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Front cover: Ueno Park—Tokyo, Japan. [Christopher Travell]
Back cover: A Moai Sunset—Easter Island. [BC Pictures]
“Nationalism” Triumphant

I found your cover story on the Balkan crisis most interesting. People are hopefully groping for analysis like that you’ve provided about the conflict in former Yugoslavia. Americans, I find, are worried about placing blame for the virulent animosity they see unleashed among neighboring Slavs and Turks, simply because the further they plunge into the past in the Balkan conflict, the more muddled becomes the chore.

They are very reluctant to classify the South Slavs as European (read: civilized) because they don’t see the poverty of Eastern Europe in general to be a characteristic of the lands of (some of) their forebears. What they don’t realize, or don’t acknowledge, is that Yugoslavia was one of the richest countries of the loosely-defined eastern bloc before the breakdown in trade in the mid-1980s.

That said, however, the Europeans are no better. The much vaunted Vance/Owen peace plan was horribly misunderstood by the general public as the only solution to the crisis. To the extent that the European public could be bothered to care about the war on its doorstep, it worried about its contributions to the UN peacekeeping forces. In this country, at least, I think that the crisis was so abhorrent to the reserved and conflict-averse British population that it went largely without acknowledgement.

The notion of providing artificial havens (a la Vance/Owen or Kosyrev) in order to stop an ethnic conflict that is still raging is positively absurd. First of all, such a solution could only have been applied effectively at the beginning of the conflict back in 1991, or at the very latest at the beginning of the Bosnian war last summer, as a demonstration of the fact that Europeans would not tolerate this sort of racial conflict on their borders.

Second, the Vance/Owen/Kosyrev alternatives seem destined at best to convert the situation from a military conflict to a trade war. The Muslim enclaves will be starved out of existence if they cannot be exterminated by firepower. At this late date, the most abhorrent but only viable solution seems to me to be granting the Croats, Serbs, and Muslims the territories they have managed to conquer over the past two years, dividing the ethnic groups into three territorial divisions which reflect these new definitions of nationalism, and allowing mass migration before sealing the borders with UN troops. While it gives tacit support to the Serbian and Croatian demands for ethnic cleansing, it seems to me to be the only way in which the Europeans can manage to control the conflict at the moment.

Sarah Williams
London, England

The Meeting of Solitudes

I enjoyed your article on Hugh MacLennan’s Two Solitudes, which I read a couple of years ago as part preparation for two post-Meech Lake speeches I gave. I found a recourse to some history was essential as part of the task of finding the common ground that constitutes the One Canada among the Several Solitudes which you discuss.

I have one thought about the “Solitudes” concept. It is because we are less “two” and more “more” Solitudes than we used to be, that the Charlottetown Agreement issues emerged. It is the increase in the interfaces, and to some degree the reduction in the solitudes, which has made living together seem more difficult and which has given rise to anxieties which did not exist to the same degree when the “Solitudes” really were solitudes.

William A. Macdonald
Toronto, Ontario

Intelligent and Unprofitable

I have had a look at the current issue, and I am impressed both by the idea (which strikes me as solid, intelligent, necessary, and unprofitable), and by the presentation.

Walter Stewart
Fenelon Falls, Ontario
The Culture of Violence

It now seems an almost unassailable reality: that we in North America (and the United States in particular) have come to accept living in societies where the level of day-to-day violence is unmatched by any other peace-time nation.

A rash of recent incidents have brought the extent of the violent sickness home: the murder and carjacking of Michael Jordan’s father, the Paul Bernardo case of demented murder and rape, a rise in juvenile arrests and such statistics as, in 1990 alone, 4,200 teenagers in the United States were killed by gunfire. The list could go on.

The violence has struck at places traditionally thought to be safe, like hospitals, malls, movie theaters, restaurants, cars, and white middle class neighborhoods. And it has struck with a savage force. The sidewalks are unsafe to walk on. Strangers should be feared.

The search for the source of the often fatal fury has dredged up a whole collection of possible candidates. From one perspective, violence has been a part of the American psyche and spirit from the outset. The legacy of the “wild west” where the ability to gouge out an eye with one’s thumb was central to survival, and certainly key to establishing a reputation and credibility—similar to today’s city streets.

Today, the prevalence of handguns and the ease with which they can be obtained pushes all crime to the most dangerous extreme. The violence and destruction shown on television desensitizes us to reality. National heroes tend to be individuals particularly adept at violence: John Wayne, Rambo, Schwarzenegger, the American Gladiators, and Clint Eastwood (“go ahead, make my day”). The triumphs of war, in the Gulf for example, are glorified. The failures of war, like Vietnam, are brought into the living room on the news.

Many analysts point to the malaise of the middle class and the impact of television on our imaginations. Youth has been left without any interests or hobbies, except perhaps guns. By the same token, critics charge, the changing nature of the family has also had its affect. It was not until 1974 that fifty percent of children found nobody at home when they returned from school. In the 1990s, the number stands closer to eighty percent.

The penal and judiciary systems are also singled out as the cause of violence. Says Randy Ballin, head of the California Highway Patrol’s Los Angeles auto-theft unit: “They have nothing to lose. The Criminal-justice system is not a deterrent. It’s a minor inconvenience.”

For others, the rise in violence is simply a matter of perception. Many people are only now realizing that it is not just someone else’s problem. Violence does not plague only poor, often racial minority communities. In fact, while crime in the big cities is down, it is on the rise in the suburbs and smaller cities and towns.

What all of these issues point to is an acceptance of violence that works at many levels in our society. Two comments from American citizens, one old and one young, uncover the all-permeating culture of violence. A teenager from middle America relates how “parents just don’t understand that everything has changed. You can’t just plug it out in the schoolyard anymore and be done with it. Whoever loses can just get a gun.” A father from that same middle America laments: “It’s so sad. I can remember when you could settle things with fisticuffs. Man, that’s antiquated now.”

Both of these statements betray a relationship to violence that perhaps we cannot afford to be comfortable with if we wish to reduce the violence around us. The message is clear: violence within certain boundaries is acceptable, expected—the problem is guns and death. In fact, violence of some sort makes up the only option for problem solving for these two Americans. Fists are fine, guns and death are not. But what about knives, kicks with steel-toed boots? Is the gang fighting of the 1950s and 1960s tolerable because fists and pipes were the main weapons, but the gang warfare of the 1990s not, because of guns? As the rise in violent crime has demonstrated, the boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable violence are not always clear. More importantly, they are easily stepped over and the violence escalated.

If violence is a learned characteristic, as many psychologists argue, is it being learned directly from us, and not the television or the judicial structure? Are we, in our day-to-day toleration and even promotion of certain types of violence, the real culprits in the escalating spiral of fear and death? Should we not rethink our own relations to violence at all levels, if we are to avoid the drift into a fatally dangerous, lawless society?
**A Conscientious Objector Looks Back**

by Paul Brownfield

In 1969, his country deeply involved in the Vietnam War, Eric Edwards was working as an orderly at University Hospital in Cleveland, Ohio. A 22-year-old Quaker and conscientious objector, Edwards cleaned bedpans, took blood and checked the vital signs of patients newly arrived to the emergency ward. He also worked on what the hospital referred to as "crash teams," administering CPR, and "Mr. Strong teams," orderlies charged with subdued psychiatric patients in the middle of violent episodes.

"You would hear the announcement over the intercom: 'Mr. Strong, please report to Hannah House, third floor,' and all those orderlies would rush over to the psychic ward," Edwards recalls. The preferred manner of restraining a patient was for two or three orderlies, using mattresses as shields against the blows, to pin the patient to the wall until he calmed down.

Edwards remembers certain incidents vividly. There was the patient who broke a pool cue in half and brandished it at anyone who came near him. Or the patient who hid in an examination room and threw glass IV bottles at passersby in the hall. By the time Edwards arrived on the scene, mattress in tow, the hallway was littered with broken glass. The man with the glass IV bottles was a tall, 6'6", and muscular, but Edwards and another orderly went at him with the mattress and got him up against the wall until his arms fell limp.

There is a heavy dose of irony in these recollections—a pacifist who stayed home during the Vietnam War, finding himself in a psychiatric ward battling pool cues and incoming IV bottles, a bor-

rowed mattress his only weapon. Edwards, finishing the story, seems to notice it.

"If you were a CO [Conscientious Objector], your draft board wanted to know you were doing something in the national interest," he says, a wry smile forming. "So I guess that qualified."

Like hundreds of other Americans during the Vietnam War, Eric Edwards sought and obtained official classification as a conscientious objector from the United States Draft board. For religious reasons, he could not and would not take part in a violent conflict.

COs are often misunderstood. They are collectively thrown in with draft dodgers, and perceived as 'shirkers' of patriotic duty. But, as Edwards' life makes clear, it was not necessarily out of lack of courage nor disrespect for the country that COs objected to participation in the war. Becoming a conscientious objector was more than a matter of declaring disfaste for the Vietnam War on a form and hoping the draft board would dismiss you from duty. You couldn't just claim to be a pacifist. It involved interviews, collecting and submitting references and providing testimonies—running the gamut of a military bureaucracy and the whims of a draft board.

It is difficult to unearth the actual numbers of conscientious objectors. Most government documents are more concerned with those individuals arrested for draft dodging who claimed CO status as their legal defense.

According to a 1972 Clemency Board report, 28 percent of draft-age men with college degrees applied for CO status, versus 19 percent of those with less education. The less educated applicants were successful in 53 percent of their CO claims, while those with college degrees were successful in only 14 percent. The Clemency Board report attributes this wide disparity in success rate to the "fact that those with less education more often based their claims on religious grounds."

But, if it is difficult to get a handle on how many American men eligible for the draft during the Vietnam War (still called a "conflict" in official U.S. government documents) applied for CO status, then it is impossible to know how many wanted to but never did. Draft boards tended to discourage the practice. The reasons were both symbolic and mundane. While public sentiment was still behind intervention in Vietnam, the federal government did not want to release a glut of conscientious objectors back into American civilian life—symbols of resistance to a war that, as the decade of the 1960s came to an end, was becoming increasingly unpopular back home. In addition, COs represented to draft boards mounds of paper work; files had to be kept, follow-up reports made on whether the CO was living up to his obligation of "alternative service in the national interest."

Edwards remembers that when he went for his Army physical in Boston, the doctor saw that he had applied for CO status and tried to convince him to go for a medical discharge, asking repeatedly if there was any history of illness in Edward's family, anything that might override the CO claim.

"The doctor sits me down, and he says, 'You're doing great on your physical. I see they're not going to draft you because you're a conscientious objector. Are you sure there's no history of illness in your family?'

Those who applied for CO status had to meet three basic requirements to receive the designation. First, their objection had to be based on religious training and belief. This was a problematic stipu-
lation that was originally equated with a belief in a Supreme Being—put simply, "Do you believe in God?" It would later be amended to a "sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by God." This was thanks to a 1965 Supreme Court decision in the case of U.S. v. Seeger, an agnostic who successfully challenged the idea that a person's objection to war had to be grounded in religious conviction.

"taking in a breath, filling yourself up with the world, then emptying." It was about being "available to that inner voice." Back in college, at those first Quaker meetings, Edwards had trouble sitting through the silence for a whole hour, often unable to focus and eliminate other thoughts. But now, he says, he finds that "inner space" in two minutes, driving in his jeep.

Edwards' anti-war activities during college went no further than a few protests in Washington, one a march on the Pentagon. His fledgling Quakerism coincided and coalesced with the peace-driven "flower power" movement that was taking shape on college campuses and coffee houses in the mid-1960s.

The Seeger decision broadened the requirement, but only to a point: a claim could be based on personal values—a moral code that guided your life unflinchingly—but not on political, sociological, or philosophical views. At best, the distinction is an esoteric one. It would seem that political and philosophical views are by their very nature personal. But perhaps sensing the floodgates of draft resisters if they opened the designation to those with conflicting political views, the Supreme Court disqualified CO designation based thereon.

The other two requirements were much more straightforward: the individual had to be opposed to war in any form—whether the enemy was Hitler, Japan, or the Vietcong. He had also to be sincere in his beliefs. This meant having a track record, a clear history of pacifism or the like. It is the sincerity question that deterred many from applying for CO status, and that Eric Edwards remembers being the most important when he appeared before his draft board. But testimonial given for Edwards clearly demonstrated sincerity. "I had this great reference from the Navy Commander I'd met in a coffeehouse and come to know. It said something to the effect of, 'If I've ever met a pacifist, Eric Edwards is it.' " Edwards was further backed by Ken Morgan, his Quaker adviser in college.

Edwards relates how he found the Quakers, formally known as the Society of Friends, when he was a freshman at Colgate University, in Hamilton, New York. It was 1965. He was 18 years old and a 2S on his draft status (college deferment). The spectre of the Vietnam War was admittedly plaguing him.

"The Quakers represented for me a cessation of discussion, of weighing differences, ideologies, concerns. The approach in this culture [at a time of war] is not for people to weigh their options, but to do what's patriotic. But the approach of the Quakers is that all war is horrible. I remember the chapel in Hamilton was in the middle of a field, and you had to walk up a sort of hill to get to it. Inside, you practiced silence, and waiting."

Silence and waiting. It sounds, on the face of it, more like meditation than prayer, and in a sense it is—at least to hear Edwards describe it. He talks about
overseas to offer medical assistance to wounded soldiers—not, on the face of it, outside the scope of Quaker practice—Edwards didn’t register as an I-A-O.

“I couldn’t belong to a system where conscience was secondary to laws,” he says. “All laws have boundaries of conscience. The military has its own set of laws, designed to produce the most effective killing machine. As an institution, they ask you not to aid the enemy. Why couldn’t I have been sent over as a medic? Because if all people are equal in the eyes of Quakers, how could I come upon a wounded Vietnamese soldier and leave him there to die? It would have been totally against everything I had come to believe.”

Edwards was very quickly given the I-O classification. Since he was already working as an orderly at University Hospital in Cleveland by the time he was interviewed by the draft board, Edwards was allowed to return to the job to fulfill the I-O stipulation that he do work “contributing to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest.”

University Hospital was located not far from the Hough Ghetto, a stronghold of the Black Panthers, the militant African-American group born of the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s. The Panthers would often escort stabbing and shooting victims to the hospital, and Edwards remembers them as “intimidating initially, cool, tough, wearing military garb.” He admits to feeling some culture shock, a sense of dislocation, “a CO running around this hospital with a philosophy degree. People would ask me, ‘What the Hell are you doing here?’ But I saw it as a way to serve my country, without being in the military.”

The doctors and nurses treated him with a mixture of contempt and compassion, depending on where the person’s political views fell.

“Yeah, lots of people tried to make me feel guilty that I hadn’t gone,” he says. “There were plenty of nurses who were unsympathetic. But I saw no incongruity with what I was doing in my life. My identification of myself with Quakerism was complete. I wasn’t defining other people’s choices, I was deciding what to do with my life.”

In 1970, he moved to Boston, where Edwards would spend the remaining three years of the war at Massachusetts General Hospital, working surgical intensive care, assisting in the preparation of open heart surgeries. By this time anti-Vietnam War sentiment in the U.S. had built in intensity. Edwards continued to attend anti-war meetings and protests, but he is quick to distance himself from the more vigilant anti-war protestors. He remembers the deep-felt disappointment after going to anti-war meetings, where they would show films of B-52s going down, to wild cheers from the assembled protestors. They too, in their own way, did violence to the sanctity of all life that Edwards held dear.

“[Anti-war demonstrators] reinvented us vs. them,” Edwards says plainly. “As a Quaker, you don’t make that kind of distinction. The political power of the anti-war movement was never as a coherent peace movement. It was a group of mixed interests. And I think it quickly self-destructed, because it didn’t have good leadership, or coordination.”

The relationship between Quakers and anti-war protestors at times cast the former in the role of the wise and gentle father, the latter as petulant son. There is an anecdote in Daisy Newman’s A Procession of Friends: Quakers in America, which episodically chronicles the Quakers’ history of benevolent acts over the last several centuries.

It tells the story of a Friends Meetinghouse in Cambridge, Massachusetts. In the summer of 1968, they found themselves the reluctant subject of consider-
Japanese Politics in Flux: Mixing Idealism and Realism

After almost forty years of relative stasis, the July elections in Japan have brought about shifts in the balance of political power which have left the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) not in the majority for the first time since 1955. Both Japanese and foreign analysts are striving to understand the process of change and the path which the politics of this world economic giant will take.

by Nicholas Breyfogle

Around the world, political analysts watched with bated breath as Japan went to the polls on July 18, 1993. For the first time since 1955, the Japanese faced the prospect of a government not dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Certainly, the LDP reign had never seemed wholly secure, but an LDP majority and a stable Japanese political system seemed to be established truths.

The elections were not the first signs to appear of the breakdown of LDP hegemony and of the political consensus that had brought Japan successfully through the postwar period. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Japanese political establishment was challenged by charges of corruption—illicit connections to large corporations and organized crime. They have also suffered under policy criticisms of the relative slowdown in Japanese growth since the mid-1970s, as well as of the price paid by the Japanese people both in environmental terms and as consumers in a producer-oriented society. Early this spring, the LDP felt the shock waves from the formation of new political parties by split-off LDP members and they were staggering from the impact of a resulting no confidence vote, that led to the most recent elections.

As expected, Japanese voters—apparently tired of LDP hegemony, corruption, and status quo attitude—cast their lot with the string of new parties. The LDP remained the largest party in the Diet with 227 seats but failed to win the necessary 256 to constitute a majority in the 511-seat house. The other postwar party, the Social Democrats, also suffered a serious electoral setback as their representation dropped from 134 to 70 seats. After the haggling was done and the dust had settled, a seven-party coalition pushed the LDP over into the opposition and Morihito Hosokawa, leader of the Japan New Party which had won only 35 seats, assumed the mantle of Prime Minister.

At stake in the whole proceedings were some very fundamental questions that will directly affect Japanese society. The coalition—composed of the Japan New Party, Japan Renewal (Shinseito) Party, and New Party Harberger (all center-right) along with the leftist Social Democrats and Democratic Socialists as well as the Clean Government (Komeito) Party and a few independents—has come to a consensus for the moment that, by all accounts, will be difficult to prevent from fragmenting. They have united in the desire to reform the existing political order, but the vision of the future often differs from group to group.

Overall, the coalition has agreed to freer, more open debate, to a greater openness to the outside world, to the decentralization of the Japanese political structure, and to the reform of ‘Japan Inc.’—that seamless interweaving of politicians, bureaucrats and business interests which has been the trademark of Japanese governance in the postwar era and the cause not only of great economic success but also of much highly publicized corruption. They call for electoral

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"Japanese Gothic:" Support for the LDP has been traditionally high in rural areas. [Christopher Travell]
reform that would end the current structure—so crucial to LDP election success because of the weight it gives to rural areas—in which multiple candidates are elected from the same riding. Further, as Hosokawa has stated: “It is time to admit candidly that Japan has so far put its highest priority on economic development and has not paid sufficient attention to improving the quality of life for each and every person.”

Political pundits are struggling to understand the meaning of the recent elections. From one perspective, some argue that the changes are superficial. They point to the LDP origins of the reform movement’s leadership (as well as the similarity of political ideology) and argue that it will be business as usual, only under new people and a new guise. Others assert that the pace of any change will be slow. No matter how much the politicians want reform, the power of the bureaucracy in Japanese politics makes overnight alterations improbable.

From the other perspective, commentators, like Tomoaki Iwai, professor of political science at Tokiwa University, believe that “it is the start of real politics,” and that these shifts in the political spectrum are only the beginning of much more fundamental changes in the structure of Japan itself. For what is perhaps the first time in Japanese history, a group of politicians have openly challenged those foundations of government that have served Japan admirably through its “economic miracle” from the late nineteenth century to the present. More importantly, whereas political parties have traditionally found their power source in the industrial conglomerates and local level bureaucracy, the new coalition has looked to the will of the people for support and legitimacy.

The Meiji Restoration
Japan’s first steps in the realm of democratic politics followed on the heels of the Meiji Restoration of 1868. At that time, the existing military-feudal system of government (the Tokugawa Shogunate) was toppled and the Emperor ‘restored’ to the top of the political order. (Since the early 1600s, the Shogun (military leader), rather than the Emperor, had been the nation’s political and administrative leader). The Restoration stemmed from a combination of internal and external factors. The internal forces—economic decline of the landowning nobility, the rising merchant class and frustration at the rigidity of the hierarchical administrative structure—were by far the most important. The external factors acted only as a catalyst.

From the mid-1850s, internal loss of confidence in the Tokugawa Shogunate coincided with the arrival of the West. Foreign ships steamed into Japanese ports, with the United States under Commodore Perry leading the way. Under the threat of superior force, the Japanese signed a series of unequal trading treaties giving the Westerners access to Japanese markets and resources as well as extraterritoriality for their representatives. When the Tokugawa Shogunate proved unable to capture their allegiance, and bring them into the new political and social order as active, while controlled, participants.

The 1899 Constitution and the Birth of Democracy
Most Western nations, especially the United States, would not consider a revision in the unequal treaties until Japan could prove herself civilized and modern (i.e. democratic and capitalist). After a great deal of debate, the majority of Meiji leaders believed that to match the West, Japan must become more like the West. Yet, the ‘West’ was by no means a monolithic block and there was not one ‘West’ to copy. During the 1870s and 1880s, Japanese leaders were dispatched on international fact finding missions to determine what parts of the western world were best to appropriate.

In 1889, the Meiji leadership fixed upon a Prussian-style constitution and assembly structure: known in Japan as the “Emperor System”. As is clear from the name, the Emperor held the pre-eminent position constitutionally. However, despite his theoretical powers, the Emperor was not intended to rule directly but, rather, to legitimize the policies of the ruling elites and ministers. Thus, the political structure was dominated by a small group of Meiji oligarchs who administered and engineered the process of change. These elites chose the Prime Minister and the cabinet of ministers (who stood atop the newly formed and highly efficient civil bureaucracy as direct advisors to the Emperor), often from within their own ranks. They also acted as the arbiters between the different loci of political authority outlined in the constitution—between the parliament/political parties, the military establishment, the bureaucracy, the Emperor and the zaibatsu (large monopolistic industrial-business combines).

As one historian has noted: “The Meiji constitution envisaged a political community directed by a small elite at the head of an extensive bureaucracy. In theory, the elite would consult public opinion as it was expressed in the Diet, but the elite would be fundamentally neutral, standing above groups and factions represented in the legislature and acting in the interests of the whole nation.”
The military—whose importance was unparalleled in Japanese processes of self-strengthening—held a special, autonomous position, answerable only to the Emperor. At the same time, business and industrial interests also came to take central stage. The success of the large conglomerates, which had begun to develop in the Tokugawa years, was deemed imperative and they were given extensive government privilege and support.

Popular government was limited. The newly created parliament—a consultative elected assembly with voting restrictions—was erected by the Meiji elite for reasons that were not always connected to western democratic principles. On one hand, many Japanese leaders argued that the only way in which they would ever compete with western strength would be to adopt western practices. On the other hand, certain elites believed that if they were to have any hope of reversing the unequal treaties and and reconstructing Japan's image abroad, they would have to appear 'civilized' to the western world. Thus, while they may not have agreed in the inherent superiority of western political structures, they realized that the adoption of parliamentary and democratic practices was required, at least in form, to placate western desires.

There was hardly unanimity over the imposition of the parliamentary system. Many of the Meiji elite considered political parties, and especially opposition groups, to be wrong to the point of immoral. Consensus rather than confrontation were the characteristics the Meiji strove to enhance.

Thus, Japanese democracy was born from above, not from below. Participation in government was not necessarily considered an innate right. Rather than an institution that would reflect and represent the will of the people, the national assembly was to be an institution that would transmit the wills and goals of the Meiji oligarchs to the populace while explaining government policies and educating the public in the art of participatory government.

Moreover, the parliament would serve as a safety valve. In the course of their missions abroad the Meiji leaders had witnessed the social dislocations that racked newly industrialized countries. The Meiji government hoped to avoid these pitfalls through a national assembly that would foster a sense of national unity and loyalty among the Japanese people and, in theory, override any divisive tendencies.

As the historian Kenneth Pyle has written, the Meiji leaders were "intent upon finding ways of spurring on the populace, of achieving national unity, and of preventing harsh antagonisms that would make impossible—or at least much more difficult—the task of building an industrial society." As a result, the Meiji leaders fostered a national ideology that would be strong enough to confront the strains of industrial change but one which also had resonance because of its deep roots in the culture of the Japanese people: social harmony, selfless dedication, loyalty, obedience, deference to authority, and subordination of individual interests to consensus and community.

**Taisho Democracy**

The passing of the Meiji Emperor in 1912 and the succession of the Emperor Taisho (1912-26) serves as a benchmark for changes in the Japanese political spectrum. If the Meiji period was characterized by consensus and a uniform dedication to strengthening Japan, the Taisho era saw the demise of this unity.

The political-economic structure erected by the Meiji oligarchs had worked exceptionally well in bringing about an unprecedentedly rapid and successful industrialization of Japan. Their efforts appeared vindicated in 1894 with the repeal of the unequal treaties. However, the very speed of the economic change combined with the top-down approach to politics confronted Japan's leaders with new problems to solve.

Despite the oligarchs' best efforts, industrial transformation and economic development brought with them dislocations and social tensions. The economic growth had been staggering, but it had not benefitted the population equally. Divisions were especially noticeable in the rural-urban split, where the agricultural sector was hurt because the Meiji government favored industry and imported less expensive foreign rice in order to feed the cities. Social unrest was on the rise, witnessed in the Rice Riots (1918), a rash vigilante attacks on Koreans living in Japan, the growth of labor unions, women's organizations and tenant farmer associations as well as in the influx of radical political thought from abroad (especially socialist and communist). The established order felt challenges from all sides. Economic ups and downs, and especially the 1929 world depression, served to exacerbate the already growing tensions and unrest.

The political and administrative structures of the Taisho era reflected this turmoil in society. On the surface, the sturdy and successful Meiji constitutional structure carried over into the Taisho period unchanged—with power shared between the oligarchs, the civil and military bureaucracies, the Diet, the zaibatsu and the political parties. However, underneath, Japanese governance underwent shifts in the respective roles. The power of the parties (and of popularly elected government) increased substantially while the iron grip on policy of the Meiji oligarchs began to loosen. Through the 1920s and 1930s, the oligarchs and the political parties coexisted—sometimes operating in tandem, sometimes at loggerheads.

*The Meiji Emperor (1868-1912) dressed in an adopted western-style uniform. [Metro Toronto Reference Library]*
Through the Meiji era (and much of Taisho), the Prime Minister was chosen by the oligarchs. Beginning in 1905, a representative of the largest party in the Diet alternated as Prime Minister with the individual appointed by the Meiji elites. From 1924 to 1932, the British practice of the head of the majority party in the Diet becoming Prime Minister became the norm. Moreover, more widespread political participation was on the rise with the introduction, in 1924, of universal male suffrage (women would have to wait until after World War II). Rule by a small group of elites appeared on its way out the door.

In the end, however, parliamentary politics was unable to construct a stable political order. While the changes initially boded well for the growth of parliamentary party democracy—and there was a well-founded belief that democratic representation had truly come to Japan—many people within the power structure were unready and unsympathetic to the vagaries of parliamentary politics. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, party politics was challenged by those—especially the oligarchs, military and zaibatsu—who feared its instability and by those who worried that it might result in a left-leaning government.

At the same time, Japan’s Taisho political parties were not fully mature democratic institutions, nor mass-based organizations. Their power derived not from the mandate of the people but from the power of the political and industrial structure itself. Kenneth Pyle has argued: “The rise of the parties did not involve them making a fundamental change in the political structure. Instead, they succeeded in shrewd infiltration and conciliation on institutional forces established by the Meiji constitution—the oligarchy, the bureaucracy and the military.”

The principal Japanese party during this period was Seiyukai. Its leader, Hara Kei, “gained power [for his party] not by championing popular causes or by seeking reform of the political system ...but by accommodating to the needs of the bureaucracy, by trading party support of government programs for positions in the bureaucracy, and by regional development projects that built support at the local level.” So long as the local leaders would provide their vote support, the gravy train would continue.

In connected trends, the parties became heavily tied to the interests of both the large landlords and the business classes, especially the zaibatsu. The Meiji government had played a significant role in the process of industrialization in order to advance national self-strengthening. Both the zaibatsu and the governing bodies had become accustomed to close ties with the other.

At the same time, the parties tended not to espouse a particular ideological view. Outside of the left-leaning parties (outlawed in 1925), the two primary political groupings held to similar, what some have called ‘pragmatic’, political philosophies—economic growth and national strength were the goals, and the necessary means were taken to achieve them.

The liberal use of the pork barrel and the prevalence corruption have left the political parties open to charges by critics that they were entirely undemocratic and that “Taisho democracy” reflects the shifting of power from one set of elites to another within the confines of the same constitutional and institutional structures. With each accommodation and compromise, the parties became less and less representative of the will of the people and more a part of the consensus-loving elite.

By allying themselves symbiotically with the other power groups within the institutional structure (the bureaucracy, oligarchs and business interests), the political parties cut themselves off from the support of the people. They restricted themselves from instituting any serious overhaul of the existing social and political order (although they did not necessarily have a choice given the nature of the Meiji constitutional system)—structural reforms that would have been to the long-term benefit of parliamentary government and of the political parties themselves.

Most importantly, however, the parties were never able to legitimize themselves within the confines of Japanese values. The nationalist ideology and collectivist ethic, long a part of Japanese culture and purposely fostered by Meiji oligarchs since 1868, had left their mark. The fluidity of the Diet, the competition between different interests, rule by majority rather than consensus, the charges of bribery and interest peddling ran counter to the traditions of the Japanese collective and the nationalist ethos.
While the populace might have been more willing to accept such changes and chaos in good economic times, the downturns of the 1920s made such a seemingly unstable political system appear even more unpalatable. The country was left with a sense that it had been set adrift. Gone, many believed, was the ‘organic unity’ and consensus between the various governing bodies (oligarchs, bureaucracy, military, and the Diet)—the rock that had anchored the political community from the Meiji beginnings.

**Militarism Ascendant: The Failure of Democracy**

Many groups in the Japanese administration were frustrated with the breakdown of consensus and the instability of parliamentary government. The military, for instance, disagreed with the accommodationist foreign policy of the period that called for the status quo and the submission of Japanese territorial desires in favor of the will of the international community.

Two possible responses existed for Meiji leaders uncomfortable with the rising social problems, pressures and instabilities of mass society. They could accede to the demands for reform and adjust the social and political institutions that they had created. Or, they could increase their reliance on authoritarianism and bolster their efforts to bring about national self-sacrifice and mobilization through the further accentuation of such traditional values as social harmony and deference to authority. More often than not, the elites turned to the latter and strove to restrict the range of political debate rather than expand the existing social and political structures: to quash opposition rather than to work with it. The Peace Preservation Law of 1925 served to contract the possible topics for discussion and, specifically, banned leftist political groups who might foment the kind of social revolution that the oligarchs desperately feared. The party-dominated Diet could solve the spiralling social problems no better than the oligarchs. Their close links to the bureaucracy and zaibatsu left them little room to manoeuvre. When the Japanese military forces in China took matters into their own hands in incidents in 1931 (Mukden) and then decisively in 1937 (Marco Polo Bridge), the Diet could do little but stand by and give their tacit support to a fait accompli. There was even less they could do in the face of a rash of assassinations of political figures during the 1920s and 1930s. The parties and parliamentary government were simply not powerful enough to challenge the military who desired conquest and empire (and who were constitutionally responsible only to the Emperor) combined with the zaibatsu who craved the markets and resources that colonies would provide. Nor, for that matter, could the politicians rein in the forces of nationalism fostered by the oligarchs since the Meiji restoration.

Democracy collapsed fully in 1937 and Japan, ruled by a military-fascist government set out on a path of war that led eventually to Japan’s complete defeat, a host of atrocities, the loss of millions of lives and a large-scale destruction of property.

**The American Occupation (1945-1952)**

The American Occupation of Japan (1945-1952) set the stage for the Japanese political structure of the Cold War period and came in two definable parts. The first—a period of reform—challenged the very foundations upon which the Meiji restoration had been based. The second sought to reverse the earlier reform and solidify the traditional political order.

In the first, the Occupation government, under General Douglas MacArthur, implemented a series of ‘radical’ reforms that were designed to bring about a democratization and demilitarization of Japan. The American occupiers believed that a truly democratic political system (as opposed to what they considered the undemocratic the Meiji version) would make Japan less likely to go to war in the future. (Interestingly, the reforms the Americans introduced coincided uncannily with the policies of the banned Japanese communists in the 1920s so feared by the Meiji elite.)

The first step towards this democratization came in 1947 with the revisions to the 1889 constitution. The new constitution cast the emperor in the role of powerless figurehead and symbol of national unity. The Diet was made the highest source of political power and the Prime Minister was required to come from the Diet as was the cabinet. An article was inserted in which Japan renounced war in perpetuity and which denied Japan the right to maintain any standing force for war potential. The political system was decentralized, shifting authority to local organs.

Paul T. Grendle

Combined with this political democratization, the Occupation administration disbanded the zaibatsu, breaking up the intertwined industrial and commercial units. The occupiers saw the zaibatsu as villains whose monopolistic control of industry and commerce caused the need for a forceful Japanese external policy. At the same time, the Administration encouraged the formation of labor unions, and instituted land reform measures, in order to offset the strength of the industrial business powers.

The second half of the occupation period was characterized by a swing to the other extreme and a reversal of many of the original reform policies. As the specter of the Cold War became increasingly real for the United States, the so-called “reverse course” was designed to re-strengthen Japan as quickly as possible as a bulwark against communism in Asia. In it, the priorities of the occupation administration changed from the reform of a non-democratic country to economic recovery and the reconstruction of Japan’s prewar power base.

Often, the occupiers repealed reforms that were already instituted. The leftist forces that had been pandered to, especially concerning the labor unions, were now considered pariahs. The zaibatsu were reconstituted and given official governmental support. A small Self-Defence Force was creat-
ed. The police and educational systems were replaced under central government control. The bureaucracy was recentralized and many leaders who had been purged due to their wartime actions were reinstated for their expertise.

The greatest beneficiary of the Occupation among Japanese political elites was the bureaucracy. While the military and zaibatsu establishments were being deconstructed to reduce their power and the fledgling parties were learning the political ropes, the bureaucracy remained relatively untouched through both parts of the Occupation. As Japan entered the postwar years in 1951 with the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the bureaucracy held the balance of power.

After the Occupation

Post-war Japan is best characterized by the ‘economic miracle’ and political stability. In the first case, Japan grew from an economy devastated by war into the third largest economy in the world by the late 1960s—a rate of growth only matched by the unprecedented burst of the Meiji era. From 1950 to 1970 Japan orchestrated annual rates of growth greater than ten percent on average. It was not until after the ‘oil shock’ (the 1973 Arab oil embargo) that Japanese growth, while everpresent, became more uneven.

Following the ‘to and fro’ reversals of the occupation years, Japanese politics settled down to a pattern of stability in which parliamentary politics played the predominant role. Gone were the chaos and instability of the Taisho years, so too were the Emperor, military and oligarchs as active participants in government. However, the bureaucracy remained strong and many commentators argue that it has been this group, and not the parties, which held the real power in Japan’s policymaking.

Post-war politics was divided between the left-wing (Social Democrats) and the conservative parties, who combined to form the LDP in 1955. The latter ruled this period with pragmatic policies and deft guidance of economic growth. The Social Democrats, on the other hand, were often too consumed by ideological stances to have any attraction to the majority of people, who feared that a Social Democrat government would mean a shift to a Soviet leaning economic policy.

While initially there was a certain amount of legitimate confrontation between the forces of left and right, the conflict quickly took on a solely rhetorical form as the postwar economic boom took off. It was hard for the Social Democrats to be taken seriously in their opposition to the existing structure when it was accomplishing economic miracles. Many political analysts argue that the Social Democrats quickly settled into the role of honorable opposition with the realization that they would never hold office. In many ways the relationship between the LDP and the Social Democrats was analogous to that between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. A tacit understanding was arrived at in which both sides agreed not to directly attack the other, but in which the level of rhetoric remained highly antagonistic.

The true arena of confrontation in postwar Japanese politics lay not within inter-party squabbling but in intra-party confrontation. The LDP was not a unified party but rather a conglomerate of some seven or eight different factions. Factions were, in many respects, parties in their own right. They existed in order to champion the cause of the faction leader. Once in a high position of power, that leader would reward his followers. Loyalty to the faction stood above loyalty to the party because it was the faction that dispensed funds and gave office. Overall party policy was decided in back room sessions where faction influence was ranked and strictly hierarchical.

As the economy soared, the influence of business in political circles returned to prewar levels. At the same time, the bureaucracy continued to dominate the entire political structure. The result was a gigantic political-bureaucratic-industrial structure (‘Japan Inc.’) that has been at the source of Japanese economic growth and the cause of criticism that it is not the politicians who rule Japan.

The Critics Take Power

In many respects, the recent Japanese elections demonstrate a desire on the part of both politicians and populace to incorporate more idealism into the highly pragmatic Japanese social-political-economic machine. They desire a merging of the “realist” politics that have brought—along with staggering economic success—corruption, back-room deals, producer oriented policies and a Japan often closed to the outside world, with certain idealistic principles: clean government, open debate, more direct public participation and a more even share of the economic spoils.

Not to misunderstand, they do not wish to give up their extensive economic growth. They are less opposed to LDP “policies” than to the manner in which “politics” was carried out. Herein lies a clue to Japan’s political future. The call to the new politicians is to continue growth but to chose a path with a more “human face”—a path that will benefit, both spiritually and physically, the “Japanese” as much as “Japan”.

Suggestions for Further Reading


Miroslav Sladek and The Republican Party: A Profile of the Far-Right in the Czech Republic

In the aftermath of the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, right-wing, nationalist movements are appearing throughout the region. While Yugoslavia represents the most well-known and violent example, other countries are undergoing similar political processes. In the new Czech Republic, the prime mover of right-wing politics is Miroslav Sladek, a political pragmatist who preaches a combination of racial intolerance and Czechoslovak nationalism.

by Thomas Ort

When the Association for the Republic-The Republican Party of Czechoslovakia first appeared on Czechoslovakia's political scene in early 1990, few took notice and even fewer cared. After all, in the rapidly evolving political culture following the revolution, parties were multiplying exponentially in the race towards the first free elections that June. At the time, the Association for the Republic-The Republican Party of Czechoslovakia, was just another party with an anti-communist agenda and a long, boring name. It could barely compete with the likes of the Independent Erotic Initiative or the Friends of Beer Party and got about the same number of votes.

But the Republican Party's charismatic chairman, Dr. Miroslav Sladek, did not remain in the shadows for long. Early on, Sladek made a name for himself with daring attacks on the country's hugely popular new president, Vaclav Havel. Though Sladek succeeded mainly in angering or alienating most Czechoslovak voters, to some he made sense. He struck a chord with those who felt they had missed out on the revolution—those who felt disenfranchised by communism and democracy alike, but still wanted their place in the sun.

1989: Hardly A Revolution

The original platform of the Republican Party was unique in its rejection of the November 1989 revolution in which power was partly transferred from the communist regime to Havel's Civic Forum. The Republicans complained that the "Velvet Revolution" was not a revolution at all, but rather a transfer of power from one set of communists to another. This belief stemmed in large part from the wealth of unanswered questions concerning the revolutionary chain of events that began on November 17, 1989 and resulted in the political arrangements between Civic Forum and the KSC (Communist Party of Czechoslovakia). In spite of several investigations into the circumstances, much remains unclear.

On the surface, the Velvet Revolution began on November 17, 1989, as a peaceful march commemorating the death of the student leader Jan Opletal at the hands of the Nazis in 1939. An annual event, the officially sanctioned march had been used by students for many years as a thinly veiled anti-government demonstration. The marchers were met in downtown Prague by an overwhelming force of riot police which attacked the crowd. In this "massacre" several hundred people were severely beaten and one marcher was allegedly killed.

These beatings, and especially the death of the marcher, became the focal points for popular outrage against the regime and the catalyst for revolutionary change. By the end


of the following week, hundreds of thousands of citizens were demonstrating all across Czechoslovakia demanding an end to the KSC’s monopoly on political power. Only later was it revealed that the student who had been “killed” was most likely a secret police operative and that his death had been staged.

It is generally believed that there was some kind of collusion between elements of the StB (the Czechoslovak state security police) and certain reform-minded communists to replace the hardline government of Milos Jakes and Gustav Husak with a regime more in tune with the Soviet model of the Gorbachev era. But it is also accepted that whatever plans existed to bring in a Gorbachev-style government went awry when demonstrators rejected the reform-communist Ladislav Adamec and vociferously demanded that Vaclav Havel become president. It seems that once unleashed, the forces of the revolution and the will of the people could not be contained. In spite of important gaps in the historical record, few dispute the legitimacy of Havel’s rise to power.

Even after the elections of June 1990 clearly reaffirmed Civic Forum’s mandate, Sladek was among those who acted in the turmoil of the revolutionary days in order to discount the legitimacy of the new government. Sladek aligned himself with the likes of Miroslav Dolejsi, author of the appropriately named Analysis of the 17th of November 1989, a political treatise claiming the whole revolution to be a Jewish-Bolshevik-Masonic conspiracy orchestrating by the combined powers of the StB, KGB, CIA, and Mossad. In Dolejsi’s conspiracy, Havel and the opposition movement Charter 77 [founded by dissidents in 1977 following the Helsinki accords, the Charter was a call to the Czechoslovak government to respect human rights and civil freedoms] were pawns of these larger forces in the struggle for world power. Civic Forum was depicted as a group of communist arrivistes who lay waiting in the wings, ready to assume power in the event of any disturbance. Sladek wrote the introduction to an edition of the Analysis co-published by the Republican Party.

Though Sladek accepts Dolejsi’s basic thesis, he does not delve into the particulars of the larger conspiracy. Sladek is neither a conspiratorialist nor an ideologue and the Republican Party adheres to no apparent agenda. On the contrary, Sladek is a pragmatist who well understands the nature of the country’s transformation and its political consequences. As early as January 1990, Sladek recognized that “the opening of the economic market, of capital, and of wealth cannot occur without a dramatic decline in the standard of living and a corresponding increase in social tension. Those things radicalize the population, and that’s when our time will come.” The Republican strategy has been to heighten this radicalization through hatred and fear-mongering.

Sladek easily capitalized on fears of communist recidivism. Every Republican enemy was labeled either a communist or a sympathizer. One such communist was Havel himself, who, in spite of his years in prison for defiance of the totalitarian regime, was continually denounced by Sladek as a collaborator. Sladek preached the total elimination of the communist party and the removal of communists from all areas of power and influence within Czechoslovak society. At the same time, he called for an extension of the lustrace laws—a screening process designed to ferret out those who had secretly collaborated with the regime and its police.

**Sweeping the Streets Clean**

Sladek’s stance vis-à-vis the communists became far more alarming following his notorious declaration in 1991 to “march through the streets of Prague and sweep everything into the Vltava [river].” At the time, “everything” was taken to mean all vestiges of communism, but it soon became clear that Sladek had much more in mind. “Everything” came to include all that was distasteful to the Republican Party. At the top of the list were Gypsies, followed by Vietnamese and other minorities. Not far behind were journalists, politicians, and other public figures who dared cross his path. At meetings of the Republican Party, anyone raising even the slightest objection could expect to be shouted down and quickly ushered out. Sladek was known to treat journalists with similar disdain, sometimes dismissing them with a wave of the hand and an order to his heavies: “Sweep up this mess.”

But it was the Gypsies, the largest non-Slavic group in Czechoslovakia, who bore the brunt of Republican attacks. During the communist years, government policy called for the assimilation of Gypsies into Czechoslovak society. Large numbers were moved from rural Slovakia into industrial and urban northern Bohemia, to the widespread resentment of the local populations. Relations have remained tense and Gypsies are blamed today for rising burglaries and vandalism. Certain towns in northern Bohemia have declared states of emergency concerning the Gypsy population.

Anti-Gypsy racism manifested itself most openly at Republican Party rallies where Sladek typically characterized Gypsies as “inferior,” as “animals” or simply as “subhuman.” From rising crime to “moral degeneration”, he lay the blame for Czechoslovakia’s social malaise squarely on the Gypsies’ doorstep. His concrete suggestions included the imposition of a curfew on the Gypsy population and even forced deportations. In one instance, he offered an Alfa Romeo sports car to the police force of the first town to rid itself of the most Gypsies.

In practical terms, the Republican Party has sought passage of an ostensible immigration law that is in fact aimed at Gypsies who are not legally registered in the Czech Republic. In a poll taken in a northern Bohemian town that voted heavily for Sladek in the June 1992 elections, the two most commonly cited reasons for voting for the Republican Party were “the Gypsy problem” and “the liquidation of the communists.”
A Call For Greater Czechoslovakia

The Republican Party also cultivated a militant form of Czechoslovak nationalism. They strongly opposed the breakup of Czechoslovakia and advocated the reclamation of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, a region of eastern Slovakia that was annexed by the Soviet Union following World War II and which now belongs to Ukraine. In March 1992, Sladek traveled to the Sub-Carpathian region and declared: “We are not on the territory of Ukraine. This is part of the Czechoslovak Federal Republic.” Sladek has established a regional office of the Republican Party in Ukraine. Many months after the fact, Sladek continued to reject the breakup of Czechoslovakia and maintained his calls for the return of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia to Slovakia—a country he does not represent. Sladek’s revanchism in turn played into the hands of Slovak nationalists who are sensitive to any perceived infringement of their sovereignty.

Sladek’s objections to the breakup of Czechoslovakia are likewise driven by his visions of grandeur for a greater Czechoslovakia. According to the Republican chairman, fear of a resurgent Czechoslovakia drove the West to conspire for its demise. For him, the 1938 Munich Conference in which the Sudetenland was surrendered to Germany, was replaying itself: “We won’t allow another Munich! Havel, [Czech Prime Minister Vaclav] Klaus, and [Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir] Meciar have sold us to the Germans. The West is afraid of a united Czechoslovakia. Today we have the best chance ever of becoming the world’s fourth superpower after the USA, Russia, and China.” Sladek has advanced this interpretation despite the public opposition of most Western governments towards the breakup of Czechoslovakia.

A Movable Platform

Sladek’s stance betrays a profound suspicion of Western democracy and the market system. He has ridiculed Western election monitors and has brushed aside criticism of the lustrace proceedings by international human rights organizations. Though he has sought to characterize himself as an economic reformer, Sladek may actually have more in common with Slovakia’s proto-socialist Meciar, than with the Czech Republic’s Thatcherite Klaus. Sladek has repeatedly criticized the sale of state-owned businesses to foreign companies as well as the large scale of foreign investment in Czechoslovakia. The details of his own economic plans remain elusive.

In actual dealings with the West, and the United States in particular, Sladek cleverly employs a double standard. In a visit to the U.S. in May 1992, Sladek cast himself as a friend of America and champion of business and the market. Taking advantage of the coincidence of names, Sladek forged a spurious link between the Czechoslovak Republican Party and the American GOP. He targeted the large Czechoslovak immigrant community of suburban Chicago and in fact received widespread support from local and national politicians of the area. American leaders were so convinced of Sladek’s stature in Czechoslovakia that they literally rolled out the red carpet for him.

He was personally welcomed to Chicago by State Senator Judy Barr Topinka and Governor of Illinois Jim Edgar, who saw fit to commend Sladek for his efforts to bring “true freedom and democracy” to Czechoslovakia. Later, in Washington, D.C., Sladek met with Illinois Congressmen Hyde and Lipinsky. Photographs of Sladek with these American politicians were widely publicized by the Czechoslovak Republican Party during the 1992 election campaign, increasing the party’s credibility and contributing to its electoral success. While in the United States, Sladek tailored his agenda for American consumption, softening his attacks on Havel, and even compli-
menting him occasionally. Back in Czechoslovakia, however, Sladek proclaimed that he had obtained material from an unspecified archive in Washington that conclusively proved that Havel had been a communist.

The Rising Cult of Sladek

Sladek’s commitment to the principles of democracy has been questioned almost from the moment of his appearance on the Czechoslovak political scene. Indeed, some of the most strident criticism has come from within the ranks of his own party. In December 1991, a founding member and former Republican chairman, Jiri Kohout was expelled from the party following repeated disputes with Sladek. Soon after his expulsion, Kohout told reporters: “Republican Chairman Miroslav Sladek is a dictator. His only concern is himself and his own popularity.” Sladek has often made clear that his person and the party are synonymous and that he will not tolerate any internal challenge to his authority. In subsequent power struggles within the Republican Party, several other deputies who criticized Sladek’s undemocratic leadership and dictatorial management of the party have likewise been expelled.

A cult of personality has sprung up around Sladek. At a rare press conference and public address in Brno, a wide variety of Sladek memorabilia was displayed. To be sure, there were the ubiquitous Sladek pins and posters; more unusual were the paintings and articles of clothing. During the long and painful years of Communist oppression, Sladek had turned to painting for solace and had even sold some of his works for cash. Now the mustard-hued street scenes, impassive still lifes, murky landscapes and garish abstractions were all available for public scrutiny.

The clothes were relics of Sladek’s fame, political and otherwise: a jacket, torn at the shoulder during a scuffle with police; a shirt, ripped during a similar incident; the tie worn in his famous poster; and a hat he once wore as an extra in a film. To devotees of the Republican cause, Sladek is a visionary — the one who showed them the forest from the trees in the chaos of post-Communist disintegration. Amidst the confusion, he has designated clear enemies and drawn the battle lines for them.

Into the Mainstream

On June 5-6, 1992, Sladek and the Republican Party shed their fringe status and entered the mainstream of Czechoslovak politics. The Republican Party won nearly 7% of the vote and gained seats in all houses of Parliament: fourteen seats in the Czech National Council, and seven seats in both the Chamber of Nations and the Chamber of the People. Economically depressed northern Bohemia emerged as a Republican stronghold, with Sladek winning over 10% of the vote in that region. In the industrial center of Usti nad Labem, the Republicans won nearly 17% of the vote, second only to the Civic Democratic Party of Vaclav Klaus.

By contrast, the elections were a major upset for Civic Movement, spiritual heir to the revolutionary Civic Forum, which failed to clear the 5% hurdle necessary to enter Parliament. Although the Republican Party ran as a national party, campaigning in both the Czech and Slovak republics, the number of votes it received in Slovakia was insignificant, establishing it firmly as a Czech phenomenon.

It was once thought that the Republican Party was nothing more than a passing distraction at the margins of the Czechoslovak political scene. Today, the party is recognized as a permanent fixture on the political landscape of the Czech Republic. It has quietly become a viable and legitimate political alternative. Moreover, the Republican Party’s presence in Parliament has given it a new status. In testimony to his newly-found palatability and respectability, Sladek received a substantial number of votes from outside his own party during one of his bids for the country’s presidency.

From its origins in the turmoil of the revolution to its success in the 1992 elections, the Republican Party has steadily cultivated the sentiments of the disaffected and disenfranchised in Czech society. While Sladek was condemned as a psychopath and a fool by both the media and the political establishment, he has repeatedly proven that he is not. In the Republican Chairman’s own words: “So what if they don’t take me seriously. One day they’ll wake up and I’ll be president or prime minister, and that will be bad luck for them.”

Suggestions for Further Reading


Spending Other People’s Money:
Debt, Deficits and Canada’s Public Sector

The reduction of Canada’s overall debt and annual budget deficits has become a central issue in the current Canadian federal election campaign. The debt problem has brought to the fore questions concerning the government’s role in the economy. Yet answers remain elusive: whether federal debt is useful, even necessary, or just ‘necessarily bad’ and who will pay for the nation’s coveted social services.

"The implications [of the recession’s longevity] are rather straightforward: to raise consumer spending, Canadian governments must cut their own, and eliminate the deficit.”
- Herbert Grubel, professor, Simon Fraser University, August, 1993.

"The prevailing error is the belief that the best way to reduce government debt is to cut spending.”
- Duncan Cameron, June, 1993.

"Canada’s social safety net is stretched to the tearing point because of needless expenditures on people who have not paid their way.”
- Diane Francis, August, 1993.

by Donna Beaudin

Of late, calls for ‘deficit reduction’ and ‘paying off the debt’ are heard from almost every corner of Canadian society. As private corporations move to ‘downsize’ and ‘restructure’ in an attempt to stave off economic decline, a comparable attitude has taken hold of Canadians vis-à-vis government. Yet, understanding the current debt debate is by no means an easy task.

Today, the Canadian public sector holds an accumulated debt of approximately $600 billion, of which $225 billion is owed to foreigners. The projected 1993 budget deficit stands at $60 billion. In an attempt to place these figures into perspective, the Canadian Taxpayers Federation recently issued a study that ranked the debt-to-gross-domestic-product ratio of countries around the world. The resulting rankings left Canadians worried and wondering. Canada stood fortieth in the world in 1991 (with a ratio of 85%), wedged just behind Burundi, only slightly ahead of Morocco, and behind all other industrialized countries except Italy—not where the G7 Canadian public figured they would find themselves.

Understanding the Debt

In response to the statistics, many analysts point to a ‘debt crisis’—that Canada’s level of indebtedness is straining the recessionary economy and having harmful consequences on its reputation abroad (and will continue to do so until it is reduced). They argue that too great a part of Canada’s resources are going to debt repayment; that government borrowing is prohibiting essential private borrowing; and that talk of debt reduction looms over consumers leaving them unsure how government measures to reduce the debt would affect them.

On the other hand, some groups deny the existence of a ‘crisis’ at all. An analysis this year out of the Canadian brokerage firm, Wood-Gundy, argued that if ‘debt crisis’ is defined as the inability to borrow on foreign capital markets, then no crisis exists. At the same time, few economists or politicians dispute the necessity

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of at least a certain amount of debt in order to keep the economy growing and moving. Just in the way the private sector would stagnate without borrowing in order to invest, so too would the public sector. For these people, the problem is not so much debt reduction as it is reducing the burden of carrying the debt and avoiding taking on new debt.

Along similar lines, other analysts assert that a ‘crisis’ would exist only if the public sector began to borrow solely to meet interest payments and put none towards productive investment (such as health care or education). They do not see such a situation (35%-40% of government revenues are earmarked to pay public debt interest charges). Yet, many question what are acceptable levels of debt, how it should be managed properly and who should bear the burden of financing it.

Caught in the whirlwind of the debate are Canada’s social programs. Historically, the Canadian government has chosen to borrow in order to enhance the present and future quality of life of its citizens—whether in railway building, economic stimulation or a national health care system. Yet, today, funding for many of these programs is diminishing and Canadians are angry. They point to what they see as political mismanagement—inefficient, wasteful overspending and a fattened bureaucracy—as the culprit.

However, Canadians recoil from and resist the idea of deficit reduction if it means austerity and are frustrated by the threat of having to pay more for the same (or lower) level of service. They would accept cuts and pay more taxes if they actually believed that the generated revenue would be used to the benefit of the society as a whole, but they have lost faith in the government and are distrustful of politicians in general. Significantly, the outrage has brought to question the very notions of a welfare state. More people now call for a structure of social services that is more selective in its giving, and one in which an individual would receive from it what they put into it.

While Canadians and their elected representatives are concerned about the current public debt, any solution to the ‘crisis’ will have to come to terms with why the debt exists. Why are governments such active agents within the Canadian economy? What forms has their spending and revenues taken over time? Have government spending and revenue patterns and philosophies changed in the past century and a half and, if so, how? What are appropriate reductions in the country’s debt levels?

Colonial Debts and Developments

National debt is not solely a late twentieth century issue. Indeed, its roots pre-date the 1867 creation of the Dominion of Canada, and critics in the mid-1800s were already cursing the existence and extent of public sector debt. The public debt of colonial Canada was firmly anchored in government-sponsored internal improvements for the colony. The means of securing the necessary revenue tended to follow the British pattern—a combination of internal revenue sources (in the form of customs or excise taxes) and external revenue (in the form of borrowing from non-Canadian investors, especially British).

Governments used the money to initiate, or continue, construction projects that would encourage economic growth within in the colony. These projects included transportation facilities, particularly canals, railways and harbors, which would increase the markets available to business and facilitate the transport of troops and materials for national defense.

Private sector pressure was often inadequate to build such commercial and infrastructure facilities. Moreover, the government often found itself thrust into the position of caretaker for projects initially funded by private groups that found themselves financially unviable.

The 1850s produced a boom in railway construction. The Railway Loan Guarantee Act (1849) made colonial railway construction a government-guaranteed venture carried out by private interests and attractive to British investors who liked the reduced risk. The construction of the Grand Trunk Railway (incorporated 1852) was ambitious, combining colonial savings with British capital. Its construction costs ($67 million) exceeded all other public works spending by the Province of Canada between 1841 and Confederation.

Confederation, Nation-Building and Economic Prosperity

With the creation of the Dominion of Canada in 1867, the new Dominion government took on all of the old colonial debts (gross debt of $98 million). In exchange it was given unlimited power of taxation (dominated by customs and excise duties, especially on liquor and tobacco). The federal administration was assigned “the most costly functions...with the most important revenue sources” out of the belief that certain programs and services were essential to national well-being (such as public works programs)—services that, if left to the private sector, might not be provided to the benefit of everyone if, indeed, they were carried out at all.

During the late 19th century, Prime Minister John A. Macdonald’s National Policy comprised three planks: a railway link between the Maritimes and the central provinces; promotion of westward expansion for agricultural survey and settlement; and development of a trade policy that would improve access to American markets for Canadian primary products while protecting domestic manufacturing and other industries. Fulfillment of these promises ensured a central role for the
government in Canada's economic and social structures.

Existing government income was insufficient to finance the promised railway construction. Macdonald was hopeful that the venture would attract private investors like the Grand Trunk Railway project had—a hope that was never realized. By 1874, construction of the Intercolonial Railway had become a publicly-funded enterprise. Revenue for this project was raised by means of a four-million pound loan from Great Britain, three-quarters of which was guaranteed by the British imperial government. The Intercolonial Railway's profits never exceeded its construction and operating costs.

By the 1880s, railway construction became an even larger component of the Dominion government's liabilities, as the promise of a transcontinental railway was used to lure the colonies of British Columbia and Vancouver Island into joining Confederation in 1871. The government attempted to sidestep the possibility of financing the line's construction directly. Instead, they promised government subsidies and land grants to private businessmen who undertook the project, along with such lesser concessions as exemptions from taxation of railway lines and buildings.

In response to its promise to procure favorable markets for Canadian products while protecting developing industries, the Dominion government implemented a policy of tariff rates on foreign goods. These tariffs initially served a dual purpose, as sources of revenue and as protectors of industry. In fact, along with excise duties, tariffs produced the largest component of government revenues.

From 1867-1896, the federal debt increased three-fold (from approximately $98 to $325 million). Improvements in transportation, agriculture, and the increase of the public domain—all "productive purposes"—accounted for over half of Dominion government expenditures during this era of nation-building.

Under the government of Wilfrid Laurier (1896-1911), subsidies on agricultural production and manufacturing continued, and there was a four-fold increase in the level of expenditures by the federal government. But the government's revenues grew faster than did its expenditures, producing a period of budgetary surpluses and per capita debt declined. Notably, a majority of the public debt was held outside Canada (loans from London's business and investment sector).

**Canadian Involvement in the Great War**

As a British Dominion, Canada was heavily involved in World War I from the outset—providing soldiers, supplying equipment and provisioning (and later, demobilizing) troops.

By 1915, Great Britain's ability to finance Canadian war expenditures waned. The Dominion government was forced to turn away from a reliance on British investment, towards a dual policy of internal taxation and "borrowings and credit expansion". Canadian citizens now played a much more prominent role in government revenue. During the war, the Dominion government generated unprecedented annual loans, to the tune of $50 million at the beginning and, eventually, $300 million. These loans were effected through the sale of bonds in a series of issues (only the last issue, in November 1919, was taxable).

Revenues to help pay for war-related expenditures were also raised through direct taxation, implementing the Dominion government's (hitherto theoretical) wide-ranging taxation powers. A federal tax on corporate profits was introduced in 1916. In the following year, in what was meant to be a temporary measure, the first federal personal income taxes were collected (the Dominion Income War Tax Act). However, these direct taxes accounted for less than one-tenth of federal revenues during the War.

By 1918, the costs and capital expenditures of the war (combined with government acquisition of further Canadian railways and the assumption of their liabilities) increased the size of the nation's public debt six-fold to approximately $3 billion. It has been estimated that just over half of the annual federal budget at this time was devoted to debt charges, approximately one-quarter went to war pensions, and the rest was directed at balancing the prices and wages of government services and employees.

**Debt, Depression, & Government Intervention**

The Great Depression (1929-39, the "Dirty Thirties"), and the downturn in the global economy, placed considerable strain on Canada's system of public finance. Regional and wealth disparities were exacerbated. The perceived role of the federal government during the Depression was threefold: to aid severely depressed industries, such as railways, coal, and wheat; to assist provincial governments in meeting their relief costs, particularly across western Canada; and to assist the worst-off provinces with continued provision of essential services, predominantly in western and maritime Canada.

While the federal government's revenues declined, attempts were made to achieve economic stability through increases in sales taxes, import duties, and personal income tax.
rates. However, there was little, if any, inter-governmental cooperation as federal and provincial governments scrambled after any and all sources of revenue. The strained federal-provincial relations made proposed economic solutions (usually along Keynesian lines) difficult to arrive at. As a result, the Depression saw a significant increase in the public debt: in 1930 it stood at $2.5 billion, but by the end of the Depression it had climbed to $3.6 billion.

**World War II: New-Style Financing**

During World War II, the government had three clear objectives: secure ample funds for equipping, provisioning, and transporting the armed forces; raise funds by increasing and emphasizing direct taxes (based on ability to pay, to ensure a more equitable distribution of the physical hardships of war); and supplement direct controls in terms of prices, production and use of materials.

![Sources of Federal Government Revenue](chart)

These aims were achieved through high taxation of income along with goods and services that were not considered “necessities of life”—eventually including: civilian motor vehicles, smokers’ supplies, radios, cosmetics, movie tickets, soft drinks, passenger transportation, candy, and pencils. New types of taxes—such as the 1941 Dominion Inheritance (Succession) Tax and the first gasoline tax—were also introduced.

During the war, revenues raised through borrowing were procured completely from within Canada. This was achieved through the conversion and renewal of previous issues of bonds, as well as through the Bank of Canada and the chartered banks. Between January 1940 and May 1945, the Dominion government also deliberately targeted Canadians with ten public bond campaigns, none of which were tax exempt—a policy in marked contrast with the tax-exempt status of Great War bonds.

The net public debt grew throughout World War II (from $3.2 billion in 1939, to $13.4 billion by 1945). But, Canadians had been willing to sacrifice for what they considered a “moral cause”. The taking on of debt was received without a second thought.

**Postwar Changes: “Neither a Borrower Nor a Lender Be”?**

In 1946, Dominion indebtedness stood at slightly less than $19 billion (of which only 3% was payable outside of Canada). However, from 1946 to roughly 1973, growth, prosperity and expansion were the hallmarks of the Canadian economy. In the postwar period, regular annual federal budgets became the norm for the first time. Nevertheless, strict fiscal management was often neglected in favor of government spending projects and taxation objectives.

From 1946 to 1956, the federal government experienced a string of annual budget surpluses (with a deficit year of adjustment in 1954) and often falling levels of unemployment. However, Canadians lived through an economic recession from 1957-61 in which unemployment accelerated and budget deficits were characteristic as the government strove to spend its way out of the recessionary economy.

Through the 1950s, the Dominion government continued to be involved in public projects which centered around resource development, participation in the Korean War, and rapid demographic change (the so-called ‘baby boom’). Money was spent to help expand the petroleum industry (a feature of western Canadian economic growth); to improve the St. Lawrence Seaway; as well as in hydro-electric and iron ore extraction projects in Quebec and Labrador.

It was not until the 1960s that proper management of fiscal policy become a matter of concern to policy-makers, largely in response to rates of inflation deemed unacceptable. A hiring freeze was placed on the civil service, a ceiling was raised on the amount by which government expenditures could increase, a tax surcharge was imposed, and rising unemployment rates were examined. From 1962-72, budgets swung back and forth almost annually between surplus and deficit as economic growth came in fits and starts, but with an overall surplus for the period.

The postwar period further witnessed an increasingly heavy reliance on borrowing not only to secure necessary revenues to fund development and social service programs but also to meet the rising costs of interest payments on the debt. The government borrowed because it was concerned with reducing and controlling inflation and desirous of lowering tax rates that had soared during wartime. Along with these policies came the “acceptance of deficit financing to stimulate the economy” as the core of federal fiscal management.
The Social Safety Net

After 1946, federal economic policy shifted somewhat, away from attempts to promote and foster economic growth, towards taking advantage of the benefits of such growth. Following in the theme of such 1920s social service programs as the old-age pension plan, there was a new determination to use the federal infrastructure to provide for the "health, education, and income-security needs of individual Canadians". Redistribution of the nation's wealth became a focal policy concern—social policies and regional development commitments now taken for granted—and were affordable in the expansive economic atmosphere of the day. The shift toward social policies intended for all Canadians, regardless of ability to pay, represented a fundamental transition in attitudes both of the role of government in people's personal lives and of the notion that only those who could pay deserved services.

Against the background of restructured federal-provincial fiscal arrangements (in which provinces moved from tax-sharing to tax-collection), initiative for a "comprehensive social-security system" came more from the provinces than from the centre. As early as 1947, Saskatchewan introduced a Hospital Services Plan that was funded by compulsory premiums and allowed people to have free hospital care. Such policies were complemented by federal health grants. In 1966, the Medical Care Act introduced a comprehensive national health-insurance scheme. It was created as a shared-cost program under which the provinces had to provide insurance plans that coincided with federal definitions of universality and accessibility.

Universality and accessibility were also reflected in federal spending, legislation, and program creation: improved accessibility to education was to be provided through the Canada Student Loans Act (1964); income-security, through the Old Age Assistance Act, was effected for persons who passed a means test; and shared-cost programs were implemented to benefit the unemployed and the physically disabled. The 1927 old-age pension system was revamped in the 1966 Canada Pension Plan. Parallel changes were made for regional development and associated policy, and were aimed particularly at disadvantaged regions.

Throughout this period the number of people employed by the public sector increased. With each new social program and development project, a new team of managers and clerics were required. Government overemployment was used on occasion as a means to battle rising unemployment figures.

Government Getting & Spending: the 1970s & 1980s

Through the last generation of government 'getting and spending', energy taxes became an increasingly important source of federal revenue. Yet, from 1974 on, this approach failed to secure a budgetary surplus. To make up the shortfall, federal governments turned to foreign, rather than internal, borrowing because growth in the business sector and in personal disposable income levels were deemed insufficient to support increased taxation.

Explanations abound over the growth of the national debt during the 1980s. On one hand, many argue that the problem resulted from overspending and fiscal mismanagement on the part of the government. Canada's public sector simply took on too much responsibility in the economy, promised too many social services, became too greatly involved in development, and hired too many people.

Other analysts see the problem not in terms of 'government spending out of control' but in the collapse of revenues. Some claim that increased debt is the result of the interest rate policies of the Bank of Canada. John Crow, Governor of the Bank of Canada, took a firm stand to hold inflation in check. To that end, he kept interest rates high while maintaining a strong dollar. The upshot has been high costs for borrowing on the part of the government. Thus, the cause of debt growth lies not in overspending on programs but in the substantial amounts governments have been required to pay on their borrowings.

Certain commentators point to the structure of the tax system and its built in "tax expenditures". By providing incentives and loopholes for certain parts of society (and most exponents here point to big corporations and the banking industry), the government has forgone a considerable income. Tax expenditures are also found in the area of RRSPs and pension plans where approximately $11 billion per year of potential tax revenues are lost because earnings from such sources are not taxable.

Policy analyst Michael Walker argues that federal public debt and deficits had, by the 1980s, become a political, rather than economic, issue. Canadians were accepting, even demanding, of the same quantity and quality in their social programs as when they were first introduced but seemed less willing to pay for them. Out of this disparity in attitudes came, for example, the 'great pension debate' that was carried on through the 1970s.

Thus, federal administrations through the 1980s acted in accordance with political pressure to continue to provide the...
services and programs to which Canadians had become accustomed. For political survival, the government borrowed against the assets of the country during a time of federal prosperity, a practice which economists now regard as both inappropriate and fiscally unsound (many economists maintain that the time to effect government spending decreases is during times of overall economic growth).

1993: What's a Taxpayer To Do?

From one perspective, solutions to debt and deficit reduction are simple: increase revenues and/or decrease expenditures. However, the how and why of bolstering revenues or reducing expenditures is a maze. All analysts point to the problem of sizable foreign debt. While parts of debt payments made domestically can be recouped through taxes, payments to foreign sources are lost forever. They point to pension funds and the possible issue of domestic savings bonds (to rival the banks’ GICs) as potential sources to repatriate the debt.

Proponents of expenditure reduction target two areas: the government bureaucracy and social services. They see the bureaucracy as a privileged, non-suffering sector of society and call for cuts to parliamentary and civil service income levels and benefits. They further demand an overall reduction in the size of the civil service, a downsizing like any private organization would have to undergo. Cost-cutting analysts also see the reorientation of social service programs as a necessity. They believe that too many programs provide services to too many people and especially to those who have contributed little to the system.

At the other end of the spectrum, analysts argue that expenditure reduction is simply not enough, nor is it a viable option in a recession. The sudden removal of millions of public sector dollars from the economy—cutting back on services, sending public servants out to pasture—can only push up unemployment and withdraw demand from the economy. Moreover, many voices claim that decreasing services is unacceptable since it hurts the poor more than the rich.

Governments, they argue, must strive to raise their revenues. This could be done through a reallocation in the Bank of Canada’s interest and exchange rate policies, which would make borrowing less expensive. It could further be accomplished by changes in the taxation structure that would remove “tax expenditures”, especially to corporations.

While most analysts recommend a combination of the two approaches, the public waits for the debt crisis to be solved. Given its roots in the colonial era, it is one that will not be resolved overnight. While, the government has been strongly involved in Canada’s economy from the outset, the form of that involvement may change under the weight of recent criticism. To extricate the nation from current economic difficulties will require patience and perseverance on the part of the public and solid, often politically unpopular, decision-making on the part of those in office.

Suggestions for Further Reading


A. Milton Moore, J. Harvey Perry, and Donald I. Beach. The Financing of Canadian Federation: The First Hundred Years, tax paper no. 43 (Canadian Tax Foundation, 1966).


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American Internationalism in the 20th Century: The Search For a “New World Order”

With the end of the Cold War, the architects of American foreign policy are faced with a less dangerous, but perhaps more complex arena in which to act. As foreign policy experts propose varying objectives and levels of American engagement in a world no longer marked by the relative simplicity of a bipolar struggle, it is useful to consider the general principles upon which American policymakers have acted over the last century. [Part II of II].

by Mark Meier

The end of the Cold War presents a curious dilemma for American foreign policymakers. For over forty years, anti-communism stood as the catch-all motive and rationale for U.S. global intervention. Now, without as clear an enemy to democracy and free trade, American ideologues find themselves bereft of an easy explanation for international intervention. In response, the U.S is struggling to redefine its ‘national interests’ and how best to attain them.

Since the United States stepped from isolationism onto the world stage following the Spanish-American War (1898), American global activism has been based generally on a combination of moral and economic motives to foster liberal democracy as a way of life and free trade as the international economic structure. During the first decades of the twentieth century, internationalism ebbed and flowed in intensity from the almost missionary involvement of President Woodrow Wilson in the First World War to the relative retrenchment under the Republican presidents of the 1920s and 1930s.

However, the circumstances of World War II (1939-45) brought global activism back to the forefront. In the post-World War II era of the Cold War, America pursued a course of global involvement that was unprecedented and unique in its history. This particularly active internationalism manifested three characteristics: persistent and vehement opposition to communism, particularly represented by the Soviet Union; a greater willingness than ever to participate in international security agreements and alliance structures, such as NATO and the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO); and increasing militarism, a blurring of the distinction between diplomatic and military strategy.

Postwar global activism was also characterized by increasing domestic criticism and, during the Vietnam War, the breakdown of consensus over the postwar American mission. Critics claimed that the strength of U.S. anti-communism on occasion subsumed the general liberal tenets that underlay such opposition to communism. U.S. policy was opened to charges of using methods and supporting governments that were antithetical to the world order that it espoused. Moreover, while it is difficult to separate ideals from interests, other analysts asserted that American support of free trade acted to the U.S.’s advantage economically, and was not ideological in motivation.

The Clinton presidency enjoys the dubious honor of blazing a new trail—of sculpting a new age of American global involvement to reflect a changing world and a different America. However, despite all of the confusion and self-questioning, past themes of U.S. foreign policy continue to guide and influence internationalist decision-making. Even with a young team in the White House, Cold War patterns of involvement and modes of thinking—interventionist, militaristic—will take many years to transform entirely. By the same token, while American moral and economic internationalism seemed far more clear in an age when America’s moral and economic stature were held in higher regard, the long-standing impulses to bring the liberal-democratic-free trade ideology to other countries still make their presence strongly felt.

Wartime Diplomacy and Global Responsibility
During World War II, traditional patterns of internationalism
were in many ways put on hold as President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) sought to prevent any interference with Allied commitment to and cooperation in the war effort. Nonetheless, American commitment to a world order based on free trade and national self-determination caused some friction among the Allies. At the Atlantic Conference meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt in August 1941, the president attempted unsuccessfully to pressure the British to give up their colonial possessions, as well as the economic barriers that the Commonwealth had constructed.

The pattern established by FDR in his dealings with the Soviet Union during the war also reflected the overwhelming importance of keeping the alliance together. Roosevelt was content to temporize and to discuss in only the most vague, non-committal ways the shape of the postwar world—a source of sharp criticism of his administration by early 1945. On issue after issue, from the fate of liberated Poland to the treatment of the defeated Germans, Roosevelt appeared to equivocate in the face of Soviet demands. In fairness, by 1945 there was little that the president could do, particularly with regard to Eastern Europe where the Soviets held de facto control. By the time of Roosevelt’s death in April 1945, his successor Harry Truman inherited a situation where temporizing and empty agreements would no longer suffice.

The transition from Roosevelt to Truman was a fateful one for American foreign policy. Truman was almost completely unschooled in foreign affairs. In addition, Roosevelt tended to keep his Vice President uninformed on critical issues involving the shape of the postwar world (most notably the development of atomic weapons). Lacking Roosevelt’s personal skills and self-confidence in dealing with foreign relations, Truman was influenced to a far greater degree by his advisors, particularly in the State Department.

Since the close of World War I, the State Department had provided the breeding ground for a new generation of foreign policy experts committed to a concept of active internationalism. They considered America’s policy objectives a seamless web of moral virtues and economic interests. Roosevelt’s Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, typified this new generation, and was a persistent spokesman for internationalism within the administration. Hull believed that global free trade would foster international interdependence, thus reducing the risk of hostilities between nations, and that the United States could and should assume the leading role in spreading the virtues of capitalism, free trade, and democracy.

Truman reacted more intransigently towards the Soviet Union, at least in part due to his sense that the atomic bomb gave him a trump card. At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 (after Germany’s surrender but before Japan’s), Truman attempted to use “atomic diplomacy” to pressure the Soviets into more cooperative positions on the reconstruction of Germany and the fate of Eastern Europe. Stalin was nonplussed by such tactics, and the conference ended without establishing any agreements. It was the last such conference among the Allies, and was a harbinger of the contentious relationship between East and West which would dominate world affairs for the next forty years.

**Pax Americana and the Dawn of the Cold War**

The course of events between 1945 and 1950 were critical in establishing the imperative for, and tone of, the American crusade. By 1950, the U.S. had committed itself to military and economic involvement in Europe and Asia on an unprecedented peace-time scale. America resolved to contain communism and even roll it back, and internationalism gained ever increasing momentum from this resolve.

In the spring of 1947, Truman announced that the U.S. would provide aid to Greece and Turkey to assist in combating leftist insurgents. He further declared a broader principle that the U.S. would aid any governments which faced similar insurgencies—the “Truman Doctrine”. In the summer of 1947, Truman’s Secretary of State George Marshall proposed that the U.S. extend massive economic aid to reconstruct the shattered nations of Europe. When the Marshall Plan was approved the next year, the Soviet Union strongly encouraged Eastern European nations not to participate.

The 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia firmly entrenched a pro-Soviet government in that country, and also established that the Soviets were willing to sacrifice national self-determination for a secure buffer zone in Eastern Europe. In late 1948, the Soviet Union closed the border between East and West Germany, and the U.S. responded by airlifting supplies into West Berlin. Finally, in the dizzying year of 1949, the U.S. and the nations of Western Europe formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Soviets successfully exploded an atomic bomb, and mainland China became communist under the government of Mao Zedong.

In 1947, in the midst of this hectic five year period, George Kennan (a Foreign Service officer assigned to the Soviet Union) outlined in an anonymously published article what he believed were “the sources of Soviet conduct.” In addition to revolutionary Marxism and the paranoia of Josef Stalin, Kennan believed that traditional Russian imperialism would exert a lasting impact on Soviet foreign policy. The United States’ response, Kennan argued, ought to aim to contain the Soviet Union within the territory it currently held, while doing everything in its power to “increase the strains under which Soviet power must operate.” In the same article, Kennan eloquently described the sense of American mission (a phenomenon under
Wilson, now about to become an article of faith:

[The] thoughtful observer of Russian-American relations will find no cause for complaint in the Kremlin's challenge to American society. He will rather experience a certain gratitude to a Providence which, by providing the American people with this implacable challenge, has made their entire security as a nation dependent on their pulling themselves together and accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them to bear.

This strategy of containment quickly took root in the Truman administration (and guided U.S. policymakers into the 1980s). While economic aid to Western Europe served U.S. economic interests by revitalizing America's trading partners, it was cast by the Truman administration as a necessary measure to check the expansion of communism. The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and NATO were the first U.S. steps in constructing a policy of containment, but did not yet address the question of military security, which was becoming increasingly important.

The Militarization of the Cold War: NSC-68 and Korea

While America rapidly demobilized after World War II, the Soviets maintained a relatively large military. U.S. strategists could count only upon their monopoly of atomic weapons to prevent Soviet adventurism, and this was not regarded as either a long-lasting or reliable solution. In 1947, the National Security Act was passed, which created the National Security Council. The NSC was intended to coordinate U.S. diplomatic, military, and intelligence planning. Its creation was the beginning of a close relationship between military and diplomatic strategies—the hallmark of Cold War foreign policy.

In early 1950, the NSC introduced NSC-68, one of the most significant documents of the Cold War. NSC-68 proposed a five-year plan for rearming the U.S. and defending against the Soviet Union. The crux of the plan was a tripling of the U.S. defense budget—a political hard sell for the Truman administration, which was already drawing fire for problems in the domestic economy.

Fate intervened, however, in the form of the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950. Truman's response was quick and decisive, as the U.S. took the lead role in a United Nations effort to push back the North Koreans. While Korea proved to be a military and political quagmire for the Truman administration, it fostered support for the NSC's recommendations. The U.S. defense budget immediately jumped to the levels prescribed by NSC-68, where they remained for the next forty years.

A "New Look" Under Eisenhower

All three principal components of U.S. Cold War policy were thus firmly entrenched by the end of the Truman administration—anti-communism, alliances and militarism—and they represented dramatic departures from earlier incarnations of American internationalism. All were products of suspicion toward, and competition with, the Soviet Union, and demonstrate the way in which anti-communism indelibly changed American internationalism. At heart, long-range visions of a Pax Americana—a U.S.-led free trade and liberal democratic world order—still guided U.S. internationalism. However, the presence of a (seemingly) immediate military and ideological threat posed by the Soviet Union gave new urgency to this mission, and shaped both short-run policies and long-range thinking.

Much of Dwight Eisenhower's appeal in the 1952 presidential election stemmed from the impression that he could bring strength and stability to U.S. foreign policy, along with the immediate cessation of the Korean War. Eisenhower did not consider the possibility that the U.S. would relinquish its role as guardian of the free world. The U.S. further aligned itself with other nations through treaties and security agreements, and continued to focus efforts on rebuilding Germany and Japan, which were regarded as the linchpins of economic security in Europe and Asia. However, he also had little inclination (as a fiscal conservative mindful of balanced budgets) to continue the pattern of costly defense spending sparked by NSC-68 and the Korean War. With the first detonation of a hydrogen bomb in March of 1954, a potential solution appeared and the "New Look" defense policy was born.

The "New Look" was predicated on an American advantage in nuclear weapons technology and delivery systems, which provided far more "bang for the buck" than conventional weapons. This policy was based on the assumption that the United States would not hesitate to use such weapons in whatever quantities necessary for the defense of Western Europe or its Asian allies. The tactic of "brinkmanship" practiced by Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, required that the Soviets believe that the U.S. was willing to stand at the brink of nuclear war.

For whatever advantages were gained from the "New Look"—either in terms of deterring Soviet expansionism or providing defense on the cheap—it also served to limit the range of effective military responses. It circumscribed the flexibility of Eisenhower's foreign policy to the potentially catastrophic use of thermonuclear weapons. The administration became increasingly vulnerable to the charge that it was inert...
and that the president’s policies had effectively disarmed America. This was vividly illustrated by the lack of American response to the Hungarian uprising of 1956, and the subsequent Soviet intervention. For all its anti-communist rhetoric, the U.S. was forced to the sidelines at this critical juncture for lack of any credible response other than nuclear war.

One activity which the Eisenhower administration did cultivate was covert action to disrupt or remove governments “unfriendly” to America’s overseas interests. These covert operations represent the elevation of the intelligence community, particularly the CIA, to a more active, if shadowy, role in America’s foreign policy. In 1953, the CIA sponsored a coup in Iran which resulted in the overthrow of that nation’s constitutional monarchy (of a nationalist bent and making overtures to the Soviet Union). As a result, the power of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi (one of America’s most reliable allies until his overthrow in the late 1970s) was solidified, and the U.S. obtained freer access to Iranian oil deposits in the process. In 1954, the CIA again “sponsored” a coup, this time in Guatemala, against the government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, whom the U.S. government also viewed as a Soviet ally.

Both brinkmanship and covert action remained policy weapons utilized by Eisenhower's successors in the presidency (witness the more recent Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), the “Star Wars” Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and the Iran-Contra dealings).

By the late 1950s, Eisenhower’s administration was coming under increasing criticism. The failure to respond to Hungary in 1956, the implications of the successful Soviet Sputnik launch in 1957, the Cuban revolution of 1959, and the administration’s embarrassment and helplessness when the Soviets shot down a U2 spy plane in early 1960, all seemed to point to a dangerous impotence. Both presidential candidates in 1960, John F. Kennedy and Eisenhower’s Vice President Richard Nixon, portrayed themselves as younger, more vital leaders who could stand up to communism and revitalize America’s global mission.

**The Cold Warrior of Camelot**

Kennedy took office in January of 1961 with the promise that

![John F. Kennedy: “Pay any price, bear any burden.”](image)

the nation would “pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty.” It is a startling testament to the atmosphere of the Cold War that such sentiments, expressed over forty years earlier by Woodrow Wilson, had led to his political demise while Kennedy enjoyed unabashed adoration. JFK filled critical positions in the foreign policy and national security establishment with relatively young “action intellectuals”. The administration promised to push the Cold War and American internationalism to “new frontiers,” bringing a new level of activity and commitment.

One of the earliest opportunities for the Kennedy administration to prove its vitality and mettle came in Cuba, where Fidel Castro’s presence was a thorn in America’s side. Plans for a U.S.-sponsored invasion and counter-revolution in Cuba had been drawn up, but never implemented, under Eisenhower. Kennedy wasted little time in putting this plan into action, but the resulting invasion of the Bay of Pigs was an unmitigated disaster. However, the early failure seemed only to stiffen Kennedy’s resolve, and contributed to his unflinching application of brinkmanship in the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962.

Outside these dramatic examples, the Kennedy administration also worked aggressively in two other ways. Through increasing levels of economic assistance to nations of the developing world, and through institutions such as the Agency for International Development (AID) and the Peace Corps, Kennedy hoped to set in motion a process of “nation-building” which would make the Third World less susceptible to communism and Soviet influence. At the same time, Kennedy pushed for higher levels of defense spending on conventional weapons, and showed no reluctance to post specialized U.S. troops and military advisors to the same areas where “nation-building” was occurring—most notably in Southeast Asia.

**Vietnam: The Climax of the American Mission**

America’s involvement in Vietnam represented the high water mark of the American anti-communist mission. Over the course of the war, the consensus over America’s global involvement broke down and threatened to split the country apart. Vietnam graphically demonstrated the manner in which anti-communism often distorted traditional patterns of liberal internationalism. In the name of protecting liberal democracy and free trade from the threat of communism, the U.S. found itself supporting groups that were often antithetical to that liberal world order. Moreover, the U.S. became militarily involved in a region whose direct relevance to national interests was not clear to all Americans.

Prior to World War II, most of Southeast Asia had been carved up among the British, French, and Dutch as colonies, of which French Indochina—including Vietnam—was the largest. Vietnamese nationalists had reason to believe that the conclusion of World War II would bring them independence, especially as France seemed no longer capable of maintaining an empire and the U.S. appeared to uphold the principle of national self-determination world-wide. But for Cold War competition, the U.S. might very well have interceded on behalf of Vietnamese independence, as this fit nicely with the U.S. desire to break down the old colonial order and replace it with
global free trade and a *Pax Americana*.

The Truman administration essentially traded its acquiescence to, and later active support for, continued French rule in return for French acquiescence in the reconstruction of Germany as the bulwark of Central Europe. By the time the French met defeat in Vietnam in 1954, the Eisenhower administration was faced with a new set of reasons for checking the expansion of Ho Chi Minh’s nationalism in Vietnam: the reconstruction of Japan.

In the late 1940s, and particularly after the Korean War, the thrust of American policy was to rebuild Japan’s export economy and insure that Japan would have access to the markets of East Asia. The logic behind this was the same as in Germany—the best check against the spread of communism, and the best way to guarantee a strong U.S. economy, was to rebuild the strongest nations in those regions. Southeast Asia, and Vietnam in particular, fit this equation as a source of raw materials and market for Japan’s manufactured goods. (Ironically, it was precisely for these markets and resources that Japan had been willing to risk war with the U.S. only a few years earlier).

Two factors unique to America’s Cold War policies also influenced the decision to support South Vietnam. As part of the strategy of global containment of communism, successive U.S. presidents were driven by the notion of ‘credibility’—that the rest of the world must solemnly believe that the U.S. could and would intervene wherever necessary, and with whatever force necessary. Moreover, the domino theory—gospel truth under the Democratic administrations of the 1960s—held that any nation which “fell” to communism, however insignificant it might seem to the national interests of the U.S. (such as Guatemala or Vietnam), took on immeasurable importance as the first of a chain of falling dominos (as Guatemala/Vietnam goes, so goes Central America/Southeast Asia).

For all these reasons, what began as economic aid to the French under Truman grew to a handful of advisors under Eisenhower, and expanded again under Kennedy, finally to explode into full-scale warfare under Lyndon Johnson.

**Detente & Old World Diplomacy Under Nixon**

Newly elected President, Richard Nixon, inherited an enormous dilemma in 1968. Clearly the Vietnam War was tearing the U.S. apart at the seams, but it was just as clear to Nixon, ensnared in Cold War attitudes as any of his predecessors, that the U.S. could not simply admit defeat and abandon Vietnam. American credibility—already damaged from the inability to impose its will upon a small Southeast Asian nation—required “peace with honor.” Nixon managed to accomplish the withdrawal of American ground troops from Vietnam (under extreme pressure from Congress and the electorate), but simultaneously brought tremendous criticism upon himself by carrying out secret bombings and invasions of Cambodia and Laos.

Nixon had made his early political career by seeking out communists at home as a member of the House Un-American Affairs Committee (HUAC). Yet Nixon and his chief foreign policy advisor Henry Kissinger preferred to use diplomatic maneuvering. They avoided high-intensity conflicts among the superpowers and pursued a policy of detente—the lessening of tension—with the Soviet Union. Detente did not imply disengagement. In the place of the Democratic presidents’ willingness to commit the United States overtly in conflict situations, Nixon substituted the ‘Nixon Doctrine’, which committed the U.S. to arming and aiding its “client states” around the world.

The U.S. had already been supplying substantial military aid to some of its allies since the dawn of the Cold War, particularly the nations of Western Europe. However, the Nixon Doctrine shifted the focus of arms sales and military aid from Europe to America’s allies in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Under the principle that “my enemy’s enemy is my friend,” the U.S. proceeded to ship unprecedented quantities of armaments abroad, to allies who did not always represent the best aspects of a liberal, democratic world order.

**Foreign Policy Since Nixon**

In 1976, Jimmy Carter promised a departure in foreign policy from Cold War patterns. The Carter administration hoped to bring about a new world order of interdependence, based on a renewed emphasis on human rights and national self-determination, and continued detente with the Soviet Union. This was not simply rhetoric, as the U.S. did begin to show greater sensitivity to these issues, distancing itself from some of the less palatable of its “enemy’s enemies.”

Old habits died hard, though, and the Carter
administration never completely broke with the patterns of Cold War diplomacy. The President gave the key appointments of Secretary of State and National Security Advisor to Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski, men well-schooled in the old ways. Considerable support was still provided to client states in sensitive regions, most notably the Shah of Iran and Joseph Mobutu of Zaire. Nevertheless, Carter came under increasing criticism for foreign policy softness. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 prompted an icy, though ineffective, response from the U.S. The Iranian revolution (1978-79) and the ensuing hostage crisis was the final straw that broke the Carter presidency in the 1980 elections.

The foreign policy of the Reagan administration began with much the same tone as that of the Kennedy presidency twenty years earlier. Criticizing the Carter administration for tarnishing American self-respect and status abroad, Reagan exhorted America to “stand tall in the saddle” once again. He promised to rearm the U.S. and resume the mission of containing the ambitions of the Soviet Union. In doing so, Reagan (and Bush after him) combined the willingness of Kennedy to involve the U.S. directly in conflicts while also following (and accelerating) Nixon’s pattern of arming and aiding “the enemy’s enemy”.

The foreign policy maneuvers and misadventures of the Reagan/Bush era are still hot topics for debate. The U.S. armed rebels and supported often unsavory governments against leftist power in Central America, especially Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador. It supported the Mujahedeen force struggling to rollback the communist government and Soviet forces of Afghanistan. Moreover, the U.S. intervened directly in Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989). However, the most momentous development to come out of the Reagan era was the rapprochement with Mikhail Gorbachev during the president’s second term. This was surprising to many since Reagan, a hardened anti-communist, had earlier referred to the Soviet Union as an “evil empire”.

The Reagan-Bush years also witnessed the harbinger of the multilateral world that was to come and glimpses of the Islamic threat that now preoccupies Americans. The U.S. supported and armed Iraq during the 1980s’ war with Iran (who the U.S. had aided during the 1970s), in order to balance the combatants and check the spread of militant Islam. At the same time, the U.S. attacked Libya in response to evidence of terrorist involvement.

Where To Go From Here?

Where will the Clinton administration take United States foreign policy from this point? The legacy and extent of Cold War involvement has a momentum to it that makes it unlikely that American internationalism will drastically alter in the near future. Relations with Iraq and Somalia demonstrate a continued commitment to interventionism and the multi-lateral character of the efforts in these regions is a product of Cold War thinking.

Yet, the reluctance of the U.S. to enter into the fray of the Bosnian war reflects a change from postwar patterns of engagement and a new questioning of America’s foreign policy. It is unclear to many Americans what U.S. interests are in the Balkans and they are unsure how arming Bosnians or intervening in the conflict will serve American needs.

While the Cold War saw the rise of the military to a central role in American internationalism, many analysts today point to economic, rather than military, security as the key to national interest. Rather than intervention in conflicts and the arming of combatants, there is a call for a return to a foreign policy designed to enhance trade and economic opportunities. The importance of fair trade is increasingly pointed to as the key to America’s continued economic health. This is especially true in relations with Japan, where free trade is perhaps unlikely but fair trade an important goal. With the American economy in a downturn, the pressure for an economic, domestic-oriented foreign policy remains strong.

Suggestions for Further Reading

One of the best single works on the diplomacy of Franklin Roosevelt is Robert Dallek’s Franklin D. Roosevelt and United States Foreign Policy, 1933-1945 (1979).

The Cold War in General

The Cold War has, of course, spawned a huge number of books, but several general treatments stand out, including Stephen Ambrose’s Rise to Globalism (1988) and William A. Williams’s The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (1962), which is, as might be expected from the title, quite critical of American policy prior to the Vietnam War. The second volume of George Kennan’s Memoirs (1972), is a fascinating autobiography of one of the chief architects of American Cold War policy.

Eisenhower to Vietnam; Nixon to Reagan


The New Barbarism: Ethnic Ferment in the Balkans

The moral and political vacuum left by the collapse of the Communist order in the Balkans has been filled by nationalist passions. Robert Kaplan’s *Balkan Ghosts* tries to make sense of the ethnic hatred and violence which threatens to engulf the entire region.

*Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History*

**by Jeffrey Thomas Kuhner**

Drawing from widespread travel experiences in the Balkans and an eclectic reading-list of histories, biographies and travel-books, Robert Kaplan has written an incisive analysis of the current political and historical forces sweeping the Balkan peninsula. Kaplan’s background as a journalist and travel-writer—as opposed to being a Balkan scholar—underlies both the strengths and weaknesses of *Balkan Ghosts*. While his individual sections on the countries occupying the Balkans—former Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, European Turkey and Greece—are insightful and crucial in understanding the present political situation throughout the region, the unifying message of the work is flawed.

To understand the Balkans, we are told, one must accept that events there are driven by “age-old ethnic hatreds”. As an explanation of Balkan society and history this is too simple and too inaccurate an answer. With the present war raging in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this sort of historical interpretation is not only wrongheaded, it can also have dangerous consequences.

**The Modern Roots of the Third Balkan War**

One cannot deny the forces of history—the development of different social and political cultures among different peoples and the expansion and contraction of past empires. Nonetheless, the present ethnic animosity in the Balkans, especially the Bosnian war (and the preceding Croatian one), is a modern phenomenon. It derives from the interaction of the nineteenth century belief in the sanctity of the ethnically homogeneous nation-state and the legacy of communism.

Today, in the former Communist states of Southeastern Europe, calls are heard for a pure single-ethnic state. Such extreme nationalist demands are possible because of the intellectual and moral void fostered by four-and-a-half decades of Communist rule. Kaplan graphically depicts the crumbling buildings and ecological pollution that act as ever-present reminders of the Communist devastation to the region’s economic infrastructure and social fabric.

In some states, like Romania and Bulgaria, this collective cultural and political vacuum is gradually being filled by the revival of the Orthodox Christian faith. However, in others, like Serbia, such ultra-nationalists as Slobodan Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic have occupied the void with artificially stimulated Serbian nationalism and xenophobia (through the control of the televised media), in the hope of creating an ethnically pure Greater Serbian state.

The use (and distortion) of ancient history and mythology by ultranationalist leaders as a tool to foster ethnic hatred and chauvinism in the service of contemporary political goals is a modern phenomenon. Not understanding this, Kaplan perceives the ethnic conflicts fermenting throughout the Balkans today as proof of profound and long simmering hatreds.

Although recognizing the savage and perverse effects of totalitarian socialism upon Balkan society, Kaplan insists that Bosnia (which he does not discuss at great length) is “full of suspicions and hatreds”. Yet, with the exception of both World Wars—caused by foreign forces and influences—little evidence exists to suggest that Bosnia was plagued historically by ethnic hatred. While there was considerable violence during the 18th and early 19th centuries, it tended not to be ethnic in nature but rather agrarian class conflicts between serfs and landowners.

Kaplan further misinterprets former Yugoslavia in the chapter on Croatia. This is especially true in his treatment of

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the brutal Nazi-puppet Ustasa state erected in Croatia during World War II, which he believes "serves as the elemental symbol of the Serb-Croat dispute, around which every other ethnic hatred in this now-fragmented, the largest and most definitive of Balkan nations, is arranged."

Few Balkan analysts would describe the Ustasa period as typical of Croatian history and society. Much of the ideology of the Ustasa was borrowed from abroad (Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany). When installed in power, the government had only 12,000 members throughout the country and relied on foreign armies (specifically those of Germany and Hungary) to cement its position. Along with Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies, many of its victims were anti-fascist Croats.

Prior to World War I, while there were disagreements and confrontations, there are few examples of an elemental hatred between Serbs and Croats. Only with the creation of Yugoslavia in 1918, and the bringing of Serbs and Croats together for the first time in one state, did a full blown Serb-Croat dispute develop. And here lies the crux in understanding the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The central problem with the Yugoslav state was the numerical and political domination of Serbs over Croats, and the attendant threat and rivalry the minority Croats felt. Conversely, the central ethnic dilemma posed by an independent Croatian state is the numerical and political superiority of Croats over the Krajina Serbs.

Kaplan notes that the primary reason for the inability of Serbs and Croats to coexist within the same political entity, is that they have developed distinct political and social cultures. The Serbs are essentially Byzantine, Orthodox, and Ottoman in their outlook. While the Croats are more closely part of the Roman Catholic, Central-European civilization. Kaplan quotes a ordinary Croat:

When I entered the Yugoslav army, I met Serbs for the first time in my life. They told me that a traditional Serbian wedding lasts four days. Four days of prayers and feasting. Who needs that? One day is enough. After that you should go back to work. The Serbs struck me as weird, irrational, like Gypsies. They actually liked the army. How can anyone like the army! I hated the army. The army for Slovenes and Croats is a waste of time; we could be out making money instead. Who wants to go to Belgrade? Belgrade's the Third World. I feel much closer to Vienna.

Because Yugoslavia was composed of national groups with distinct and divergent political, economic, social, and religious cultures, there was an historic logic to its eventual breakup.

Serbs view the nearly two million Muslim Albanians living in Kosovo (called Kosovars, between 80% to 90% of the population) as foreigners in Serbia's historic heartland and remnants of Ottoman subjugation. It was in that area on the June 28th anniversary, 1987, that Serbian Communist party leader, Slobodan Milosevic, pointed his finger towards Kosovo Polje and pledged that "nobody, either now or in the future, has the right to beat you." While Serb leaders strive to defend fellow Serbs from presumed ethnic discrimination, the Kosovars have responded to the Serb crack down by waging their own inutifada and have set up their own government.

As Kaplan notes, the plight of the Kosovars has not been missed in neighboring Albania. With the collapse of Enver Hoxha's Stalinist regime and the reversion of Albania's self-imposed isolation, Kosovo and the Kosovars' revolt against the Serbs is now dominating the political agenda.

**Bulgaria**

Kaplan believes that Soviet domination of Bulgaria during the Cold War era held Turkish influence in the region in check, a fact welcomed by Bulgars tired of the long period of Ottoman domination (which ended only in the late 19th century). With its size and larger population, combined with a relatively free-market economy, Turkey is poised to re-extend its political and economic sphere of influence over Bulgaria.

In 1985, in a pre-emptive act, Bulgarian Communist authorities forcibly began changing the names of the 900,000 ethnic Turks living in Bulgaria (10 percent of the total population). Much worse, thousands of rapes, murders, and expulsions were committed in Turkish villages throughout the country. As a Bulgarian official explained:

The state has to protect the interests of the nation, and in the Balkans a nation means one particular ethnic group. Keeping the peace in this region means that every minority has to be completely assimilated into the majority.

**Transylvania**

Problems with ethnic minorities also lie at the core of the conflict between Hungary and Romania. Kaplan asserts that during
the Cold War the border between Hungary and Romania—two Warsaw Pact allies—was one of the meanest frontier crossings in Europe (worse even than the Berlin Wall). The cause of the dispute is Transylvania, the region which contains the bulk of the 2.1 million Hungarians living in Romania (one of Europe’s largest ethnic minorities).

For Hungarians, Transylvania was the region where their most famous victories over the Ottomans took place and where democratic insurgencies against Austrian rule led to the creation of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy in 1867. Transylvania was ceded to Romania after the First World War and, with a brief hiatus during World War II, has remained in their hands since.

Romania’s postwar Communist governments—especially the repressive regime of late dictator Nicolae Ceausescu—pursued a policy of systematic discrimination against the Hungarian population in Transylvania. Ceausescu, a Romanian nationalist, sought to eradicate Hungarian culture and society in his nation. He banned the public use of the Hungarian language and shut down Hungarian schools and newspapers. He attempted to alter the demographic balance by relocating Hungarians out of Transylvania into other parts of Romania while transferring Wallachian and Moldavian workers into Transylvania.

To this day, tension remains high between Romanians and Hungarians (especially with the local government) in Transylvania. In Budapest, nationalists and revanchists are demanding the return of Transylvania to Hungary in the name of a “Greater Hungary.”

Greece and Macedonia: A Larger Balkan War?

The best section of Kaplan’s book is the one concerning Greece (not surprisingly, considering he lived there for much of the 1980s). Just as the legacy of Communism is crucial to understanding the other Balkan countries, the rule of the Socialist former Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou (1981-1990), is integral to the understanding of Greek political culture. Kaplan argues that Greece, considered by many to be the birthplace of Western civilization, is fundamentally Byzantine and Ottoman in its world outlook. In the words of one of Athens’ leading pollsters:

In our politics, I would say we are completely Oriental. We look at the West like Middle Easterners. Like the Arabs, we [as Orthodox Christians] were also victims of the Crusaders...Greeks are married to the East. The West is our mistress only. Like any mistress, the West excites and fascinates us, but our relationship with it is episodic and superficial.

During the 1980s, Papandreou replicated the Balkan pattern of stimulating xenophobic nationalism and tribalism to perpetuate his grip on power. Preaching a virulent anti-Americanism and flaunting Greece’s democratic institutions, Papandreou embraced the likes of Ceausescu and Colonel Qaddafi and helped to turn Athens into one of the terrorist capitals of Europe.

As Kaplan notes, the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia is another salient example of the present political illness infecting much of the Balkan peninsula: a ruthless revanchism by which nations claim as its natural territory all the lands that it possessed during the period of its greatest historical expansion. Macedonia is the most volatile area in the Balkans because it threatens to bring Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece into a wider Balkan war.

Since Macedonia was part of the Bulgarian medieval kingdoms in both the tenth and thirteenth centuries, Bulgarian irredentists regard Macedonia as “Western Bulgaria.” However, because Macedonia was conquered by Serbia’s King Stefan Dushan in the fourteenth century and formed an integral part of Serbia’s medieval empire, Serb nationalists call Macedonia “Southern Serbia.”

Although making no territorial claims on Macedonia, the Greek government refuses to recognize the sovereignty of the republic—and has stalled European Community recognition—as long as it continues to use the name “Macedonia.” The Greeks believe that it is an usurpation of Greece’s cultural heritage—Macedonia is associated by Greeks with Alexander the Great—and fear that Slav-Macedonians have territorial ambi-

The Need for a Comprehensive Western Strategy

Unless the Western powers develop a more forceful and coherent policy towards Macedonia—and the entire Balkan peninsula—an all-encompassing regional war is likely to occur. First, and foremost, the West must understand that as the old Communist structures begin to be dismantled in post-Soviet Europe, transnational entities will inevitably disintegrate into their constituent parts (for example, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia). Although this process is messy it does not have to be violent, if it is done through democratic means (witness Czechoslovakia, thus far).

The West should support and cultivate the development of democracy in the Balkans since this will ensure longer-term regional stability and security. To do so, the principle that territorial borders cannot be altered through military aggression must be established. Milosevic should not be allowed to forge a Greater Serbia; Bosnia-Herzegovina should not be allowed to be partitioned by the Croats and Serbs; and Macedonia’s territorial integrity should be preserved.

Also, the West must make it clear to all Balkan states or would-be-states, that respect for the rights of ethnic minorities is a prerequisite to becoming incorporated into the European community of nations. Unless Western policy makers develop a normative system of order and legality in the Balkans and Eastern Europe—and quickly—social disarray and brutal ethnic conflict will continue to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of communism.
The Earth in Our Hands

"When President Bush welcomed an international conference on the global environment in the spring of 1990, his staff prepared materials [that contained a] graphic illustration of the administration's approach to balancing short-term monetary gains against long-term environmental degradation.

In this illustration, several bars of gold rested on one tray of the scale; on the other tray perched the entire earth and all its natural systems, seemingly with a weight and value roughly equivalent to the six bars of gold. Although several delegates from other countries commented privately that it seemed to be an ironic symbol of Bush's approach to the crisis, the president and his staff seemed wholly oblivious to the absurdity of their willingness to place the entire earth in the balance."

by Caryl Waggett

Earlier this year, Vice President Al Gore earned the Robert F. Kennedy book award for Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit. In it, Gore challenges individuals to confront the crisis of environmental degradation through personal activism. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. of the awards committee stated that "this powerful book is an eloquent early warning to us all to think and act anew if civilization is to escape destruction." While critics have discounted the praise, arguing that any Vice President would receive the same, the acclaim legitimately belongs to the author. He has taken great personal risks to assert such a strong view in a political climate that responds unfavorably to strong statements in general and to action in particular.

The 'Environmental Crisis'

At the heart of Earth in the Balance, Gore discusses the environmental crisis, but it is not the crisis that most of us are familiar with. While he refers to concrete dilemmas—the depleting ozone, greenhouse effect, water degradation, lower air quality, loss of arable land, and diminishing biodiversity—he points to these as symptoms of a larger problem. The true environmental crisis, he argues, lies in our mindset and how we relate to the earth. We have lost touch with the basic interactions of the natural world. Thus, the physical depletion of the ozone, while a grave reality, is not in and of itself the problem. It is the human attitudes towards the environment which allowed such a depletion to occur, that represent a crisis.

Gore asserts that the environmental crisis cannot be solved without addressing this core dilemma. We will never truly confront the problem of a disappearing ozone so long as we remain disassociated from natural cycles. If we keep the same mentality, other environmental problems will replace the ones that we try to solve.

Writes Gore: "In discussions of the greenhouse effect, I have actually heard adult scientists suggest placing billions of strips of tin foil in orbit to reflect enough incoming sunlight away from the earth to offset the larger amount of heat now being trapped in the atmosphere. I have heard still others seriously propose a massive program to fertilize the oceans with iron to stimulate the photosynthesis by plankton that might absorb some of the excess greenhouse gases we are producing.

"Both of these proposals spring from the impulse to manipulate nature in an effort to counteract the harmful results of an earlier manipulation of nature. We seem to make it easier to consider even

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hare-brained schemes like these than to consider the wisdom of those earlier manipulations which don't seem to have a healthy relationship to their context, for they are in the process of destroying it.”

At the same time Gore shows how our lack of a unified understanding of the environmental problem has made lasting solutions impossible. “Many refuse to take [the environmental crisis] seriously simply because they have supreme confidence in our ability to cope with any challenge by defining it, gathering reams of information about it, breaking it down into manageable parts, and finally solving it.... We have encouraged our best thinkers to concentrate their talents not on understanding the whole but on analyzing smaller and smaller parts.” By not focussing on the true problem, the necessity for change is less apparent.

Understanding the Crisis

On a more specific level, Gore defines the crisis as one where the earth is being changed in both geologic and evolutionary terms at historically unprecedented rates. Ecosystems, individual species, and natural cycles have no chance to reach a new equilibrium.

Until such a balance is arrived at, the ecosystem as a whole will suffer under enormous strain, the effects of which will dominate throughout the natural world. Humans will have little time to react to the changes. Today, our inability to predict even small portions of the potential effects of global warming should leave us in a state of awe at the magnitude of ecological response that we unintentionally have set forth.

However, the term 'crisis' is often held at issue. Not all analysts would agree with Gore’s vision of an earth in fatal disequilibrium. Most scientists would describe the earth as dynamic; continents shift; wetlands, prairies, forests, meadows all move through various stages of ecological succession; species evolve, adapt, and go extinct; ecosystems are not stagnant—coastal erosion and barrier beach formation are constantly in progress, topsoil erodes and causes sedimentation with attendant changes in the primary growth (plants, algae) and consumers (herbivores, carnivores and scavengers); weather patterns do exist, but erratic weather variations occur, from droughts to floods to tsunamis. If the earth is changing already, why the fuss if humans are affecting changes as well?

Environmental philosophers continue to ponder the nature of the earth. Is it a delicate system, held lightly in balance by the interconnectedness of all living and non-living (nutrient cycles, water cycles, weather patterns) systems, where any changes can cause devastation to the system as a whole? Or is it a hearty, thriving system that can withstand almost any damages that an individual species can place upon it; a system that is so resilient that, although the individual components may vary, the system itself will not collapse and always find balance?

These two theories greatly affect an individual's response to environmental problems. Gore stands closer to the first interpretation. Many who subscribe to the second view claim that change alone does not define a crisis.

Gore is right to point out the philosophical roots of the environmental problem and to make people think in the longer term. But, his use of a geological time scale, and criticism of our ecological spirituality, leaves the debate up in the air. While it is true that these issues must be dealt with, there are also specific shorter-term problems directly affecting human welfare that must be addressed in order to ensure that a society will be around to undergo the more profound attitudinal transformations Gore desires—problems such as the lack of sanitation, inappropriate management of hydroelectricity, increased cancer rates from overuse and misuse of pesticides and fertilizers, and unsafe drinking water, for example.

Personal Activism: Beyond the Idea of an Environmental Crisis

However, recognizing the scope of the “crisis” that we face—from the interaction of technological innovation and lack of foresight—is insufficient: the true challenge is one action. Throughout Earth in the Balance, Gore examines his own contradictions (using the air conditioner in his car while driving to a conference on global warming) and those of our society. Outside of ignoring the problem, there are two responses to the crisis: individuals can change their lifestyle, or they can keep the present lifestyle but change the manner in which that lifestyle is produced.

Gore calls for both. On one hand, individuals should change their lifestyles to conserve more, use less energy, have less reliance on fossil fuels, eat only local products that use a wider variety of non-toxic farming techniques, and move away from the basic economic concept that “more is better”. On the other hand, these same individuals should preserve the American Dream ideal of a car and better material products while pursuing technological innovations that are more environmentally benign: solar and wind power versus coal and oil; electric cars; buying products that do not leach harmful chemicals into the earth.

In theory, these two concepts are not directly at odds. In reality, however, the simultaneous acceptance of both mechanisms has caused a split in public ability to respond to the crisis at hand. People are battling and searching within themselves for their own role. The two solutions makes action difficult and a response to this environmental crisis has been effectively paralyzed at both the individual and the larger governmental levels.

Gore’s challenge to us, as individuals and as actors within larger organizations, is to take the risk of accepting change and to alter our ways of thinking and approaching the environmental problem to encompass the larger picture. The plea for a global environmental ethic by the Vice President—himself challenging and battling his own dreams and needs—is a resounding summons to action.
Who's Afraid of Jurassic Park?

Jurassic Park, the book, has been on best-seller lists for countless weeks. The movie has broken box office records around the world. Why do those long extinct dinosaurs fascinate us so?

by Josephine King

Who’s afraid of Jurassic Park? Not too many children are, counting the numbers who are thronging to see the movie, adult accompaniment in tow. But, apparently, director Stephen Spielberg is. The filmmaker is quoted as saying that he would not let his own children see the scary final product.

The Book of the Month Club has taken Spielberg to heart. Its September issue advertises a Jurassic Park Set (2 vols), in which “the film has been retold so the story is suitable for kids.”

Perhaps Spielberg’s statement was made as a defence against any claims by members of the public for payment of psychiatric bills incurred while sorting out children whose subconscious dreams happen to dredge up echoes of those ancient days—millions of years before man walked this planet—when the “terrible lizards” and other reptiles ruled and our rat-sized mammalian ancestors were scurrying around, struggling to survive.

Dinosaurs and the Human Psyche

For years, ever since the first dinosaur remains were recognized in the early 19th century, humanity’s imagination has been fired by thoughts of those defunct dinosaurs, some of whom were so big as to boggle our limited minds.

Certainly, dinosaurs challenged years of western socio-religious conditioning. After centuries of condoning and propagating a one-shot explanation for creation, the discovery of complex extinct animal societies well before our advent changed the way we view the planet’s history—and in the process aided Charles Darwin in the formulation of his evolutionary and natural selection theories. (“Just how did two of each of these huge dinosaurs fit into the Ark?”)

It is unnerving for us humans—who think ourselves possible controllers of this planet—to find evidence that dinosaurs were not the stupid, extinct, well, dinosaurs that we like to think them. They were very successful land reptiles who existed on this planet for somewhere around 160 million years. In comparison, the human line only appeared in the fossil record somewhere about three million years ago. Dinosaurs, of course, did not manufacture or build anything, nor did they manipulate resources as we humans do (often to the ecological detriment of the planet). As the spectre of catastrophe hovers over humans today, could we become extinct like the dinosaurs? All very unsettling.

This fascination has led to much entertainment of all kinds. The most recent arrival is the chart-topping book Jurassic Park by Michael Crichton. Crichton, who showed his mastery of suspense exploring fiction on the borderline of scientific actuality with The Andromeda Strain, tackles the world of the dinosaurs and plugs it into a theme park environment. The vastly entertaining and well researched book has been followed by a box-office record-breaking movie of the same name as well as mass marketing of associated toys, clothes, lunch boxes and foodstuffs.

Fact and Fiction in Jurassic Park

The book does a good job of describing the world of the dinosaurs and explaining the palaeontologists who study their fossilized remains—certainly much better than some past fictions that ascribed highly implausible characteristics to dinosaurs, even though the reality is just as amazing. The list of consultants for both the book and the movie is highly impressive so it is depressing that there are, nevertheless, errors in both. Why, with so much excellent work, include a few crasing inaccuracies?

The movie has outstanding representations of the re-created dinosaurs, enough to make a palaeontologist drool, and great visual appeal. The special

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effects team should be congratulated. Without them, the film would have been little more than banal. The first shots of arriving at the island are lush in the extreme, as are the views of herds of dinosaurs wandering around a savannah-like area (one cannot say grazing because there is no evidence of grass when dinosaurs were alive). Small wonder the palaeontologist hero, Alan Grant, is almost overcome by the scene.

The plot revolves around the ability to retrieve sufficient dinosaur DNA from the stomachs of biting insects incarcerat-ed millions of years ago in globs of tree resin which have since become amber. John Hammond, the designer of the theme park, “Jurassic Park”, purchased all the amber he could in the hope of finding fossilized insects which had ingested dinosaur blood just before dying. The fossil blood might contain dinosaur DNA, the building blocks of life, and therefore the possibility of their re-creation.

The impossibility, however, of sufficient complete dinosaur DNA being preserved in fossilized insects is evident, especially when fifteen separate dinosaur species are recreated in the book (dropped to six in the movie). It is, however, a wonderful concept, and there are reports that there is now a rush on amber jewellery, especially if the piece has an included insect.

While the name “Jurassic Park” is catchy and easy to remember, it will likely mean that dinosaurs will be associated solely with the Jurassic geological period. In fact, they were around during the preceding Triassic as well as the subsequent Cretaceous periods. Those J.P. villains, the infamous Tyrannosaurus Rex (found in North America) and the Velociraptors (from Mongolia) both lived in Cretaceous times. The book points this discrepancy out, the movie glosses over it. There is, however, no excuse for Tim’s incorrect statement in the book (when talking about his trip to the Museum of Natural History with his father) that Camptosaurus was alive in Cretaceous and not Jurassic times.

The one badly represented dinosaur, in the book, but much more graphically in the movie, is Dilophosaurus. This black-poison-spitting, frilled dinosaur docs in the rather nasty computer whiz, Nedry, who is selling dino-embryos from the hatchery, secreted in specially designed shaving cream aerosol cans, to some bad guys off the island (goodness knows what they would do with them when they hatched!). Good riddance to him, of course, but what about poor Dilophosaurus?

Is this early carnivorous dinosaur to be remembered forever by our generation for things that he almost certainly did not do? There is no evidence to date of hollow teeth, which would have been necessary to spit poison in that way, nor of an erecting frill, although he certainly had a head crest made up of two boney plates (Dilophosaurus meaning “two ridged reptile”).

What We Know Today

Anyone seriously involved with dinosaur restoration tends to be very careful what they say—“on the basis of the evidence to date it is possible/probable that...”. Quite rightly, for what do we know about dinosaurs today?

The answer is that we know very little, but much has been deduced from careful examination of the fossilized bones which have been found in various rock strata. Unless we happen to learn how to break the time dimension and go back to the Mesozoic era we will never know for sure. A situation which makes for very exciting speculations, some of which are less scientifically responsible than others.

According to the story told by their remains, dinosaurs (i.e. land reptiles, as opposed to swimming and flying reptiles from the same era), ranged in size from that of a chicken to the many ton (one estimate is up to 80) monsters that dominate in popular appeal. These creatures were ascendant during the Mesozoic geological era, roughly 245 to 65 million years ago.

At the end of the Cretaceous period (65 million years ago) something happened which caused the dinosaurs to disappear from the fossil record, one of the many extinctions in the history of Planet Earth. Whatever caused the ‘great extinction’, whether it was an immense asteroid hitting the earth causing rapid climatic change, or some other factor, the event was selective in its victims. Not all reptiles, let alone other living things, died out at that time.

Flying reptiles completely disappeared, as did many based in the water, but not crocodilians and turtles. Members of the lizard and snake families survived on the land through to our time. Many other living creatures we recognize were also around at the time of the dinosaurs’ demise—fish, sharks, arthropods and small mammals. Notably, of approximately 300 known dinosaur genera, 288 genera had already evolved, thrived and died off. There were only about 12 still around to become extinct 65 million years ago.

The body of knowledge about dinosaurs and other extinct reptiles is increasing daily. It has certainly grown dramatically since British anatomist, Dr.
Richard Owen, stated in 1841 that the bones found to date were so unlike anything he knew that they should be recognized as a separate sub-order, which he called the dinosaurs, meaning “terrible lizards.” Could Dr. Owen have had any conception of what he had done?

Modern palaeontologists, such as J.P.’s Alan Grant, as is well documented in both the book and the movie, do not sit at their desks all day. They go out into the field and search. Nowadays the search is more organized (with the use of computers and increased international cooperation) than it was in the early days, when no-one really knew where dinosaur bones might be found.

In the more casual days of 1909 John Wegener, a rancher from the Red Deer River area in Alberta, visited the American Museum of Natural History in New York, and noted that the fossil bones on show resembled some of those he was turning up on his farm. Barnum Brown, a U.S. palaeontologist, did not let this slip by and spent the next few years hunting dinosaurs in Alberta using a barge as a base which was floated down the Red Deer River, bound for the Big Apple.

Today, along with palaeontologists, many different disciplines are involved in dinosaur study. Palaeobotanists, like J.P.’s Ellie Sattler, endeavor to recreate the botanical environment of the dinosaur world. Geologists define the land masses of different eras. Other experts are at work studying the muscle scars on fossilized dinosaur bones to understand how dem bones actually hung together. Specialized artists paint restorations, sometimes repainting their works many times as concepts of how a specific dinosaur looked change with new evidence.

The Iguanodon, whose remains had included a fossilized spike, was originally restored with the spike on its nose, rhinoceros-like. Later discoveries showed that it was in actual fact a thumb spike. Stegosaurus, a well known Jurassic dinosaur (featured in the book but not the movie), was once depicted with its fan-like plates overlapping like armor down its back, instead of standing upright along its spine.

Many authoritative restorations of dinosaurs are in fact based on very little evidence. All representations of Parasaurolophus, with its distinctive arcing bony head crest, are based on the evidence of no more than five heads and no complete skeleton.

Theories abound, some of which might be proved and some of which can probably never be proved. For example, there is no method known to distinguish gender by the remains. Indeed, some palaeontologists believe that variations between some similar dinosaurs might actually represent sexual differences within the same species. Also, there is the warm/cold blooded controversy. And what about colour, smell, hearing, sight, and communication, all those intimate sensory details we humans set so much store by? These remain in our imagination.

If They Ever Broke Loose.....

So, who is afraid of Jurassic Park? Why do these long extinct creatures hold us in their thrall? A quotation from Timothy Findley’s book Inside Memory seems effectively to capture our reactions.

The author describes a circus parade: the clowns, the bears, the music, the crowds, the children. And then, “after that, there was a hiatus - and an eerie, almost disturbing silence... and into this silence there came a shuffling sound - a soft padding sound..... And it was the elephants.

“We all just stood and stared.... There they were. Watched by maybe a thousand, open-mouthed people with voided minds - whose expressions slowly turned to concern, as if the elephants worried them.

“...And the elephants’ eyes stared about... uncertain, fearfule, flicking looks out over the crowd, unaware that they were the giants among the midgets - the beasts among the men. But the men knew it....

“And the elephants looked out and saw the buildings and the hordes of people... and they turned and lumbered around the corner and were gone. And one man said to another: My god - if one of those creatures ever broke loose!....”

And that is precisely why we can be afraid of, and fascinated by, Jurassic Park. The elephants (mammals like ourselves) were well under control. If one broke loose, it would only cause a minor catastrophe. If Jurassic Park broke loose, we, despite all our cleverness, would have a real problem.

The money-making movie leaves us in no doubt, Tyrannosaurus Rex is triumphant. The Velociraptors are vanquished by brute force. What a wonderful scene it was in the Visitor Centre as the display bones came tumbling down and the two sickle-clawed Velociraptors leapt vainly into the air to attack the monster. Victorious T. Rex celebrated with a roar, ready to return for Jurassic Park II and a second round of box office approval!

But, what if they really?...in real life?...could they? Now such is the stuff that dreams are made on.
Easter Island: Secrets in the Stone
A Photo Essay

by Bea Broda Connolly
BC PICTURES

Located 3700 km west of Chile, alone in the midst of the Pacific Ocean, Easter Island comprises only 117 square km. With its relative isolation and small size, it is baffling not only that the island was discovered at all but that it has acted as the crossroads of so great a variety of cultures and peoples.

Known also as Isla de Pasqua and Rapa Nui, three races have called Easter Island their native land—amer-indians, polynesians, and whites. It was ‘officially’ discovered in 1722 by a Dutch crew under Admiral Jacob Roggeveen. He recorded the mysterious presence of giant stone statues, called moai [left], as well as his fascination with the natives worship of them.

By the time Captain James Cook arrived in 1774, copper-colored Polynesians, as well as white-skinned people, inhabited the island. Many of the moai had already been toppled by warring tribes as an insult to the enemy. The moai seen standing on the island today were re-erected by the British during the nineteenth century.

There are a whole slew of theories concerning the purpose of the giant stone figures. Most people assume that they have some religious purpose. For instance, some islanders say that a spirit dwells within each moai. On the other hand, Cook believed that each sculpture marked a burial place. Regardless, they are certainly significant enough that it was considered an insult to topple the moai and, even today, no one is permitted either to step on or excavate them.

The mystery that shrouds the island has encouraged other, more outrageous, explanations: that the moai were built by extraterrestrial beings, or by the descendants of some lost continent (perhaps even the mythical Atlantis).

Bea Broda Connolly is the writer, host and producer of the travel television series Passport to Adventure and The Time Traveller.
Easter Island remains an enigma. There has yet to be a satisfactory explanation of where the people came from, how they arrived at Easter Island, why they carved the immense stone moai, and how they accomplished the complex engineering feat of moving them all around the island.

Islanders today are inclined to take the path of least resistance. To the chagrin of those of Polynesian descent—interbreeding has blurred (almost erased, in fact) many of the earlier racial distinctions [above left and right]—Easter Island is now owned and governed by Chile. They are particularly angry that the best jobs go to those of Chilean origin. The same kind of animosity which brought about the toppling of the moai long ago continues to surge on this small island of tumultuous history.

Because a weekly cargo ship is sent to meet the needs of the population, all industry and most agriculture have ended, resulting in a complete dependence on these supplies. Tourism, which includes the mass production of moai replicas [left], has become the primary occupation. A traveller is welcome to stay in the homes of islanders, who are also happy to make dinners and rent their vehicle.
Easter Island is volcanic in origin. The stone used in the construction of the moai (some of which are as high as 10 metres) was all mined on the island from two quarries where partially finished moai can still be seen [left]. The moai are carved from basalt, while their topknots are all made of a red volcanic ash.

While no one really knows, a variety of theories have been proposed explaining the erection of these monuments. The quarried stone may have been rolled to its eventual resting place, or moved along on a wooded platform while suspended by ropes.

Most, but not all, moai were built with red topknots, each weighing the equivalent of two elephants [below left]. A later development in moai construction, they have been thought to represent anything from hats, to baskets, to crowns, or just the hairstyle of islanders at the time.

Each moai sits atop a stone platform, or ahu. Given the religious importance attached to the moai, the ahu are generally believed to be the Easter Island equivalent of an altar.

Some moai were built with long ears, others with short ears—a physical feature that delineated two tribes once native to the island. At one point, a civil war broke out on the island, in which all but one of the long ears were exterminated. Today, this lineage is a point of pride for the boy who is the last living descendent of that long ear.
An eerie ambiance prevails on the island. It is as if all of the giant stone moai are waiting silently—forever staring off into the distant winds—for someone to unscramble the riddle, and free their secrets once and for all from the stone that binds them.

[below, a moai toppled during the long ear-short ear war]
One Hundred Years of National Women's Suffrage in New Zealand

September 19th, 1993 marks the centennial of the passage of the parliamentary act that made New Zealand the first country in world history to grant women suffrage on a national level. It was a time of great hope for the women who had dedicatedly worked to bring about the reform. But, even to this day many of the planks on the agenda remain unrealized.

by Brenton Arthur

Perhaps the single most important change to both the form and function of the Western political process in the twentieth century has been the inclusion of women (the growth of the mass media excepted). The story of women’s franchise opened in 1893 in the self-governing British colony of New Zealand. There and then, this “unlikely candidate” became the first country in the world to grant national female suffrage and the only country to do so before the turn of the twentieth century.

Female franchise was by no means unprecedented internationally. The women of a number of the western American states had won the vote at the state level prior to 1893: Wyoming in 1869, Utah (briefly) from 1870 to 1887, Colorado in 1893. On the Isle of Man, female property owners could vote as of 1880. The Island of Pitcairn, which had been settled by the mutineers from the Bounty in 1790, included equal voting status for women in their colony’s constitution. Propertyed women in the colony of Quebec voted from 1809 to 1849 under the notion of no taxation without representation. However, even though 1918 marked the enfranchisement of Canadian women at the federal level, Quebec women did not retrieve their right to vote until 1940.

Following on New Zealand’s heals (and the devastation of World War I), other nations gave women the vote. In 1918, Great Britain gave suffrage to women over the age of thirty (after a long and violent struggle on the part of suffragists and anti-suffragists). But, it was not until 1928 that legislation was passed to include women into the ranks of “persons” and thereby give them equal electoral status as men. In the United States, the 19th Amendment giving women the vote nationally became law in August 1920. In Australia, women of European origin won the vote in 1902 but it was not until the 1960s that Aboriginal women were included.

Why New Zealand?

There are perhaps few candidates for world leader in any particular movement more unexpected than New Zealand. So separated geographically from the rest of the world, it was assumed that years were required for world trends to float into these backwaters.

However, New Zealand women had the advantage of being a frontier state. The inegalitarian social structures of the mother country were not as strongly entrenched: the distance between aristocrat and plebeian much closer, the distinction between home and work more blurry, and the value of women’s contributions to survival much more obvious.

New Zealand women were leading the way internationally in the realms of education and employment. The frontier environment and the recession of the late 19th century coupled to bring increasingly larger numbers of women into the workforce. Eighteen ninety-one saw 45,000 women officially classed as wage earners. It was quickly realized that women could compete both competently and completely in the workplace and soon in the universities. In 1877, the first women graduates with a BA passed out of university (one year before London University began admitting women to degree programs). In

Brenton Arthur is a graduate student in history.

A suffrage petition of 1893. Three hundred yards long and containing signatures of 25% of all women, when unrolled it covered the length of Parliament. [National Archives of New Zealand]
that same year, New Zealand girls were among the first to receive the right to free primary education.

The entrance of women onto the public stage was by no means unopposed by portions of the male population. Emily Siedeberg met strong resistance when she entered the male bastion Otago Medical School in 1891, the first woman ever to do so. She was confronted each day in the dissecting room by disapproving (or perhaps just troublesome) male students who would throw dissected human flesh in her direction while she struggled to carry out her studies—no need to say which part of the male anatomy was usually the projectile of choice.

When women's rights have come to stay,
Oh, who will rock the cradle?
When wives are at the polls all day,
Oh, who will rock the cradle?
When Doctor Mamma's making pills,
When Merchant Mamma's selling bills,
Of course, 'twill cure all women's ills,
But who will rock the cradle?

New Zealand Graphic, August 1891

Temperance

Suffrage was but one of many causes that women's organizations strove to bring to fruition. They had already succeeded in enacting the Infant Life Preservation Act and had petitioned for universal pensions, women police, equal rights in the guardianship of children, raising the marriage age, and female justices of the peace, to name but a few.

However, the avant-garde of suffrage agitation was found in the Women's Christian Temperance Movement (WCTU), an international organization brought to New Zealand in 1885 from the United States and the United Kingdom. Women were the principal sufferers of male over-consumption: beatings, spent wages, psychological violence. For leaders of the temperance movement, the vote appeared as a viable avenue for controlling the drink problem. In comparison to the laggard male drunkards (who had the vote), women looked the epitome of sensible, good living.

Women learned valuable skills in organization, administration, leadership as well as political agitation from their work in the WCTU. These "public women" were accepted into the WCTU as equals in a way not experienced in other philanthropic groups. With its international roots, the WCTU imported many Western ideas of feminism.

Under the sage leadership of Kate Sheppard, New Zealand women developed a decorous suffrage movement. Unlike Britain, New Zealand saw few of the jailings, hunger strikes (with tubes forced down strikers' throats), arson, vandalism, publicity suicides, and bombings. In order to drive the franchise movement home, Women's Franchise Leagues were formed throughout New Zealand. These groups organized petitions (one which had signatures of almost one quarter of the female population) and a nation-wide canvas that reached out to those previously unreached—those non-temperance women. They held public meetings and made speeches. They hounded the press, submitted articles for publication with clockwork regularity, took out advertisements, and lobbied members of Parliament, often sending white camellias to sympathetic ones.

Moving to Enfranchise

The idea of national women's suffrage was by no means new to New Zealand in 1893. There had been a long and quite drawn out process before the parliament actually passed the law. The process included many twists and turns, and highlights how one political issue can rarely be divorced from others. On more than one occasion, when the vote came in the house, suffrage was defeated for reasons unrelated with women and their competence in voting.

Eighteen seventy-eight witnessed the first determined efforts to attain national female franchise from parliament. The electoral bill included clauses that would have made women ratepayers eligible to vote and to stand for election to parliament. While female suffrage was agreed upon in theory by the house, the bill was eventually discarded because of a parliamentary stalemate over the question of Maori (New Zealand's Aboriginal peoples) suffrage.

Before the Maori issue provided an easy exit from the dilemma, the parliamentary reaction fell into three camps: disapproval, acceptance of limited franchise, and unacceptance of limited franchise and the call for immediate, universal suffrage. The first camp feared the ramifications of releasing women's power and sexuality from the confines of domesticity. They repeatedly raised fears of sexual impropriety on the floor of the parliament should women be allowed to sit in office—would they not use their womanly charms and wiles to influence the decisions of the male members?

Moderate parliamentarians called for female suffrage restricted to taxpayers. The moderates would only support partial enfranchisement—afraid of the ramifications of giving the vote to poorer, and presumably ignorant, women. The "radicals", opposed to the economic discrimination and the travesty of democratic principles that such a compromise would involve, did not support the measure. They feared that such a law would allow the wealthy to give land to their wives and daughters and thereby increase their voting potential.
In the end, radicals sided with conservatives and the bill was voted down.

In 1885, all New Zealand women were granted the right to vote in local elections. During 1891-92, national suffrage was again at the forefront of parliamentary debates. Nevertheless, politicians remained wary. They were unsure whether or not to back female suffrage because they could not determine who the women would vote for. Would they be a force for conservatism or for change? There were conservatives who, while opposed to women in the public arena, believed that women would be upholders of established institutions, home and civilized values. To give them the vote would only serve the conservative cause. Other conservatives feared that poor women would vote en masse for the radicals. Both the moderates and the radicals were similarly split.

**Women Win the Vote**

The actual passing of the electoral bill that enfranchised the female half of the population came about almost by accident. The Bill passed through the house for the first time with only a slight debate concerning the inclusion of Maori women (finally agreeing that they could not, in good conscience, enfranchise all non-native women while excluding the Maori). The liquor interests moved even harder to block the bill. They were paralytic that the female vote would land soundly against their industry.

While the Bill passed easily through the lower house, the same cannot be said of the upper house where debate on issues was less public. When it became clear that the opposition group stood one vote shy of defeating the suffrage bill, Richard Seddon, an outspoken critic of suffrage, worked a deal to bring the necessary vote over to his side. But, when two opposition members became aware of Seddon’s breach of etiquette they were so outraged that they conspired to teach Seddon a lesson. At the final moment they changed their allegiance and gave their votes in favor of the suffrage bill. Wrote the New Zealand Herald: “So obscured have been the real merits of the question in the manner of its determination, that it is hardly too much to say that the enfranchisement of woman has been accomplished by her enemies.” A dispirited Christchurch Press added: “We have now got the Female Franchise as surely as we had the measles.”

Understandably the passing was received with much greater joy by women. Marion Hatton telegraphed Kate Sheppard: “Splendid meeting last night City Hall crammed mostly women enthusiasm unbounded thousand handkerchiefs waving for victory.” But, Catherine Wallace of Melbourne, more than any other, best summarized the mood of euphoria when she wrote:

Your long, patient, faithful, untiring, earnest, zealous effort is finally rewarded, which means so much, not for you and the women of New Zealand only, but for women everywhere on the face of the globe. It will give new hope and life to all women struggling for emancipation, and give promise of better times, of an approaching millennium for all down-trodden and enslaved millions of women.... Right glad I am and proud of New Zealand.

The first election in which women voted took place on November 28, 1893 and was met with a great deal of trepidation from all sides. Wrote Sheppard: “We have held our breath to hear the howls from babies left untended and unwashed, from husbands who have been left dinnerless; we have listened for the hooting of men, whose indignation and disgust have been aroused by the sight of women unsexing themselves.... We have each morning opened our daily paper with fear and trembling, and although a week has passed, not one voice of lamentation has been lifted up therein.”

**Only the First Step**

Many of the issues that brought the first organizations of women together remained unresolved: violence against women, the need for child care, sexual assault, the streaming of women into non-science educational tracks. While great strides have been made over the past hundred years in what concerns the status of women, statistics point to a reality in which much more is needed before a closer version of equality is approximated in New Zealand.

Women continue to earn only seventy-eight percent of men’s average ordinary time weekly earnings. While women make up fifty-one percent of the New Zealand population, only 16 of 97 Members of Parliament are women (in fact, since 1919, when women were finally granted the right to stand for national office, again after a long and hard fought campaign, only 36 women have held the position) and only a quarter of local government seats are held by women. Females also remain underrepresented in management positions.

The New Zealand passage of female suffrage is a stark reminder that while laws may be changed with a few deft scratches of a pen, it requires generations for attitudes and assumptions to transform.
Requiem for the Rhinos?

by Nicholas Breyfogle

- Fund higher education by building taller schools;
- Re-introduce turtle racing as a gambling sport;
- Simplify U.S.-Canadian free trade by swapping “Frank Zappa for Pierre Berton, Kermit the Frog for Lorne Greene” and rewrite NAFTA to trade “British Columbia (where most people already own ponchos) for Ricardo Montalban and a 1974 Eldorado low-rider with a horn that plays Babaloo”;
- A guaranteed Annual Orgasm;
- Repeal the law of gravity;
- Paint fishing boundaries in watercolor so that the fish would see it and stay inside Canadian territory;
- Turn the Bay of Fundy into a mall and parking lot “to give kids a place to hang out”;
- Clear the deficit with American Express;
- And promise to break all campaign promises if elected.

This platform is hardly what one would expect from the fifth most popular party in Canadian elections of the 1980s and the short-lived front-runner in the 1988 U.S. presidential elections (for a few blissful weeks the Rhinos could claim the only officially declared candidate). But, the Rhinoceros Party has never been a usual party.

Founded in 1963 by the late Dr. Jacques Ferron, in the midst of the tumult of the Quiet Revolution in Quebec politics, Ferron strove to teach “the power of positive absurdity in the face of absolute idiocies.” He considered the Rhinoceros the consummate politician: “a thick skinned, clumsy, stupid animal which loves to wallow in the mire but can move fast when it senses danger.”

From their Montreal “hindquarters”, the Rhinos have demonstrated an acute understanding that constitutional affairs and free trade negotiations are little more than ephemeral to the average Canadian. “What mystifies most is why hot dogs invariably come in packages of six or twelve, and the buns are in packages of eight or ten.” And they remind us, with comforting homespun truths, that “in times like these, we must remember that there have always been times like these.”

For years, the Rhinos have provided an escape from the “idiocies” of politics, and they have been rewarded with increasing electoral success (although, no Rhino has ever suffered what they consider to be the “ultimate humiliation—being elected”). In the 1980 Canadian elections, Rhinos moved from a fringe party to a successful fringe party. They picked up 111,000 votes nationally on 121 candidates, 1.01% of the total, while finishing ahead of both the Conservatives and the New Democrats in two Quebec ridings.

After skirmishing with Pierre Trudeau in his Quebec riding in 1980, Ferron passed the mantle of leadership (“Eminence of the Great Horn”) on to current Rhino visionary, Cornelius I (“His Horiness”). Cornelius is a true Rhino, born Canadian, but expatriated to the San Diego Zoo in exchange for a giraffe in 1981.

The Rhinos set their sights on the U.S. presidential elections in 1988 when the party sponsored former major league pitcher Bill (Spaceman) Lee. The Spaceman ran on a platform of “no butter, no guns (both can kill you)”; a best of seven series between the Sandinistas and the Contras to settle the political fate of Nicaragua; and an end to the designated-hitter rule.

Today, the Rhinos are running for their lives. In response to recent changes to the Canada Elections Act that require a cash deposit for candidates to contest a riding, they have announced that no Rhino candidates will contest the 1993 election. They have declared themselves in a state of “near-open rebellion”, renamed the party the ‘Pauvre’ (poor) Parti Rhinoceros and have become almost deathly serious.

“We believe Section 81(1)(j) of the present Canada Elections Act, and... Bill C-144, given royal assent, May 6, 1993 - both of which require monetary deposits for registered candidates in the amounts of $200 under the present Act, and $1,000 under the amended Act - constitute an unfair economic means test and undemocratic user fee, which in our view, infringes on the rights of economically disadvantaged Canadians, contrary to the spirit and intent of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms,” wrote former Rhino head Charlie McKenzie.

“This will force ordinary Canadians to rob banks in order to run for election in this country,” said Brian (Godzilla) Salmi, Rhino coordinator for British Columbia. “And we just might do it... [Bill C-114] will do to Canada’s Rhinos what poachers will do to Africa’s Rhinos. Namely, make us extinct.”

Despite a good deal of unbounded panic and uncharacteristic seriousness, the Rhinos show brief flashes of handling the challenge with their past aplomb. “We were quite happy when our status was preserved by the status quo, but now, our quo has lost its status,” read an official communiqué. Outside of mainstream tactics—challenging the amendment through the Chief Electoral Officer (who told them to go to the Courts), the Supreme Court (who told them to get a lawyer), the Canadian Human Rights Commission (who denied protection under the Human Rights Act), and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (from whom they have received no response whatsoever)—the Rhinos sought protection under “the Endangered Species Act only to discover that Canada doesn’t have an Endangered Species Act.”

Over the years, the Rhinos have received much criticism for the fun that they poke at the political process. Many find that politics and the current economic troubles are too serious to be mocked. But—in the midst of the Mulfroneys’ selling furniture to the government at outrageous prices, distributing patronage like jelly beans, and the ramifications of democracy of Bill C-114—the Rhinos respond: “you know, ask yourself seriously who is the one making the mockery of the process here?”
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