After Apartheid: A Unified Democracy

The Evolution of South Africa

For the past three-and-a-half centuries, South Africa has been a country characterized by ethnic strife. In the twentieth century, the oppressive system of apartheid divided races politically, economically and socially. But now, with the historic April election, South Africa has taken the first step towards creating a democratic, non-racial society.

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As observers around the world watch the formal dismantling of apartheid, the prevailing mood within South Africa is one of wariness, laced with hope. If the past few years are any indication, the future is certain to contain further conflict as South Africa continues its tortuous transition to democracy.

President F.W. de Klerk, of the ruling National Party, first announced in February, 1990, that he was committed to the reformation—indeed, transformation—of the apartheid state. After four years of gruelling negotiations, April 26, 1994 marked the dawn of a new era, as South Africans, regardless of their race, voted in the country’s first democratic election.

The old parliament of three houses—whites (178 seats), coloreds (85), and Indian (45)—excluded blacks completely. It reigned by simple majority vote, thus allowing the white house to dominate. The proposed new parliamentary structure will have a National Assembly and a regional Senate. The 400-seat National Assembly will be elected by proportional party representation, and will select a president from the governing party. The Senate will consist of ten members from each of the nine new provinces (replacing the previous geographical organization of four provinces and many black “homelands”). In the 27-member Cabinet, every party that captures over five percent of the popular vote is entitled to a seat.

The new government will be one of ‘national unity,’ which will strive to govern by consensus during the next five years while writing the new constitution and smoothing the transition to full democracy. In 1999, complete majority elections are to take place.

The stage is set in South Africa for the preliminary years of democracy. Its backdrop includes natural and manufacturing wealth and a sophisticated infrastructure. Yet, over all this falls a curtain of instability, disparity of living standards, ethnic tensions and global scrutiny. South Africa’s gnarled historical roots will make its road to prosperity and peace an arduous one. At last, however, South Africa will face the future as a united, democratic country.

Since they registered for the election just days before voting began, special Inkatha Freedom Party stickers needed to be attached to the ballot. [South African Embassy, Ottawa]
The Europeans: The Dutch Establish Themselves

By the beginning of the seventeenth century, ships from the major European trading nations were pausing at the Cape of Good Hope to replenish their stocks. The fate of southern Africa was irrevocably altered when a crew working for the Dutch East India Company (VOC), having lost their ship in a storm, was forced to spend the winter in Table Bay. Upon returning to Holland, they persuaded the VOC to establish a permanent replenishment station, and Commander Jan van Riebeeck was dispatched to organize a settlement. The year was 1652.

The Dutch knew little of the indigenous population upon their arrival. In the coastal area of the Cape where they settled, the local people, nomads from the Khoi-Khoi group of tribes, were nicknamed “Hottentot” (from the Dutch “stammerer” due to the clicking sounds made in the tribes’ language). Initially, relations were based on trade, but the VOC soon discovered the benefits of actually using the indigenous people to produce the goods needed by the colony. This exploitation, combined with the influx of Free Burghers (Dutch settlers unrelated to the VOC) and the use of imported Angolan or Namibian slaves, created a racially stratified community.

Throughout the next century the colony expanded, particularly with the arrival of Huguenots—refugees from the European reformation. The Free Burghers sought farms beyond the growing population of the colony and the problems of a rebellious labor supply. These Dutch farmers, Boers, pushed east along the coast, and north inland. The VOC rather presumptuously granted them plots of land of approximately 6,000 acres.

As the trekboers (those farmers that pushed back the colony’s frontier) migrated, they came across Bantu peoples. “Bantu” refers to a related group of languages derived from a common ancestor in Central Africa, and the term has come to denote the tribal groupings based on these languages. These tribes have evolved into the present day Khosa, Zulu, Suthu and Tswana. The earliest recorded conflict between the trekboers and the Bantu peoples was in 1702, when two “cattle bartering expeditions”, one comprised of trekboers and the other from the Khosa clashed in the area of the Fish River, over 500 miles east of Cape Town. As both the trekboers and the Bantu tribes gradually expanded, the “Hottentots” were caught between these two larger and more powerful groups. By the end of the eighteenth century, the original inhabitants of the southern tip of Africa were on the brink of extinction.

The beginning of the nineteenth century marked the rise of the Zulu nation in modern day Natal. Conflicts between the Bantu tribes of the area culminated in the rise of Shaka, the bastard son of the chief of a small tribe called the Zulu. A fierce fighter and tyrannical general, Shaka through conquest united over a hundred of the small surrounding tribes to create the Zulu nation of today. A direct result of the havoc spread by his reign amongst the peoples of the area was the mfecane (great migration), which lasted from 1822 until 1836. In an effort to escape his power, tribes moved southwest into Khosa territory, west over the mountains and north into modern-day Zimbabwe. It is estimated that over a million Bantus died as a result of the conflicts that took place during the tribal upheavals of the mfecane.

The British Presence and the Consolidation of Afrikaner Nationalism

The rapidly growing British Empire first became involved with the southern end of the African continent when its soldiers occupied the Cape colony in 1795. After the Convention of London in 1814, the British acquired full sovereignty over the whole territory of the Cape, which included the coastal strip as far as the Fish River. The British imposition of circuit judges to mete out justice in the Boer communities, the introduction of 5,000 British settlers in 1820, the replacement of Dutch with English as the official language, and the formation of two representative assemblies to replace the Burgher administration were all seen as an attempt to deprive trekboers of their independence and heritage. Two British legislative acts in particular made the situation intolerable for many Boers: in 1828 non-white races were granted full civil rights, and in 1834 the slaves of the colony were freed.

The teachings of the Dutch Reformed Church in Afrikaner (the general term for South Africans of Dutch descent) society was—and still is to some degree—central to the Afrikaner
abhorrence of any integration of blacks into white society. The Dutch Reformed Church offered a literal interpretation of the bible, which tells of Ham, the black son of Noah, going south after the great flood to spawn the Bantu races. The Dutch interpretation intimates that these peoples were the natural slaves of whites.

The Great Trek to escape British domination began in 1836, and it is impossible to understand the Afrikaner mentality without acknowledging the importance of this diaspora: the trek was the Chinese Long March, the American pioneer wagon trains and the Flight of Moses from Egypt rolled into one. For the Voortrekker (those who embarked on the trek, from the Dutch “to press forward”), it was the ultimate embodiment of Boer independence, courage, determination and faith in God. The trek also coincided with the end of the mfecane.

The mfecane eased the Voortrekker’s passage northeast, as at the time of the Bantu migrations there were no established tribal boundaries. Nevertheless, the trek did lead to numerous localized conflicts. The most famous of these was the Battle of Blood River, which occurred between a group of Voortrekkers and the Zulus. The Voortrekkers had sent emissaries to the Zulu king, Dingane, to arrange for passage and settlement in the greatly expanded Zulu domain. The negotiators were ambushed and executed on their return journey, and the Voortrekkers sent a punitive force to gain redress by raiding for cattle. Dingane ordered his regiments into battle, and in the clash with superior Boer weaponry lost 3,000 of his finest warriors. After Blood River, Zulu power began to recede.

The Voortrekkers established two republics, which have survived until now as the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. By 1854, both had been recognized by the British as independent entities. The Boers, in moving north, had earned the enmity of the Bantu tribes (still recovering from the effects of the mfecane) who could do very little to prevent the agreements for independence between Boer and Briton. By this time, the British had added the coastal area of Natal to their territorial holdings.

In 1860, the British introduced indentured labor from India into Natal. These Indians were used to build the infrastructure, such as roads in the colony. Certain conditions pertained to wages, hours and accommodation, and on completion of their obligations, the laborers’ families were brought from India to settle. These are the ancestors of the large Indian community now living in modern South Africa.

**Diamonds, Gold Mines and Wars of Independence**

Outright war between Bantu, Briton and Boer had been avoided in the first 200 years of the European occupation of South Africa. More serious conflicts marked the second half of the nineteenth century. One of the main reasons for this was the discovery of diamonds in the Orange Free State in 1867 and of gold in the late 1880s in the eastern region of the Transvaal. The combination of British efforts to annex land for control of the mines, and the huge influx of miners of all colors contributed to rising tensions between Boer and Briton.

Large British-owned mining corporations used migrant Bantus to labor in the mines. The ruling Boers tried to control this influx with various rules regarding employment, freedom of movement and living arrangements, but the power of the mining conglomerates rendered their efforts impotent. In 1880, the Boers went to war with Britain. The First Boer War, in which the British were defeated, lasted two years.

Despite this setback, the British continued to expand north of the Boer republics, moving into modern-day Botswana and Zimbabwe, and annexing Zululand in 1887. As a result of the British expansion, the Boers found themselves geographically surrounded. Their feeling of insecurity intensified when L.S. Jameson, an associate of Cecil Rhodes, the Prime Minister of the Cape, led one hundred armed men into the Orange Free State in an attempt by the British to regain political control of the republic. The Jameson Raid of 1895 failed, yet it was only a matter of time before war broke out again.

During the Second Boer War of 1899-1902, guerrilla warfare initially proved effective against the British military. However, the British began incarcerating Afrikaner women to prevent them from supplying the Boer commandos. The British thus exhausted the Boers, who surrendered at Vereeniging in 1902. South Africa was incorporated into the British

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**Word Watch**

**Trekboer**: a farmer on the colony’s frontier, from the Dutch.

**Free Burghers**: the group of early settlers who were not directly engaged on VOC business.

**Hottentot**: a member of a group of tribes (e.g. Khoi-Khoi) found in the Cape. It is a term that freely translates from the Dutch as “stammerer”, due to the repetitive clicking sounds that were prominent in the tribes’ language.

**Huguenots**: refugees from the European reformation, mostly French, who arrived in 1688.

**Bantu**: refers to a related group of languages derived from a common ancestor in Central Africa, and denotes the tribal groupings based on these languages. These tribes have evolved into the present day Khosa, Zulu, Suthu and Tsowa.

**Mfecane**: roughly translates as “great migration,” but describes the bloody upheaval of peoples as a result of Shaka Zulu’s conquests.

**Afrikaner**: the general name for South Africans of Dutch descent, and hence a term that includes the Boers.

**Voortrekker**: from the Dutch term “to press forward”, the name given to those Boers who embarked on the Great Trek.

**Peace of Vereeniging**: the treaty, signed in Vereeniging, that ended the Second Boer War. The Afrikaner today refers to it as the Second War of Independence.
Apartheid. to power in 1948 that formally ushered in the system of segregation. It was the era that coincided with the National Party's rise to power in 1948 that formally ushered in the system of Apartheid. Many factors ultimately contributed to the emergence of South Africa as an independent dominion. Most important were the influence of the new multi-national business corporations, the huge cost of the Boer War to the British (nearly £200 million, and 22,000 lives) and the resurgence of Afrikaner politicians in the Orange Free State, the Transvaal and the Cape. In October, 1908, the Durban Convention was held with the intention of writing a constitution for an independent South Africa. In 1910, the House of Commons in London voted to give South Africa its independence. Eight years after the Peace of Vereeniging, the Boers achieved by ballot what they had failed to achieve by bullet—an independent Union of South Africa.

By the time of independence, the major divisions in society had begun to take hold. For Bantu peoples, survival was no longer based on raids and the protection of grazing lands, but on the tough working environment of the mines. In the years immediately after South Africa's emergence as a dominion, Louis Botha's Afrikaner-dominated government began to enact a series of laws that curtailed Bantu rights.

The Mines and Works Act of 1911 instituted certificates of competence, but included a color ban to specific occupations. The Native Lands Act of 1913 designated 22 million acres as reserves for Bantu ethnic groupings, but prohibited the sale of land between different races. After bloody riots by white union workers, the Apprenticeship Act of 1922 defined educational standards for apprenticeship positions, and thus ensured that the only eligible candidates were the better-educated whites. The Urban Areas Act of 1923 regulated the flow of blacks into populated areas, and established locations for them to live, ultimately giving rise to townships like Soweto.

According to the Constitution of 1910, the Union of South Africa was a dominion with the rights of a separate nation. The positions granted the blacks were those of unskilled workers; the Indians ran small businesses; the coloreds—anyone who did not conveniently fit into the three other groups—filled any gaps; while whites provided overall political and economic direction. Social segregation was not a new idea—separate buses and benches were notions imported from the United States. At the same time, the biblical interpretation espoused by the Dutch Reformed Church effectively meant that the system was sanctioned by God.

Over the ensuing years, the steady "Afrikanerization" of all state institutions has ensured that the interests of whites prevailed over those of the other groups. In order to add legitimacy to this trend, whites were classified as one ethnic grouping, while the black population was divided into many tribal entities as was possible, making whites the largest group in South Africa.

The four pillars of apartheid—the Mixed Marriages Act (1949), the Population Registration Act, the Immorality Act and the Group Areas Act (all of 1950)—were erected to enforce the legal separation of races. The intricate internal security system spawned a vicious cycle of legislation and violence: restricting the freedom of most of the peoples of South Africa led to unrest, followed by further security measures and legislation to maintain the status quo.

Black Resistance and Modern South Africa

Founded in 1912, the African National Congress (ANC) was the first black political opposition group in South Africa. The ANC's founding vision was of a non-racial South Africa, where people would be South Africans, not whites, blacks, Indians or members of tribes. Its Freedom Charter of 1955 espoused the socialistic goals of nationalizing trade and industry, and distributing both the natural and material wealth of the country among the people. In the 1950s, when Nelson Mandela first appeared on the scene, the ANC was rapidly becoming a popular, radical outlet for black dissent. It launched its now famous passive resistance campaigns with strikes and marches to punctuate demands for political liberty and social equality.

However, many became frustrated with the campaigns' lack of progress. In 1959, Robert Sobukwe, an instructor at the University of Witwatersrand, emerged as the leader of the Pan-African Congress (PAC), a more radical alternative to the ANC. The fundamental ideological difference between the two that remains to this day lies in their vision of the identity of South Africa. While the ANC sees South Africa as a country belonging to all its people regardless of race, the PAC fervently believes that Africa belongs to black Africans, the real natives of the soil.
In 1960, the National Party under Hendrik Verwoerd outlawed African dissent, banning the ANC, PAC, as well as the South African Communist Party, as treasonous. In 1961, the PAC formed its military unit Poqo, and the ANC formed Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation)—a military wing that would carry on the struggle for black liberation, this time with violence. Shortly thereafter, in 1964, Mandela was arrested and jailed for life. South Africa descended into violent civil turmoil, and the South African military became the most powerful force in the region: in 1975, South Africa’s defence budget accounted for nearly 22 percent of total government expenditures.

By the late 1970s South Africa had become unstable and economically weak. The shortage of skilled labor due to the increasing emigration of educated whites, as well as international trade embargoes enforced by the West, hurt South Africa’s economy tremendously. During the 1980s, the world watched in horror as P.K. Botha (President until 1989) repeatedly imposed states of emergency, and used the notoriously brutal security force to quell unrest. The value of the rand (South Africa’s currency) crashed, and sanctions were tightened. As the country’s self-destruction seemed imminent, and the tenor of international condemnation rose in volume, it became apparent that drastic political reform was necessary.

Botha made some concessions regarding, for example, the legality of black trade unions and the right for a small number of black Africans to live in urban centers. In 1983, he created the chambers for coloreds and Indians to make a tricameral parliament. However, these reforms did not cut at the roots of the problem—apartheid itself. A stalemate developed between the government’s position and the urgency of black demands. Before he would even consider entering into any sort of dialogue with the ANC and the imprisoned Mandela, Botha demanded that the ANC first renounce its armed struggle. Mandela refused, arguing that in banning the ANC, the government had given blacks both the right and the reason to turn to weaponry. Until the government was willing to commit to genuine negotiations, the armed struggle would not be renounced. Botha resigned in 1989, paving the way for his successor, F.W. de Klerk, to steer the country on its present course towards democracy.

The Transition to Democracy

In February, 1990, de Klerk stunned South Africa and the world by announcing that the government was lifting the 30-year-old ban on the ANC and other black liberation organizations, was freeing all political prisoners, and would negotiate with these groups regarding a new national constitution. Nelson Mandela, the man the western world associated most closely with the anti-apartheid struggle, was released from prison on February 11, 1990 after 27 years in confinement.

As the newly legitimized PAC and ANC prepared for their re-entry into organized politics, other groups also responded to these changes in South Africa. In the province of Natal, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi of the Zulus, bitter rival of the ANC and South Africa’s largest tribe, felt threatened by the ANC resurgence. Formed in 1975, his present political party Inkatha was originally a cultural movement with a strong regional sentiment. In mid-1990, Buthelezi relaunched Inkatha as a political organization—the Inkatha Freedom Party—whose goal is Zulu independence.

Buthelezi traditionally represented the free enterprise alternative to the ANC in South Africa, and supported cooperation with the National Party. Now, as the country moved towards de Klerk and Mandela’s shared vision of a non-racial South Africa, Buthelezi and his followers began to fear that the Zulu nation would lose its identity and territory under a strong central government. These fears sparked some of the worst violence in recent memory as Zulus took up arms to defend their nation, and ANC supporters responded in the name of the new South Africa.

The first stage in ANC-National Party cooperative efforts was the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), a multi-party (19 parties were represented) gathering whose task was to negotiate an interim constitution. Problematic issues in CODESA were the geographic distribution of power (federal, confederal or unitary), and the allocation of regional powers.

CODESA ultimately broke down over de Klerk’s proposed “special majority”, which would be needed to approve the final draft of the constitution. Not wanting to relinquish all power in the face of a black majority, his vision was a system...
of power sharing, whereby blacks could vote and create legislation, but a balance of power would remain with whites, who would have the right to veto. The ANC and its supporters fiercely resisted this as an un-democratic and illusory liberty which essentially amounted to continued white power. Mandela was charged by his supporters to win nothing less than complete equality.

De Klerk, on the other hand, was under pressure from the Conservative Party and right-wing elements in the National Party who accused him of acting without a mandate and of selling off South Africa to the Communists (whose party has been, and still is, allied with the ANC). To quiet the opposition, in March of 1992 de Klerk put a referendum before the voting whites: Did they approve of continuing negotiations for non-racial democracy and the granting of amnesty for detainees and returning exiles? The answer was a resounding “Yes”.

By May, 1992, the stalemate had not been resolved, and the ANC walked out on CODESA. It planned for a summer of mass action to force the government’s hand with a show of popular support. The ANC also intended to march on homelands where regional leaders, like Buthelezi, resisted the idea of a unified, non-racial South Africa and continued to ally themselves with the right-wing.

In June, 1992, the factional violence which had raged unabated since 1990 reached new heights: in that month, in the Boipatong township near Johannesburg, a group of Zulus slaughtered forty ANC supporters and injured many others. Reports came back saying that the Zulus had been aided by security forces. The ANC accusation that a third force—the security forces—had been promoting township violence to destabilize blacks and undermine the ANC gained support and cast suspicion on de Klerk’s government once again.

By mid-1992, at the height of bloodshed after Boipatong, Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists issued reports criticizing police for being partisan and contributing to the violence. By July and August of 1992, the international community threatened sanctions if something was not done to end the bloodshed. The first stage in the talks towards democracy had been characterized by some of the bloodiest violence in South African history. From 1990 to mid-1992, 8,000 people had died during political violence; mostly black, and mostly dead as a result of intra-racial fighting.

**Barriers to a “non-racial” South Africa**

At the end of 1993, Mandela and de Klerk finally reached an agreement that would lead South Africa into democracy. Their newly created Transitional Executive Council, charged with creating a new police force and overseeing a multi-racial election, was one based on the principles of a non-racial South Africa. This notion has been the sticking point for many groups within South Africa.

Significant Afrikaner resistance has emerged—indeed, had been there ever since the National Party announced that they were determined to reverse the course of South Africa’s history. The rise of the right in South Africa has been dominated by a wide assortment of people, ranging from guerrilla-minded militants to those committed to the parliamentary process. At present, it is the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) led by Eugene Terre’Blanche, that embodies the most radical threat to South Africa. This guerrilla organization has vowed to use all means necessary to topple an ANC government, including outright civil war.

Previously allied under the banner of the Afrikaner Volksfront, the AWB and other right-wing Afrikaner groups, led by former South African Defense Force head General Constand Viljoen, were committed to securing an independent Afrikaner homeland. This past March, however, after bloody clashes in Bophuthatswana between ANC supporters and an invading AWB army, General Viljoen quit the Volksfront. He registered a new party, the Freedom Front, to pursue the goal of an Afrikaner “volkstaat” (people’s state) from within the parliamentary process. Support for the Front has come from Conservatives and other Volksfront generals.

With the voice of Afrikaner independence now integrated into the political process, a significant barrier to a democratic South Africa appears to have been overcome. Afrikaners, regardless of the image the AWB portrays, are not the trekkers of yesteryear, ever moving bravely into the wild African interior to scratch out an existence from the land. They are a part of South African society on every level, and, for the most part, will work within the new South Africa. The AWB, though a significant threat and not to be ignored, has dwindled in numbers and in credibility.

Resistance to the changes sweeping the country towards a non-racial democracy also came from black South Africans. Conservative, anti-ANC leaders of homelands, like Buthelezi, wanted to retain great regional autonomy. Two allies of Buthelezi, and of the Afrikaner right, were the homelands Bophuthatswana, led by Lucas Mangope, and Ciskei, led by Oupa Gqozo. Both leaders have been deposed, and their former strongholds are now fully a part of the unified South Africa championed by the ANC.

Just days before the election, after negotiations with Mandela and de Klerk satisfied his desire for guarantees of greater Zulu autonomy, Buthelezi renounced his election boycott and registered Inkatha. Much of the concessions agreed to by de Klerk and Mandela are largely ceremonial regarding the Zulu King and Monarchy, to whom millions of Zulus feel tremendous loyalty—enough to take up arms and disrupt the progress...
towards a non-racial country. Now that these regional powers have joined the move towards a unified South Africa, the fears of many about the possibility of civil war have been assuaged.

The New South Africa

It would be unreasonable to expect that all of South Africa will make a smooth transition from a fragmented, oppressive society, to an interwoven, free one. Still, for the most part, the main players will all have a parliamentary voice. Dominating the political scene will be the challenge faced by the ANC to please its own supporters—those who have consistently lost out in South Africa, and who, for this reason, have so much to gain.

The legacy of apartheid will not be easy to overcome. Whites make up 15 percent of the population, but own approximately 90 percent of the formal businesses. Black income is only a tenth of that of whites. Two-thirds of the black population lives in rural areas where over 80 percent have no electricity and 90 percent no sewage. Forty percent of the black population is illiterate, and half the labor force has no formal job. The hopes pinned on Mandela to transform water into wine are high indeed.

The ANC’s election platform spoke of “a roof over one’s head and reasonable living conditions.” It has promised to supply water and sewage to one million homes, and electricity to 2.5 million. It plans to build homes, vastly improve the quality and accessibility of education and will employ over 2.5 million people in its public works program. This will cost an estimated $12 billion—though critics warn that this figure is far too low. The ANC plans to fund its reconstruction of South Africa with savings from money usually allocated to homelands, cuts in the defense budget, revenue from an improved tax collection system and funds from a surtax on the rich.

The ANC has come a long way from its Freedom Charter of 1955. The rhetoric of nationalization and redistribution has not been heard in 1994, and the ANC knows it must make friends with the business community so that South Africa can build on the structure already in place. Even ANC candidates from the Communist Party, which campaigned under the ANC banner, have dropped their revolutionary rhetoric in favor of the free-market reality that the business community both within and without South Africa wants to hear. Certainly, this stance will gain the trust of the international community who are being counted on to pour investment dollars back into the country.

One of the biggest challenges Mandela faces will be to work with the people themselves. Their organizations excluded from the politics and downtrodden for decades, they are a lost generation of protesters, unschooled in the political reality of gradual evolution and growth. Mandela cautions that patience is necessary, and that the legacy of apartheid will not disappear overnight. As the ANC stated in its election manifesto, “When the African National Congress set out its vision for a non-racial society on January 8th 1912, we did not know how long it would take to achieve.” Indeed, much has happened in the intervening 82 years, and consequently, much needs to be done before this country finds stability based on a non-racial, equitable society.

Building a post-apartheid South Africa promises to be as difficult as toppling apartheid itself. On many levels—economic, social, political, regional and tribal—the road ahead is still one that is certain to contain unexpected curves and pitfalls. For many South Africans, the end of apartheid will not directly lead to improved living conditions, and for many, life may even get worse. Still, the future is truly in the hands of the people. With the close of the polling stations, the first act in the history of the new South Africa has ended. As the symbolic victory sinks in, the real war against apartheid begins in earnest.

Suggestions for Further Reading

John Saul, Recolonization and Resistance in Southern Africa in the 1990s. (Between the Lines, 1993).