a partisan, Cold War perspective. To



VIETNAM: Supervising and observing.
[Canadian Armed Forces]

counter-balance, Canada felt obliged to act as the spokesperson for Western interests in the region. A frustrated Department of External Affairs found that:

...an impartial approach on the part of Canadians combined with the partisan attitude of the Poles and the middle-of-the-road policy adopted by the Indians did not lead to just decisions. Since early 1955, there has been an increasing tendency in the Canadian Delegation to apply pressure against North Vietnam and to defend South Vietnam when it was considered [that] Commission action...was unduly harsh.

Canada's awkward position as a 'partisan peacekeeper' was exacerbated by the refusal of the United States to recognize the 1954 peace accords. The United States had moved to distance itself from the Geneva conference. The U.S.-backed Saigon government followed suit and refused to hold the 1956 elections—an act which prompted the North Vietnamese regime of Ho Chi Minh to do the same. It was the claim of both the South Vietnamese and the U.S. that the Viet Minh army—the northward repatriation of which the ICC was there to oversee—had left behind guerrilla troops (the Viet Cong) in


the South. It was this transgression of the Geneva accords, and the success of the guerrilla action, that was used to justify the build up of arms and U.S. troops in South Vietnam in the early 1960s.

Canadians were part of the ICC in Vietnam from 1954 to 1972. During that entire period, no more than 170 Canadian personnel served in the region and the average contingent during the height of the Vietnam War reached only 66 observers. Despite this small commitment of manpower and resources, Canada's involvement in Vietnam and its effect on relations with the United States became a focal domestic issue during the 1960s. It was understood from the outset that Canada was to represent Western interests on the ICC. Yet, controversy arose over whether Canada should be playing the role of 'partisan peacekeeper' at all. If they were not impartial, could they be effective in keeping the peace?

In 1967 a CBC report on Vietnam claimed that two copies of all ICC intelligence reports were made—one for Ottawa and one for Washington. Prime Minister Pearson moved quickly to diffuse these allegations:

Members of the Canadian delegation in Viet Nam are not engaged in clandestine or spying activities.

PEACEKEEPING: A CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE WORLD



[Canadian Armed Forces]



BOSNIA: Tending to the wounded.
[Canadian Armed Forces]

The Canadian delegation reports to the Canadian government and the Canadian government only; it is for the Canadian government to decide in the case of these reports...what use is to be made of them in the course of normal diplomatic exchanges with other countries.

In reality, Pearson did not deny the charges, he only deflected responsibility. The representatives on the ICC were doing nothing unethical. But, that was not to say that their reports did not wind up in the U.S. State Department anyhow.

The partisan nature of the supervisory force affected the ability of Canadian observers to carry out the work of the commission. The ICCs were dependent upon local governments for transportation from their permanent posts to the investigation sites. In North Vietnam, it was common for a jeep to be broken down or a bridge to be washed out when the ICC wanted to investigate an incident. In response, Canadians soon began to turn a blind eye to South Vietnamese violations, especially those concerning armaments.

In 1965, the seven ICC teams in North Vietnam were removed by the government, ostensibly because the North Vietnamese could not guarantee their security during American air raids. With a full-scale war in progress and neither side respecting the original peace accord, it soon became clear that the ICC was both ineffective and obsolete. In 1972, it was disbanded.

A Pale Blue Helmet

Peacekeeping is almost by definition a process doomed to failure. Peace will not be *made*, no matter how hard an international force strives to *keep* it, while the antagonists refuse to come to terms with each other. Officially, peacekeeping forces have no authority to intervene when hostilities break out. Their presence in any region is conditional on the approval of the parties involved, and can be revoked at any time. U.N. peacekeepers are caught more and more often in the crossfire of a region's chaos. They become one of the combatants, another faction in a particular conflict—sometimes unwillingly, sometimes willingly given their interests in a particular region.

The distinction between peacekeeper and peacemaker

should be kept in mind when evaluating peacekeeping missions both past and present. So too should the mandate of the peacekeeping mission—partisan or impartial, passive or active. For nearly 30 years, U.N. peacekeepers maintained peace on Cyprus. It was the failure of diplomatic efforts to find a lasting solution to the problem—and the recalcitrance of the Cypriots—that prolonged the need for peacekeeping.

Faced with constraints on their actions, it is not surprising that the lives of peacekeepers are constantly in danger and that international peacekeeping efforts are now regularly characterized as ineffective. As a Canadian Forces Major, in Cyprus in 1974, has remarked:

It is almost axiomatic that, if one is going to insist on flitting about a battlefield trusting in what security a pale blue helmet might provide, eventually, somewhere, somebody is going to get hurt.

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The Many Faces of Islamic Fundamentalism: A Profile of Egypt

Fundamentalist movements in Egypt are best known in the West for their violence and extremism. Yet, these movements represent only a visible minority of Egyptian fundamentalism as a whole. Other groups and organizations espouse very different, often more peaceful, methods to realize the goal of an Islamic state and society. Today, the intertwining of colonization, foreign influence, economic traumas, and the failure of secular governmental institutions to meet the needs of a changing population have combined to turn many moderate Egyptians towards fundamentalism.

By Nicholas Breyfogle

The very words “Islamic fundamentalism” strike fear into the heart of the Western world. They elicit images of deranged terrorists; of suicide bombers who explode themselves at thirty thousand feet along with any number of fellow travelers; of chanting and ranting street crowds; of world leaders such as the Ayatollah Khomeini who issued the celebrated death threat to writer Salman Rushdie; of tourists attacked and killed as they survey the pyramids; and of female university students forever scarred by acid thrown in their faces because they were not wearing a veil.

The bombing of New York’s World Trade Center in February of this year, combined with the more recently thwarted plot to explode the Lincoln and Holland tunnels along with the United Nations building, did little to change (and much to entrench) these impressions. With every denial of his involvement, Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman—blind from birth, his eyes disfigured with a whitish coating—looked every bit the part of the unbalanced muslim militant.

Currently a New Jersey resident in the hands of U.S. immigration, Sheik Omar was exiled from Egypt for his anti-government rhetoric and actions. He has been linked—although never conclusively—to a series of murders and killings that stretch back to the 1981 assassination of, then Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat. He is suspected to have issued the *fatwa*, or religious opinion, that spiritually sanctioned the killings not only of Sadat, but also of Egyptian Mustafa Shalabi in Brooklyn last year and of Farag Foda, an

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anti-fundamentalist Egyptian writer killed in his homeland in June of 1992. Moreover, it is believed that Sheik Omar has provided much of the religious justification for the recent rash of attacks on tourists in southern Egypt that have so damaged the country’s \$4 billion tourist industry.


Back in Egypt, the confrontation between fundamentalists and the state powers is on the rise—a conflict that has claimed more than 140 people in 1993 alone. In one week at the end of May, a bomb detonated outside a police station killing seven and wounding another twenty, another explosion sent five people into hospital, and two assaults on military installations were also reported. An immediate suspect for the latest violence was the Islamic Group (*Gamaa al-Ilamiya*). They are infamously credited with a long list of atrocities that includes a variety of attacks on tourist buses and boats, forays against the police, and a series of attempts on the lives of public officials, of which the failed assassination of information minister Safwat Sharif in April, 1993 is among the most recent.

The Egyptian government has fought back in recent months. During the spring, security forces led raids on suspected extremist strongholds in which hundreds of purported activists were killed, many more arrested, and others

still sentenced to death by military tribunals. Yet efforts on the part of the government to hold the extremists at bay appear to have only temporary affect.

The Faces of Fundamentalism

While the violent element of Muslim fundamentalism has currently taken center stage (and deservedly so, one cannot deny their existence nor their significance), many analysts are quick



[Electromap, Inc.]

to assert that the Islamic fundamentalist movement is not solely composed of extremists and terrorists. They point to a wide variety of other faces of Egyptian fundamentalism which, as a whole, provide a less extreme Islamic answer—faces whose numbers dwarf the relatively small and numerically marginal violent militants.

As professor Robert Bianchi recently argued in the journal *Current History*, there exists a “wide assortment of mainstream religious organizations that are pursuing various visions of an Islamic state through peaceful and legitimate means.” Mumtaz Ahmad, a political science professor at Virginia’s Hampton University, continues in this vein: “The most important thing to remember is that not all Islamic revivalist movements are fundamentalist, that not all fundamentalists are political activists, and that not all political activists are radicals.... There are very respectable Islamic fundamentalist movements in major Muslim societies that are part of the mainstream and part of the democratic electoral process, and that want to operate within a constitutional framework.”

These analysts affirm that aspects of fundamentalism hold an appeal for many secular Muslims. The fundamentalist movement in Egypt has its intellectual roots in a society whose cultural reference points and worldview originate from within a Muslim environment. While a state and society based upon Islamic law, custom and political practices may appear far-fetched to the Western mind, it is far from a foreign idea to even the most irreligious Egyptian citizen. Thus, there are many who are sympathetic to the fundamentalist cause while opposed to the extreme methods used by certain sects. That many citizens do support the application of at least some Islamic tenets in state practices is clear from recent inclusions of *Shari’a* law into Egyptian legal books. [The *Shari’a* is the name given to the compilation of Islamic law. It includes the teachings of the Qu’ran (the Muslim holy text), the *Hadith* (those traditions associated with Muhammed), and the *Sunna*

(customs, practices and practical inscriptions of how to live one’s life)].

Egypt and the Appeal of an Islamic Society

On the whole, Islamic fundamentalists in Egypt, as in other countries, assert that existing social and political structures are corrupt and unsound. Problems and deficiencies derive from a deviation from Islamic tenets and ways of life. Thus, as anthropologist Michael Gilson relays, for a lasting solution, fundamentalists desire that “the entire social order should be overthrown by the righteous and an Islamic state should be established.”

Specifically, the fundamentalists call for the recognition of God as the single source of power and legitimacy; the implementation of Islamic *Shari’a* law; a return to traditionally sanctioned forms of dress and social interaction; an end to interest charges; the stamping out of corruption; and, more recently, the cutting of ties to Israel with whom Egypt had begun a rapprochement in the late 1970s, as well as the end to the Western presence with its debt charges, hotels, bars, discos, and alcohol.

Many secular leaning Egyptians have turned increasingly to versions of the fundamentalist answer. They do so not solely out of faith, nor simply because Muslim leaders have been able to successfully paint an untested and untried Islamic state as a panacea. But, rather, they look to Islam out of frustration with the failures of the existing western style regime to provide basic necessities to the nation. As Mamoun Hodaibi, the 77 year old leader of the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood, has asserted: “Every time there is a crackdown, there is a period of calm. But until the social, political and economic problems of this country are addressed, the struggle and the violence will continue.”

Egypt faces ever worsening economic problems. Foreign debt stands at somewhere more than \$45 billion for a population of only 57 million. The country now imports approximately 70% of its food requirements. Remittances from Egyptians working abroad in oil producing countries have declined with the drop in oil prices. Millions are unemployed. A housing crisis grips the urban centers. It is a paradoxical crisis in which one in three people lacks adequate accommodation while there are some 100,000 to 150,000 unoccupied units in Cairo’s fancier sections—units that were quickly erected during the construction boom of the latter part of Anwar Sadat’s reign in the 1970s. On top of the economic crisis lies widespread government corruption. In a celebrated incident in the 1970s, a government minister used his position to establish a lucrative trade in illegal hashish to the tune of millions of dollars.

Muslim groups have often taken clearly defined actions to mitigate widespread hardships and bring services and aid to sections of the populace that the ineffectual and cumbersome bureaucracy cannot reach. Through the philanthropic infrastructure of the mosques, they have set up relief organizations,



The many faces of fundamentalism
[BC Pictures]


educational facilities, health clinics, and job training centers. "They are strong in my village," states a woman from the delta region. "Unlike the other parties, [the Muslim Brothers] work among people in the fields and take up real problems." In response to the October, 1992 earthquake in Cairo, another man cried: "The mosque is the only place we can turn to for help. Everyone else is corrupt."

The Inherent Unity of Church and State

While specific historical circumstances have often determined the course of Muslim fundamentalism in Egypt, an important component of its motive force comes directly from the general precepts and history of Islam itself. Jesus Christ is quoted as saying "render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's and unto God the things which are God's." With that sentence the basis for the Christian world's separation of Church and State was established. In Islam, however, no such distinction exists. From the birth of Islam, the church and the state were one and the same. Dictionaries of classical Arabic have no words for such common Western opposites as lay and ecclesiastical, sacred and profane, and spiritual and temporal.

Christianity grew up as an independent movement within the Roman Empire—a community within a state. However, as Bernard Lewis points out in his introduction to Gilles Kepel's *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*: "the Prophet Muhammed founded not only a community but also a policy, a society and a state, of which he was the sovereign. As sovereign, he commanded armies, made war and peace, collected taxes, dispensed justice and did all those things which a ruler normally does."

Islam ordered not only the spiritual life of the community but also its social and political lives. The *raison d'être* of the state structure was to "defend and promulgate God's faith and to uphold and enforce God's law." Muslim norms are applicable to all peoples and in all times. Each fundamentalist movement of today—and in fact each movement of the past approximately 1350 years—has looked back to the purity of the



Listening to the Friday sermon
[BC Pictures]

model society, to the short-lived "golden age" founded by Muhammed himself.

British Colonization and the Rise of the Muslim Brothers

When the British bombed the Egyptian port of Alexandria in 1882, Egypt became a full fledged British colony. The new possession served Britain—through the Suez Canal—primarily as an important link to British interests in India and the Far East. Nonetheless, the imperialists were quick to fully integrate Egypt into the flow of the British international economy.

British economic penetration of Egypt had significant impact on the colony's economic structure. On one hand, it served to enrich certain classes of Egyptians—notably the large landowners. On the other hand, it disrupted and displaced the traditional patterns of subsistence agriculture as well as the established trade systems. For example, cheaper textiles could be imported from European industry and, as a result, local textile manufacturers found themselves out of job. Farmers turned to cash crops from the traditional fare that had sustained the populace for centuries. Despite the benefits that accrued to portions of the Egyptian population, most suffered widespread social and economic dislocations while the majority found life to be increasingly unstable.

In the midst of the uncertain economic environment in the 1920s, and in the wake of the failures of the national independence movement (which had become tainted by collaboration with the imperial powers), grew the most long-standing and the most prominent of the modern Islamic fundamentalist groups in Egypt: the Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwan al-Musilman*).

Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brothers in 1928 had a simple message: "The Qu'ran is our constitution, and the Prophet is our leader.... Our programme is the Qu'ran, our programme is Islamic government.... When asked what it is you propagate, reply that it is Islam, the message of Muhammed, the religion that contains within it government. If you are told that you are political, answer that Islam admits no such distinction."

While the message of the Muslim Brothers was not new, their success was. Hassan al-Banna was a passionate speaker and an inspired organizer. He acted as the "General Guide" to a national network of cells, battalions, youth groups, philanthropic organizations for health and social welfare, labour camps, religious centers, schools, political activists, journals, and a secret organization (the paramilitary "Special Wing") for covert activities.

This bureaucracy, though tangled, was nevertheless remarkably effective in reaching the populace both with propaganda and with aid to those who the government had overlooked. But, the efficient organizational structure hid divisions within the movement as a whole. The official approach of the Muslim Brotherhood to creating an Islamic society was gradual and reformist. However, many were attracted to their message of Islamic renewal who had very different notions of the tactics required to succeed. An increasingly vocal fringe even called for violence.

The Muslim Brothers reached the apex of their power following World War II. The increased economic and social pressures that the war placed on an already hurting society sent many adherents their way. During the late 1940s, the Brotherhood itself became increasingly frustrated both by the denial of

the state powers to allow them to participate in the parliamentary system and by the ostentatious rule of King Farouk. Discontent reached its peak. Outbursts against foreign, un-Islamic symbols—bars, nightclubs, movie theaters, and department stores—became increasingly common. A prominent judge was assassinated. Strikes broke out in opposition to the British presence.

This rise in action by the combined forces of the nationalist and fundamentalist opposition movements was met with repercussions, arrests, and crackdowns from the Egyptian government. Undaunted, the Special Order killed the Prime Minister Mahmud Nuqrashi in 1948. In return, Hassan al-Banna himself was assassinated by the government's secret police. Unrest came to a climax in early 1952. British bulldozers and tanks had crushed a community of Egyptian mud houses to make way for a British water supply. When Egyptian police responded to what they considered an outrage, British troops shattered the police barracks, killing 50 and wounding over a hundred. The public reaction was "Black Saturday" in which 750 establishments were destroyed.

The Free Officer Revolution: The Fundamentalists Suppressed

When the military coalition of the Free Officers, including Gamal Abdel Nasser, came to power in 1952 (ousting the king, parliament and much of the British presence), the Muslim Brothers initially enjoyed a relative amount of freedom and toleration. The role that they had played in pre-revolutionary opposition movements was not forgotten by the Free Officers. However, relations between them quickly began to sour as the differences in their respective programs and goals became more and more apparent.

Nasser, recognizing the potential strength (and threat) of the fundamentalist movement, used a two-prong assault in order to assure that they did not disrupt the power of the Free Officers nor his plans to modernize and strengthen Egypt. On one hand, he ruthlessly quashed any signs of movement on the part of the Muslim Brothers. The Brotherhood had already been officially dissolved by the government on two separate occasions by the time one of its members (from the Special Wing) attempted to assassinate Nasser in 1954. A severe crackdown and arrests followed. Leaders were imprisoned, tortured, sent to concentration camps, and some executed. Their headquarters were razed to the ground and a propaganda barrage railed against their organization. The back of the Muslim Brothers, the last independent association in Egypt, was broken—permanently, so the Free Officers hoped.

On the other hand, in all government actions and speeches, Nasser was very conscious to accent Islamic practices and principles in order to buttress the legitimacy of his regime in the eyes of popular Islam. Some Free Officers even preached

Friday sermons in the mosques. In 1954, at the zenith of the conflict with the Muslim Brothers, Nasser made a pilgrimage to Mecca to show that despite his oppressive tactics against an Islamic organization, he was no less a Muslim than they. Later in 1954, the government founded the Islamic Congress to administer the relations (sometimes coercively) between the state and religious leaders. The *ulema* [Islamic religious clerics] were encouraged to point to the similarities between Islam and Nasser's brand of national socialism. Islamic scholars often provided the spiritual sanction for the policies of socialist nationalization.

Despite government efforts, neither the Muslim Brothers nor Muslim fundamentalism as a whole were definitively defeated. In the late 1960s, Nasser once again ran into problems with the resurgence of Islamicist movements. Muslim Brothers who had been released from their imprisonment were quick to return to their old patterns of preaching and grassroots organizing. Many were rapidly re-imprisoned.

The Muslim fundamentalist movement was profoundly altered by their experiences under Nasser. Never before had they experienced such oppression, and from Muslim Egyptians no less. The years in the concentration camps, facing the threat of torture and the gallows, hardened the fundamentalists deeply. It also provided them with the time and a segregated environment in which to develop new strategies for the successful implementation of an Islamic nation. When those surviving fundamentalists emerged from the camps in the 1970s, the movement was intrinsically split and many had moved towards the extreme.

Exit Nasser, Enter Sadat

The death of Nasser in 1970 ushered in deep-seated changes in government policy. Over the course of the 1970s, Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, moved Egypt from a quasi-socialist economic structure that relied on the Soviet Union and stressed unity with other Arab

nations to a free market system that looked to foreign investment and which integrated Egypt into the economy of the United States. With the Camp David Accords of 1978-79, Sadat brought about the beginnings of the normalization of relations with Israel after the 1973 war—a highly unpopular move in Egypt, but one designed to demonstrate commitment to the U.S.

Sadat's new economic orientation was known as the *infittah*. In retrospect, his policies brought inflation, high prices, American influence, quickly rising foreign debts, a culture of vulgar profiteering, a society that consumed more than it produced, and excluded the poorer classes. Western investors—given privileged status and incentives by the Egyptian government in the hope of attracting large amounts of foreign capital for development—in fact did little to develop the industrial or agricultural infrastructure. Instead, they focussed their



Nasser reaches out to his people
[BC Pictures]

attentions on the service and construction sectors where they could make a quick profit. Luxury hotels and apartments began to dot the Cairo skyline to service a clientele who were almost exclusively foreign. The rapidly enriched privileged Egyptian classes began a frenzy of consumerism and luxury that set in motion an ever spiralling foreign debt.

Sadat required justification for his drastic change of course and, like Nasser before him, he looked for it in the religious community—a tactic that both succeeded and failed. While a portion of the clerics were more than willing to provide spiritual blessing for his actions, another component—and one that became increasingly large as the 1970s progressed—vehemently opposed him. Unlike Nasser who pandered to popular Islam while keeping a tight lid on the fundamentalist organizations, Sadat began by pandering to all Islamic groups irrespective of their potential threat.

Sadat legalized religious parties and organizations. He expanded the Qu'ran radio station which played excerpts from the Qu'ran and theological commentary. All radio and television programming was briefly stopped for the five-times-daily call to prayer. The amount of religious instruction in schools was increased. Sadat was called the “pious president” and was widely publicized going to a different mosque every Friday. As a sign of goodwill, he released many activist fundamentalists from Nasser's concentration camps.

Fundamentalism Split, Extremism on the Rise

At the changeover of leadership, the Muslim Brothers—scarred by their experiences with oppression—looked, acted, and believed very differently. The older fundamentalist oppositionists quickly came to welcome Sadat's initially more moderate regime. They worked for accommodation with the government and embraced the hope of changing the regime from within. The Muslim Brothers, led by Hasan al-Hudaybi, and their monthly magazine *al-Da'wa*, took the accommodationist, constitutional point of view. They did not alter their beliefs or deny their goal of instituting an Islamic society. But, they strove to attain their goals through non-violent, reformist, and parliamentary means. They argued that they should be “preachers, not judges.”

For others, the more moderate path had yielded little fruit and, instead, much pain. The tendency to look to the extreme was enhanced. The belief that there could be no compromise between the Islamic world and the Egyptian government as it then stood was becoming increasingly more entrenched. These

were two mutually exclusive societies and sets of beliefs. Sadat aide Mohamed Heikal explains in his book on the assassination of the President that “as the *infatih* developed, bringing in its wake foreign influences, vulgar ostentation and materialist values, [fundamentalists] felt more than ever convinced of the justice of their cause.”

The structure of the Muslim Brothers' formerly cogent and efficient organization was fractured into multiple parts. New organizations and sects grew up, each with their own modus operandi. As Gilles Kepel eloquently relates: one group, led by Shukri Mustafa, “preached *'uzla*, or withdrawal from society, as a means of avoiding the horror of the camps and gallows [and of demonstrating their opposition to the regime]. Others took the road of political commitment in a multitude of ways, either collaborating with the regime in an

attempt to Islamicize it or entering the world of politics as a sort of opposition, in the hope of avoiding, partly through ties to the regime itself, the spectre of torture and extermination. Still others organized for the forcible seizure of power, hoping that next time they would be able to act before the state could strike back.” A final group of fundamentalists took to preaching—using the pulpit as a means to verbally critique the failings of the existing government and spreading their words to increasingly larger audiences through cassette and now video recordings.

Fundamentalism in the Universities

Under Sadat, the universities became hotbeds of Islamic thought and action. Students were encouraged by the regime to organize Islamic student associations (*jama'at islamiyya*) as a counter balance to leftist/Nasserite groups (who opposed Sadat's western leaning policies). Almost overnight, however, the Islamic student groups turned to bite the hand that fed them. The associations espoused the need to return to the “golden-age of Islam” where society was ruled by “rightly guided” leaders. Specifically, they forcefully challenged the government's rapprochement with Israel and its ties to the United States. The regime responded with harassment and repression as Sadat found that his lenient policies vis-à-vis Islam were not producing the desired results.

It should not be surprising that the universities became loci of Islamic opposition to the regime. The university system at this time (and today as well) left much to be desired. Universities were under-staffed and over-studented. The infras-



*Mohammed Hosni Mubarak: twelve years of emergency rule
[Egyptian Embassy, Ottawa]*

structure was highly lacking—it was not uncommon that two if not three students would share the same chair in a lecture. While education was ostensibly provided gratis by the government, students often found themselves having to pay huge sums out of pocket to attend special tutorials held by the professors before the decisive end of year exams. For the professors, such tutorials were their only means to stay alive on the government salary. For the students, it was the sole way to obtain the information that they would need for the final exam. Students of anatomy found themselves required (if they wanted to pass) to pay exorbitant fees in order to acquire (illegally) a freshly buried corpse for dissection. Perhaps the most devastating aspect of the university system was the lack of jobs awaiting students if they could, in fact, extricate themselves successfully from the confusion.

Jama'at confronted issues that affected all students whether they were sympathizers of the fundamentalist cause or not—a fact that brought the *jama'at* wide support.

Women had increasingly become a part of public life in a society that did not have the infrastructure to accommodate such changes. Sharing seats, as well as the crowded buses that students took to school, were sites where a female student was compromised and often harassed. *Jama'at* set up a minibus service that would transport women to and from the campus in the hopes of avoiding assaults on their dignity and modesty. The shuttle system was an instant success and demand quickly outstripped supply. It soon became common that a woman would have to dress in “Islamic fashion” (veil, gloves, long dress or robe) in order to use the buses. Many women, whether Islamic sympathizers or not, did take up the dress to avoid public transportation. The same was also true in university buildings. *Jama'at* found a great deal of support from female students tired of having to fight to preserve their dignity for their demands to segregate genders in the classroom by row.

In response to the tutorial sessions that emptied the pockets of students and their families, *jama'at* began revision sessions at local mosques. There, students could, in peace and quiet, pour over lecture manuals that the *jama'at* had reproduced at the Student Union for free.

Sadat Assassinated, Mubarak in the 1990s

One of the extreme fundamentalist groups that grew up during the Sadat years from the legacy of the Muslim Brothers was *al-jihad*, or Sacred Combat. It was one of this group's adherents who was the celebrated assassin of Sadat in October, 1981. His words, “I am Khalid al-Islambuli, I have killed Pharaoh, and I do not fear death,” were recorded and broadcast throughout the Islamic world. For many, this sentence represented a relief to finally be rid of Sadat. For others, it was call to battle, the echo of which has yet to fade.



One of the fundamentalists' hated Western hotels, in Cairo [BC Pictures]

Hosni Mubarak, Sadat's vice-President and successor, has taken an approach to the fundamentalist problem that stands closer to Nasser than Sadat. He has kept Egypt in a state of emergency for his entire rule and used the special powers that it gives him to crack down quickly and forcefully on all forms of opposition. He has channeled almost unprecedented support in the direction of the military in order to ensure their support. Like Nasser, he has struck at the heart of fundamentalist organizations while playing up to popular Islam. A huge new, neon green billboard displaying “Allah” sits atop the headquarters of the ruling National Democratic Party. Official statements now refer to Mubarak by his full, religious name: Mohammed Hosni Mubarak. Stated Judge Ashmawy: [The government] are trying to outbid [the fundamentalists] for Islamic support, just like some kind of auction.”

Mubarak has been successful up to now in keeping a lid on an increasingly boiling pot. But his policies are making him enemies from even the most moderate of Islamic groups. They criticize his reliance on undemocratic, coercive measures to keep his government in power. The recent hanging of an Islamic extremist, the first of 22 such death sentences, has left many dismayed with the brutality. They are further frustrated by an ever worsening economy (this despite U.S. aid of \$30 billion over the last 12 years) and what they consider to be the corruption and ineptitude of Mubarak's regime. In comparison, the Islamic answer appears promising.

Moreover, events in other Islamic countries have led Egyptian fundamentalists further down the extremist path. In recent Algerian elections, the fundamentalist party won the majority of votes for the parliament. Despite this, however, the military stepped in, instituting emergency powers, and denied the elected members the places that they had won. Such actions have made it clear to many fundamentalists in Egypt that the parliamentary road yields no fruit even if electoral victory is achieved. In Bosnia, Egyptians see Muslims killed by Christians as Europe and the United States looks on; in India, they see Hindus murdering Muslims; and they see U.S. bombings of Iraq and Somalia with little international reaction. In their eyes, the Western world seems bent on stamping out Islamic societies. Fundamentalists increasingly believe they must react in kind.

Suggestions for Further Reading

- Robert Bianchi, “Islam and Democracy in Egypt,” in *Current History* (February, 1989)
- Michael Gilsean, *Recognizing Islam: Religion and Society in the Modern Arab World*. (Pantheon Books, 1982).
- Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, *Contemporary Islam and the Challenge of History*. (State University of New York Press, 1982)
- Mohamed Heikal, *Autumn of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat* (Andre Deutsch, 1983).
- Derek Hopwood, *Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1984*. (Allen & Unwin, 1985).
- Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples*. (The Belknap Press, 1991).
- Gilles Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh*. (University of California Press, 1985).
- Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of Muslim Brothers*. (Oxford University Press, 1969)

American Internationalism In The Twentieth Century: The Search For a "New World Order"

With the end of the Cold War and the fragmentation of the former Soviet Union, the architects of American foreign policy are faced with a less dangerous, but perhaps more complex arena in which to act. As foreign policy experts propose varying objectives and levels of American engagement in a world no longer marked by the relative simplicity of a bipolar struggle, it is useful to consider the general principles upon which American policymakers have acted over the last century, as well as the cultural beliefs, and economic and political necessities that have stood at the foundation of those principles. [Part one of a two-part series].

By Mark Meier

New Problems and Old Patterns


Since George Bush took the Oath of Office in January of 1989, many of the seemingly eternal truths underlying America's foreign policy have been cast aside. Dramatic events worldwide, most importantly the demise of the Soviet Union and its grip over eastern Europe, confront the Clinton administration with a paradoxical position. On the one hand, American policymakers may look back on the past five decades with a degree of triumph, as the plan of containing the spread of Soviet influence has been realized. On the other hand, this very triumph has undone what former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger has called the "*sanctas simplicitas*" of the Cold War, and in the process has spawned a new set of foreign policy problems.

Conflict with the Soviet Union, whether hot or cold, no longer looms over American foreign policy. But, by the same token, it no longer provides a defining mission for American policymakers. Current problems in former Yugoslavia, Eastern Europe, the former Soviet republics and East Asia as well as recent conflicts in Iraq and Somalia now vex America's foreign policy architects. Celebration over America's "victory" in the Cold War has quickly given way to new doubts and debates over America's global role and responsibilities.

As the Clinton administration searches for a foreign policy suitable to a "new world order," the themes and patterns of American diplomacy over the last century help to demarcate the framework and parameters within which they will act. Two significant shifts have occurred in this nation's basic approach to relations with the rest of the world. In the first of these shifts, leading to, and drawing momentum from, the Spanish-American War, the United States moved from nearly complete isolation to more active engagement as the twentieth century began. A curious blend of moralism and economic

self-interest provided the philosophical underpinning for this involvement. Woodrow Wilson raised the mission of American diplomacy to a near-messianic level in World War I. Moreover, while U.S. foreign policy in the 1920s and 1930s reflected a degree of withdrawal from Wilsonian zeal and activism, there was still a concerted attempt to further the economic interests of America.

The second of these shifts (which will be discussed more fully in the second installment of this series) occurred as a result of World War II and the rise of Soviet power. While maintaining the fundamental combination of moral and economic motives for engagement, the U.S. moved toward significantly broader, more complex, and more formal ties with a variety of nations—all aimed at checking the power of communism in general and the Soviet Union in specific. New battle lines were drawn even before the smoke of World War II had cleared, and American foreign policy was dominated for



U.S. activity in Central America and the Caribbean in the early 20th century. [Electromap, Inc.]

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the next four decades by the need to contain the Soviet Union.

The overarching result of these transitions has been to steadily increase the level of American engagement in world affairs. Defense budgets and foreign aid programs have risen steadily since the end of World War II. Whether post-Cold War policy should maintain or decrease this level of engagement is a focal point of current debate. As such, the question of how the Clinton administration should utilize the "peace dividend" made available by the Cold War's end is clouded by new crises and the continuing influence of moral and economic motives for engagement.

The Gulf War neatly encapsulates these issues. The Bush administration's policy demonstrated a blend of old values and potential new methods. U.S. intervention was defended on both moral grounds (you may choose here between the defense of a democratic government in Kuwait, which is difficult for some critics to swallow, or the upholding of international rule of law by punishing Iraq's aggression against its weaker neighbor) and economic grounds (the strategic importance of the Gulf region, based on its oil reserves, has been a linchpin of U.S. foreign policy for decades). At the same time, however, the multi-lateral nature of action against Iraq—including the support of our former enemies—represents a clear break with the past.

It would seem that we may be at the threshold of a third historic shift in America's foreign policy. Actions in Somalia, the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet republics may one day be regarded by historians as the defining moments of this shift. But for now, no clear principles or patterns for the conduct of foreign policy have yet emerged. In the absence of a clearly-defined new direction, an understanding of older patterns is essential, as they will certainly continue to exert influence on American international activity.

In The Beginning . . . Isolation

Throughout the nineteenth century, America was able to deal with the rest of the world (meaning principally Europe) at its discretion. In practice this meant very little involvement at all. For a variety of reasons, Americans were willing and able to ignore the world arena. The Monroe Doctrine, proclaimed by President James Monroe in 1823, offered a basis in principle for American isolation.


Monroe declared that European powers should no longer pursue colonies in the Western hemisphere, effectively roping off the Americas as the United States' sphere of influence. In return, Monroe pledged that the United States would not intervene in the affairs of Europe. The relative peace prevailing in Europe from Napoleon's defeat in 1815 to the early twentieth century ensured that America could uphold her end of the Monroe Doctrine. The nations of Europe focused their colonial aspirations on Africa and Asia while Latin American colonies were left to gain their independence throughout the century.

It is convenient, and at least partially accurate, to claim that the United States' entrance upon the world stage at the end of the nineteenth century was spurred by the completion of territorial expansion across the North American continent. The isolation of the U.S. had been compounded by Americans' inward-directed attention to economic development and domestic expansion, and to the resolution of their sectional dispute in a bloody civil war (1861-1865). By the early 1890s America was a rising industrial power and the American frontier, which had moved steadily westward throughout the century, was considered "closed."

By the end of the decade, America had fought Spain in its first war against a European power (albeit a power in decline) in eighty years. In victory, America unlocked new frontiers and opportunities beyond its shores. If we see the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century as a nation entering young adulthood, then the Spanish-American War and its consequences may be seen as America's first full-scale foray into the adult world of foreign affairs and power politics.

From Isolation to Empire

Many explanations have been offered for America's decision to go to war with Spain in 1898. The ostensible reason for American involvement was to uphold the Monroe Doctrine and to end the Spanish hold on its increasingly restless colonies in the Caribbean, particularly Cuba. Attempts at a peaceful settlement seemed to offer some promise, but the sinking of the U.S. warship *Maine* in Havana harbor provided an American press and Congress apparently hungry for war with reason enough to drive the Spanish out of the Americas once and for all. There was little evidence implicating the Spanish in this act of sabotage. Nonetheless, so



The end of isolation: public viewing of the Spanish-American War (1898) [Metro Toronto Reference Library]

many Americans (for nearly as many reasons) wanted the U.S. to intervene that President William McKinley, it seemed, had little choice.


Moral and ideological motives as well as economic interests were critical components in arguments for U.S. intervention. Spain represented not only the old imperial, non-democratic order but also, because of its protected colonial markets, an obstacle to U.S. free trade. Nevertheless, the critical factor may have been a simple matter of timing. America intervened against Spain not only for moral or economic reasons, but also because it *could* intervene, having matured to the point where it could effectively assert its will. The consequences of this course of action were, to a degree, unanticipated by American policymakers at the time, but they were to leave a permanent mark on the conduct of foreign affairs.

In the course of liberating Cuba, the United States also gained control over the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam. America, a young nation rapidly growing in economic stature, now possessed more of the trappings of "adult" life—overseas territories. A quasi-missionary impulse, founded on the premise that the American way of life was supreme and worthy of export, provided one motive for acquiring these territories, as America took on the mission of preparing their inhabitants for liberal democracy.

This missionary motive was not universally shared among Americans, however, as there were objections on moral and racist grounds. Some Americans believed that their country's



'El gigante del norte' (*The Giant of the North*). [Critical] A Latin American view of Uncle Sam's 'dollar diplomacy.'



'The Rights of Small Nations: Haiti.' [Good Morning, 1921] A negative look at American occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934.

actions were antithetical to democracy, bordering on imperialism. The U.S. decision to annex Spain's former possessions threatened (as the 1899 platform of the American Anti-Imperialist League claimed) to "extinguish the spirit of 1776 in those islands." Other critics, less concerned with the sovereignty of Filipinos, Puerto Ricans, *et al.*, argued that America could never prepare these non-whites for self-government. While such criticisms were never completely addressed by American policymakers, President McKinley, in response to the anti-imperialists and in accordance with his own anti-imperial tendencies, promised to give autonomy to the newly acquired lands (especially Cuba) as soon as possible.

A New Empire

Having set a new, more aggressive tone for American diplomacy in its war with Spain, the United States embarked upon a pattern of intervention in Latin America by which it fully earned the label *gigante del norte* (as well as other, less innocuous names). In addition to annexing Puerto Rico (and later portions of the Virgin Islands), the U.S. intervened in Mexico, Honduras, Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, and supported a Panamanian rebellion against Colombia which resulted in U.S. possession of the Canal Zone.

Control of the Philippines also heightened U.S. interest in East Asia, particularly the potentially limitless marketplace of China (which has tantalized Western nations for centuries). American pursuit of an "Open Door" to economic activity in Asia, and its rather forceful claim-staking in Latin America were early harbingers of the long-term patterns of American diplomacy.

The motives involved in this unprecedented expansion are critical to understanding the policy of subsequent decades. The dominant set of ideas held by makers of American foreign policy at this time has been labeled the "New Empire." The proponents of this "New Empire" exhibited a seamless and inseparable combination of moral/ideological motivations and economic considerations. Capitalism and free trade were as much a part of the unique superiority of America as its democratic government. The strength and health of each depended upon expansion. This expansion was not, however, to be accomplished through the "Old World" method of brute imperialism, but would depend largely upon free trade.

This emphasis on economics would give rise to one of the principal criticisms of American foreign policy in the first decades of the twentieth century. Some critics saw in America's search for an "Open Door" in Asia and stable markets in Latin America a disproportionate influence of business interests, and attacked such policies as "dollar diplomacy." To Europeans, American policy seemed hypocritical. It appeared that the "New Empire" wanted the benefits of colonialism without the burdens. Nonetheless, the "New Empire's" advocates prevailed. The rise of these ideas, combined with the new-found power that permitted America to act on them, marked the birth of American internationalism. In the crucible of World War I, Woodrow Wilson would give this internationalism its most emphatic expression, leaving an indelible mark on American diplomacy.

Woodrow Wilson and the American Mission

Wilson came to the White House in 1912 with little experience in foreign affairs. This is not to say, however, that he did not have an interest in defining America's role in the world. Wilson's policies, both domestic and foreign, were built upon a very basic set of assumptions—a combination of his deeply-felt religious beliefs and his optimistic view of man and society. America, Wilson felt, was politically, socially, and morally unique. With this uniqueness, however, came a heavy responsibility.

Arthur Link, the foremost Wilson historian of our time, paraphrases Wilson's sense of this mission as "advancing democracy and the cause of human rights throughout the world . . . [in serving] mankind through leadership in moral purposes and in advancing peace and world unity." For Wilson, just as for the "New Empire" advocates who preceded him, free trade would serve a critical role in accomplishing these goals. This mission was the fundamental underpinning of Wilsonian inter-

nationalism. It would influence several generations of U.S. foreign policy architects, ultimately to rise to the spotlight in the post-World War II era as the premise for America's Cold War with the Soviet Union.

In spite of Wilson's conviction that the U.S. bore a unique responsibility to the world, he strained to preserve U.S. neutrality throughout the first three years of World War I. This was in part due to the power of precedent. Both George Washington's farewell warning to avoid entangling alliances and the Monroe Doctrine stood as barriers to U.S. involvement in European affairs. Added to this were Wilson's own pacifism and distaste for the "corruption" of European power politics. In the decade and a half prior to the war, the United States had involved itself internationally, particularly in China and Latin America, but had always done so on its own terms, refusing to become enmeshed in the alliance structures which eventually gave rise to World War I.

Historians have noted, with some justification, that the neutrality practiced by America from 1914 to 1917 tended to favor the Allies. Leaving aside the question of whether this was intentional or not, it is clear that the combination of moral and economic motives that marked Wilsonian internationalism strongly influenced the conduct of American neutrality. To Wilson, the autocracies in Germany and Austria-Hungary represented the worst of Europe's corruptions. They were clear enemies of the liberal democratic world order which America represented. Compounding this—and one of the key reasons for America's eventual entry into the war—was Germany's campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare. Wilson regarded the attacks as a damning breach of international law and interference with free trade.

America's economic ties to Western Europe also complicated the issue of neutrality. In 1914, U.S. trade with the Allies (principally Great Britain and France) totaled \$825 million. By 1917, just prior to U.S. entry into the war, this trade had grown to \$3.5 billion. In that same period, American trade with Germany dwindled from \$170 million to \$1.7 million, due in large part to the British blockade of Germany. The increase of trade with the Allies (which represents their arming by American industry) combined with the willingness of the U.S. to tolerate the restriction of trade with Germany, while condemning Germany's interference with free trade, is a clear indication of American economic priorities. It was not without some basis in fact that many opponents of America's entry into the war claimed that the decision was driven by business inter-



"A Fair Field and No Favor." [Harper's Weekly, 1899]
Uncle Sam: "commerce, not conquest."

ests, blasting it as the culmination of “dollar diplomacy.”

While there was a grain of truth in these accusations, it does not do justice to the magnitude of Wilson’s decision, which was both agonizing and unprecedented. To justify this full-fledged and costly involvement in world affairs, both to himself and to the American people, Wilson portrayed American involvement as a moral crusade, the climax of America’s mission to the world. His impassioned words and actions suggest that he truly saw the situation in this way. The crusade would bring about the peace and stability necessary to foster liberal democracy and free trade throughout Europe and eventually the globe. In short, this was to be the “war to end all wars.”

America’s Victory, Wilson’s Defeat

When Wilson arrived in Europe in December of 1918 to personally usher in the new world order that he had both envisioned and promised, he was greeted by cheering crowds who seemed to want desperately to believe in his vision. Behind the exuberance of this welcome, however, lay a shattered

Europe which would pose tremendous obstacles to Wilson’s plan. Besides the nearly 40 million casualties (including over 8 million dead), economic hardship and political chaos threatened the nations of Europe. The Austro-Hungarian empire had disintegrated, the Kaiser had abdicated in Germany, and Russia was rocked by the Bolshevik Revolution and ensuing civil war.

In an address to Congress in January of 1918, ten months before the armistice, Wilson outlined his plan for peace and the rehabilitation of Europe. The famous “Fourteen Points” presented in that speech are the most explicit articulation of the priorities of Wilsonian internationalism. In addition to promising autonomy and national self-determination to the peoples of Eastern Europe (including Russia) and the Balkans, and a call



Woodrow Wilson, 1856-1924. [Cartoons, 1912]

for disarmament, Wilson demanded “the removal...of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions” and the creation of “a general association of nations.” It was over this last point that Wilson fought the political battle which proved to be his undoing.

Wilson proposed the formation of a League of Nations, which would act multilaterally to uphold international law. American opposition to the League was generally based on the suspicion that, by committing unreservedly to carrying out the decisions of the League, the U.S. would lose its prerogative to make its own foreign policy choices. Fresh in the minds of many Americans was the way in which alliance systems had irresistibly dragged the nations of Europe into a disastrous World War which no one seemed to have wanted. Also

imprinted in many Americans’ minds was the idea that Europe was a “tar baby” best left to its own devices. While some of these fears were exaggerated, they were sufficient to stymie Wilson’s plan for peace. Two years after his triumphant arrival in Europe, Wilson, physically crippled by a stroke, had seen his ideas repudiated, and his party was decisively defeated in the presidential election of 1920.

Americans had been willing to carry out the demands of Wilsonian internationalism up to a point, but the end of the war had dimmed the missionary zeal which Wilson’s plan for peace demanded. One should not underestimate the symbolic importance of the 1920 presidential triumph of Warren Harding and his promise of “normalcy.” The urge to withdraw from international activism in the wake of the war was nearly irresistible. However, although conventional wisdom tends to regard the 1920s and early 1930s as a period of isolationism, one might just as well be impressed by the continued level of engagement which American foreign policymakers were able to sustain in such an atmosphere.

Muted Internationalism in the 1920s and 1930s


Americans’ refusal to participate in the League of Nations signaled a preference for the traditional American practice of acting unilaterally in world affairs, unbounded by alliances or security agreements. This return to form was a setback to Wilsonian internationalism. Nevertheless, an internationalist foreign policy was still pursued in less formalized ways, again reverting primarily to economic means. As such, historians often refer to the diplomacy of this period as “conservative” or “independent” internationalism.

America offered substantial (although in the end insufficient) financial assistance to both the victors and the vanquished in the post-war period, trying in more limited ways to nudge Europe along the course Wilson had charted. In addition, the perennial concern over open, stable markets in Asia and Latin America persisted throughout the 1920s and 1930s. The Republican presidents of the 1920s, acting as overseers of an enormous post-war economic boom, turned away from the crusading diplomacy of Wilson, preferring instead to rely on the less demanding ways of “dollar diplomacy.”

Coinciding with the American economic boom of the 1920s was a growing economic interdependence throughout the world, of which U.S. policymakers seemed somewhat unaware. Following the crash of 1929 and the onset of the world-wide depression, the U.S. withdrew to a position of economic nationalism. They preferred to expend capital, both economic and political, on problems within America’s borders. This inward attention reduced the events in Europe in the 1930s—including the rise to power of fascist governments in Italy and Germany, the Spanish Civil War, and Soviet purges and collectivization—to an easily ignored, distant threat.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, whose ability to sense the mood of the American electorate was unparalleled among U.S. presidents, steered a course of neutrality throughout the 1930s primarily because his constituents demanded a higher priority for cushioning the blow of the depression. Critics of Roosevelt, among both his contemporaries and later generations, have often failed to take into account the enormous obstacle that the economic downturn posed to a more active foreign policy. The popular mood as well as the mood of Congress

RELATIVE VALUE OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, 1925-29



[Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, *The United States in the World Economy* (Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 28.]

favored strict neutrality. Nevertheless, in the interpretation and implementation of foreign policy, Roosevelt was able to use his discretionary powers to the benefit of the allies.

As the actions of Germany, Italy, and Japan grew more bold and threatening in the late 1930s, Roosevelt was able to shape America's official policy of neutrality such that the U.S. became the "arsenal of democracy," arming its future allies for nearly three years before its entry into war. Without offering an apology for Roosevelt's handling of foreign policy in the 1930s, it seems fair to say that he was caught in the classic dilemma of American presidents, walking a fine line between heeding the desires of the electorate and leading it.

Internationalism: How Easily Discarded?

There are several themes, arising in recent discussions of America's post-Cold War policy options, which are interesting to consider in light of its foreign policy in the first four decades of this century. Most recent commentators have suggested some degree of withdrawal from earlier commitments, but the degree of this withdrawal is hotly contested. If we choose to view our current situation as roughly similar to the immediate post-World War I period, this retrenchment seems a natural reaction and falls within the parameters of past American isolationism and inward looking policies. In addition, given the economic difficulties which the U.S. is facing, a sense of economic nationalism akin to that found in the Great Depression is also not unexpected.

But internationalism is not so easily discarded. Even as current commentators have spoken of retrenchment and of investing the "peace dividend" at home, many have also articulated the long-standing American desire to continue to reshape the world in its image. The "messianic" fight against despots continues to rage in such areas as Iraq, Somalia and former Yugoslavia where Americans continue to struggle to "make the world safe for democracy." Moreover, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics, now painfully discarding the com-

mand economies which functioned for over forty years, are favorite targets for a new generation of "dollar diplomats." Although policy proposals today tend to sound more pragmatic than Wilson's idealistic promises, there is still considerable support for an economic crusade to stabilize the development of free markets (and consequently liberal democracy) in these areas.

The precedents and patterns of American foreign policy in the multi-polar world of 1900 to 1941—the growth of internationalism to its Wilsonian peak followed by muted internationalism driven by moral and economic motives—are very instructive. But they do not tell the whole story of American internationalism in the twentieth century. As I will discuss in the second installment of this essay, American foreign policy in the Cold War era was marked by the resurgence of a Wilsonian brand of near-messianic internationalism. Unprecedented levels of overseas commitments resulted in costly interventions in Korea and Vietnam and lesser actions world-wide.

The legacy of Cold War foreign policy and, thus, the importance of understanding both halves of this story is underscored by the still-volatile situation in the former Soviet Union. With every challenge to Yeltsin, the minds of some American policymakers quickly turn back to the framework of antagonistic communism and the patterns of the Cold War, which offer a simple way of understanding a very complex world.

Suggestions For Further Reading

There are several first-rate overviews of American diplomacy in the twentieth century. One of the most interesting, because it is written by one of the principal architects of America's Cold War policies, is George Kennan's *American Diplomacy* (1951, revised and expanded in 1984). Also of interest is volume one of Kennan's *Memoirs* (1967), which covers his early years as a diplomat. For a highly critical view of American foreign policy, see William Appleman Williams' *Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (1959).

Walter LaFeber's *The New Empire* (1963) is a good survey of America's war with Spain and rise to world power, while Lester Langley's *The Banana Wars* (1983) is a newer history of U.S. "dollar diplomacy" in Latin America.

A brief, sympathetic introduction to Wilson is Arthur Link's *Woodrow Wilson: War Revolution, and Peace* (1979), while N. Gordon Levin's *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics* (1968) offers a longer discussion.

L. Ethan Ellis' *Republican Foreign Policy, 1921-1933* (1953) is an old, reliable introduction to the diplomacy of the twenties. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, former editor of *Foreign Affairs* and card-carrying Wilsonian, has left behind an interesting view of America's inter-war diplomacy in his memoirs, *Peace and Counterpeace: From Wilson to Hitler* (1971).

The best place to begin a study of Franklin Roosevelt's foreign policy is Robert Dallek's *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945* (1979), although Robert Divine's *The Reluctant Belligerent* (1979) is also a good, if more brief, study.

What Makes Wetlands "Wet?"

Understanding the Disputes Over Wetlands

"Twenty Democratic House members, led by Billy Tauzin (D-LA), urged President Clinton to convene a summit to reform federal wetlands policies. The legislators, in a letter to Clinton, said: 'We have heard from our constituents that the regulatory program has caused severe hardships and has greatly diminished their property values. ... [A summit] could generate sound measures for accomplishing the goals of wetland protection.' Pam Goddard from the Sierra Club said she would not object to such a forum, provided it was not restricted to those who think that federal wetland regulations are too stringent. 'These members are saying wetland protection is going too far when, in fact, we are still losing 300,000 acres of wetlands every year.'" (*New Orleans Times-Picayune*, 2/25/93).

By Caryl Waggett

The Thorny Side of Wetland Protection

Over the last several years, widespread attention has been given to wetlands. Having earned a reputation as one of the most valued and most threatened ecosystems, an intense dispute now rages over the extent of wetlands protection. On one side, environmentalists call for strict preservation of what they consider to be an exceptionally valuable resource. They point to the fact that the number of wetlands in existence in the contiguous United States is half of what was once documented. On the other side, developers, farmers, politicians and private citizens, while agreeing that wetlands must be protected, assert that the existing legislation has gone overboard, leaving too much land guarded. They are often miffed at the regulations that hold them back from utilizing natural resources to their maximum extent.

Recently, the debate has been brought to the forefront by the Congressional subcommittee hearings on the re-authorization of the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act (more commonly known as the Clean Water Act or CWA). While the Clean Water Act does not specifically address the issue of wetlands, for the past twenty years it has provided the guidelines by which wetlands have been administered. The CWA—which lays down maximum allowable levels of effluent dumping and thermal pollution in the nation's different water bodies—is likely to be the first environmental act re-authorized by the Clinton administration. Activists (from all sides of the environmental fence) are using this opportunity to take up the soapbox and vent their feelings, hoping to set the tone for future environmental debates, such as the not too distant re-

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authorization of Superfund.

Disputes over wetlands have brought out a Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde split personality in the public at large—a schizophrenia that is a common refrain around many environmental issues. Apparently, most people feel that wetlands are a valuable ecosystem and require some protection. However, when an extension to a house cannot be added on because of wetland regulations or when farmers discover that they are unable to expand their tillable land, the regulations are quickly challenged as too restrictive.

So, What is A Wetland?

Wetlands as an ecosystem are as diverse as people: salt water tidal marshes, river flood plain zones, prairie potholes, cypress swamps, red maple swamps, bogs, and moors. Generally speaking, wetlands are defined as "a habitat that is inundated or saturated with water for a long enough time during the growing season to support hydrophytic vegetation." Hydrophytic vegetation refers to two types of plants: plants




A New England hardwood swamp during early spring showing the extent of flooding. [Caryl Waggett]

that have developed adaptations to survive periodic anoxia (lack of oxygen) due to water saturation of both the soil and the plants' roots, and also plants that can exist equally well in saturated as well as normal environments, but which must modify their morphology (physical appearance and structure) in order to survive the periods of saturation.

Despite this definition, however, most wetland scientists agree that the delineation of what constitutes a wetland is problematic. In many ways "wetlands" is a misnomer of the worst kind. A wetland does not need to have standing water on the surface to be a wetland, nor to have water on the surface each year. There are often no clear boundaries between habitat types. Some people do not even consider wetlands to be a unique habitat in their own right, but rather a "half-way world between terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems that exhibit some of the characteristics of each." Yet, not all wetlands fall between aquatic and upland ecosystems (many are low points within an otherwise "terrestrial" habitat). Nevertheless, the concept of a spectrum of wetland types is particularly descriptive and provides some basis for understanding the extreme difficulty that scientists have encountered in finding a single definition that encompasses all of the land that they would like to consider "wetlands."

Regulating such a varied set of communities is, quite clearly, a remarkable challenge. Many of the conflicts over wetland protection arise from the absence of a universally accepted definition of exactly what a wetland is. This scientific debate centers on what combination of criteria determines a wetland from an upland and, when out in the field, what delineates the boundaries of a wetland. If the "experts" are unable to settle on how to demarcate a wetland, the public certainly does not have an easy time learning either.

This confusion has led, in turn, to an administrative dispute. The process of day-to-day regulation is overseen by multiple governmental agencies and has led to all sorts of jurisdictional problems and an atmosphere of inter-agency confrontation.



The Value of Wetlands

Over the course of the past twenty-five years, scientists and the community at large have come to realize that wetlands serve several valuable functions both within an ecosystem and for the human communities in which they exist. Wetlands provide a constant source of groundwater recharge, often during the driest seasons. Most communities receive their water from either surface reservoirs (natural ones or from rivers that have been dammed) or from ground water (wells, for example). During the wettest seasons, wetlands absorb flood waters (from both rivers and precipitation) and then slowly release the water over time, long after the floods have receded. A constant recharge of water is a necessity for wells to maintain not only their quantity but also their quality of water. If the water level drops too low, well water tends to become salty and filled with particles from the ground below.

Wetlands also provide a substantial flood control mechanism, buffering the surrounding areas from the true impact of the wettest seasons. Water that arrives in large quantities, either through storms or increased river flow, can flood substantial areas. However, wetlands have the ability to slow the water flow rate, and can retain much of the water from the initial impact and slowly drain over a longer period of time [See Fig. I-1].

Thousands of homeowners realize each year the full extent of wetland buffering potential when normally dry backyards and basements become damp or flooded. In the case of houses which have been built on drained wetlands, the natural blocker has been eliminated. These houses may seem dry for four out of five years, but since the ground water table remains the same even with the wetlands gone, large periodic variations in the water cycle can cause long-term flooding problems. The ability of wetlands to buffer flood waters has recently been recognized in the public policy arena. Rather than build a series of flood control dams, the Army Corps of Engineers chose to acquire wetlands in order to protect the cities of Cambridge and Boston.

Wetlands further serve an important function in sediment and nutrient retention. During extreme flooding, the sedimentation that occurs in rivers is filtered in wetlands. Sedimentation is the build-up of sediments and soil in water that has been scoured by heavy precipitation or other similar events. It can be harmful for water bodies because the sediment particles floating in the water block much of the sunlight necessary for plants to photosynthesize.

In recent years, wetlands have become highly valued because they contain the right combination of aeration and vegetation to disperse and breakdown on a large scale many of the pathogens and nutrients (nitrates and phosphates) found in septic waste from housing developments as well as in excess fertilizers from agricultural runoff and golf courses—pathogens which would typically degrade water quality. In fact, artificial wetlands specifically designed to act as a surrogate for septic tanks are beginning to receive wide acclaim.

Furthermore, wetlands are among the most diverse ecosystems in the world [diversity refers to the number and variety of differing species within a given ecosystem], comparing only with tropical rainforests and coral reef ecosystems. Significantly, wetlands support 5% of the endangered or threatened

Figure I-2
Threatened or endangered species that are associated with wetlands

| TAXON | NUMBER OF SPECIES IN WETLAND (OUT OF 1331) | THREATENED/ENDANGERED IN U.S. (TOTAL) |
|------------|--|---------------------------------------|
| Total | 151 | 5 % |
| Plants | 95 | 3 % |
| Mammals | 5 | 15 % |
| Birds | 22 | 31 % |
| Reptiles | 4 | 31 % |
| Amphibians | 3 | 50 % |
| Fish | 22 | 54 % |

Source: Williams JD and CK Dodd, Importance of wetlands to endangered and threatened species, in Wetland Functions and Values: the State of Our Understanding, PE Greeson, et al, eds., (Minneapolis: American Water Resources Assoc., 1979).

species that are listed in the United States, including over half of the protected fish and amphibian species, and nearly one-third the bird and reptile species [See Fig. I-2].

The wetlands of North America are of vital importance to migratory birds. Primary flight paths, critical for the birds' survival, cross above the entire Northeast region. Long after the ground is frozen, wetlands with moving water are still able to support a remarkable amount of life that will sustain the birds. Recent studies suggest that the declining loss of migratory birds in the last several decades is not a result of the disappearance of habitat in the equator and southern hemisphere—as previously blamed on the deforestation and development of Central and South America—but rather is due to the loss of available habitats along the migratory pathways and in the North during their summer stays.

Perhaps one of the most valuable aspects of wetlands is the network of contiguous habitats that they support. Although isolated wetlands do exist, the large majority part of a larger lake and riverine system. The value of this network is unquestionable as a corridor of protected wildlife, but is also necessary to maintain the continuity of intra-species genetic variation. In order to maintain the healthiest variety of a species, the mechanism by which they breed and germinate with other varieties of their species must be maintained.

Wetland Protection: Before Congressional Environmentalism

Despite what has recently been discovered, wetlands have not always been viewed as a resource of value. For the majority of the existence of the United States, they have been scorned as bearers of disease (often through mosquitoes) and other pathogens; an eyesore to local communities; and a hindrance to rapid development—although numerous wetlands were filled in to form the basis for cities as well as housing developments, shopping malls, and cities (in fact, the majority of large cities

along the East Coast were once marshes that have since been filled in. Much to everyone's consternation, numerous buildings in Washington D.C. are presently sinking back into the ground due to improper construction). Only in the last several decades has there been widespread acceptance of the importance of even coastal wetlands for their role in maintaining commercial fisheries. Any protection that was granted prior to the enactment of the Clean Water Act in 1972 was by towns and states who actually looked to ecosystems as indicators and causal agents in their own community's health.

In 1970, hundreds of thousands of people celebrated Earth Day, in one of the first wide scale environmental initiatives that made Congress aware of the public need for an environmental ethic. This, combined with the publication of the landmark book *Silent Spring* which documented the health effects of pesticide use, spurred the government on to the formation of a federal agency. The National Environmental Protection Act and the formation of the Environmental Protection Agency began the onslaught of huge environmental efforts at regulating and protecting the environment.

The Clean Water Act and the Rise of Inter-Agency Confusion

In 1972, Congress enacted the Clean Water Act to restrict the degradation of water resources and regulate the transport of pollutants through waterways. Despite the fact that wetlands were not specifically regulated in the 1972 Act or in the 1977 Amendments, it nevertheless became the primary tool for protecting wetlands. Wetlands have been interpreted as part of the "waters of the United States" and the filling of a wetland for development purposes is covered under the "discharge of pollutants."

Until the late 1980s, four agencies: the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Defense's Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), the Department of the Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Department of Agriculture's Soil Conservation Service (SCS) were directly involved in the regulation of U.S. wetlands. Despite the fact that each agency utilized the same definition of wetlands as the foundation for their work, they also developed their own criteria to identify which lands were to be considered wetlands and which were not. These criteria were separately codified into at least four distinct federally sponsored wetlands manuals.

Protection of wetlands under such circumstances clearly posed a bureaucratic problem. While the manuals did address the definition provided by the Act, they also reflected the needs, objectives and history of the agency involved in a particular wetland delineation. For example, the Corps is run largely by engineers, not ecologists. Their primary role over time has been to assist in the construction of various development projects: moving and dredging rivers, building dams, and constructing bridges. Although they are particularly qualified to identify wetlands—they work in and around them daily—their historical relationship with wetlands has been to fill them in or dredge them. The Corps was not necessarily averse to wetland protection but they have tended to identify the extent of a wetland more narrowly than other agencies might.

At the same time, when the EPA was created in 1970, it did not have a great deal of technical expertise—a fact that both hindered and helped them in their efforts to delineate the

extent of wetlands. On one hand, the young staff brought new ideas, perspectives, methodologies, and an optimism that were not restricted by the traditional processes by which legislation takes place. On the other hand, the fledgling EPA was immediately barraged by vocal lobbying groups—farmers, developers, industrialists, homeowners—who challenged legislation as an infringement on personal property. Since the new agency lacked a long-term perspective on wetlands issues, they were often easily swayed by these large constituencies to the detriment of the scientific aspects of the debate.

Collaboration: the 1989 Manual and the Current Regulatory Framework

In order to combat the confusion of multiple agency regulation, the four agencies came together in 1989 to create a uniform wetland delineation manual which continued to meet the accepted definition while combining portions of each of the agencies' previous manuals. There was little public discussion while the new manual was being drawn up and it was designed for trial use for a year or two in order to evaluate its effectiveness both for the agencies directly involved and for the public in general.

The agencies identified three technical criteria—hydrophytic vegetation, hydric soils, and wetland hydrology—to jurisdictionally delineate wetlands. While all three criteria are mandatory and must be met for an area to be identified as a wetland, the hydrology is the primary determinant. The hydrology, or the frequency and duration of water saturation (from precipitation, surface runoff, groundwater, and flooding processes), actually determines whether an area is wet or not. It can affect the basic structure of the soils and is a major factor in determining the flora, and ultimately the fauna within the ecosystem. Two of the primary values that humans place on wetlands—flood control and recharge of underground water supplies—can be attributed to hydrology and the periodic fluctuations in the water budget.

Hydric soils are those soil types that can maintain water at or near the surface for long enough periods to support hydrophytic vegetation. Hydric soils are determined primarily by the hydrology of the specific site, but are also defined by the texture and structure of the soil, or the presence of a very slowly permeable layer, such as a clay or bedrock.

In terms of hydrotrophic vegetation, different plants can withstand different amounts of anoxia. Water lilies, for example, thrive only in water. Other plants have evolved mechanisms to endure the anaerobic (without oxygen) conditions associated with saturated or temporarily saturated soils. These include: pneumatophores, or “breathing roots,” (e.g. mangroves); prop roots, that extend from the trunk and have increased surface area above the surface (e.g. mangroves, tupe-

lo and cypress); and aerenchymous roots where the plant sends oxygen down to its roots to modify the immediate surroundings and to provide an aerobic atmosphere (e.g. sedges, including *Spartina alterniflora*).

Other plants have maintained the ability to respond to environmental conditions, as they may become flooded. Red maples, for example, send up multiple sapling sprouts. Certain plants, including many ferns, have adapted their life cycle to the periodic flooding familiar to their ecosystems. These plants can survive in their germinated spore stage while the flood waters are high, then grow when the flood waters recede.

Scientific Critiques of the 1989 Manual: Regionalization Issues

During the first two years of its use, the wetland manual came under criticism from the scientific community. Wide divergences in wetland characteristics and indicators exist over the more than four million square mile expanse of the United States—a fact that poses certain difficulties in the creation of a national standard for wetland protection. It became clear that the manual took too little account of the diversity of wetlands and their regional variations.

The geology differs widely across the country, ranging from glaciated areas, such as the Midwest and northeast to areas that have never experienced the scouring and erratics of glaciers. Moreover, the climate varies dramatically. While the Boreal Rainforest exists in the south Alaskan latitudes, most of the continental states are covered with temperate forests. The westernmost states are more constant in temperature and higher in precipitation, while the Atlantic coastal states receive wider temperature fluxes. The variations between ecosystems within the States is also great.



The same New England hardwood swamp showing a red maple's root modification to survive annual flooding. [Caryl Waggett]

Wetland norms in the southern states, with cypress swamps and the Everglades, differ widely from those in the Northeast, with peat bogs and red maple swamps.

Although widespread agreement exists about the need to construct regional standards for wetland delineation, the most scientifically logical solution—separate regional manuals—has been derided as politically unfeasible because (a) some localities have no interest in maintaining the strength of the Act and (b) regional organizations resist the expansion of federal input into the program (inter-regional communication would have to be exceptionally strong to provide equal protection between regions). The result has been what many call a second-best attempt to identify wetlands by certain aspects regional input, and has been attacked by both proponents and opponents of wetland conservation.

Wetland Boundary Succession and Wetland Migration

A further problem not addressed by the 1989 Manual is the dif-

faculty of putting a permanent boundary around a wetland. Wetlands, by nature, move, grow, and change. They are created and depend upon a succession of ecosystems. Many lakes will in time fill in with decaying matter and form various stages of wetlands, eventually becoming a successional forest. Within the next several decades, the possibility that global warming will create large changes in coastal estuaries and precipitation patterns will also alter the existing wetland locations and areal extent. Moreover, many rivers will naturally become flooded by beaver dams, forming small ponds that will experience similar successional patterns. Some of these progressions can take as little as 50 or 60 years.

Defining a specific area in which a wetland exists, and allowing extensive development up to its edge, restricts natural patterns of wetland movement. Moreover, it sets that development up for severe problems down the road as the wetland tries to follow its natural course of movement. In order to prevent large economic losses and bureaucratic litigation, this fundamental problem must be taken into consideration as the goals and strategies of wetland protection evolve.

The 1989 manual was further critiqued for not taking into account *inter*-annual variations. For example, in the state of Rhode Island over a year long period, the water table is highest in the early spring and lowest during the late fall—an *intra*-seasonal variation addressed by 1989 delineation methods. Even during a dry fall, many of the plants that have adapted to survive during the spring are still around and have visible signs of their adaptations (*e.g.*, red maples show their prop roots even during the dry fall). However, *inter*-annual variations are not as vivid in the field, so that a wetland might not be considered as such under dry conditions one year. To determine whether or not a given year is unusually dry or whether an area of land becomes flooded on a cyclical basis requires many years of study—years that developers, farmers, and bureaucrats do not want to, and often cannot, afford.

Have Permits Been Defining Wetlands More than the Manual?

At the same time it was also becoming apparent that the process by which permits were being given out to develop wetlands was in many cases usurping the manual's authority. An area determined to be a wetland may only be developed if it receives a variance through the permitting process. The bureaucratic structure surrounding the granting of permissions is tangled between different agencies.

Officially, wetlands are protected by Congressional mandate, and are to be administered jointly by the four agencies. The Corps and EPA share the bulk of the responsibility under the CWA. However, the Corps is responsible for the day-to-

day administration of permit decisions to develop, fill, or dredge in wetlands, including permit issuance. The EPA has authority to make the final determination on the extent of CWA jurisdiction, which effectively gives it veto power over the Corps.

Despite the structure, wetlands are not being protected very stringently. Seventy-five thousand activities are authorized every year and require no special application on the part of the land-owner. In addition, of 15,000 applicants, 10,000 individual permits are issued by the Corps, and only 500 are denied (the remaining are accepted through general permits). Overwhelmingly, the Corps approves permits in wetlands at a rate almost equal to having no protection at all, with only 1 in 30 applications being denied. One of the greatest problems with this rate is that the permits, and not the wetland delineation manual, are effectively defining what constitutes wetlands.

The Delineation Dispute: 1991 to Today

After two years of field use, both the scientific and political communities believed that the 1989 manual needed to be revised for further clarity. Many argued that the Manual was over-inclusive both in word and in practice. Others asserted, with equal forcefulness, that it was under-inclusive.


The three technical criteria used to delineate wetlands were widely accepted by the scientific community as the essential characteristics defining a wetland. However, debate raged over the specific combination of these criteria required. According to Former EPA Administrator William Reilly, farmers, developers and property owners who were upset with federal interference in property rights, had all expressed concern that too much land was being delineated as wetlands. According to Reilly (1991): "Although the 1989 manual appeared solid technically, it contained confusing language that led to inconsistent, sometimes over-inclusive

assertions of jurisdiction. As a result, the government appeared to claim jurisdiction under this manual over areas it had never before considered wetlands."


Dan Quayle Recommends a New Manual

In August of 1991, the Executive Council of Competitiveness (ECC), headed by Former Vice President Dan Quayle and under the auspices of the EPA, proposed an alternative manual that had a much narrower interpretation of the combination of criteria needed to delineate a wetland. To the dismay of many, the arrival of this proposed second manual later in 1991 immediately caused as many problems as it set out to resolve.

Field testing of the proposed manual suggested that, if enacted, more than 500,000 acres of current wetlands would no longer fall under federal protection. More than 60,000 people



An explanation of how plants such as ferns and mangroves survive in their germinated spore stage while flood waters are high, then grow once flood waters recede. [Josephine King]



A coastal salt marsh that is both tidally flooded and annually flooded by winter coastal storms (Waquoit Bay, MA) [Caryl Waggett]

commented in response to the proposed manual, in what turned out to be a very heated debate. Even the regional branches of federal agencies involved in wetland delineation found the new manual ineffective. After field testing, the New England Review Team claimed that the new manual delineated approximately half the wetlands of the 1989 Manual, complicated the field methods, was not based on scientific evidence, utilized invalid field indicators and criteria, and in general lacked clarity. In distinction to the 1989 manual which took a "define as wetland first, ask questions later" approach, the 1991 manual assumed that a particular area was not a wetland without specific proof and, instead, required an indication that it was indeed a wetland.

Many argue that the 1991 manual was a political and economic move designed to spur growth and bring the U.S. out of its recession and did not necessarily take environmental considerations into account. An alliance of home developers and mall builders, supported by the logging industry, proposed to the ECC that a less inclusive definition of wetlands would provide incentive for a building spurt. Since home building and construction are typically used as the primary indicators of the economy's health, this seemed a very promising avenue to instigate growth.

It was also inexpensive. A change in the legislation would free up hundreds of thousands of acres for development purposes and would cost the government little in time or investment.

Wetlands' Protected Future

While the 1991 proposed manual is widely accepted as having no sci-

entific validity, the 1989 Manual is still under fire as being over-inclusive. The delineation debate is far from over as the different agencies have reverted to using older versions of manuals including the 1989 Manual, a draft 1987 version, and even ones used prior to 1989 by individual agencies. The dilemma of accurate wetland delineation has been sent to the Scientific Advisory Board. The Board will provide a series of proposed revisions for public review, and several issues in addition to the over-inclusive nature of the current 1989 Manual will be examined. As the Clean Water Act comes up for reauthorization later this year, there is little possibility that it will pass without rectifying the mechanism for wetland delineations.

Suggestions for Further Reading

These sources provide a solid and clear understanding of the scientific basis of wetland ecology and may have some focus on wetland valuation and management:

- Good, RE et al, eds., *Freshwater Wetlands: Ecological Processes and Management Potential*. (Academic Press, 1978).
- Larson, JS, ed., *A Guide to the Important Characteristics and Values of Freshwater Wetlands in the Northeast*. (DOI Office of Water Resources Research, 1973).
- Miller, GT, *Living in the Environment*. (Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1990).
- Mitsch, WJ, and JG Gosselink, *Wetlands*. (Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1986).
- Salvesen, D, *Wetlands: Mitigating and Regulating Development Impacts*. (Urban Land Institute, 1990).
- Scodari, PF, *Wetlands Protection*. (Environmental Law Institute, 1990).

The following sources focus on the regulatory initiatives involved in wetland protection, considering the various steps in protecting ecosystems, as well as public participation in these processes:

- Broadway, JE, "Practicable alternatives under Section 404 of the Federal Clean Water Act after *Bersani v. Robichaud* [850 F.2d 36]" in *Syracuse Law Review*. 825 (1990).
- Duggins, RE, "Notes: *National Wildlife Federation v. Hanson*: Content-based review of Corps wetlands determinations under the citizens' suit provision of the Clean Water Act," 67 in *North Carolina Law Review* 695 (1989).
- Fortune, CW, "Factoring socioeconomic considerations into the Corps of Engineers' dredge and fill permit decisions," 21 in *Connecticut Law Review*. 1019 (1989).
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- Greenson, PE, et al, eds.; *Wetland Functions and Values: The State of Our Understanding, Proceedings of the National Symposium on Wetlands*. (American Water Resources Association, 1978).
- Reiser, A, "Ecological preservation as a public property right: An emerging doctrine in search of a theory," 15 *Harvard Environmental Law Review* 393, (1991).

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The Kyra Field Memorial Fund

Manhood on Trial: Homosexuality, *Conduct Unbecoming*, and the Military

"The lifeblood of a soldier is masculinity, bravery and gallantry. The battlefield soldier is inspired to risk all by fighting with comrades whose attributes conform to his view of manhood. . . . And it is inarguable that the majority of a fighting force would be psychologically and emotionally deflated by the close presence of homosexuals who evoke effeminate or repugnant but not manly visions." [Bruce Fein, "Keep the military's ban on homosexuals," *USA Today*, September 1990]

***Conduct Unbecoming: Gays and Lesbians in the U.S. Military, Vietnam to the Persian Gulf* by Randy Shilts. St. Martin's Press, 1993. \$27.95**

By Brenton Arthur

Rarely has a book planned so long ago come to fruition at the precise moment when it is most needed. No doubt, the publishers pushed Randy Shilts to finish *Conduct Unbecoming* when they realised what a hot issue homosexuality and the military was rapidly becoming. Indeed, Shilts is quick to mention how he had initially envisioned taking the book up through to the end of the Gulf War with Iraq (a section that will appear with the next edition).

Even without its planned ending, however, *Conduct Unbecoming* is truly a tour de force: 784 pages, 1,110 interviews, 5 years of research, and 15,000 pages of classified U.S. government documents obtained primarily through the freedom of information act. Beginning with George Washington's Continental army, Shilts interweaves the moving stories of dozens of gay and lesbian soldiers, sailors and flyers. They are a group so varied in background and personality that only their sexuality remains in common.

Shilts binds these disparate personal histories (most of which are in print for the first time) with deftly applied thematic glue. The story of homosexuals in the military is a story that transcends the boundaries of the armed forces and


speaks about American society as a whole. It is the story of changing definitions of masculinity and a story about the fixation of the military with appearances at the expense of reality.

although this does lie at the heart. The debate concerns the vast changes that have come at the very essence of American life; the new ways of thinking that have directly confronted established structures.

The Changing World of Masculinity

"For both women and men, the story of gays in the military is a story about manhood. For generations, after all, the military has been an institution that has promised to do one thing, if nothing else, and that is to take a boy and make him a man. The military's gay policy crisis in the past decade reflects the turmoil of a nation thrust into conflict over our society's changing definition of manhood."

Service in the military has long been considered a male rite of passage. Like many other world cultures, the American male has been defined by his ability to provide and protect. That concepts of strength, force and courage remain entrenched in the American psyche is clearly seen in muscleman heroes like Arnold Schwarzenegger and Sylvester Stallone and in the widespread use of steroids by male teenagers hoping to bulk up to impress the girls. "...[C]alling recruits faggots, sissies, pussies and girls had been a time-honored stratagem for drill instructors throughout the armed forces. The context was clear: there was



The book is a study of a culture and society in the throws of change. Shilts reminds us that the question of the legal status of homosexuals in the military is not simply about issues of acceptable versus non-acceptable sexual orientations—

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not much worse you could call a man.”

One hundred years ago, the image of ‘manhood’ was seen as male, heterosexual and also white. The first, in what would become a series of challenges to this definition, came to a head in the late 1940s with the call for the integration of blacks into the armed forces. Then, as now, opposition to integration argued that military efficiency would be undermined. No white soldier would want to share a foxhole with a black soldier and, certainly, no self-respecting white man would take orders from a black. Nevertheless, military integration was pushed through and American society had, for the first time, to re-think how they conceived of manhood. If the army produced “men” and blacks were successfully conducting themselves in the military, then black males could no longer be considered simply “boys.”

Twenty years later, a further challenge came from women—a challenge that continues to this day as servicewomen struggle to be allowed to fly combat missions. In the mid-1960s, traditionally held notions of masculinity and femininity were rocked by rapid forces of change. Gender roles were increasingly confused as women and men moved across once sacred boundaries and into jobs traditionally held only by the other. The more that women moved into military jobs, the more the traditional axiom of ‘military maketh man’ became redundant.

Shilts regales us with tragic, almost comic, vignettes of the military reaction to this challenge to “manhood.” In the beginning of the 1970s, Airman Penny Rand, only recently joined up, became increasingly frustrated with the lack of opportunity for women in the armed forces (and pay 40% less than men). While the recruiting poster offered a selection of some 150 jobs for women to choose from, they were almost without exception clerical and secretarial. As well, she was dismayed by the sexual harassment of her male peers, who began to call her ‘dyke’ because she refused their repeated entreaties. She and her barracks’ mates jammed their doors shut with broom handles every night to avoid rape.

At one point, fed up with the whole proceedings—and especially with the young ROTC cadet who gave their troop weekly lessons in applying makeup—Rand stopped shaving her legs. She was

repeatedly counseled that it was simply not “feminine” to leave legs hairy. In fact, she was even given a direct order to shave her legs. She refused to comply. “No sooner had she gotten her promotion to airman first class, even before she had sewn on her stripes, than she was busted back to airman—for not shaving her legs.”

The old concepts of masculinity have been challenged and in many cases overturned, yet a new vision of manhood has not arisen to take its place. Shilts repeatedly asserts: “The ideology of masculinity had remained a strong cultural imperative in the United States despite the best efforts of the gay and women’s movements, perhaps because nothing had come along to replace the psychological anchor that imperative provided young males. The old ways were receding, but new ways to assert manhood, or more accurately, personhood, had not yet taken shape, and many young men were lost, clinging to the old as if to a life preserver.”

The debate over the acceptance of homosexuals into the military is but the latest act in an ongoing drama. Since the definition of what defines “male” characteristics now includes non-whites as well as women, the heterosexual component of the original tripartite definition of “manhood” is all that remains unchanged over the course of this century.

Hypocrisy

“... the military is far less concerned with having no homosexuals in the service than with having people think there are no homosexuals in the service.... More than one general and admiral in the armed forces’ medical branches have commented privately that if they really went after all the gay doctors and medics, the military would have to close down its medical centers.”

Shilts goes to great lengths in *Conduct Unbecoming* to demonstrate that homosexuals are part of the military now, and have been so from the outset (Baron von Steuben the most celebrated from the armies at Valley Forge). It is not a question, then, of whether or not to let homosexuals into the military. They are already there.

In fact, most estimates would indicate that the military holds a relatively larger percentage of homosexuals than society as a whole. The very regulations of the military assured that there would be an above average number of lesbians. Until recently, women could not serve in the armed forces if they were married or became pregnant. Lesbians were often the only ones left. The military also attracted great numbers of male homosex-



THE PRESENCE OF GAYS IN THE MILITARY, AND HOW IT AFFECTS MORALE AND DISCIPLINE.

[Kirk Anderson]



THE PREJUDICE TOWARD GAYS IN THE MILITARY, AND HOW IT AFFECTS MORALE AND DISCIPLINE.

uals who hoped that the experience would turn them into "real" men.

If Shilts' interviewees can be taken as a fair cross-section, by far the majority are outstanding soldiers. They have received medals and commendations and often hold high security clearances. Some, like Tom Dooley, were nationally famous heroes. Shilts stresses again and again that homosexuals have proved themselves in the military. They are not security risks, as once charged, nor incompetent and inefficient. The problem with integrating homosexuals lies not in them, per se, but in the reaction of the rest of the military. As long as homosexuals "don't say anything," the military machine chugs along unhindered.

It seems clear that the military also knows what good soldiers homosexuals are. As Shilts points out, there is no time when discipline and competence are more important than during war. Yet, from the initial implementation of the ban in 1943 to today, it is exactly at times of war that the military has rapidly increased the number of homosexuals in the forces and decreased the enforcement of the ban. Before the Korean war, for instance, the navy gave out an average 1,100 gay-related undesirable discharges per year. In 1950—when the war was at its height—the number dropped to only 483. Nineteen fifty-one saw only 533, but by 1953, with the armistice signed, discharges were back up to 1,353. In 1971, when the United States was searching for recruits to supply the flagging war in Vietnam, they dropped the standard entrance question concerning "homosexual tendencies" from the questionnaire. Homosexuals, even the most blatant, had a hard time pushing discharge papers through.

Big Brother could not have done better

The most frightening aspects of Shilts' account are the "Orwellian" methods by which the armed forces came to track down and survey homosexuals. Phones were tapped, rooms bugged, mail intercepted and opened and conversations eavesdropped. When a soldier was

accused of being homosexual, as Sergeant Rich McGuire quickly found out, there were no boundaries to what the Office of Special Investigation might do to extract names of other suspected homosexuals.

McGuire was threatened physically and mentally, told that his parents would suffer (their home confiscated) if he did not tell them what they wanted, denied legal representation, subjected to seemingly endless interrogations in the windowless basement of a warehouse bunker, forced to look at pornographic material, asked detailed questions about his sexual life, and informed that he would receive a \$25,000 fine and life imprisonment. All this because McGuire had in his posses-



Author Randy Shilts and friend
[James D. Wilson]

sion magazines with photographs of naked men. He did not know any other homosexuals. The interrogations went on and on as the investigators did not believe him.

Under a totalitarian system such extremes are perhaps expected, but they are intolerable moral outrages in a country that claimed to be the leader of the "free" world.

Who Are Homosexuals?

One facet lacking in *Conduct Unbecoming* is a look into the meaning of words such as 'homosexual' and 'heterosexual'.

In Shilts' usage there is rarely any ambiguity—people are either gay or they are straight. Yet, the lines of demarcation are not always so clear. What defines sexuality? Is it who you love or who you have sex with? Can one have sex with a member of the same sex and still be considered heterosexual? If one has never had a sexual encounter, can one be defined one way or the other?

Recent investigations show that sexual orientation is as much as 70% biologically determined. A slew of recent studies of twins further demonstrates, at least tentatively, that sexual orientation is genetically based. Identical twins, who share identical genes, are more likely to have the same sexual preference than fraternal twins, and they more than siblings, who in turn are more likely to have the same orientation than adopted siblings who have grown up in the same household.

These investigations point to a reasonably definable line between heterosexual and homosexual. But at the same time, Shilts relates scenes of the soldiers in Vietnam who, clearly heterosexual, engaged in sex with members of the same gender, in the absence of their first choice: Should these men and women be considered homosexual?

Only the Beginning

The title *Conduct Unbecoming* is pregnant with a dual meaning. While the military establishment uses the term to describe its homosexual troops, Shilts appears to be using it to tag the military complex: the conduct of the military towards homosexuals

has itself been unbecoming and it is conduct that is deeply ingrained.

As Shilts ends: "It seemed clear, watching these University of Minnesota cadets earnestly debate whether they should serve with gays, that whatever happened to the military's antihomosexual policy, even a presidential order to allow gays into the military would not mark the end of the campaign for acceptance of homosexuals in the armed forces; it would only be the beginning."

The State Of The World

As the list of environmental woes afflicting the planet increases, the Worldwatch Institute is striving to mitigate the results. In their annual report on the condition of the earth, they call for an "Environmental Revolution" to change ways of thinking and jumpstart the world's population on the path towards a sustainable society.

***State of the World 1992: A Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society* by Lester R. Brown et al. W.W. Norton and Co., 1992. \$10.95.**

By William F. Fehrenbach

The report released by the Worldwatch Institute entitled, *State of the World 1992: A Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society*, concerns itself with the overall impact of human behaviour on the natural environment and details the price we are paying for "human progress." The Report—a collection of chapters on various topics written by different authors—provides a basis for monitoring the effects of global development and examines a wide array of options that could reconcile the disparity between economic growth and environmental sensibility. While the chapters are both diverse and distinct in topic and approach, they are tied together by a similar thread: in an environmentally interdependent world, no country (nor individual) can separate its fate from that of the earth as a whole.

The planet stands at the proverbial crossroads. On one side are those who claim that, in fact, little needs to be done for the environment. On the other, are those (including Worldwatch) who argue the necessity of embarking upon an "Environmental Revolution" that would rival the Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions in terms of importance and the magnitude of change.

State of the World makes clear that the physical tools required to bring about

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an "environmental" revolution (or even minor changes for that matter) are already in our hands. For instance, we already have access to refillable containers, compact fluorescent light bulbs, photovoltaic cells, wind powered electric generators, and contraceptives. The greatest problem now lies with our approach and attitude—a problem, *State of the World* rightly points out, that stretches from the individual to government to multi-national corporations. All that is left to do is to change our ways of thinking.



The Report: A Motivation for Change?

In the absence of a comprehensive annual assessment by the United Nations or any national government (Global 2000 and UN 1999 excepted), *State of the World* is now given semi-official status by those same organizations. Copies of the Report are distributed to members of the U.S. Congress, CEO's of Fortune 500 corporations, and members of the Scandinavian, Belgian and French Parliaments. It has been translated into 23 languages and

used in more than 1,300 universities in the United States alone. Such a wide distribution attests to the perceived credibility and reliability of the Report.

Despite its all-encompassing nature (to address the environmental realities of the entire planet is indeed a formidable task), *State of the World* is a valuable piece of literature, capable of contributing impetus in motivating society to adopt a more sustainable framework and to accept the seriousness of our actions and their negative effect on the environment.

Yet, *State of the World* is also somewhat of a paradox. It presents global problems in one sentence while in the next it diminishes their significance in order to stress hope. At the same time, it intermingles an urging for some form of environmental revolution while detailing solutions that are less serious and less far reaching—minor adjustments to business as usual. If the Report cannot stand the heat of the fire it wants to see created, then it should not tempt people with only smoke. (But, perhaps, if enough people make these minor adjustments, then a spark will be created).

After I read *State of the World*, I felt that we are making too many promises we cannot keep, simply to ease our collective conscience about the plight of the planet. My fear is that many readers will walk away denying that we are facing a serious environmental challenge, dismissing it all as mere doom and gloom. Others will feel too insufficient to face the challenge head on. Unfortunately, the old saying that a horse can be led to water,

but cannot be made to drink, is applicable.

A Fundamental Restructuring

The increasingly familiar litany of environmental concerns faced by the planet forms the starting point and continual basis of the Report. Anywhere between 50 and 400 species are lost forever each day. The ozone over population centers is disappearing more quickly than scientists had predicted. Each year the human species adds 92 million to their ranks—the equivalent of a new Mexico. In response to which, encouragement to phase out fossil fuels, to shift to a reuse-recycle economy, to protect the ozone layer by reducing air pollution, and to minimize hazardous waste generation is constantly repeated.

State of the World arms itself with an arsenal of policy planning tools. In the opening article, entitled "Denial in the Decisive Decade", Sandra Postel asserts that the elimination of environmental threats to our future will require a "fundamental restructuring of many elements of society." She combines grim statistics about the planet's health with equally disconcerting realities of unmet human needs.

One in three children worldwide is malnourished. 1.2 billion people lack safe water to drink. Three million children die annually from diseases that could be prevented by immunizations. In order to provide for basic human needs while minimizing our impact on the environment, rethinking of our basic values and conception of progress is desperately called for. Despite this summons to extensive action, "Denial in the Decisive Decade" ultimately takes a pessimistic outlook on humanity's chances for survival. We are too tempted to deny the severity of environmental threats, she believes.

According to Postel, who cites the *World Military and Social Expenditures 1991*, the global budget for military spending in 1991 was \$980 billion. She asserts that a mere 2% of this budget would be sufficient to provide primary education, health care, family planning services, safe drinking water and adequate nutrition to the world's population.

The question that immediately enters my mind is what would 50, 75 or even 100% of military spending accomplish? What is preventing us from applying a similar sized budget to stopping habitat destruction of all species including our own? The world is literally dying for such investments in more efficient and environmentally sustainable industries.

Chapters such as "Building a Bridge to Sustainable Energy", and "Shaping Cities" demonstrate how to arrive at the desired future. They are replete with basic strategies and sustainable practices

Ryan's "Conserving Biological Diversity," is that solutions to current problems make both economic as well as ecological sense. Throughout the world, high levels of agricultural uniformity and crop specialization have left harvests, and their farmers, extremely vulnerable to pest and disease outbursts. In 1991, the genetic similarity of orange trees in Brazil led to the worst outbreak of infection in that nation's entire history. Crop output was reduced to zero. Based on this localized lesson, other countries are currently learning the benefits of avoiding monoculture

crop production and especially the exclusive use of genetically altered identical hybrids.

Ryan continues by stating the now obvious wisdom that protection of habitat is the single most effective means of conserving species diversity. Yet, he fails to recognize the encouraging signs of governmental action to address the problem of species elimination. In the past, government strategies involved employing multiple-use plans for utilizing remaining natural areas. Now, through increasing legislation, wild animals are forced less and less to compete with the logger, miner or cattle rancher for what should be considered their inherent right to utilize the natural abode.

In the ninth entry, entitled "Creating Sustainable Jobs in Industrial Countries," Michael Renner points out that within the U.S. manufacturing sector, five industries—which include

primary metal production, paper mills, oil refining, chemical and stone processing, along with clay and glass production—account for 80 to 85% of both energy used and toxins released into the environment by manufacturing. Meanwhile, the five industries account for only 17% of the nation's employment within the manufacturing sector. They use 21% of energy consumed in the U.S. economy overall, but provide only 3% of the nation's jobs. Such statistics make obvious the huge disparity that exists between the benefits derived from these industries and the costs they inflict on the environment.

Moreover, the proper technologies

State of the World

Lester R. Brown

and Holly Brough
Alan Durning
Christopher Flavin
Hilary French
Jodi Jacobson
Nicholas Lenssen
Marcia Lowe
Sandra Postel
Michael Renner
John Ryan
Linda Starke
John Young



A Worldwatch Institute Report on
Progress Toward a Sustainable Society

for policymakers as well as examples of countries, corporations, villages and individuals who have taken the initiative that places them far ahead of mainstream society on the path to a sustainable society. For example, Japan's goals for lowering petroleum dependence had the effect of causing tremendous improvements in energy efficiency in the late 1980s. Furthermore, Europe's recently legislated carbon emission goals could have the same effect.

Both Economically and Ecologically Smart

The message of the second article, John

already exist to provide increased resource-use-efficiency, along with new methods of energy and material goods production. Sadly, however, society, industry and government are dragging their heels in putting them into everyday practice. The slow move to new sustainable technologies is particularly surprising because increasing documentation demonstrates that such technologies, while good for the environment, also provide increased employment. Renner asserts that generating 1,000 gigawatt hours of electricity per year requires 116 workers in a coal fired hydro plant, but 248 workers in a solar thermal facility and 542 on a wind farm.

Not a Spectator Sport


The remainder of *State of the World* is often repetitive or too wide in scope. Chapters such as “Reforming the Livestock Economy” and “Mining the Earth” are specific in content and repeat the general themes found throughout the collec-

tion. The chapter entitled “Improving Women’s Reproductive Health” is notably out of place and often contradictory. While both significant and substantial, the article would fit better in a publication that is not primarily concerned with the effects of mining, nuclear energy, carbon emissions and de-forestation. The Report in other chapters advocates decreasing population while enhancing biodiversity. Yet, the chapter on reproductive health proposes to improve female fecundity and advocates abortion. I wonder how one publication can at the same time condemn the killing of other species and condone the killing of human products of conception.

Importantly, *State of the World* does not forget the Third World. The chapter on “Strengthening Global Environmental Governance” highlights the creation of the \$1.5 billion Global Environment Facility, that will finance environmental projects in developing countries. The

Report also avoids pointing the “green” finger at the standard scapegoats—typically from the Third World—who are clear cutting rainforests or overgrazing rangelands. As it should be, the blame for our current degraded environmental state is placed evenly between developed and developing nations.

In chapter eleven, “Launching the Environmental Revolution”, Lester R. Brown leaves us all with an important message to ponder. He poignantly states that environmentalism has long been viewed by society much like a sporting event. Thousands of spectators sit in the stands watching, while only a handful are on the field actively endeavouring to influence the changes that are necessary to forestall the ecological collapse of the planet. Brown states that “success depends on erasing the imaginary sidelines that separate spectators from participants. Saving the planet is not a spectator sport.”



[Kirk Anderson]

Russian Leadership in Crisis: Russian Reform is Dead, Long Live Russian Reform!

The process of reform in Russia moves back and forth from political crisis to economic crisis. All the while, the West struggles to understand the course of change and to help it along in directions that will bring about the desired end of a democratic, market-based Russia. All too often, however, analysts unfamiliar with the traditions and goals of Russian politics misunderstand the day-to-day machinations. By giving voice to a quorum of the former Soviet Union's leading reformers, *Voices of Glasnost* hopes to set the record straight.

Voices of Glasnost: Interviews with Gorbachev's Reformers.
by Stephen F. Cohen and Katrina Vanden Heuvel. W.W. Norton & Co., 1989. \$17.95.

By Nicholas Breyfogle


On the cover of *The Economist* not more than a few weeks ago was a waist-up photograph of Russian President Boris Yeltsin. The ominous words "Stalin or ..." floated above his head, pregnant with meaning. Apparently, in the midst of the recent leadership crisis, plebiscite and fiddling with the constitution, these two extremes were Russia's only options for the future.

In uncharacteristic fashion, *The Economist* had failed to remember two unavoidable axioms of Russian politics. First, reform is not made by one man alone. It is a process that must involve large numbers of the population in order to succeed and one that will likely include any number of successive leaders. Second, the political spectrum in Russia does not begin or end with the Yeltsin-Stalin poles. Opposition to Yeltsin was not (and is not) necessarily opposition to reform, nor is it a call for a return to the horrors of the Stalinist years. Unfortunately, western writers too often throw the words "Stalin" and "Stalinism" around without fully understanding the severity of the connotations.

Stephen Cohen and Katrina Vanden Heuvel's *Voices of Glasnost*, a collection

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of interviews held with fourteen of the most active and influential leaders of reform in the former Soviet Union, reminds us that we cannot afford to view Russian politics in such narrow terms if we hope to fully understand the process of transformation. While the speed of



recent changes has outdated certain aspects of the book, as a whole, *Voices* provides an invaluable groundwork for understanding and explains fundamental truths about the reform process in Russia.

Voices grapples to fill a void in west-

ern literature. Rather than a western analysis of the events, the book presents the Russian perspective and the Russian viewpoint on the changes that they are not only experiencing but also creating. The respondents range from politicians to academics to journalists to poets and include such people, some now well known in the west, as Aleksandr Yakovlev, Yuri Afanasyev, Tatyana Zaslavskaya, Fyodor Burlatsky, Giorgi Arbatov, Aleksandr Bovin, and Yevgeny Yevtushenko. In his introduction, Cohen states that the questions posed in *Voices* revolve around "three important questions [that] have been obscured by the ... western reaction What is perestroika, how did it originate, and what has it achieved since 1985?"

One Man Doth Not A Reform Make

The interviewees in *Voices* underline the very long-term development of perestroika. The need for change had been recognized as long ago as the mid-1960s and had been germinating in the minds and work of significant portions of the intelligentsia, of scholars, and of the bureaucracy. While waiting for the proper moment, these men and women worked diligently in preparation by writing up plans for reform, investigating existing conditions and avenues for change, and criticizing government policy.

Tatyana Zaslavskaya, sociologist from the Aganbegyan Institute who in 1983 leaked a reformist document to the West (the Zaslavskaya Memorandum),

highlights the importance of the communities of reformers in scholarly institutes (of which she was a part) that arose during the 1960s and 1970s. "And if such people had not worked on all our country's problems for all those years, no political leadership could have started perestroika. People had to do the ground work first."

Yevgeny Yevtushenko, the most popular poet of the Khrushchev era and standard bearer of the post-Stalin thaw in the 1950s and early 1960s, continues along these lines from the artist's point of view: "The poets of my generation help prepared [sic] these new leaders. Don't think that glasnost or perestroika dropped from the sky or that it was given to us by the Politburo. It was many years in preparation."

Those interviewed stress that Gorbachev should be viewed less as the originator of the reform path but rather as a representative thereof who was given a seminal role to play in the unfolding of events. Rather than the sole instigator of perestroika and glasnost, he was the one chosen—elected to the leadership by the Communist Party itself—to be the spokesman for a policy of reform.

Aleksandr Yakovlev, considered "the architect of glasnost," asserts that while Gorbachev's ability and drive have left an indelible mark on the perestroika movement, his role would not have been possible without the mandate of the party and the widespread belief that changes were

essential and inevitable. It was a policy of reform that, given the severe economic stagnation in the Soviet Union of the late 1970s and early 1980s, was agreed upon by at least a plurality of Party leaders. In actual fact, the reforms that flourished under Gorbachev took off from the foundations laid under his predecessor, Yuri Andropov. It is ironic to think that had former KGB head Andropov not died so suddenly, he, and not Gorbachev, would in all likelihood have been *Time's* man of the year.

The interviews further underscore the fact that the success of reform will not depend upon one man alone. It will depend upon the people who will carry it out and defend it—the sellers on the street, the industrialists, and the people at the barricades in front of the Russian White House during the 1991 attempted seizure of power.

To Reform or To Reform

Many in the West continue to hold to the myth that Gorbachev was the sole motive force behind perestroika and glasnost. They hold to the same myths today about Yeltsin. As the interviewees make clear, the question in Russian minds has never been "to reform or not to reform?" but rather, "at what rate and in what manner shall we reform and who shall control and guide the process?" If Yeltsin were to go, another reformer would likely take his place (just as Yeltsin succeeded Gor-

batchev), although perhaps with different perspectives on change.

The struggle today is not between Democracy capitalism (now one word, it seems, in western speak) and Communism, but between representatives of different speeds and scopes of change. The opposition within the Parliament (the Congress of People's Deputies) is by no means a unified block, nor do they necessarily desire a return to communism. Generally speaking, they are looking for a slower, more controlled and hopefully less hurtful rate of change (which, not incidentally, would help them to maintain many of the perks which Yeltsin is now challenging in his headlong rush to codify a new assortment of presidential privileges for himself).

Undeniably there are those who are disenchanted with the present economic path and some who call for a return to the system under Brezhnev. From one perspective, who can blame them? At least materially, they were better off then than they are now. Only time will tell how soon the benefits of the Yeltsin sponsored program of accelerated change (deriving from the 500 days plan) will begin to filter down to those who need it most. A widowed pensioner I met on a recent trip to Russia had not received a pension cheque—her sole source of income—for over eight months. In order to survive she was selling her bi-weekly vodka ration on the street. When she pines for the old days, it is not because she feels any connection to communism but because it was then the last time that she received her pay.

For others, the victories of reform have been ambiguous. Under the old system, one was not free to travel where and when one wanted, even though many people had the financial means to do so. Now, one is free to go anywhere, at any time, but travel has become so expensive and the population so impoverished that few can take advantage. At the bottom line, little has changed—only a privileged elite remains able to travel.

That the economy is in chaos is clear. Inflation now runs somewhere around 30% per month. That anything can be done about it is unclear. There are as many plans to correct the problems as there are political leaders.

While they support reform, such Yeltsin challengers as Ruslan Khasbulatov and Aleksandr Rutskoi hold different



A Moscow crowd considers posters outside a Metro stop telling about Presidential impeachment. [Nicholas Breyfogle]

visions of the road to arrive there. In *Voices*, Aleksandr Yakovlev, who remains wedded to components of the past structure, defines perestroika to be "the further development and strengthening of socialism," the task of which is "to reunite the ideals of socialism and people's real interests." Socialism and Leninism (of NEP variety) had been pushed entirely off course by the Stalin years and their bureaucratic forms of

define the short term personal power of the individuals involved but they will demarcate the relations of political power in Russia for many years to come. Understandably, Yeltsin wants power to revolve around and emanate from the presidency while the vocal parliamentarians desire it around the parliament.

This butting of heads, however, presents the western world with an opportunity to teach the former Soviet Union

were equally extreme.

In contrast, perhaps Western politicians can also learn something from the Russian experience. It is admirable that Russian leaders believe so strongly in what they are doing that will tolerate no challenge to their goals. Yeltsin was willing to overturn his democratic reform process in order to defend it in the long run (granted there was a good deal of grappling for personal power involved). With



Graffiti writers show their support for reform. "Yeltsin--Yes!" (left) and "No to Dictatorship!" (right) [Nicholas Breyfogle & BC Pictures]

management, statism, and command administrative system.

The "voices" of the book hold a definition of democracy that is firmly grounded in Russian historical experience and practice. The democracy of which these reformers speak appears as a combination of the somewhat anarchic practices of the peasant commune and the Bolshevik conception of democratic centralism. These include a submission to and "unconditional implementation of the decision of the majority" once the debate is over. This brand of democracy was clearly visible in the recent Yeltsin-Parliament clash.

Growing Pains

After a closer look, the current leadership crisis forms part of what should be expected growing pains in a newly democratic society—who will have what power, what gives the leader legitimacy to rule? In a system that has both Parliament and President, the problem is acute. It took the French politicians well over a hundred years to settle on the existing political power structure and many are still unhappy with the balance of powers between President and Parliament. In Russia, there is no precedent of who should control what. The lines that are drawn in the battle today will not simply

something about the democracy in whose name they "fought" the cold war. At the heart of western democracy is the notion of compromise and of checks and balances between the different governing bodies—legislative, executive, judiciary. However, Russian politicians have yet to come to terms with this aspect. Each time Russian politicians run up against opposition, their immediate reaction is to remove the obstacle rather than to try to work with it. Once a decision is reached, they expect all to follow along behind, whether they agree or not, and are unused to the extensive criticism and blocking that accompany the implementation of policy.

A case in point was Yeltsin's declaration of a state of emergency in mid-March of this year. Little attempt was made at this time to find a middle ground acceptable to all parties. The imposition of rule by presidential decree was clearly unconstitutional according to the existing statutes. Just imagine if President Clinton suddenly came on television to institute the equivalent of martial law because Congress happened to have filibustered his economic stimulus package and disagreed with his economic philosophy! By the same token, the efforts on the part of the Russian parliament to impeach the President in response to Yeltsin's actions

western politicians seemingly so ambivalent and caught in the ruts of bureaucratic legislation, this idealism and motivation is both inspiring and instructional.

Renovations

In general the "Voices of Glasnost" are not entirely pleased with the progress of reform. While they believe that important and significant acts and measures have been accomplished they foresee a very long road ahead before any substantial, qualitative differences will be achieved. States Aleksandr Yakovlev: "It is like repairing a house or an apartment. Living becomes better only after the reconstruction is complete." The greatest fear among the reformers is not, as might be expected, conservative/communist backlash so feared in the West, but, rather, apathy and disinterest on the part of the general population (Velikhov declares: "what I really fear is indifference and passivity"). Despite this, there is an optimistic flavour that surfaces during their comments. As Yevtushenko states: "What is it you used to say in America? We shall overcome."

Against Her Will: Devadasi Culture In South India

In her five month stay in India's southern state of Andhra Pradesh, Erin Albritton lived, observed and worked with a women's organization called SAMSKAR that struggles to release local women from a system of hereditary concubinage and bondage.

By Erin Albritton

Parvavva turned six last month. Today she sits before an altar adorned as a bride. Braided into her long, black hair are garlands of fragrant jasmine flowers. Dark kohl lines her frightened brown eyes and crimson henna stains her hands and feet in the most intricate of patterns. Parvavva and her four brothers live with their parents in a small Harijan community in Southeastern India. They hail from one of the lowest castes in Indian society—her mother, father and four brothers are all bonded labourers who work from dawn till dusk in the surrounding paddy fields.

Today, however, is a time for celebration and the family's cow dung hut has been festively decorated with mango leaves and branches. The altar before which Parvavva sits is made of two bundles of straw. In her hands she clutches a green coconut to be offered as a gift to her groom. On this occasion, however, her "groom" is not a nervous young man, but rather a deity of the village temple. She waits patiently with her eyes lowered while the priest mutters his prayers and then finally ties the leather Mangal Sutra around her neck. With this gesture, Parvavva's marriage is finalized and her new life as a Jogini begins.

On the day Parvavva turns fourteen, the local landlord arrives at her family's hut and requests her sexual services. From this point forth Parvavva works not only as a casual labourer but also provides services (sexual and otherwise) to

the landlord upon his request. Her expected duties as a Jogini include dancing around dead bodies as well as dancing and singing for the entertainment of villagers during festival time. Rupees tossed by spectators are considered supplemental pay to the meagre amount of money or grain which is provided, only on occasion, by the landlord.


nis as well. Indeed, the more Joginis patronized, the more prestige he will receive in his community. Like other Joginis in the village, she and her children have no legal rights to the property of their father. Parvavva, who is already "married" to a deity, is forbidden to marry a mortal man.

Parvavva dies shortly before her thirtieth birthday. Her son is now a field labourer. In a few years, if he so chooses, he may marry a girl providing she belongs to his caste. According to tradition, however, her daughter is not given this choice. Like her mother, she is destined to live a life of degradation and oppression. Her future, and that of generations of daughters to come, is clearly defined as that of a Jogini.

* * *

In September of 1992, as a volunteer for Canadian Crossroads International, I had the remarkable experience of travelling to the South Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. For four months I lived with and closely observed the work of SAMSKAR, a group of people dedicated to the emancipation of women like Parvavva. Although marriages like the one outlined above were abolished by the Andhra Pradesh government in 1988, freedom for the Joginis requires much more than paperwork and stamps on legal documents.

Throughout my stay in India and particularly during the time I spent observing the work of SAMSKAR, there were many instances in which I questioned my role as a white, upper middle class, basically



[Electromap, Inc.]

Parvavva bears two children by the time she is twenty. Neither one is accepted by the landlord as his own. Parvavva is one of many young women trapped in a life of concubinage. It is not unusual for the landlord who serves as her "master" to seek the service of several other Jogi-

Christian, North American woman. My lack of knowledge with regards to the caste system as well as many of the religious beliefs which underpin the Devadasi culture left me ill-equipped to even begin to understand the lives of the Jogini women. I often felt out of place and am certain that others found my presence perplexing if not downright offensive. I have struggled against the tendency to project my experiences of oppression as well as my visions of liberation onto a particular group of women whose lived realities are very different from my own.

Devadasi (Jogini) Culture: A Tradition Now Old and Defunct

In ancient India, promotion and patronage of the arts were considered to be a luxury of the state, the king and regional princely regents. The practice and cultivation of these arts were relegated to the domain of the Brahmins (a Hindu caste traditionally assigned to the priesthood). Music, dance, sculpture, painting and literature were, therefore, incorporated into the activities of temples and the active pursuit of these arts was undertaken in the name of gods and goddesses.

A separate caste came into being which took as its profession the performance of music and dance on temple premises. These arts were considered to be sacred and temple dances and musical concerts came to be highly respected cultural events. A sub-caste of this group of temple performers were called "Devadasis" (or, literally, women servants of God). These women were considered to be, in a sense, property of the temple and were obliged to offer their services to God and dedicate their lives to the profession of temple performance. Unlike the Christian Nun, a Devadasi was permitted and even encouraged to engage in sexual activity with temple patrons. Temple prostitution was a cultivated practice, particularly in the South. The fascinating and highly erotic architecture of the Khajuraho and Konark temples emerged as the Devadasi culture reached its pinnacle.

For centuries the culture of the Devadasis was nurtured by and confined to the temples of the rich castes. Eventually, however, the practice began to trickle down into the strata of the poor castes. The landed gentry in rural villages began to emulate the nobles from temple towns. A crude form of the Devadasi sub-culture

soon began to engulf women of the lowest castes and a rigid type of village concubinage came into being.

Jogini Culture in Andhra Pradesh

In Telugu, the language spoken in the Southeastern state of Andhra Pradesh, the term "Jogi" is a derivation of the Sanskrit word "Yogi." A Yogi is a revered member of society (usually a man) who accepts alms as a gesture of respect. In its vulgarized form, however, the word "Jogi" refers to a beggar who is given alms, not out of societal deference, but rather out of sympathy. The Telugu word "Jogini," as it has been used to label women dedicated into the Devadasi culture, is a derogatory term intended in part to strip women of their identity and undermine their sense of self-worth. Unlike the "privileged" temple dancers of an earlier era, Joginis are seen as little more than beggars who prostitute and humiliate themselves for virtually no remuneration.

Although it is not known precisely when the Jogini custom percolated into village societies of Andhra Pradesh, social scientists have concluded unequivocally that this system of concubinage emerged in direct correlation with the pauperization of the lowest castes. It is particularly important to note that in modern day India, 95% of the women dedicated into the Devadasi practice come from Scheduled Caste groups—the most

deprived social groups in Indian Society, they make up a large part of the forty-three percent of India's population who live below the subsistence level. The majority are landless and spend their lives as bonded labourers, trapped in an endless cycle of loans and debts.

Today, at least 10,000 Joginis live scattered throughout isolated villages in the Nizamabad district of Andhra Pradesh alone. While, initially, I had difficulty seeing a justification for such blatant exploitation of women, I soon came to realize that a family's decision to dedicate their daughter into the Jogini system is deeply rooted in their socioeconomic status. Faced with unbearable economic conditions, a family will often turn to the local landlord for some type of financial assistance. In return for a loan the landlord, who invariably hails from an upper caste, requests that the family's daughter be dedicated as a Jogini. Tangled as they are in a complex system of power and hierarchy, the family often feels it has no other choice but to sacrifice their daughter in accordance with the landlord's wishes.

If economic vulnerability does not first succeed in prompting a family to dedicate their daughter into concubinage, then, in small temple villages, religious superstition often plays a key role in the decision making process. When someone in a village community falls ill, it is not uncommon for a landlord to circulate the



*The author with some Joginis and their children. Nizamabad district, India. October, 1992
[Photo courtesy of Erin Albritton]*

rumour that the illness is a result of the village deity's wrath. According to superstition, the deity's anger can be pacified through the dedication of a young girl. Hoping for appeasement, a family might choose to dedicate their daughter into the Jogini system. It is not difficult to see how religion, poverty and centuries of gender inequality act together to ensure the continued existence of Jogini culture.

SAMSKAR: Social Reform and Jogini Welfare

Established in 1986 by Hemalata Lavanam, the organization SAMSKAR dedicates itself to working with the Jogini population in the Nizamabad district of Andhra Pradesh. Its early efforts were aimed primarily at studying the living conditions and terms under which the Jogini culture operates. Indeed, Hemalata engaged in extensive tours of villages, visiting Joginis and their families and compiling numerous case studies.

In April of 1987, SAMSKAR opened its operating centre known as Chelli Nilayam (or "Sisters' Home") in the village of Varni in Northwest Andhra Pradesh. It is at this centre that women who once practiced the Jogini custom can now come for literacy programs, health camps, individual counselling and occasional meals. With the financial assistance of groups such as HELPAGE, U.K. and OXFAM, pensions for elderly Joginis as well as educational programs for the young now flourish. In fact, more than six hundred Joginis, along with their children and aging parents, find their way to Chelli Nilayam at least once each week. Here, the women pledge not to engage in any Jogini practices and vow not to dedicate their daughters into the system of concubinage that has ensured their slavery for generations. In addition, Joginis are encouraged to break the Mangal Sutra or "holy thread" around their necks which serves as a physical reminder of their dedication to a deity and servitude to a landlord.

The most important aspect of SAMSKAR's social reform philosophy is its dedication to awareness and education. The organization actively tries to raise

awareness and educate Joginis with regards to existing progressive laws and how these laws can help to overcome social and economic hurdles. In addition, SAMSKAR believes that people must be supplied with the instruments of literacy, self-confidence and social consciousness in order for them to realize that the traditions and forms of exploitation can be broken.

From the onset, the organization stresses that they do not wish to impose occupational alternatives on Jogini women nor do they promise paradise should the Joginis chose to abandon their old way of life. Rather, SAMSKAR assists women in mobilizing their own strengths and places prime importance on the Joginis' own rehabilitation proposals. For this reason, much of SAMSKAR's


age the women's economic independence through the cultivation of paddy.

In 1988, the Andhra Pradesh Devadasi (Prohibition of Dedication) Act came into effect. The Act condemns the existence of all Jogini/Devadasi systems in the state of Andhra Pradesh including the ritual dances connected with the custom. To publicize the Act, thousands of posters with captions specifically mentioning that violations of the Act are punishable, were pasted on huts and trees. In addition, meetings were conducted in the presence of village elders to explain the legal content of the Act.

As is the case with most legal documents, the Act has its limitations when it comes to practical application. Although the Joginis themselves are not at risk of being punished for involvement in their own dedication ceremony or for performing their ritual dances, the Act does little to ameliorate the dire economic situations or the corrupt power hierarchy which often place families in the position to dedicate their daughters. Nevertheless, it does serve as a protective measure which has worked to prevent wealthy village men from taking punitive steps against Joginis and their families who want to shed the tradition.

Today, within the Nizamabad district of Andhra Pradesh, dedications of young girls into the Devadasi system no longer take place. Although conditions for the women remain far from ideal, SAMSKAR stands dedicated to improving their standard of living. To my knowledge, there are as yet no other organizations of

this type in areas where the Devadasi culture continues to exist. During my one month field visit to Chelli Nilayam, I asked Hemalata Lavanam if she planned to expand the work of SAMSKAR to include Joginis throughout India. Her project in Andhra Pradesh has only just begun, she responded. She is dedicated completely to her work with women in the Nizamabad district and expects to be involved in that region for many years to come.



The Devadasi Prohibition Act (1988), displayed throughout Andhra Pradesh. [SAMSKAR]

work is aimed at re-establishing women in occupations which will allow them to become self-sufficient and yet remain in close contact with their family and village support networks.

Jogini Practices Outlawed

Since SAMSKAR began its work in 1986 they have received surprising amounts of support from government bodies in Andhra Pradesh. In 1987, a National Convention on Jogini Welfare was hosted in New Delhi. Since that time more than five million rupees has been granted by the government towards the purchase of goats and sheep for the Joginis and land has been donated to encour-

The Prague Spring: A Year of Awakening

In 1968, Czechoslovakia was a country revelling in the excitement of change. After some twenty years of authoritarian government, an urgent summons for a new form of communism arose from almost every corner of Czech society. "Socialism with a human face" called for the integration of democratic and socialist ideals and placed itself in direct conflict with Soviet interests. Now, 25 years after this monumental year of upheaval, as the Czech and Slovak republics come to terms with the aftershock of a more recent revolution, it is important to remember the energy and defiance instilled by the Prague Spring.

by Alison Pion

This spring a great chance has been given us...It is now up to us to make our way through unknown conditions, to experiment, to give the Socialist development a new look, while leaning upon creative Marxist thinking...No one could forgive us were we to waste this chance, were we to give up our opportunities.

-from a Czechoslovakian government document on reform, entitled "Czechoslovakia's Road to Socialism," April 19, 1968.

Twenty five years ago, while students in the United States demonstrated for civil rights and for an end to the Vietnam War, and while French students and labor leaders took to the barricades in Paris, Czechoslovakian youth groups and intellectuals conducted their own struggle for reform. The so-called "Prague Spring," with its emphasis on rebirth and change, challenged the ruling Czechoslovakian Communist party. It pushed Czechoslovakia's leaders to break with the Stalinist model of communism and to declare their country's independence from the Soviet bloc.

However, the Prague Spring did not denounce communism altogether, the basic tenets of which were integral to the movement's vision of reform. While it did directly confront the ideological and political monopoly of the Czechoslovakian communist government, the movement strove to create a new defini-

tion of communism—one that incorporated a number of Western democratic elements.

Reformers called for an end to censorship and for the establishment of laws and party statutes that guaranteed the right to dissent. They also demanded recognition of Czechoslovakia's freedom to determine domestic policies without outside intervention from powerful countries such as the Soviet Union.



[Electromap, Inc.]

The Winter Preceding: The Rule of Antonin Novotny

Despite the tight reign and Stalinist-style governance of Communist Party Chief Antonin Novotny, the late 1960s saw the growth of an increasingly restless and frustrated public who condemned and criticized the activities of the government. Many Czechoslovakians faulted Novotny for his retention of the old Stalinist bureaucracy and his refusal to give full backing to Czechoslovakia's economic reform measures. He was also unpopular for his failure to compensate fully the vic-

tims of the 1950 purges and his negative attitude toward the some 4.5 million Slovaks living in Czechoslovakia. These policies, as well as his support of censorship, particularly alienated numerous intellectuals and students and encouraged them to speak out in favor of change.

Intellectuals were well positioned in Czechoslovakian society to be a powerful force for the reform movement. Endowed with a certain respect and status (due them from their education and role as cultural leaders), but removed from political positions that afforded them influence over the government's actions, intellectual reformers were free to point out the government's failures without incriminating themselves.

The intellectual assault on the communist administration began at the Writers Congress Conference in Prague in June, 1967. Impassioned speeches and demonstrations called for an investigation into the activities of Novotny's regime. Declarations boomed that, now, the time was ripe for change. In response, the Novotny government moved to discipline these writers through jailings and stricter censorship regulations.

However, the spirit of reform had already taken hold of the people and was not so easily extinguished. Intellectuals and student groups continued to press for the removal of Novotny and for a change in government domestic policy. Even from within his own administration, Novotny was confronted with demands for reform as more and more politicians sensed the changing mood of the

Czechoslovakian population.

Public reports outlining the abuses and scandals of the Novotny regime flourished. The Communist party was increasingly discredited, while the reform movement was energized. As tensions mounted, the Soviet Union—all the while anxiously awaiting the outcome—pledged a policy of non-interference in the Czechoslovakian power struggle.

Alexander Dubcek and the Blossoming of Spring

In January of 1968, Novotny was replaced by Alexander Dubcek as head of the Czechoslovakian communist party. Dubcek had been a leading figure in the mounting Slovak opposition to Czech dominance in the country's post-war years. He now came to symbolize the spirit of reform and the hopeful mood of the Prague Spring.

Almost immediately after his ascension to power, Dubcek eased regulations regarding censorship and began to move his country towards a model of communism that encouraged political discussion and dissidence. It is unclear whether Dubcek himself shared the desire for reform or whether he simply reacted to the insistent demands of the people. In either case, in a reform platform published April 9, 1968, Dubcek's party outlined its plan for monumental change.

Included in the package were regulations that guaranteed freedom of speech, press, assembly, and religious observance. It established electoral laws designed to broaden the choice of possible candidates and provide greater opportunities for non-communist parties. Dubcek's plan for reform also included economic policies that afforded public and private businesses more independence and allowed them to trade openly with Western nations. In addition, there was a plan to establish an independent judiciary system and draft a new constitution for implementation in 1969.

To keep Dubcek in line and remind him of his promises to the Czechoslovakian people, the country's leading intellectuals issued a manifesto on June 26, 1968. The piece, entitled "2,000 Words to Workers, Farmers, Scientists, Artists, and Everyone," warned against a return to authoritarianism. The manifesto also called for all Czechoslovakians to push for further reform of old Stalinist practices still entrenched in the bureaucracy.

Trouble in Moscow

While the spirit in Czechoslovakia was one of euphoria and rebirth, Moscow's mood was a great deal more somber. A collective warning by Soviet, Polish, East German, Hungarian, and Bulgarian leaders to the Czechoslovakian government went unheeded. Though the Soviet bloc suggested that Czechoslovakia ought to proceed cautiously with its reform policies or face potentially harsh reprisals (like those Hungary received in 1956), the Dubcek regime still declared its right to determine domestic policies without outside interference.



Prague's Old Town Square with Tyn Church in background [Nicholas Breyfogle]

Czechoslovakia's reform movement raised fears in Moscow about the possible adverse effects on the Soviet Union's power position in Europe. It provoked concern that Czechoslovakia's example might lead to other anti-Soviet outbreaks in other parts of Eastern Europe. The reforms had already received support from Yugoslavia and Rumania. Confronted with a mounting sense of vulnerability, Soviet leaders became increasingly convinced that a policy of non-interference towards Czechoslovakia would be counter-productive.

Thus, on August 20, 1968, Czechoslovakia was invaded by the armed forces of the five Warsaw Pact powers. Despite the high level of hostility felt by the Czechoslovakian public, resistance to the predominantly Soviet force of 400,000 was largely non-violent and grassroots based. Reluctant to position itself in direct opposition to the Soviet Union, the Czechoslovakian

government made no appeal to the people to confront the invaders and, instead, preached passive resistance.

From Spring to Winter

In an effort to maintain his power, Dubcek struck a compromise with the Soviets. He legitimized the presence of foreign troops in Czechoslovakia, agreed to increase restrictive measures against dissidents and to restore censorship, and promised to purge the 1968 reformers from the political arena. In return, the Soviet Union offered Czechoslovakia economic assistance and continued peace between the two countries—an agreement that effectively reinforced the political ties between the two countries.

However, most Czechoslovakians remained angry and frustrated by the Soviet Union's invasion and repressive measures. Large and militant demonstrations against the U.S.S.R.'s actions occurred in late October and early November, but the spirit of rebirth was already largely stifled. The verbal protests by communist parties in Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Italy did nothing to affect the Soviet Union's hard-line position on Czechoslovakian reform.

Throughout the next three years, individuals active in the Prague Spring movement were either jailed or expelled from Czechoslovakia for their activities. Vladimir Skutina, former TV commentator and a well known advocate of change, was sentenced to two years in prison on charges of having written unpublished pamphlets slandering Czechoslovakia and the U.S.S.R. A group of fifteen Czech intellectuals charged with "subverting the republic" were sentenced to prison terms ranging from 12 months to 2.5 years. These, and hundreds of other trials, combined with police searches and random mass round-ups, frightened the population and silenced public demands for reform.

What had once been in Czechoslovakia a time of spring, hope, and rebirth quickly transformed into a cold winter of silence and resignation. Yet, the energy and optimism of this movement that galvanized the country into action continues to be commemorated each year in life's enduring cycles. As the revolution of 1989 has shown, while spring leads seasonally to winter, winter leads just as naturally and inevitably to spring.

Messing About With *Bufo Marinus*

By R.D. Bowman

We have recently passed the 58th anniversary of what could be classed as either the most significant day in Australian history, or the remembrance of one of the greatest ecological goofs ever perpetrated by well-meaning individuals. Your perspective all depends on whether or not you like toads. To explain, let's take a trip back to the murky days of 1935, and talk a little bit about sugar.

In the early twentieth century, sugar was one of Australia's primary exports. By the mid-1930s, the depression had brought the world price of sugar down, but cane growers in Australia's Northern Queensland had other reasons to sing the blues. They were having a spot of trouble with the pesky cane grub. These "little buggers" had an insatiable hunger for the cane, camping out in its roots while it grew, and leaving vast fields of cane plants dead.

Not surprisingly, local agricultural agencies started casting about for a solution. Existing pesticides, they discovered, wouldn't touch the little fella'. But a biological means of control appeared in answer to everyone's prayers. The *Bufo Marinus*, or Hawaiian Cane Toad, had been feasting on Hawaiian cane grubs and beetles for quite some time. So one glorious day (22 June 1935, in fact), 102 individuals of the species were released into a slough just outside Gordonvale, North Queensland. And then things started to happen fast. Really fast.

No-one seemed to realize just how prolific these toads were. One would think that Australians, after all of the problems they had encountered with hares, would have a healthy respect for rapid proliferation of newly introduced species. But, instead, they just popped the cane toads in the nearest pond and waited for the grub problem to be solved.

The average female cane toad starts producing after one year of cane toad adolescence (mooning after boys, going to movies etc.). When she produces, she is capable of spreading some 40,000 or so eggs every summer (for as many as 16 years). In Hawaii, cane toads lay 40,000 eggs so that a few will survive. In Australia, however, there is a marked lack of natural predators to feast on the bounty (besides which, the toad has some rather interesting defences—but more about that later).

Australians found themselves in the middle of a population explosion of immense proportions—an "invasion" that one farmer called "more dangerous than Hitler's armies." And to add insult to injury, these toads ate everything that could fit in their mouths, from other frogs to bugs to snakes to mice and even ping pong balls if bounced in front of them. They ate everything around, EXCEPT... you guessed it, the cane grub. Apparently, the beetle of one form of the grub stays well above ground in the cane's foliage and out of the toad's reach, while

the other form of the grub only appears when the cane is without foliage, too exposed for cane toad liking.

Now, about those defences. Cane toads have little poison sacs on their shoulders that can shoot poison about a metre when pressured. So your average dog or cat grabs the toad by the neck and, for its efforts, gets a face full of poison. This has pet owners in Australia understandably a little upset. Cane toads don't carry the normal warnings that scream to predators, "Wait! Don't eat me!" (typically bright colours or a bitter taste that dissuades without killing) and native Australian toad predators are often unprepared for the unpleasant surprise that awaits.


The poison from the toads has found other uses as well. In the 1970s, there was quite a fad among the hippies of Australia which involved knocking a toad on the head, boiling him down in a pot, and drinking the residue. The result of which (not surprisingly) was intense colour hallucinations. To this day, there are rumours of individuals in the southern hemisphere catching these toads and licking their shoulders for the high.

The reaction of the Queensland population to the invaders has been wide. Many are completely in love with these amphibians, keeping them as pets and feeding them cat food. Others drive over as many as possible and enjoy the tonal "pop"—something "like a balloon going off"—that occurs if you hit them correctly (head-on, I believe).

For some, the toad has become a kind of cultural icon. The town council in Gordonvale, apparently hoping to build tourist potential and spur on postcard sales, briefly planned to erect a bust of the cane toad to commemorate its arrival. A government ministry bound a book in cane toad skin and sent it off to Buckingham Palace as a wedding gift for Charles and Di. In a celebrated incident, an Adelaide man was arrested for "impersonating a cane toad"—crouching at the side of the road and hopping on all fours out in front of oncoming cars.

Whatever the viewpoint, the cane toads pose an ecological nightmare for Australia, and a problem that has no immediate solution. These toads are in the process of destroying the Australian ecosystem and already cover more than 40% of North Queensland, rapidly moving South and West. They reproduce so quickly, eat anything and everything, kill their predators, and utilize so much of the biomass that native species are being forced out. On top of the ecological catastrophe, these creatures also cause road accidents as people skid on the vast numbers crossing the highways.

And so, as June 22 has just passed, raise your glass to *Bufo Marinus*, whether in recognition of the species' superb ability to adapt and proliferate, or as a monument to humankind's good intentions but ultimate shortsightedness. Or, best yet, to both.



FUTURE SUBJECTS AT HAND


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Not just off the turnip truck