Current Events In Historical Perspective

INDIA CONFRONTS THE AIDS EPIDEMIC

ALSO
- Debating Free Speech
- The Nation-State's Uncertain Future
- The Life and Times of Thurgood Marshall
- A Look at Monetary Policy
Towards a Charter of Responsibilities

No man is an Iland, intire of it selfe;  
Every man is a piece of the Continent,  
a part of the maine;  
If a Clod bee washed away by the Sea,  
Europe is the lesse,  
as well as if a Promontorie were,  
as well as if a manor of them friends or of thine owne were;  
Any mans death diminishes me,  
because I am involved in Mankinde;  
And therefore never send to know  
whom the bell tolls;  
It tolls for thee.

It is unlikely when John Donne wrote these verses at the turn of the 17th century, that he could have known his words would one day serve as the foundation for a critique of the twentieth century world. Yet, Donne’s sentiments remain as valid today as when they were written.

Donne’s emphasis on the organic connections and ties binding all humans points to the question of rights versus responsibilities in society. Since the end of the eighteenth century, Western politics and culture have been predicated on the rights of the individual. Those rights are documented and delineated through constitutions. They are protected by systems of law. They are endowed by a collective ethos that places individual rights among our most cherished and protected values.

While the men of those times needed to defend themselves against the power of feudal and aristocratic privilege, their emphasis on individual rights has carried over into our times. Such affirmation of the rights of society’s members is still absolutely, gravely necessary. However, this singular focus on the rights of the individual has been to the exclusion of societal responsibility.

In the Western world, huge expectations (and sometimes demands) of what one deserves and should receive from society (what is yours “by right”) have grown up around the idea of the protection of individual rights and those of specific societal groups. But, these expectations come without the simultaneous prospect that one needs to give something back—that in order to receive the benefits, one must accept the responsibility to give. And this unbalanced focus on rights has left us with a common psyche that is damaging. Garbage, for instance, is left on the street because it is not on “my” property.

To strive for a society that is harmonious, we must include responsibility into the equation. We have the right to free speech, but we have no concomitant responsibility to use it properly. Certainly, we have laws that tell us what we cannot do. But these are constructed for the protection of rights and are almost always in the negative: you cannot do this.

Responsibilities are not like laws. They are agreements to act in a certain way. They also reflect certain realizations: that the life of a society must balance rights with responsibilities if we are to fulfill our greatest societal potential; that life is a trade off, for every right we receive, the good functioning of the society requires that we also formally accept a responsibility; that we cannot think only of ourselves, but must realize our connections to, and our role in, the larger whole.

This is not to deny the sanctity and undeniable necessity of individual rights. It would be a dark world without them. But, is it not time that we began to draw up a Charter of Responsibilities to balance our Charter of Rights?

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Come Firewalk With Me

by Bertie Bregman

The evening began with a yoga class. Chick, our facilitator, led us in a series of limb-twisting poses. This was good. If I was going to walk barefoot on a bed of red-hot coals, ignoring the organism's natural instinct for survival, I could use a little yoga to help loosen me up.

My first exposure to firewalking came four years ago, at a New York club. My friend Ken brought along his new girlfriend, whom he met on a commuter train early one morning. She had knocked him onto the floor for taking up two seats, and, admiring her directness, he asked her out.

Tracy sold insurance by day, but her real passion was firewalking. She spoke about it in quasi-religious terms, and credited it for everything from her promotion at work to her gutsy way of meeting men. She was finally in control of her own life, she said, thanks to the firewalk.

I was intrigued—as a scientist, by the phenomenon itself, and as an American, by the prospect of transforming my life in one, glorious epiphany. So when I heard that a group called “The Center for Transformational Growth” was holding a firewalk in nearby Woodstown, N.J., I jumped at the chance, drugging my girlfriend Stephanie along with me.

Twenty other people had the same idea. We were a healthy mix of thrill seekers and New Age spiritualists, and the conversation moved easily from the joys of parachuting to ways to prove that life is just an illusion (we all agreed that a firewalk should do the trick). But a genial man named Mike best articulated our central purpose when he said: “The way I see it, man, if you can walk self-actualization from his infomercials, where he pitches his line of books and tapes.

When Tony is not out recruiting Hollywood stars, he is running huge firewalks involving thousands of participants and multiple beds of coals. For a goodly sum, they are herded like cattle across the fiery embers toward the rainbow of self-fulfillment that awaits them on the other side.

Luckily, our experience was more intimate. After the yoga class and a meditation, we built a bonfire outside, near the edge of the farm where the firewalk took place. It had been raining all day, but the logs and kindling were protected by a tarp and ignited quickly. I shivered nervously in the cool night air, but as we stood holding hands in a big circle around the fire, I quickly cheered up. My thoughts turned from the hospital burn trauma center (now, who were my connections there?) to marshmallows. I felt sorry that we had not brought some.

Chick solemnly opened the floor to anyone who felt moved to speak. After some awkward moments of silence, we offered up a few prayers, mostly of the global and personal transformation type: “Let this fire help us to break through the illusions in our lives.”

“Let this fire represent victory over our fears.”

Even, “Let this fire bring peace to the warring nations of the world.”

I whispered a private prayer to Stephanie: “Let this fire not burn the soles of my poor, uncalled, city-boy feet.”

“I whispered a private prayer to Stephanie: ‘Let this fire not burn the soles of my poor, uncalled, city-boy feet.’ She whispered back that I was being selfish, so I mentally broadened my prayer to include everyone’s feet.”

Firewalking originated as a spiritual practice in India, but it has a certain cross-cultural, visceral appeal. The Vikings did it on hot chains. Sri Lankans do it as a religious rite. Tibetan Buddhist monks have a practice where they sacrifice a finger by making it a butter-lamp.

In our own time, G. Gordon Liddy showed America how tough he was by holding his hand over a candle flame, and Jean Claude Van Damme actually gripped a white-hot metal bar in the movie Hard Target. Conquering fire is the ultimate test of mind over matter.

In America, though, firewalking is most closely associated with Tony Robbins’ motivational seminars. Any channel-surfing insomniac with cable will immediately recognize this clear-eyed, square-jawed, New-Age prophet of

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Feet.” She whispered back that I was being selfish, so I mentally broadened my prayer to include everyone’s feet.

Apparently, the fire symbolized many things to different people. To some it represented fear, illusion, obstacle; to others it represented transformation, growth, or mystery. As a former liberal arts major, I was very comfortable with all of this. Fire-as-metaphor was my friend; I was just not so sure about fire-as-chemical reaction.

Finally it came time to walk. Chick broke down the bonfire and raked crazy, that they do it to the pounding beat of a drum.

As we drummed, and rattled, and danced around the fire, whooping and blowing the conch shell, the collective mood rose to a feverish pitch. I felt like one of the little savages in Lord of the Flies. Kill the pig! Slit his throat! Drink his blood!

Suddenly, someone stepped out of the circle and stood facing the bed of coals. The darkness obscured his features, but we all saw him take a deep breath and walk toward the fire, palms facing the sky. Without hesitating, he walked together. The man who believes that life is an illusion walked really, really slowly. And aside from the rare blister, no one was burned.

Afterward, we each had our theory as to how it worked. I reasoned by analogy with the Hot Sand on the Beach Principle, whereby the steady pace of walking ventilates your soles and limits their contact with the hot sand, allowing you to reach the ocean without burning your feet.

But the important thing, Chick insisted, was not how it worked, but what you gained from the experience. I stepped onto the coals, and strode across in five or six steps.

We all cheered, and one by one, followed his lead. Stephanie got in touch with her Buddha-nature before her turn; I got in touch with my lemming-nature before mine. After everyone crossed the coals once, some of us became cocky. One woman danced across, a guy walked backwards, and a few couples, including Stephanie and I, thought about that on the way home, and realized that I actually had learned something.

I firewalked five times in all, and only felt the heat once. The reason was that halfway across the coals I noticed a photographer out of the corner of my eye, and instinctively came to a stop so that she could get a good shot.

I learned that night that fire may be an illusion, but vanity is very real.

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David Wysotski

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the coals into a flat bed about nine feet long and four feet wide. We watched them flicker and listened to the hiss and pop of escaping gas. Here and there, little tongues of flame licked the air.

Some of us had brought along conga drums and rattlers, and Chick even produced a conch shell. This was an excellent idea. I highly recommend to anyone who wants to try something
Racism, Hate and Free Speech: The Search for New Boundaries of Sensitivity

Throughout North American society calls for the creation of legal limits to the range of permissible expression in order to protect against racism and hate propagation are being countered by staunch defenders of the principle and practice of freedom of speech. While the debate is far from new, the parameters of the conflict appear to have changed. With such a volatile and sensitized atmosphere, is the room for meaningful debate disappearing?

by Brent Barclay

In 1990, Michael Levin, a professor of philosophy at the City University of New York (CUNY), came dramatically into the public spotlight for his belief that “on average, blacks are significantly less intelligent than whites.” In print, his racial views had already appeared in a book review published in Australia as well as in letters published in the New York Times and a philosophical journal. Levin’s declarations led to protests and demonstrations at CUNY, and college officials formed a committee to investigate.

Despite committee findings that Levin had not expressed the questionable views in the classroom, the CUNY administration made little effort to discipline protesters who violated school rules by disrupting Levin’s classes, and further established separate course sections for students who might have been offended by the professor’s ideas. In response, Levin sued the college president and dean for the violation of his civil and constitutional rights. Presiding Judge Kenneth Conboy found CUNY in violation of Levin’s freedom of speech and barred the university from taking any disciplinary action against him for his beliefs.

Not more than a year later (July 1991)—in a separate, though ultimately related case—Professor Leonard Jeffries, chairman of the African-American studies department at CUNY, delivered a speech on high school curriculums at the Empire State Black Arts and Cultural Festival in Albany, New York. The speech contained what many considered anti-semitic and otherwise racist statements. A public uproar followed Jeffries’ speech, and high-profile figures from Governor Mario Cuomo, to several New York state legislators, and at least two university trustees joined in a groundswell of criticism. Further accusations popped up that Jeffries had, on other occasions (including in his classroom), espoused racist theories about black superiority. Supporters of Jeffries claimed that the purported comments were taken out of context and were not, in any case, anti-semitic.

A panel convened by CUNY recommended that Jeffries’ choice of words be criticised, but that the university should defend his right to express his beliefs without initiating further punishment. Despite the panel’s decision, university trustees removed Jeffries as chair of the department on the grounds that he was a “poor administrator.”

When Jeffries filed suit challenging the removal, Michael Levin—not surprisingly, though ironic nonetheless—supported Jeffries’ right to make his speech. A federal jury ruled that CUNY had removed Jeffries from his position not for poor administration, but due to his speech and the public pressure that had ensued. CUNY had violated his rights to free speech under the first amendment.

The Levin and Jeffries cases point out the challenge faced by universities to uphold academic freedom while meeting the demands of the academic community to curb racist or hate-based speech. Yet, these cases reflect more than the battles raging today on college campuses. The social struggle to find an acceptable compromise between the cherished, and constitutionally enshrined, ideals of free speech and the need to foster a non-threatening environment for all members of a nation

Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826): “A bill of rights is what the people are entitled to.”

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is prevalent in North American society as a whole.

How are we to interpret the intentions of people speaking of race, and who is entitled to do so? How do we encourage communication yet remain sensitive to the concerns and fears of all involved? Is it better to suppress racism and hatred by restricting speech, or should we expose it so that it may be confronted and defeated by education and the superiority of argument?

**Freedom of Expression Meets the Speech Code**

In response to speech considered racist or intolerant towards other dispossessed groups in society, certain restrictions of expression have been codified and put in place. Anti-hate laws and speech codes are predicated on the notion that there are identifiable speech acts that can and must be suppressed in the interests of equality and eliminating discrimination. Over three hundred universities across North America have instituted speech codes. Racial and sexual harassment have come under media scrutiny and the boundaries of acceptable speech are changing.

First Amendment advocates, while careful to appear sensitive to minority and racial issues, cite the dangers of the restriction of questionable speech to individual liberty and are concerned over the creation of an atmosphere of fear on campus and in society as a whole. They worry that this “political correctness” or “new puritanism,” and the consequent “expression chill,” will suppress potentially valuable additions to discourse on a wide range of topics and result in a rigid and stagnant conformity. Nat Hentoff, author of *Free Speech for Me—But Not for Thee*, argues that “when [a speech code] reaches the point where sensitivity stifles communication, it has gone too far.”

In turn, supporters of speech codes and restrictions on hate propaganda accuse First Amendment devotees of avoiding the still-prevalent issues of discrimination and prejudice. Allowing for the expression of racism and hatred, they argue, does not confirm the principle of liberty, but restricts the liberties of the individuals and groups targeted.

The atmosphere of fear and social denigration that results does much greater harm to the society as a whole than would the imposition of certain restrictions of expression. They counter the charges of the tyranny of a “new orthodoxy” by pointing to “media hype” and “right-wing disinformation.”

Events on a U.S. university campus recently brought the speech code debate into sharp relief. In an unexpected action, the university’s administration announced its intention to suspend—and consider permanently rescinding—the school’s existing speech code. In support of the established legislation, a student group put up posters throughout the campus on which racially derogatory names and unsettling gender stereotypes were printed in uncertain terms. The posters strove to demonstrate the need for codes to prevent such speech from threatening community members.

Reaction to the posters underscored the complexities of the free speech/speech code debate. Many avowed “free speechers” agreed that while they supported the rights of individuals to speak as they wished, it could not be denied that there existed speech which was simply unacceptable. At the same time, one student, arguing from the free speech perspective, pointed out the ironic reality that under the speech code in question, those students who had put up the posters would have been guilty, and punished, for violating the very code they strove to protect.

While the free speech/speech restriction debate rages on throughout North America, the juridical underpinnings and history of the conflict show that it is far from new. The legal history of free speech in the United States has been alternately charted by vindications of, and exceptions to, the First Amendment. Despite the apparent clarity with which this amendment was set forth, it has been interpreted, re-interpreted, ignored, manipulated and abused throughout its more than two hundred years of existence. Likewise, the legalities of free speech in Canada have also been complex and inconsistent. Tensions between the recent Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Criminal Code reflect the complications in combining the right to expression and the freedom from hatred based upon color, race, religion, ethnic origin or gender.

**Congress Shall Make No Law...Abridging the Freedom of Speech**

Even while the Constitution of the new United States awaited ratification in the late 1780s, questions whether this document would go far enough in protecting civil liberties persisted. Many state constitutions already provided protections for individual rights, but advocates for a federal bill of rights worried that it was dangerous to leave unchecked the potentially coercive powers of the federal government. Thomas Jefferson, writing to James Madison in 1787, expressed his conviction that a federal bill of rights was necessary: “I will tell
you now what I do not like. First the omission of a bill of rights...[A] bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth...and what no just government should refuse, or rest on inference.”

The shapers of the United States’ Bill of Rights, no doubt with their own struggles for individual liberty firmly in mind, set out to guarantee that government power would be sufficiently limited in the newly-formed nation. After a prolonged process of debate the first ten amendments (the Bill of Rights) were ratified on December 15, 1791. Underlying the First Amendment’s support of free speech was the conviction that falsehood would be struck down and truth would prevail as ideas and doctrines found expression in the public domain.

However, for nearly one hundred and thirty years after the ratification of the Bill of Rights, no definitive expression or application of the meaning of the First Amendment was achieved, nor, for that matter, were definitive standards to deal with free speech established. In this environment prosecution of certain types of speech continued unabated.

**Curbing Opposition: Sedition and Politics**

Like most of the legal framework of the newly-independent United States, early American notions of freedom of speech were derived from the English system, particularly the English Bill of Rights (1689) and the common law. Under common law, free speech was considered a parliamentary privilege, *not the absolute right of all citizens*. Furthermore, the liberty of the press was understood only as a freedom from prior restraint (i.e. freedom from censorship), but not immunity from later prosecution. As a general rule, issues of freedom and censorship of speech were only of importance with regard to politics, where the intent of the government was to protect itself from seditious libel—often broadly defined to include any criticism of the government.

America’s Founding Fathers upheld this pattern even while they enshrined free speech in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights (1791). Historian Arthur M. Schlesinger has succinctly described the paradox of free speech in revolutionary America: “liberty of speech belonged to those who spoke the speech of liberty.” All of the former colonies, save Connecticut, included a right of free speech in their new state constitutions, but Loyalists and pacifists (such as the Quakers) were relentlessly censored and intimidated in spite of these formal guarantees.

This pattern continued as the Federalist party, which controlled the presidency and Congress until 1800, attempted to censor the rival Republican party. The culmination of this policy lay in the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, which broadly construed sedition as any criticism of Federalist policies or personalities. Out of this conflict, and with the triumph of Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans in the election of 1800, came a more libertarian interpretation of the First Amendment.

The fact that no firm guarantee of free speech existed was demonstrated again during the next national political crisis: the debate over slavery and states’ rights, which led to the Civil War. From 1830 to 1861, the right of abolitionists to speak and publish their views, and to disseminate these views through the postal system, was consistently violated in northern and southern states alike. On top of which, the federal government often exercised prior restraint over abolitionist literature. The supposed inflammatory nature of abolitionists’ pamphlets and speeches were regarded as just cause for preventing their expression.

The crisis of the Civil War itself also prompted federal limitations on the right of free expression. Speech and literature deemed damaging to the Union cause was often censured and/or prosecuted. Constitutional scholar Robert E. Cushman, noting that President Abraham Lincoln (1861-1865) himself initiated much of this activity, claims that “no President has ever invaded private constitutional rights more flagrantly, or from worthier motives, than he.” On the whole, the history of this period demonstrated that without clear precedents established by the court to define and apply the Constitution, the written guarantees of personal freedom and individual justice promised by the amendments meant very little. Yet, as the following years demonstrate, efforts at such defined precedents did not themselves settle the problem.

**The Evolution of First Amendment Jurisprudence Since World War I**

It is clear that government protection of the right to free speech has long been dependent on the atmosphere of the times. Periods of real or imagined crisis prompted the most active attempts by government to restrict speech deemed dangerous. A combination of crises in 1917 touched off a firestorm of free speech controversy, and set the wheels of jurisprudence in motion toward creating the current standards of freedom of expression.

Since World War I, the Court has made a much clearer effort to construct definitive standards by which to judge speech. Criteria such as “fighting words,” “bad tendency,” “clear and present danger,” and culminating in the “incitement” standard, were created in order to set down clear doctrines and tests of what constituted unacceptable speech. The development of these criteria marked a departure from strict control on a variety of speech acts to an attempt to maximize freedom of expression and provide less subjective restrictions on speech.

Sedition trials involving protesters against America’s
involvement in the First World War ushered in what can be called the modern era of First Amendment jurisprudence. President Woodrow Wilson, like his predecessor Lincoln during the Civil War, reacted to the crisis of World War I by limiting the criticism of opponents to American involvement in Europe. Adding to the government’s suspicion of anti-war protesters—many of whom had ties to communist or socialist organizations—was the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917. Now they were seen as doubly dangerous to America’s security. During the war, and throughout the first “Red Scare” of 1919-1920, the right of free speech of these individuals was regularly infringed upon.

Under the Espionage Act of 1917, many anti-war protesters were brought to trial for publicly expressing their views. In what is likely the most famous of the Espionage Act prosecutions, that of Schenk v. U.S. (1919), the Supreme Court, while upholding the Act, set forth the first critical test for speech. First Amendment protection, wrote Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, did not extend to speech posing a “clear and present danger” to national security and public safety.

Towards a Clearer Understanding: Refining Protection Under the First Amendment

However, the existence of the “clear and present danger” standard did not, in and of itself, prevent further excesses in the restriction of speech, since the criterion could be interpreted as broadly as earlier governments had interpreted seditious speech. This was especially true because it was originally understood according to the “bad tendency” rule. This rule stated that if the words tended towards “clear and present danger,” then the defendant fell outside the protection of the First Amendment and prosecution was legitimate. Thus, the Smith Act of 1940 (like the Espionage Act, intended to muzzle aliens and potential subversives) also spawned its share of abuses. It proved to be an important precedent for McCarthyites to call upon during the second “Red Scare” of the late 1940s and early 1950s—a poignant example of censorship outgrowing its intended scope.

In fact, it was not until 1969, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, that “clear and present danger” was refined to include only the advocacy of force or violation of law, “where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” This landmark decision was the strictest application to date of the “clear and present danger” criterion and established what is now known as the “incitement” standard.

With the juridical notion of “incitement”—a more precise clarification of what expression would be prosecuted—came an expansion of the boundaries in which free speech would be protected. In this vein, the juridical criterion of “fighting words” was introduced in 1942, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, when unprotected speech was defined as:

the lewd, the obscene, the profane, the libelous and the insulting or “fighting words”—those which by their very utterance [1] inflict injury or [2] tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace...Such utterances [which] are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value...that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.

The “fighting words” criterion also characterized some speech as “worthless speech” or speech not deserving constitutional protection under the First Amendment. However, it quickly became clear that less subjective terms were warranted as it was unclear what constituted “worthlessness.”

In the 1971 trial of Cohen v. California, “fighting words” was redefined as “fight-provoking language that tends to incite violence.” In this case, Supreme Court Justice Harlan argued that it was impossible to articulate a principle by which citizens will know which words are permissible and which are not, and that when the state attempts to prohibit certain words, it inevitably creates a substantial risk of suppressing ideas. Justice Harlan concluded that “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.” While the Cohen decision resulted in a stricter definition of speech not protected by the First Amendment, the definition of “fighting words” still remains under debate.

Tackling Racist Speech and Hate Propagation

Although the evolution of more clearly defined restrictions on speech have reduced confusion and ambiguity, hate propagation and racist speech remain to a great extent protected. The legal roots of the attempt to fight the propagation of racism and hatred, particularly as a form of group libel, are found in the 1952 case of Beauharnais v. Illinois. These roots, however, have not taken hold—for better or worse depending on your evaluation of the primacy of the First Amendment.

The state of Illinois had established a statute that made it unlawful for any person to communicate a message portraying “depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion” or which exposed the “citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is productive of breach of peace or riots.” A group called the White Circle League, of which Beauharnais was the president, distributed a leaflet urging city officials to prevent blacks from moving into white neighborhoods, with accompanying racist descriptions of
the “dangers” blacks posed.

Beauharnais was convicted of violating the state’s group libel laws, and the conviction was upheld by a 5-4 vote in the Supreme Court, though with strong dissension. Justice Hugo Black, dissenting, stated that “the same kind of state law that makes Beauharnais a criminal for advocating segregation in Illinois can be utilised to send people to jail in other states for advocating equality and nonsegregation.” Through the 1950s and 1960s and a variety of cases, Justice Hugo Black stood as a steadfast protector of absolute free speech, while many other judges worked to construct tests and standards for acceptable speech.

Supreme Court decisions following the Beauharnais case served to gradually undermine it as a precedent. The 1954 trial of New York Times v. Sullivan, for example, brought certain types of defamation, considered absent of malice, under the protection of the Constitution—largely in the face of the ramifications of potential law suits. In the well known Skokie case of 1978, the Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal of a lower court decision that had struck down a local ordinance prohibiting the distribution of material promoting racial or religious hatred.

Nonetheless, Beauharnais serves as a useful example of an instance where the interpretation of the First Amendment reflected an attempt to balance between the interests of the individual and the community at large. This approach has often been described as communitarianism which, as Nat Hentoff explains, “argues that the values and priorities of the community—or a group—should prevail over an ‘undue’ emphasis on individual rights and values.” This approach is gaining currency in the U.S. and is receiving even greater attention in Canada.

Canada: The Approach to Hate Propagation

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), Section 2(b) provides for the “fundamental freedom” of “opinion and expression.” Section 1 states that the Charter’s protected rights and freedoms are “subject to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” In this connection, section 319 (2) of the Canadian Criminal Code (1970) criminalizes the propagation of hatred towards any identifiable group defined by colour, race, religion or ethnic origin. The relationship of this criminal code section to the Charter is problematic, and poses a variety of difficulties in their overlapping and, some have said, mutually exclusive contents.

In 1990, the Canadian Supreme Court rendered a decision on R v. Keegstra that attempted to resolve the contradictions between these principles. James Keegstra was a school teacher in Alberta who taught anti-Semitic and racist doctrines to his students. After being dismissed from his teaching position, Keegstra was charged under Section 319 (2) of the Criminal Code. He, in turn, challenged the constitutionality of the Criminal Code provision. The majority decision of the Supreme Court, reversing an earlier verdict, held that while the provision violated Section 2(b) of the Charter, it was saved by Section 1.

In other words, the restriction of hate propagation, while a violation of the guarantee of free expression, was nonetheless justifiable because of the strong community interest in preventing the spread of hate. The Keegstra decision reflects a growing consensus in Canada that racist or hate-based speech does not, or should not, fall within the purview of constitutionally or institutionally protected speech—that hate propagation restricts the interests and liberties of the the minority group under attack because it marginalizes and denigrates their position in society.

Prior to Keegstra, a report from the Special Committee on Hate Propagation in Canada, published in 1966, defined hate propagation as “constituting a clear and present danger” to the functioning of a democratic society. For in times of social stress such ‘hate’ could mushroom into a real and monstrous threat to our way of life.”

Yet, the application of section 319 (2) of the Criminal Code has had results that many Canadians find peculiar. As Alan Borovoy writes in his article “How Not To Fight Racial Hatred”: “in 1986 a film sympathetic to Nelson Mandela in South Africa was held up at the border for more than a month because of allegations that it promoted “hatred” against white South Africans... A Jewish leader became the target of a hate propaganda investigation. He had expressed anger against the Austrians for having elected Kurt Waldheim as their president despite reports of Waldheim’s pro-Nazi activities during World War II. And Salman Rushdie’s book, The Satanic Verses, was ordered detained at the Canadian border.” In response, analysts now question whether it is possible to define hate propagation or racist speech without it being subject to the shifting meanings of history and the distinctions between intent and received meaning.
The Royal Ontario Museum: “Into the Heart of Africa”

In June 1989, Toronto’s Royal Ontario Museum (ROM) announced plans to mount the exhibit entitled “Into the Heart of Africa.” It was to consist of a collection of African artifacts that had remained in the museum’s basement for close to one hundred years. The exhibit, described by curator Jeanne Cannizzo, “offered the history of the museum’s African collection through a critical examination of the role played by Canadians in the European colonization of Africa while displaying the rich diversity of African cultural practices and traditions.”

Thus, the exhibit was designed to describe the Canadian colonial experience historically and, among other goals, to bring attention to the racism of the period. Part of the strategy of the exhibit was to reveal this racism by ironically surrounding colonial and imperialist terminology with quotation marks. In an effort to ensure sensitivity, the ROM had contacted certain black organizations prior to the exhibition in order to incorporate their feedback.

Four months into the exhibit a demonstration was held outside the museum by a group of protesters denouncing the exhibition as “racist,” one which presented “a colonial and white supremacist view of Africa.” A group called “The Coalition for the Truth about Africa” charged the ROM with misleading the public by portraying the history of Africa in a deceitful manner. The protesters did not agree with the exhibit’s representation of Africa as “backward” and believed that the ROM had no right to mount this exhibit without the full collaboration of black professionals in the field.

Other members of the black community offered contrary arguments, citing the value of the exhibit for its exposure of imperialist racism in nineteenth century Canada. Still others believed that the sophistication of the exhibit and its ironic pose failed to fully confront and make explicit the origins of racism during the colonial period. The controversy continued, resulting in further protests, arrests, and even injuries. It became unclear how representative the protesters were of the black community and the protests broadened their focus to other racial issues such as police brutality.

While implicitly underlying the ROM controversy, the issue of free speech was carefully avoided by many of the combatants. A multi-city tour which had been planned for the exhibit was ultimately cancelled due to the furor created in Toronto. Jeanne Cannizzo, upon returning to her teaching post at the University of Toronto, was forced to request a leave of absence after protests took place in front of her house and she was shouted down as a racist, in explicit language, in the classroom. While this constituted a serious infringement of Cannizzo’s academic freedom, little protest resulted — some have argued, because of the fear of being labelled a racist by association.

The protesters of the ROM exhibit fairly exercised their rights to free speech. Cancellation of the exhibit’s tour serves as evidence of what free speech can accomplish without recourse to the law. Yet, supporters of the ROM argue that the museum, and Jeanne Cannizzo, were simultaneously denied their rights to free speech. Nonetheless, what many observers found the most disturbing was the absence of room for discussion. The ROM claimed that the exhibit was not racist, rather an exposure of racism in Canada’s history. But it failed to take fully into account the black community’s concerns. On the other hand, the protesters demanded “change it or close it” of the exhibit, and refused to negotiate alternatives. Neither side seemed able to concede to the other nor come to the table for discussion.

Treading New Ground

The debate over freedom of speech versus legally controlled expression is by no means a new one. In fact, throughout the histories of the United States and Canada — and despite constitutional enshrinement — qualifications and restrictions have tended to prevent the application of absolute free speech. Nonetheless, the recent conflicts surrounding racism and hate propaganda are, in many ways, new.

Past free speech debates tended to center around political conflict and dangers to national security. More recently, speech legislation has revolved around issues of sensitivity and the need to respect other individuals and communities within the nation. At the heart lie changing notions of community versus individual needs. This fundamental shift in the nature of the argument has left both legislators and society as a whole unsure of where to draw the lines of acceptable and unacceptable speech. Perhaps more importantly, they are also unsure who should decide.

By way of conclusion, however, a thought offered by George Orwell goes the farthest to underscore the complexities and difficulties of hate propagation-race-free speech jurisprudence: “If large numbers of people believe in freedom of speech, there will be freedom of speech, even if the law forbids it. But if public opinion is sluggish, inconvenient minorities will be persecuted, even if laws exist to protect them.”

Suggestions for Further Reading

“Out of the Broom Closet”:
The Resurgence of Witchcraft and Neo-Paganism

In recent years, the popularity of witchcraft and neo-paganism has risen sharply in North America, due in great part to the growth of feminism and environmentalism, as well as to the perceived inadequacies of established religion. Whether the interest in witchcraft and neo-paganism will survive these movements and establish themselves as traditions in their own right, remains to be seen.

by Patti Ryan

Blue-eyed, baby-faced and smiling, Dave seems an unlikely candidate to fill the solemn position of summoner at the Ottawa Occult Shop’s weekly rituals.

But his job demands a dual personality. As the person who greets newcomers when they venture into the shop for their first encounter with witchcraft, he has to be approachable and reassuring. As the witch who later dons a black hooded robe, wields a staff and guards the ritual circle against intruders, he must assume a more intimidating presence.

The Wiccan Church holds weekly public rituals in the basement of the Occult Shop. It is only one of innumerable traditions of witchcraft thriving in North America today. As with “Christianity,” “witchcraft” is an umbrella term for a group of religions that share a basic world view, but differ in beliefs and practices; in witchcraft, these different subgroups are called traditions.

It is difficult to be precise about the numbers because many witches keep their identities a secret. Furthermore, witchcraft is loosely organized and informal, with no central authority or well-defined theology that binds all its traditions together. Feminist (women only) covens are extremely secretive and keep an even lower profile than most other traditions. Then there are “solitaries” who choose not to join a group at all, but instead practice alone or simply learn the Craft and live its lifestyle.

The result, say researchers, is that the number of self-declared witches is probably small compared to those who practice some form of the Craft. Shelley Rabinovitch, who travelled across Canada to interview more than 130 witches, estimates there are anywhere between 10,000 and 15,000 witches in Canada.
Margot Adler, author of *Drawing Down the Moon*, suggests similar numbers in the U.S., with approximately 10,000 self-proclaimed witches. Census figures for 1991, released in May, showed the number of people identifying themselves as witches or neo-pagans had more than doubled since 1981. And over 100 pagan periodicals currently exist in press.

In the United States, in fact, witchcraft is expected to outpace Christian fundamentalism to become this year’s fastest-growing religion. In 1988, a Toronto witch went to court to argue for paid religious holidays for witches—and won. Witches are currently awaiting formal recognition of their religion by the Canadian government; in the United States, they already have it.

Though witches are a tremendously diverse group with little tying them together, Rabinovitch finds that they are generally highly literate. Because of the Craft’s low-profile, and because witches are opposed to proselytizing, its members tend to come to it through study, or through dissatisfaction with their current faith, all of which involves research and reading.

The Wiccan Church of Canada is one of the most public, easily accessible traditions, and as such is often the gateway into the world of witchcraft for the uninitiated.

### Herbal Charms

Herbal charms are small bags filled with herbs and other symbolic objects. They can be worn on the person or kept in the house to attract what you desire. Here are some suggested combinations.

#### To Attract Love

Use a circle of rose-colored or red (for more sexually passionate love) cloth. Fill it with acacia flowers, myrtle, rose petals or buds, jasmine flowers, and lavender. Add a red felt heart and a copper coin or ring. Tie it with blue thread or ribbon, in seven knots.

#### To Heal A Broken Heart

Use a circle of blue cloth, filled with All-Heal, Balm of Gilead buds, feverfew, myrtle, and rose petals (white). Take a white felt heart cut into two pieces, sew it together with blue thread while charging the charm, and add it to the herbs. Add a copper coin to draw new love. Tie it with white thread.

#### To Get A Job

Use a square of green cloth. Fill it with bay laurel, lavender, and High John the Conqueror Root. Add four other herbs governed by—

- **Mercury**—for a job involving communications
- **The Moon**—for a job involving healing, women’s work or health, or psychology
- **Jupiter**—for a job involving leadership and responsibility, or the law
- **Mars**—for a job requiring aggressive, assertive action
- **The Sun**—for a job outdoors, in agriculture or nature, or for an easygoing, enjoyable job
- **Saturn**—for architecture, history, or any job where you will be limiting others’ actions or freedom (police work, for example)

Add a silver coin, for wealth, and pictures of any important tools you may use in your work. Tie it with purple thread.

#### For Inner Power

Use a square of royal purple cloth, filled with bay leaf, Dragon’s Blood, elder flowers, High John the Conqueror Root, rosemary, vervain, oak leaf, holly leaf or berries, and mistletoe. Tie with blue thread, and embroider or draw on your own personal symbol.


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elements. Slowly and with great ceremony, one walks along the circle’s interior, sprinkling scented sand on the ground to symbolize earth. Next, incense represents air, then a candle for fire, and a fourth person circles the room with a bowl of water. The elements correspond to the different directions: south, west, north, east, respectively. This is known as casting the circle, or drawing down the moon.

Everything to this point is fairly universal to a witchcraft ceremony, and with the exception of the chants, it rarely changes. But what happens next does. Each ritual will have a different theme, usually emphasizing earthly pleasures and powers, cycles of birth, death and rebirth, and gods and goddesses assuming natural forms. The group might simply choose to invite a particular goddess to participate. To entice the goddess into the circle, the group must generate energy by chanting, focusing, holding hands, and sometimes swaying or dancing.

During the ritual, no member can leave the circle without the summoner’s permission. This is to prevent interruption of the energy generated by the group. To leave, you must make eye contact with the summoner, who will escort you from the circle. To end the ritual, the group—led by the high priestesses—says goodbye to the elements, directions, and goddess, turning to face each direction separately.

“We bid thee goodbye and farewell,” the high priestess tells the goddess. Then she claps once to break the circle.

“So mote it be,” she says solemnly, ending the ritual with the traditional, archaic Wiccan words.

**Origins and Evolution of Modern Witchcraft**

Modern witchcraft falls under the greater category of paganism, now more often called neo-paganism to distinguish it from both the negative literal meaning (“country-dweller”) and from Buddhism, Hinduism and other religions considered “pagan” by virtue of not being Christian, Jewish or Islamic. As Margot Adler explains, neo-paganism is pantheistic, a “view that divinity is inseparable from nature and that deity is immanent in nature.” As a category, pantheism most often refers to people who identify with some sort of new or re-created form of witchcraft.

In its modern carnation, witchcraft draws heavily on the 1950s works of writers like Gerald Gardner, Robin Skelton, and the Farrars, who built a system of beliefs and practices based partly on history, partly on anthropological studies of the 1920s, and partly on imagination. There is strong debate over the connections between modern witchcraft and its medieval counterpart, primarily raised by those who doubt that medieval witchcraft ever existed.

But the debate over the origins of Wicca has not tarnished the tradition in the eyes of witches, precisely because it runs counter to its premise—pantheism. In other words, the fundamental principle of the tradition is its decentralization, which translates into an acceptance of individual interpretations and expressions. Today, “witch” can describe anyone who labels themselves as such, and traditions of witchcraft range widely.

There is, however, one ethical which all witches share, known as the Wiccan Rede: *An’ it harm none, do what ye will*—in other words, if it will not hurt anyone, go ahead. They believe in what they call the “threefold law of karma”: whatever they do, good or bad, will revisit them three times. Most witches also share the belief that all living things have souls and spiritual power, and that the world is composed of a network of spiritual forces. Most worship a Goddess who rules the universe with her male consort, the Horned God.

**The Believers**

For his first 15 years, Thorbjorn—his pagan name, meaning “thunder bear”—was Catholic. Then, searching for something different, he began to study Zen Buddhism. But that did not suit him either, and one night he finally worked up the nerve to drop in on a free Wiccan class.

The experience was more than he bargained for.

“When I showed up, they weren’t having a class so much as they were going over to a house to exercise it,” he recounts, in a tone that still reflects a sense of disbelief. “I thought, okay, sure...I hung around. We went to this house across the street, and they did a ritual to banish any evil spirits.”

More intrigued than apprehensive, he decided to stick around for more classes. “I became more and more interested,” he says. “I even wore a pentacle for a while.”

Several years later, Thorbjorn is an Asatrú pagan. As it turned out, witchcraft, he says, was not really for him; something was still “missing.” But through the contacts he made in the witchcraft community, he stumbled across the Asatrú tradition—a closely related form of paganism. He describes finding Asatrú as a sort of religious “coming home.”
Asatrú, which means “true to the northern gods,” attempts to reconstruct Norse paganism. Members brew their own beer, wine and mead, produce all their own ritual tools, such as runes and rings, and often share bank accounts. Many have been witches and retain close ties with the witchcraft community.

Now happily settled in the Asatrú tradition, Thorbjorn married another Asatrú pagan last summer in a pagan hand-fasting ceremony. His wife, Runreg—whose name means “rune wisdom”—was once a handmaiden in the Ottawa temple of the Wiccan Church.

“I went from neophyte to initiate, and I got a lot of training from an Ottawa coven,” says Runreg. The handmaiden allows the priesthood to focus on the ritual without attending to the details of the ceremony—keeping the candles lit, the incense burning, and the worshippers focused. But after eight months, Runreg says, her heart was no longer in it, and she had begun having “theological discussions” with the same person who had first introduced Thorbjorn to Asatrú.

“I just felt that his stuff made a lot of sense,” she says. “It was like, hey, I put the right shoes on this time.” She was initiated into the tradition the same day as Thorbjorn.

The stories of Thorbjorn and Runreg are typical: most newcomers to witchcraft encounter it through the Wiccan Church, dabble in it for a while, and then either move up the ranks in Wicca or move on to a more suitable form of neo-paganism. Their experience is just one example of the sheer diversity within witchcraft and neo-paganism.

Image Problems: A Troubled History

Many practising witches refuse to “come out of the broom closet” about their religious identities. Some do not call themselves witches, preferring the term Wiccan, which is generally considered to be less threatening. Historically, it derives from the Anglo-Saxon word “wicca,” as in to bend, or “wicce,” meaning wisdom or wise.

Within feminist branches of witchcraft, the term “witch” is sometimes used to reclaim female power, in much the same way some activists in the gay movement have reclaimed words like “queer” and “dyke.” But within the broader Wiccan system, “witch” simply means an initiate of the religion.

Stereotypes regard witches as weird, flaky, spooky, yet powerful—malevolent hags able to practice black magic, sending evil spirits into the lives of their enemies. Centuries of literature and folklore have emphasized witchcraft’s most dramatic aspects: “Double, double, toil and trouble; fire burn and cauldron bubble,” cackle the three Weird Sisters in Shakespeare’s darkest tragedy, Macbeth. “Round about the cauldron go; In the poison’d entrails throw...”

Suspicion in the general public about witchcraft now stems largely from misconceptions arising out of Halloween stereotypes and misinformation. But these attitudes are also fostered by the secret, mysterious nature of witchcraft. Most witches are happy to clear up misconceptions about what they do not do; but often, they will not (or cannot) tell you what it is that they do.

Some theorists believe witchcraft’s much-maligned image grew out of its competition with Christianity in earlier centuries. Robin Skelton, a well-known British Columbia witch and author who has been studying and practising witchcraft since the 1950s, writes that witchcraft was at first “tolerated” by early Christians.

“In the 11th century it was common for there to be a ‘pagan’ altar in the church, which was almost invariably built on ground once used for pagan worship, and people would pay their respects to the pagan altar by the north door of the church as well as to the Christian altar in the east,” writes Skelton in his 1991 book, The Practice of Witchcraft. “Later in the 14th century the Church began to persecute witches. From the middle of the 14th century until the middle of the 20th, witchcraft was illegal in most countries of the Western world.”

Although laws against witchcraft in Great Britain were not repealed until 1951, by the end of the 17th century persecution of witches had largely died in both the U.S. and Europe. With the Enlightenment, new and more rational forms of inquiry now questioned the use of witch hunts and superstition to explain the natural and supernatural worlds.

But the legendary witch trials are not completely confined to the history books. In 1972, a woman was “tried” by a group of locals from her rural Nova Scotia town who found out that she was a witch and decided she should be burned. The woman claims she was accosted by a group of six adults on a deserted beach, where they tried her “in the name of the Roman Catholic Church” and sentenced her to death.

She says they accused her of “sacrificing infants, blighting crops, interfering with livestock, casting the evil eye, causing illness and death, and ensorcelling men.” Though she escaped, when she returned to the town nine years later she was warned to leave within six months or someone would be hired to shoot her.

Women and Witchcraft

Though many men have joined the movement, the modern relationship between women and witchcraft has strong historical roots. In the 15th century, two Dominican priests, Heinrich Institoris and James Sprenger, wrote the volume that for centuries was used to explain the proclivity of women to witchcraft, and then to justify the execution of alleged witches.

In their Malleus Maleficarum (“The Hammer of Witches”), they argued that “[w]omen are naturally more impressionable, and more ready to receive the influence of a disembodied spirit...They have slippery tongues, and are
unable to conceal from their fellow-women those things which by evil arts they know... All wickedness is but little to the wickedness of a woman." "Women," the priests continued, are quicker "to abjure the faith, which is the root of witchcraft." Heresy is therefore to be expected of women. "All witchcraft comes from carnal lust, which is in women insatiable."

The *Malleus Maleficarum*, which went through 13 printings, was provided to interrogators and confessors, who were almost always male. Although the priests conceded that men too could submit to witchcraft, their writings reflect not only a hatred and fear of witchcraft, but also of women. About 90 percent of witch trials from the 15th to 17th centuries, most of which involved women, occurred after the first publication of *Malleus Maleficarum*. The book's publication also preceded the Vatican's decision to define witchcraft as an exceptional crime, thereby removing all legal limits on torture for accused witches.

Historians disagree over the exact number of witches that were executed. Estimates range widely, from tens of thousands to nine million. This is the legacy that modern witches carry with them. As recently as the late 17th century, 20 people were executed, and about a hundred more imprisoned, following accusations of witchcraft in the New England communities of Salem and Danvers.

Carol Karlsen, in her book *The Devil in the Shape of a Woman*, argues that almost all those accused of witchcraft in colonial New England shared two characteristics. First, they were inheritors of property or money, unusual in a society where sons were first in line for inheritance; second, they were disagreeable women who frequently challenged the hierarchy of colonial society. Hence, Karlsen concludes, witchcraft in New England reflected fears of powerful women more than fears of non-Christian beliefs.

**Social and Religious Explanations for the Growth**

Witches and researchers alike agree that both the environmental movement and feminism go a long way to explain the religion's current popularity. "A couple of things are in play at the same time, and I think one of the really major ones is the whole environmental crisis we're wrestling with," says Rabinovitch. "Traditional Jewish and Christian thought has always been one of ownership: God gave dominion over the animals, the birds, etcetera, to Adam and Eve, and that's been interpreted as the ability to take whatever we want for ourselves, which has led us into the pickle we're in now."

"As an alternative to that," she says, "Wicca and most neo-pagan thought is about equals: this tree is equal to me, this cow is equal to me, this black person, this Chicana, is equal to me, and that means you have no right at all to exploit anything. I hate to say 'spiritual correctness,' but it's hitting people at a level deeper than political correctness, and it makes sense."

But Bill Marrevee, a Catholic priest and prominent Canadian theologian, cautions that this is just one interpretation of traditional Christian thought. "It's true that in the Genesis story of creation, it is said that human beings are ultimately created as the summit of all God's creations," he relates. "But whether all the extremes can be attributed to Christian and Jewish faith is another question... It seems to me we would have devastated nature even without Christian faith, too."

Barrie Zwicker, a frequent critic on social and religious issues, thinks people who have been in a state of "deep denial" until now are starting to wake up to environmental concerns and relate to them on a more spiritual level.

"In times of crisis, people review their basic value systems, their basic beliefs," says Zwicker. "Now, people are looking for simple answers. They want to go back to the old ways and then everything will be okay. That explains both the rise of neo-Nazis and the rise in New Age beliefs, and it explains fundamentalism and various other religious sects, not excluding the Davidians. In that larger context, you have witches. They're logically going to come in for extra attention as explainers of the human dilemma that we're in."

Some witches say part of what drove them to witchcraft in the first place is the way the Christian church has historically limited female role models. "The problem with Christianity for women is that the roles it offers are so limiting: you have either the Virgin Mary or Mary Magdalen," says Coraider, 23, who has been a witch for eight years. "If you choose to follow the Virgin Mary, you have to serve your husband as he serves God. If you follow Mary Magdalene, you're a slut."

Naomi Goldenberg, a professor of religious studies at the University of Ottawa, says women are feeling the reverberations of feminism from the 1960s and 1970s in their spiritual lives. "The women's movement is a whole cultural revolution that takes time to work through," says Goldenberg. "These ideas are seeping into our culture, and women are getting more and more interested. Many of them are dissatisfied with the kinds of symbols that traditional religions present. Women are thinking more about what they need in religious practices."

Some witches with Christian backgrounds maintain that Christianity is not changing at the same pace as society, and is having trouble meeting the needs of its congregations' younger members. Catholics wrestle especially hard to reconcile their
faith with issues like divorce, abortion and birth control that confront them daily.

"Confusion in the extreme," is how one Christian theologian—who wished not to be identified—sums up the situation of how the church's hierarchy handles real human problems. "A lot of people, at least in the context of Canadian culture, don't feel that the church should be telling them what to believe. They go, 'Yeah, right. Who are you? You're a 75-year-old man who's never had sex. How can you tell me about my sex life?'"

Marc Tymrell, a witch who researched Ottawa's witchcraft community, also suggests three personal reasons that motivate people to explore witchcraft: a search for the female as divine, a search for magic in the sense of "wonder" or "enchanted," and a quest for personal power in the material and social worlds.

Ideally, a coven serves as a training ground for each witch to develop her or his personal power. Witches think of power as another word for energy: an invisible network of forces shaping reality. Rituals create a situation that allows the individual to reach and control her or his psychic abilities. The net effect is a feeling of power from within that can effect changes in the individual's immediate world. The chance to learn how to harness this kind of personal power, says Tymrell, attracts many newcomers.

And in 10 Years: Religious Fad or Serious Faith?

How does all this bode for the future of witchcraft?

Its close alliance with so many current social issues seems to characterize it as a trend whose long-term potential is uncertain. It has some of the classic textbook characteristics of new religious movements—but it is missing considerably more.

Despite Wicca's relatively small following, underground nature and apparent appeal to victimized people, it defies being typed as a cult because in structure, content and purpose it fails to meet most of the major criteria. Most importantly, it emphasizes self-empowerment, which is antithetical to cult mentality. Cults, unlike most witchcraft traditions, usually have one charismatic leader and well-established hierarchies. Cults actively recruit new members; witches do not.

As it now stands, witchcraft seems to be a curious hybrid of social movement, spiritual movement, and new religion—a paradox entirely in its own category.

One question is whether the religion's apparent momentum will falter if and when the media lose their fascination with issues like women's spirituality and environmentalism. Will it have gained enough of a foothold by that time to evolve into a legitimate religion with long-term potential from the social movement it is frequently viewed as now?

"I don't know in Canada if there ever will be a recognized pagan faith," muses Thorburn. "Maybe Wicca in a few years. But it's very hard in Canada to be recognized... Paganism comes from all cultures. It's hard to be seen as the pagan faith."

Its popularity might also hinge, in part, on the collective religious mentality of Canadians. From that perspective, Professor Reginald Bibby, a sociologist at the University of Lethbridge who has been analyzing religious trends in Canada for some 20 years, throws some cold water on the religion's prospects:

"Looking at it as a product that frankly is often characterized as something that's rather deviant, it's really had a tough time trying to crack the religious marketplace," he says. "There are certainly some Canadians who have an interest. But interest in something like Wicca is still pretty small, relative to what the vast majority of Canadians are inclined to do."

But he adds one caveat: "We're finding over and over again that there still is a market for spirituality; there's still intrigue with the supernatural. If religions have something to say to those things, they'll survive."

Professor Nicholas Spanos, a Carleton University psychologist, compares witchcraft to any other "fringe religion" that attracts people searching for meaning and a sense of connection: as long as there are people who feel alienated from their society, witchcraft and other fringe movements will survive.

"These people are looking for stable interpersonal relationships. They're joining because members seem to have their heads on straight and offer friendship as well as perspective," says Spanos.

Meanwhile, perplexed religious studies scholars are still scratching their heads over how to characterize it. Like its individual practitioners, witchcraft refuses to be classified, and squirms under researchers' attempts to quantify, pigeon-hole or dissect it.

Perhaps Rabinovich expresses the paradox best.

"Neo-paganism," she says, "defies the traditional boundaries of what religion is."

Suggestions for Further Reading


Around the World

Whither the Nation-State?

For the better part of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the concept of the nation-state (a state composed of one ethnicity) has stood at the forefront of thought about the world structure and has been inscribed as the foundation of today’s international system of law and order. Yet, over the past few years, incidents around the world have levied an assault on the doctrine of the ethnic state. Under the pressures of the post-Cold War international system, states are simultaneously being torn apart from within and made obsolete from without.

By Stephanie Marrone

Today, after decades of predominance in the international system, notions of state sovereignty and the role of the nation-state are in flux. On one hand, minorities within multi-ethnic states have raised their voices in the name of nationalism, calling for their own state and challenging accepted borders and state structures. In the process, they have spawned non-state actors in the international arena—like the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) prior to Namibian independence—certain of which have received official recognition and observer status in the United Nations. On the other hand, multi-national organizations and associations, many of which arose in the post-World War II period, have offered a vision of global interdependence that has taken responsibilities out of state hands.

With the end of the Cold War, the boundaries of states have once again come into question. Examples abound of countries, racked by centrifugal forces, dissolving into smaller units of ethnic affiliations: the current Balkan crisis, the breakup of the former Soviet Union, inter-ethnic and tribal violence in various parts of Africa (most notably Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, South Africa and Liberia), the Kurdish struggle against Iraq and Turkey, Tamil opposition in Sri Lanka, and Canada’s struggle with secessionist groups.

The violence of the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia has cast serious doubts on the credibility and desirability of a state composed of one ethnicity. If war and “ethnic cleansing” are to be the ideology and practice at the root of the nation-state, many argue that such a state should not exist. Rather than create states for each nation, new thinking asserts that peoples and states must learn to live in multi-ethnic communities and respect the rights of minority groups within their boundaries. Nevertheless, the ideology of the nation-state has remained strong.

In response to the crisis of state sovereignty inherent in these nationalist groups—and in an attempt to shore up the existing international state system—the Council of Europe issued a first-time declaration on October 9, 1993 that sought to promote the rights and protection of national minorities. Yet, ambivalence on the part of the European leaders resulted in the Council’s failure to reach any final agreement on the definition of a “national minority.” The specific rights of such groups or whether legislation aimed at their protection should be binding on member states. Czech President Vaclav Havel warned against affording too much protection for minorities: “It inevitably leads to questioning of the integrity of the individual states and the inviolability of their present borders and thus even the validity of all postwar peace treaties.” To codify group rights to self-determination would place the sovereignty of states in jeopardy—the very opposite of what the European negotiators had in mind.

At the same time, the existence of supra-national organizations and confederations that cut across state boundaries can be observed in the international system. They have grown increasingly powerful in directing international relations and the affairs of sovereign states. The United States became painfully aware of this when numbers of their soldiers were killed in Somalia under the direction of a United Nations (UN) command led by Turkish generals.

Such organizations as the UN (along with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)), the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), the European Community


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(EC) and regional political and military unions of states such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Organization of American States (OAS), the Western European Union ( WEU), NATO, and the proposed NAFTA have gained importance in resolving conflicts both between and within faltering nation-states. Global problems, such as the AIDS epidemic and the environment, require global solutions and will continue to demand that individual states work together.

Moreover, revolutions in technology and communication have widened the range of influential actors in the international arena. The nineteenth century model of a self-contained state which could ensure economic growth and justice within its given territory no longer holds true. The new model is one of sub-national entities that are linked together into larger economic units. Local government officials in the United States compete with each other for the business of Mitsubishi or Motorola. Multi-national corporations are increasingly challenging the sanctity of borders. As the “charge” towards globalization continues, what is the future of the nation-state?

**Nations, States, and Nation-States**

In everyday usage, the terms nation, state and nation-state are often employed interchangeably. However, it is important to point out how they differ. A state is most often described as a political or legal entity which operates in the international arena under the United Nations and has the power to require obedience and loyalty from its citizens. International law, enshrined in the charter of the United Nations, governs relations between states.

Nations are more difficult to define conclusively. There are any number of very different standards by which a non-state nation may define itself or be defined—is also language, ethnicity, race, shared culture, historical precedent—and a key component of any nation is the consciousness of being one. Although there are approximately 170 independent states in the world, there are as many as 8,000 nations if language is used as the defining factor. Since by far the majority of these nations are without their own states, they are unrepresented in international law. For instance, the Navajo nation in America does not have its own place at the United Nations.

Hugh Seton-Watson, in his book Nations and States, offers a succinct definition: “All I can find to say is that a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation or behave as if they formed one.” Benedict Anderson enhances this definition by adding an anthropological dimension: “[a nation] is an imagined political community... It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will not know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them; yet in the minds of each lives the image of the community...”

In theory, a nation-state combines the two concepts of nation and state to describe a political entity with representation in the international community, consisting of a “people” who share aspects of the same culture, language, ethnicity or history. Central to the concept of the nation-state is the notion that a government of a state ought to serve entities called nations.

While nation-states sit at the foundation of the contemporary structure of international law, only a handful of states contain representatives of a single nation. With thousands of cultures, languages, and, therefore, nations in the world—many of whom overlap and intermingle geographically—the formation of true “nation-states” often requires mass migrations or the sort of “ethnic cleansing” that is currently sweeping Bosnia and that the Nazi regime brought upon Germany and its neighbors during the Second World War.

States today are usually comprised of one (or more) primary nations and any number of smaller minority nations within. Even in Western Europe—which most historians see as the birthplace of concepts of the nation-state and nationalism (the movement to become a nation-state)—there are few full-fledged nation-states. And most of these came about through the interplay of power politics, not the fulfillment of nationalist dreams. The borders of so-called nation-states outside of Europe tend to be multi-national mixtures whose boundaries were created and divided by victorious imperialists for economic or strategic purposes.

**When Did Nationalism Originate?**

Ancient peoples, from the Greeks and Romans to the Ger- mans and Jews, felt a loyalty to their respective principalities and tribes (enough to ward off invaders and to conquer foreign territories) and an affection for the customs, physical surroundings and people among whom they were born or raised. But, do these feelings of attachment constitute nationalism or consciousness of a “nation”?

Analysts are divided over the origins of nationalism. Some scholars trace it back to instinctive behavior and the earliest societies. They see nations and ethnic communities as steadfast units of history and integral elements of human experience. Nations are natural and therefore unlikely to disappear.

Other academics see nationalism as the product of particular economic and social circumstances. Nations are neither natural nor necessary, but are a product of modern phenomena such as capitalism, bureaucracy, and the industrial revolution. In this view, the birth of nations can be dated to the late 18th century.

A pioneering scholar of nationalism, Anthony Smith, attempts in his book The Ethnic Origins of Nations, to seek an intermediate point between these perspectives. He emphasizes that although nationalism is a wholly modern phenomenon, the modern nation incorporates several features of pre-modern ethnic communities. “Modern nations simply extend, deepen and streamline ways in which members of [ethnic groups] associ- ated and communicated. They do not introduce startlingly novel elements, or change the goals of human association and communication.”

**Setting the Stage for Modern Nationalism:**

**The Seventeenth Century**

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, states in Europe tended to be multinational conglomerations. They existed to
serve God and to support dynasties (not 'the people' or specific communities). The monarch himself personified the state—Louis XIV of France would say L'Etat c'est moi—and the culture and language of his people were irrelevant to his mandate from above. Different communities and 'nations' were united into states by conquest and inter-court maneuvering (alliances based on marriages between members of different monarchies).

The Peace of Westphalia in 1648—which effectively ended years of religious wars involving England, France, the Netherlands and the Holy Roman Empire—introduced the beginnings of the "modern" state. Such a state included a more centralized political structure and new notions of sovereignty: the state was now understood to possess a monopoly over the administration of justice and the use of force within its territorial boundaries. The peace settlement also marked the advent in international law of the modern European system of sovereign states, the system against which most nationalists formed their rival vision of the world.

The social structure of the seventeenth century was segmented into many different sub-cultures and classes which inhibited the advancement of the nation-state. Peasants, squires, burgesses and aristocrats were the distinctive groups within such societies. Each had its own interests, customs and traditions. While these different classes may have hailed from the same ethnicity, their sense of shared community was very different from one to the other. The celebrated French historian Alexis de Tocqueville observed that this period was "when the provinces and towns formed so many different nations in the midst of their common country." In Russia, for example, the court nobility spoke French among themselves and had a difficult time understanding the colloquial Russian of the peasantry.

In the old kingdoms, all the functions that we today expect the state to carry out were usually provided by local government. Feudal agricultural estates and towns were the units of production and trade, while nobles and local parliaments made law and administered town affairs. The dynasts' role was to govern relations between these local institutions and communities. In these diverse pockets, political loyalty and sense of shared community went to town, province, guild, or religious body, not state or nation. At the court level, kings surrounded themselves with their own group of loyal servants who were often of foreign descent. One observes Italians serving as diplomats to French and English Kings, as well as German princes on Spanish thrones.

Since customs and institutions cut across ethnic lines, the foundations of group loyalty were mainly religious and dynastic, not national. However, during the period of monarchical dominance, the concepts of the nation and nation-state were evolving. Parliaments were appearing and, with them, the attendant belief that they should represent the great collective interests of the people, rather than of the monarch. The infrastructure created by the monarchies—centralized state governments with law, courts, roads, canals and officials—were the foundations on which the later nations developed. And as the old structures which held ethnicity in abeyance disappeared, the way to the nation-state became clearer.

**The 18th Century: Intellectuals Debate Nationalism and the Nation-State**

From the perspective of intellectual thought, the years preceding the French Revolution of 1789 are commonly labelled the Age of Enlightenment. The Enlightenment was inspired by a revolution in scientific and intellectual thought. It was characterized by a belief in the powers of human reason, science and progress. The notion of the state during this time evolved from one defined as an estate owned by a ruler and sanctified by divine right, to one that belonged to an abstract and impersonal authority—the people—and which was governed by public officers, of whom the king was the highest. This fundamental shift, that set the conditions for the rise of the nation-state, arose from the intersection of the new forces of rationalism, capitalism and the Napoleonic Empire.

One of the ideas that rationalists such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke developed was the criticism of divine right monarchy. Gone was the pageantry and pretense of heavenly mandate. Instead, rulers and ruled were to be bound by a rationalized contract. An enlightened despot should not claim a mandate from God, they argued. Justification for authority was grounded in usefulness to the state and society. The monarch was to be considered the "first servant of the state." This attack on divine right monarchy extended to a criticism of the whole social structure of privilege and feudal caste ranking.

The developing force of industrial capitalism also contributed to the coming of nation-states. The pre-conditions of industrial operations involved a steady labor source, supply of raw materials and a market. Changes in agricultural
production—new crops introduced from the colonies, new techniques of cultivation, crop rotation, and new implements—resulted in the breakdown of feudal relations and produced a vast population now increasingly tied to the market for their livelihood. Early economists such as Adam Smith expounded the idea of laissez-faire economics or free-trade. In *The Wealth of Nations*, he advocated the natural working of the “invisible hand” in guiding trade and the establishment of prices. A capitalist, market economy required that people be free to move. Thus, the peasant became a paid worker, without tie to land. Social status built on rank began to erode in favor of one based on wealth. Thus, there grew up people without ties to noble privilege, people who could then associate with nations.

At its height, the Napoleonic empire (1804-1815) encompassed the entire European mainland except the Balkan peninsula. Many historians argue that nationalism, and the desire to endow nations with state powers, developed in resistance to the conquest and domination of Napoleonic power. (Although, other scholars also assert that opposition movements had less to do with nationalism and more to do with the desire to oust the French conquerors.) Protests began in Germany and Italy and spread eastward in the wake of Napoleon’s conquests. Local populations resented foreign domination and protested against the dictation of French policy. As one of the emerging “isms” of the nineteenth century (along with liberalism, radicalism, socialism, individualism, etc.) nationalism moved throughout Central, Eastern and Western Europe, taking on a slightly different, local flavor in each new locale.

**The Consolidation of the Nation-State: Ideas Meet Power**

The nineteenth century saw the acceptance of nationalism as a central and indispensable component to the modern European state. Yet, it was also a period that saw many complications in the formation of nation-states. Overall, nationalist movements were led by intellectuals. They instilled the idea of a cultural nationalism, emphasizing that each people had a language, history, worldview, and culture of its own. It was important for each nation to create for itself a sovereign state to preserve these national differences and to ensure liberty and justice for its members.

However, the course of the first half of the nineteenth century demonstrated to nationalists throughout Europe that a nationalist ideology was itself not enough to build a nation-state. The revolutions that took place in 1848 reflect these problems. Throughout Central and Eastern Europe, from the Italian peninsula and the Germanic states to the Austrian Habsburg monarchy, nationalist uprisings appeared. But, nowhere did these uprisings succeed in the creation of nation-states. The power of the multinational, dynastic states stood staunchly in the way.

Furthermore, in the German case, the question of where to place the boundaries of a new German state could not be answered. Centuries of German migration had left Germanic peoples scattered throughout Central and Eastern Europe. The Austrian Habsburg monarchy, with their vast territories of non-Germans—saw no reason to join a German confederation. Yet, could a unified Germany truly be a nation-state, nationalists questioned, if the Austrians were not involved? In 1848, German unification founeder on this and other issues.

At the same time, the chauvinistic nature of certain types of nationalism eventually prevented the realization of nation-states. In the case of the Habsburg monarchy, the different nationalities, rather than uniting against the common enemy of Austrian hegemony, tended to fight amongst each other. In a celebrated case, Vienna agreed to the formation of a representative parliament for the Magyars in Hungary. However, in order to vote for that parliament, individuals were required to speak Hungarian. The other nationalities living on Hungarian lands were angered by such a requirement and saw little difference from the rule of the Austrians. Under these circumstances, when forces came through to suppress a Hungarian uprising, many of the other nationalities stood against the Hungarians and with the Habsburgs.

The events of 1848 further reflected two different types of nationalism that have been present in European history since. One on hand, there was the drive towards national unification, the bringing together of a “nation”: in Italy and Germany for example. On the other hand, one sees the fragmentation or breaking up of multinational states into their “national” parts: Eastern Europe and the Balkans, for instance.

Years later, when Germany (1866-1871) and Italy (1859-1870) did undergo unification, the process was driven less by the nationalist intellectuals and more by the very calculated power politics of conservative leaders who used war and diplomacy, not some inherent national bond between peoples, as the foundation of the new “nation-states”. These leaders—Prince Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898) in Prussia and Count Camillo di Cavour (1810-1861) in Piedmont/Italy—did not always act out of the desire for a nation-state. Rather, they were in search of a state structure that would be able to compete economically and militarily with industrialized Great Britain and industrializing France. Moreover, the creation of the nation-state, these leaders believed, would provide a safety-valve that would suppress class antagonisms under the framework of nationalism—a safety-valve that would allow them to perpetuate their conservative rule.

From the outset, the new Italian and German states were met with problems. In a celebrated statement following unification—which belied the nationalist intellectual assumption
that there existed a natural tie among the people of the Italian peninsula—Massimo d’Azeglio, former Prime Minister of the Italian state of Piedmont, said: “We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians.” At the same time, in Germany, the exclusion of Austria, the many ethnic Germans who remained outside German borders and the extensive sovereignty given to many component states of the new Germany (until World War I Bavaria maintained a foreign ambassador and embassy in Berlin) left many Germans frustrated with the process of unification and with the feeling that the creation of a German nation-state had not yet been completed.

**Building the “Nation”-State**

Other historians of national consciousness have argued that nationalism was produced by the rapid economic and social changes attendant with the nineteenth century. Often peoples and communities that existed within the confines of what was considered a nation, held only a regional consciousness. Their daily interactions took place within the boundaries of their particular region, they spoke regional languages and subscribed to regional history. They had no reason to consider the remainder of the country. In France, for example, historian Eugen Weber points out that the “French” spoke a mosaic of regional dialects. Somewhere between a quarter and a half of the population spoke no French at all in 1863.

With the expansion of transportation networks and the growth of national (and international) markets, individuals suddenly found reason to take part in a larger national unit. In Western Europe, and France in particular, regional groups began to learn the language of the center (without which they could do no business) and often did so by sending their children to the newly appearing national schools. At these schools, the children learned about national rather than regional history. In the course of little more than a generation, formerly isolated regions had, due to economic incentive, integrated themselves both physically and culturally into a national whole.

Increasingly, federal governments controlled and penetrated the lives of their people. They imposed taxes, controlled information, established schools and transportation networks, and offered social security and protection from foreign threats. Most importantly, the new states created national armies that brought together citizens from all over the country and filled them with a sense of discipline and love for the “patrie”. In *Faces of Nationalism*, Boyd Schaefer argues that “people increasingly participated in the national affairs and identified themselves and their political and cultural interests with those of their respective nations...” The activities of governments became so pervasive that few could avoid the call to nationalism and the appreciation that their country provided them with welfare and security.

Many scholars now argue that nationalism is not a force inherent to Europe but one that was “invented”, often purposely, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Participation in national affairs further increased through voting, mass ceremonies, and national celebrations. National holidays were created to celebrate the new nation-states and to foster (create) a new historical memory. At the same time, statues to local heroes were replaced by those of national heroes in an effort to foster unity and a sense of collective consciousness. Each of these engendered a feeling of pride and attachment for their own country. These feelings were buttressed by the rebirth of the Olympics and other forms of international athletic competition. By cheering a nation, one placed oneself in opposition to all other nations. A bond was created between all those who cheered for the same side.

This creation of nationalism, historians claim, changed the nature of the national ethos from a “liberal” variety to a “chauvinistic” variety. The former believed in the importance of a nation-state for all nations and did not consider any one nation to be superior to any other. In contrast, the latter asserted the ideology of a “chosen people” who are inherently different and better than those around them. This form of nationalism often led to a single-minded implementation of one nationalities’ goals at the expense, or the negation, of other nations’ claims to a nation-state.

**Nationalism in the Twentieth Century**

World War I brought the concept of the nation-state to its apex. On June 25, 1914, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, Sophie, were assassinated in the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo. The multinational Austro-Hungarian Empire assumed that the assassins were operating with Serbian support. The determination to crush the Serbian separatism was one factor that led to its declaration of war on Serbia one month later and the following outbreak of World War I.

At the peace settlements of Versailles (1918), American President Woodrow Wilson made the principle of national self-determination the basis of his plan for a new international order. “Self-determination,” he claimed, “is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.” The treaty attempted to actualize the principle of coinciding state frontiers with those of ethnicity and language.

But a combination of factors prevented the realization of the nation-state plan. Despite Wilson’s efforts, the victorious allies were more interested in permanently reducing German power than they were in following the ideals of nationalism. Germany was split up into zones of occupation and German lands—with German people—were given to some of the new “nation-states”—Poland and Czechoslovakia, for example.

At the same time, Europe simply contained too many overlapping ethnic groups to reach this goal. For example, the new states created from the broken Austro-Hungarian empire were as multinational as the old, only smaller. The previously “oppressed peoples” were now called “oppressed minorities.” Although the Great Powers after World War I championed this principle of minority rights, they confined it to the European continent. The victors of the war divided its spoils, namely the German colonies, and absorbed...
them into their own empires, refusing to admit that colonized people also had the right to self-determination. The Middle East and Africa was divided with little regard for ethnicity, tradition or language.

Despite the failure of the Allies to separate the old multinational empires into nation-states, the power of the nation-state idea continued to grow through the establishment of such organizations as the League of Nations (and later the United Nations). Such institutions created an international system that considered the nation-state as the principal actor on the world stage. The privilege of being a member in this system meant being able to voice one’s national interest in a forum among other nation-states. Here too, however, the League of Nations (another Wilson idea) did not live up to its promise since, ironically, the American Congress refused to join.

Following World War I, new means of expressing nationalism emerged. The modern mass media—through newspapers, the radio and, later, television—became nationalizing agents. In parts of the world where the government controlled such communications, the people received little that was not nationalism-propaganda. National symbols became part of the lives of individuals as the divisions between the public and the private lives of each citizen began to disappear. Between the wars, sporting events became an even more important expression of the nation. The sports teams and players embodied the spirit of their nation-states as was witnessed by Hitler’s use of the 1936 Olympics to instill pride in and cohesion among the Germanic peoples.

National self-determination and the defense of minority rights were used by Adolf Hitler—who many historians have called the ultimate “Wilsonian”—to justify his engulfment of Austria and Czechoslovakia as protecting the interests of their German-speaking populations and the natural evolution of German national unification. This was an argument that the other European powers found hard to counter as they, at least publicly, voiced support for the nation-state ideal.

After World War II, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, which formed the basis of the United Nations Charter, purposely played down the issue of minority rights. Furthermore, no mention of the principle of self-determination was made until the Soviet Union proposed an amendment with the phrase “based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination.”

### Change Since 1945

Since the Second World War, the incidence of inter-state conflict has been significantly less than conflict between governments and independently organized armed groups. With the breakup of the Yugoslav state, the world has witnessed three instances since the end of World War II of a modern multi-ethnic state collapsing (Pakistan in 1971, and the former USSR in 1991 before it). Within the “new world order” of the post-Cold War world, separatist groups are forming throughout the Middle East, Southern and Central Asia and parts of Europe. As Turks and Russians attempt succession from Moldavia, Serbs are declaring independence from Croatia and Bosnia, and Tamils fight for independence from Sri Lanka.

The outburst of separatist groups can be seen through the perspective of the United Nations and international law. Theoretically, the system of international law regulates relations between subjects to maintain order. These subjects are entities (i.e. nation-states) which according to the law have gained legal personality and are recognized to possess certain rights. This view regulates non-state entities and individuals to the position of objects of international law. Among many such entities include separatist groups and terrorists; non-recognition implies that the international community refuses to acknowledge their cause. The result is the proliferation of national liberation movements who capitalize on the use of technology as the “great equalizer” to advance their interests. In the place of international legal mechanisms which could render some form of coherent justice, these unrecognized entities are pushed to desperate measures to capture the attention of those who deny their presence as legal persons.

The nation-state, which has arguably existed since the late eighteenth century, is in a state of flux. It is difficult to imagine a world without nation-states. In our century, the rise of nationalism and the segregation of the world into national units has created intense feelings of identity within the citizens of each nation. Yet, it remains to be seen whether the international system will witness a proliferation of many more new nations, or if such states will be replaced with global or regional political institutions as the unit of international politics.

### Suggestions for Further Reading

Between Black and White: The Complexity of Brazilian Race Relations

Despite the persistence of a racial order remarkably unchanged from the time of slavery, Afro-Brazilians have yet to launch a collective attack on racism in Brazil. Such inaction is a product of ideologies which inhibit the formation of racial consciousness, political climates which discourage racially-defined political activity, and Afro-Brazilian leaders whose agendas are alien to Black Brazil’s majority poor.

by Claudine Gay

In the Northeastern city of Salvador, some 16,000 children work, beg and sleep on the streets every day. Much has been said of Brazil’s street children and the faltering economy responsible for their delinquency, but few recognize that the plight of homeless youth in Brazil is in no small part an artifact of Brazil’s racial order. The overwhelming majority of these children are black, and while it may not be revolutionary in North America to recognize how race influences childhood, in Brazil the only thing more unusual than acknowledging racism is organizing against it.

In 1950-51, at the request of UNESCO, French social scientist Alfred Metraux led an international team of researchers to Brazil. The purpose of the study was to document what was then thought to be a “racial paradise,” and to use Brazil as a model for other multi-racial nations to follow.

But instead of leaving Brazil with a recipe for racial harmony, the researchers ended up repudiating the whole notion of “racial democracy” in Brazil, illuminating the contradictions between the state’s emphatic proclamations and a reality of racial discrimination. Analysts had previously celebrated the absence of legal and institutional discrimination in Brazil (like that of the U.S. or South Africa). Following the study, scholars began to focus on the more complex forms of racial prejudice that Brazil had produced. Ultimately, the most puzzling question facing the researchers was the lack of serious Afro-Brazilian opposition to pervasive racial oppression.

(The term “Afro-Brazilian” refers to that 44%—according to the 1980 Census—of the Brazilian population that is entirely or partly of African descent).

Forty years later, the question remains: Afro-Brazilians have not organized against the stark social, economic, and political inequalities that they face as a group. They are disproportionately represented in low wage, dangerous jobs; they make up the majority of residents in the favelas (slums) and shantytowns that lie outside the cities; they have little or no access to higher education; and they are frequently the victims of police brutality.

Three reasons help to explain why Afro-Brazilians
Vorably high ratio of white males to white females encouraged
white slave holders to exploit sexually their female slaves.
Since by law the children of these unions retained the slave
status of the mother, miscegenation did not pose a threat to the
established social order.

"Whitening" has been both a social and an individual
experience. Collectively, "whitening" was reflected in the pro-
motion of European immigration and the restriction of Asian
and African immigration. These aggressive policies began on
the eve of the abolition of slavery (1888), and continued virtu-
ally unabated until the 1930s.

The program, which included subsidies for the trans-
Atlantic voyage, was designed to solve the labor crisis expect-
ed to develop after the end of slavery. The idea was that
skilled, white European labor—as opposed to the growing pop-
ulation of "free coloreds"—would make up the newly forming
middle class. The post-colonial Brazilian elites who favored
"whitening" believed that this immigration policy would
increase the coefficient of white blood in Brazil, ideally light-
ening the skin color of the general population.

Today, while "whitening" is no longer official government
policy, it continues to be expressed in individual terms. Arguably,
"whitening" has taken on a life of its own, becoming
so ingrained and subtly "understood" that it no longer needs
vocal advocates. It is the logic of "whitening," as both a genet-
ic and a social process, that continues to structure the social
hierarchy and regulate social mobility in Brazil.

The distinctions of black and white—or even white and
non-white—that exist in other societies such as the United
States, are not used by Brazilians. Instead, they refer to a
multi-category system, based not on origin, but on phenotype
(i.e. appearance). Essentially, Brazilians are "color-conscious"
whereas as Americans and Western Europeans tend to be
“race-conscious.”

Brazilians evaluate an individual based on certain physical
characteristics: namely, amount of pigmentation, hair type,
nose, and lips. From this assessment, an individual is placed
along a color continuum, anchored at the two extremes by
those with either no (visible) African traits or no (visible)
European attributes. As a consequence, there are literally hun-
dreds of different categories of racial identification. And while
the color continuum may create considerable ambiguity, it is
clearly hierarchical: the more European attributes one has, the
higher one is placed in the social hierarchy. Sociologist Carl
Degler, in his comparative analysis of Brazil and the United
States, translated the meaning of some of the more commonly
used categories:

The lowest level is composed of the pretos (blacks) and
preto retintos (dark blacks). Somewhat above the preto
is the cabra, who is slightly less black....Still moving
upward, we come to the cabo verde (Cape Verde) who is
lighter than the preto, but still quite dark, but with
straight hair, thin lips, and narrow, straight nose.....

For simplicity's sake, we will combine this multitude of
varieties into three categories: pretos (blacks), pardos (mulat-
to), and brancos (whites).

What makes this movement within the color continuum
important is not just that it leads to changes in racial self-iden-
tification, but that this change brings with it new privileges.
The less one is physically identified with the pretos, the closer
one approaches full citizenship and its attendant benefits. The

I. Concepts of Race

The power of racial ideologies rests in their ability to disguise
the real basis of relations between people, and thus to champi-
on image over fact, myth over reality. In Brazil, the ideas of
"whitening" (branqueamento) and "racial democracy" are the
ideologies which perpetuate discrimination. These beliefs
have maintained a system of individual opportunity and indi-
vidual responsibility which has hampered the development of
racial identity and of political organization based on race.

"Whitening" and the Color-Class Continuum

The Brazilian concept of "whitening," symbolized in the popu-
lar saying "we are becoming one people," represents an ideol-
ogy entirely different from white European and North American
phobias about race mixture prevalent at the turn of this centu-
ry. In the Brazilian view, the mixing of whites and non-whites
(be they of Indian or African descent) led to the "breeding out"
of non-white racial characteristics, and the propagation of
white racial heritage and attributes. Over many generations and
on a wide scale, inter breeding would lead to the eventual
"whitening" of Brazil.

Miscegenation, or racial interbreeding, has had a long his-
tory in Brazil, dating back to the colonial period when an unfa-
straighter the hair, thinner the nose, lighter the skin, the greater the access to education, better housing, better employment, and higher standards of living. The mulatto's access to the spoils of white citizenship is one of the ways in which "whitening" discourages their challenge of the system.

However, along with skin color, "money also whitens." According to this logic, in poverty, the mulatto is socially positioned closer to the pretos, whereas, once "whitened" by money a preto becomes a pardo, regardless of actual color. For blacks who succeed in securing substantial earnings, not only does this open up to them new—though limited—possibilities of vertical mobility, it also triggers shifts in racial self-identification. In this way mobility drives a wedge between the perceived interests of the upwardly mobile and those of the rest of the Afro-Brazilian population. Thus, the social significance of color and wealth tends to weaken Afro-Brazilian solidarity.

When we take all this together what emerges is a color-class continuum. The bottom of this continuum is poor and black, the top is white and privileged. In the middle we find a bizarre mixture of upwardly mobile mulattos, monied blacks, and even poor whites. The emphasis on appearance over origin highlights the physical diversity among Afro-Brazilians, thereby detracting from the reality of a shared ancestry as common ground on which to build racial solidarity.

For Afro-Brazilians aspiring to join the mainstream, success is seen not as a function of an organized effort to change Brazilian society, but rather as a matter of individual effort and responsibility. In this way, blacks and mulattos both adhere to and perpetuate, if only passively, the "whitening" ideology.

Shadow Boxing: The Myth of Racial Democracy

The myth of Brazil as a racial democracy has also undermined the legitimacy of Afro-Brazilian grievances, thereby making social change an unlikely prospect.

The concept of racial democracy was already taking shape in Brazil in the early part of the twentieth century, to be fully developed in the 1930s by Brazilian Gilberto Freyre. After witnessing the overt racism of the United States, Freyre extolled the virtues of the Brazilian racial order, linking its tolerant and democratic nature to the nation's more humane experience of slavery.

Later, "racial democracy" was grafted into official state policy and rooted in the official view that Brazil is a country in which race makes no difference to opportunity or status. Furthermore, the Brazilian government claims that the country is free of both institutional and informal forms of discrimination. Access to public resources—be it education, health care, employment, political participation—is equally available to all citizens. Therefore, the potential for upward mobility is perceived as simply a matter of fair competition and individual merit.

Advocates of "racial democracy" point to any one of a number of symbolic forms of integration as support for this argument: miscegenation, the growing mainstream appeal of Afro-Brazilian religions, and the diversity of Carnival. Despite the role of the UNESCO study that detailed a more realistic picture of race relations in Brazil, elites have tenaciously defended this benevolent image of racial equality.

Analysts concede that, at best, the UNESCO study made Brazil more self-conscious about its international reputation. Symbolic of that new self-consciousness was the Afonso Arinhas law, reluctantly passed in 1951, which makes racial discrimination in public places a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment. The move was prompted by an internationally embarrassing incident when American performers Katherine Dunham and Marian Anderson were barred from a Sao Paulo hotel. Yet, the Arinhas Law has shown itself to be merely a cosmetic change—rarely enforced and unaccompanied by stronger measures.

But though "racial democracy" is clearly a misnomer, the concept survives for concrete reasons. Most importantly, it has proven effective in both inhibiting racial uprising, and absolving the government from decades of inaction. By insisting that Afro-Brazilians enjoy opportunities to better themselves and freedom to compete, the myth has resulted in a widespread attitude (among whites and Afro-Brazilians) that the problems of the black urban population are largely due to the incapacity and irresponsibility of individuals, rather than to social prejudice. If a high proportion of Afro-Brazilians remain poor and uneducated, it is perceived as a fault of their own laziness, ignorance, and weaknesses. Such failures are attributed by some to the legacy of slavery, which left Afro-Brazilians ill-prepared to compete in capitalism, and by others to theories of racial inferiority.

By invoking an ideology that at once denies and justifies
the reality of racial inequality, both the state and white Brazilians are exempted from responsibility for the socioeconomic deterioration of the Afro-Brazilian community. "Racial democracy" denies Afro-Brazilians both a point of contention as well as a target for their protests. In fact, Afro-Brazilians who have spoken out against the myth of racial democracy and demanded redress of inequalities have been labeled "racist," "anti-democratic," and even "anti-Brazilian."

II. Politics

Though the ideologies of racial democracy and whitening have been a powerful force limiting racial solidarity, the lack of Afro-Brazilian collective activity has also been influenced by the political reality. The character of the regimes in the last 40 years has controlled the availability of a political arena where Afro-Brazilians could speak out. The history of the Second Republic (1945-1964) and the military dictatorship (1964-1985) go a long way in explaining the absence of an Afro-Brazilian mass movement.

The Second Republic and the Redirection of Grievances

In October 1945, a military coup deposed President Getúlio Vargas, drawing the curtain on his repressive Estado Novo (New State) and escorting him to self-imposed exile on his ranch in Rio Grande do Sul. The coup and the subsequent December elections, judged to be among the freest in Brazil's history, ushered in a new political phase: civil liberties, suspended since 1937, were restored, and political parties were once again permitted.

Yet despite the new openness inaugurated in 1945, the expected reemergence of the Frente Negra Brasileira did not occur. (The FNB, or Brazilian Black Front, was a political movement born in the 1930s, and the first Afro-Brazilian organization to aggressively lobby the government, and attempt to organize the black vote on a national scale). The absence of an Afro-Brazilian political movement was a product of two interacting forces: on the one hand, the rules of industrial relations organized under Vargas; on the other, the emergence of competitive political parties in the Second Republic.

Under Vargas the state had been highly centralized, modeled partly along the lines of European fascism. The federal government, enjoying unchallenged authority, aggressively restructured the economy—one of the most important measures being a reorganization of industrial labor relations in 1943.

The new labor code, which would last until the 1980s, mobilized labor into government-controlled unions by plant and industry, and outlawed any state- or nation-wide labor organization. These unions, while holding a monopoly on representation, were also under the close scrutiny of the labor ministry which controlled union finances and elections. Employers were organized and directed by the state in a similar fashion.

Designed primarily to provide the executive with a mechanism for controlling the economy, corporatism—as this system is known—proved to have unintended consequences on Afro-Brazilian political behavior. By the time that the new labor code had been instituted, Afro-Brazilians formed a large and growing portion of the urban labor force.

Despite its constraints, corporatism represented a form of political participation previously unheard of for Afro-Brazilians. Earlier, the government had been ruled through a one-party system, and labor unions had been dominated by European immigrants. Under the conditions of the Estado Novo, corporatism appeared to be a marked improvement for Afro-Brazilians, creating a sense of integration into Brazilian politics.

This sense of integration was enhanced by the new openness of the Second Republic. Now, not only were Afro-Brazilians attached to the state, but they were attached to a democratic state, theoretically accountable to its citizens. In addition, there were now competitive political parties, including the labor-based Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, which actively sought Afro-Brazilian support.

By establishing institutional channels and admitting Afro-Brazilians into the political system, corporatist labor unions and the labor party defused the sense of need for racially-defined political activity. As a consequence, the few collective endeavors which took place within the Afro-Brazilian community were primarily social, recreational, or cultural in their orientation. Preeminent among these was the nationalist Black Experimental Theater, founded in the 1940s by Abdias do Nascimento and Sebastiao Rodrigues Alves, as a forum for both Black artistic expression and consciousness-raising.

Dictatorship and Repression

Whatever the aspirations of the Black Experimental Theater and other collective endeavors, its prospects were abruptly cut short by the military coup of 1964 and the 21-year dictatorship which followed. Concerned with what it perceived as the excesses of populism and the shambles of the Brazilian economy, the military moved swiftly to purge the government bureaucracy, universities, and trade unions and to adopt an economic stabilization program.

The first of the general-presidents, General Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco, managed to resist "hardline" pressure to suspend constitutional guarantees. However, by 1968 the growing political radicalization of students and industrial workers drove then-President Artur de Costa e Silva to decree the Fifth Institutional Act (AI-5), effectively authorizing the suspension of civil rights as a matter of national security.

AI-5 and the accession of General Emilio Garrastazu Medici to the presidency inaugurated the most repressive phase of the military dictatorship, from 1968-1974. The government censored the media, controlled all public events, and continued arbitrary purges of university faculty and other institutions. Overt politi-
cal mobilization was illegal and impossible. Thus, there were essentially no collective endeavors—be they political or cultural—within the Afro-Brazilian community. Afro-Brazilian newspapers no longer operated. Long-time activists, such as Abdias do Nascimento, chose self-exile. Popular culture witnessed a brief, youth-oriented “black soul” current in the late 1960s, but this was limited to little more than afro hair styles and dashikis.

**Starting Over**

It was 1985 before the military dictatorship had fully given way to civilian democratic government. However, the democratization of Brazil took over a decade, beginning in 1974 with the slow unveiling of *dissensão* (decompression) and accelerating after 1978 with the definitive start of *abertura* (opening). Initiated under President Geisel, the transition was from the outset a tightly controlled, elite process. With *dissensão* the military dictatorship reduced its human rights violations, and relaxed restrictions on civilian political organizations. With legal barriers lifted and the fear of persecution reduced, civil society began cautiously to reemerge from the ashes.

In this new political environment, Brazilians of color came to question publicly the reality of “racial democracy.” At first, this renewed debate was contained within the student and intellectual communities. They bitterly denounced Brazilian racism at conferences such as the Congress of Black Culture in Cali, Colombia in 1977. They also established organizations (e.g. the Brazil-Africa Interchange Society, the Research Institute of Black Cultures) in order to exchange information and build solidarity with Africa. Meanwhile, Afro-Brazilians outside of these circles participated in the militant *sindicatos*, as well as other social movements such as human rights groups, women’s groups, and the *comunidades eclesiasticas de base* (CEBs) organized by the Catholic Church.

Afro-Brazilian political efforts became less fragmented as *abertura* advanced, democracy became more certain, and Afro-Brazilian activists revived old communication networks. On June 18, 1978, representatives from a number of Afro-Brazilian organizations, outraged by a series of racially-motivated incidents, joined forces in São Paulo to form the Unified Movement Against Racial Discrimination (MUCDR).

As their first project, MUCDR organized a July 7, 1978 demonstration to protest two acts: (a) the April 28 beating death of black worker Robson Silveira da Luz, by a São Paulo policeman; and (b) the May expulsion of four young black athletes from the volleyball team of the Tiete Yacht Club because of their color. Two thousand people participated in the protest on the steps of the Municipal Theater. The organizers read an open letter to the population in which they outlined their campaign against “racial discrimination, police oppression, unemployment, underemployment and marginalization.”

Invigorated by this initial success MUCDR rapidly launched a process of institution building: holding a National Assembly, electing a National Executive Council, setting up its organizational structure, recruiting delegates nationwide, and developing a Charter of Principles. At the First National Congress of MUCDR, held in Rio in December 1979, the organization changed its name to the Unified Black Movement (MNU), emphasizing that any struggle against racial discrimination must be led by Blacks.

The establishment of the MNU, while catalyzed by specific new grievances, was first and foremost a product of the political transition. The organization and its co-founders took advantage of the relatively more open and tolerant political climate of *abertura* to rally Afro-Brazilians around issues of mutual concern. Furthermore, not only was the climate more open but also more politicized, a result of the reemergence of civil society. The *sindicatos* and CEBs, which had emerged in the mid-1970s with *dissensão*, politicized Afro-Brazilians, preparing them for their role in the MNU-organized protests of the late-1970s.

**III. Problems of Leadership**

Afro-Brazilian activists and foreign observers alike held high hopes that the MNU would develop into an Afro-Brazilian mass movement that would rival the American civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. However, by the early 1980s it was clear that this would not be the case. While the MNU continued to mobilize in frequent nationwide protests, its constituency became increasingly limited to Afro-Brazilian students, professionals, and artists. Considering that only 4% of *pretos* and 6% of *pardos* have completed even nine years of schooling, the MNU’s constituency was extremely small, unrepresentative of the majority working class Afro-Brazilian population.

Again, part of this failure can be attributed to the political environment—particularly, the party reform of 1979, which allowed the opposition to return to multi-party competition. Operating in much the same way as in the Second Republic, party competition and the promise of free elections encouraged competition for black electoral support. Parties adopted anti-discrimination platforms, and organized commissions to investigate race relations. Affiliation with one of these political parties served a critical function which the MNU could not: it created a sense of attachment to the mainstream political apparatus, thus defusing the perceived need for racially defined political activity.

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*High hopes, but still living with the status quo.*

*Consulate General of Brazil*
High Hopes, But Failures to Bridge the Class Divide

Yet beyond politics, or even the ideology of "racial democracy" and "whitening," there is still another reason for the failure of the MNU: the inability of its middle class leadership to bridge the class divide. Collective endeavors among Afro-Brazilians, past and present, have tended to be elitist—either in their mission or in their membership.

Whether organized with an elitist intention (such as the exclusive social and athletic clubs) or not, rarely have collective projects brought Afro-Brazilians from different socio-economic classes together as equals. Even the FNB, for all of its effort at organizing the Afro-Brazilian vote, maintained a leadership comprised exclusively of professionals and white-collar office workers. Poor and working-class Afro-Brazilians were clients, not partners. The MNU was no exception. The inability of its middle-class militants to form effective linkages with the poor and working-class majority insured that the movement would not move beyond a small, well-organized elite exercise.

The MNU’s failure to bridge class divisions had nothing to do with lack of effort. In fact their elaborate organizational structure placed a heavy emphasis on the inclusion of the povo (poor person). The fundamental organizational unit, as approved by the founding National Assembly in 1978, was to be the Center of Struggle (Centro de Luta). Centers were to be formed in work areas, villages, prisons, candomble and umbanda temples, samba schools, churches, and favelas. A vast network of these Centers were to criss-cross the county, educating and mobilizing the masses around issues of local concern.

A network of Centers did develop. By 1986, in fact, there were 12 chapters of the MNU in major cities throughout Brazil. However, these Centers were not forming in favelas and samba schools, but rather in academic institutions and cultural organizations. It was a younger generation of Afro-Brazilians, many with one or more years of university education, that were among the first and most eager respondents to the MNU’s organizational call. Their eagerness was in large part a measure of the economic and political exclusion they had suffered under the military dictatorship.

As their numbers grew, it was their aspirations and rhetoric which came to define the organization. The movement became an expression of frustration among upwardly mobile Afro-Brazilians denied admission to the middle-class status to which their education and qualifications entitled them. To that extent, the aspirations of these activists were too removed from the lives of the poor to facilitate class-linkages.

Among the poor the more pressing issues concerned overcrowding, access to basic services, health care, and crime. Had the MNU continued to organize around more tenable issues, as it had done in the initial protest against police brutality, the gap between middle-class militants and the masses of Afro-Brazilians might have been bridged.

Living with the Status Quo

The absence of an Afro-Brazilian mass movement, especially in the last 40 years, has been no simple matter of acquiescence, nor of insufficient grievances. Rather it is the result of three forces which have psychologically and politically discouraged racial solidarity. The ideologies of “whitening” and “racial democracy” have complicated attitudes towards race, divided loyalties, and rewarded individual enterprise over collective endeavor. Politics have been organized to either repress or re-channel collective action. And Afro-Brazilian activists have allowed protest to remain an elite exercise.

Florestan Fernandes may be correct: Afro-Brazilians probably cannot indefinitely continue to leave the Brazilian social order unchallenged. But the obstacles to collective political action are formidable. In the absence of the psychological and political prerequisites, organizing an Afro-Brazilian mass movement may prove more challenging than living with the status quo.

Suggestions for Further Reading


A though monetary policy may not—as the two authors here point out—capture the popular imagination, it does hold profound repercussions for the quality of life of populations around the globe. The following two articles examine from diverging perspectives the history and effects of international postwar monetary policy. In the process, they demonstrate the variety of interpretations to which history is often subject.

In the first, Geoff Day summarizes the background and philosophy behind both the gold standard and floating rate policies. For Day, market forces—in the long-term beyond the control of individual government intervention—play the primary role in shaping and directing the course of the international monetary structure. While each of the postwar systems has significant weaknesses, he argues, a global monetary solution—though deemed idealistic by some—is necessary and might not be completely intractable.

Brahm Eiley, in his lively analysis of U.S. monetary policy over the last fifty years, takes a different tack, de-emphasizing the predominance of the market. Rather, he assigns pride of place to government monetary tactics and points specifically to the “hegemony” of the U.S. in postwar monetary relations. Short-sighted U.S. fiscal policy, trade goals, and an inability to adapt to changing international monetary relations, he argues, have created unsettling results in the American and world economies—a U.S. influence that will only wreak more damage if policy is not improved.

**International Monetary Policy: From a Fixed to Uncertain Future**

by Geoff Day

Each day, some $750 billion to $1 trillion is traded on the world’s foreign exchange markets. In the past few decades, currency speculation by traders, in conjunction with massive trading volume, has created an environment distinctly unsuited to exchange rate stability. These instabilities in turn have affected nearly every individual, corporation, and government institution through changes in employment, inflation, and interest rates.

To understand today’s chaotic environment, one must turn to the events that have shaped the international monetary system from the end of the Second World War through today. Since that time, two major alternative systems have ruled the global currency market: the gold exchange standard initiated by the Bretton Woods agreement, and the present, alternative system of floating exchange rates. Understanding these two systems provides not only a valuable perspective on the evolution of the money market, but also hints at future directions and needs.

**Bretton Woods and the Gold Exchange Standard**

As the end of the Second World War approached, grave concern over the future of the international monetary system led to the International Monetary Fund’s Articles of Agreement, signed by representatives of forty-four nations in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in July 1944. The system established at the Bretton Woods called for a “gold exchange standard,” in which currencies had fixed exchange rates against the U.S. dollar and dollars were in turn redeemable for gold at the fixed price of $35 per ounce. The selection of the U.S. dollar as the principal reserve currency in the post war monetary framework was to have profound effects on the international economy until the eventual collapse of the system in 1973.

The Bretton Woods agreement was intended to provide a stable international economic environment to maximize growth and avoid the protectionist, insular conditions that led to the worldwide pre war depression. To accomplish these goals, Bretton Woods relied on a series of checks and balances in an effort to maintain the stability of the system.

The primary balance mechanism limited the power of the United States as owner of the reserve currency. By obligating the U.S. central bank—the Federal Reserve—to redeem dollars for gold, the agreement prevented the U.S. from increasing the dollar supply too rapidly in order to fuel domestic growth. Since the Federal Reserve held a finite supply of gold, theory dictated that a more prudent monetary policy would result.

The second balance was intended to prevent excessive monetary growth by foreign central banks. A foreign government allowing inmoderate mon-

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etary expansion would eventually suffer a loss of international reserves. Its central bank would be forced to buy quantities of the domestic currency to reduce the oversupply in the world’s money markets and maintain the fixed exchange rate. The loss of reserves would lead directly to currency instability and the inability to maintain the fixed dollar exchange rate, triggering a currency depreciation.

Cracks in the Facade: The End of Bretton Woods

While the Bretton Woods system had worthwhile advantages for the post-war international economy, key weaknesses in the system soon became apparent. The first was the “dollar shortage” problem in the immediate post-war period. Although the IMF Articles encouraged member nations to restore their currencies to convertibility (meaning their currencies could be freely used in international transactions by citizens of any country), the war-ravaged economies of Europe and Japan lacked a proper domestic economic infrastructure and thus were incapable of supporting convertibility.

This meant that until most major European currencies became convertible in 1958 (and Japan in 1964), the U.S. dollar reigned supreme. With the vast majority of international trade conducted in U.S. dollars, shortages were inevitable—a situation exacerbated by the need of most recovering nations to purchase American goods, again in U.S. dollars.

A longer-term concern was the “confidence problem.” While the United States initially had adequate gold supplies to guarantee dollar redeemability, many economists and speculators soon realized that this situation could not continue in perpetuity. As the U.S. Federal Reserve expanded the money supply in response to strong worldwide growth throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, eventually a time would come when the global supply of dollars would be greater than the Fed’s supply of gold. In such a situation, a revaluation of the dollar price for gold would be required. Otherwise, the outright collapse of the system was inevitable. Given these expectations, foreign governments began to redeem their U.S. dollar holdings for gold in anticipation of similar actions by other governments.

However, the key structural problem of Bretton Woods lay not with American hegemony or long-term worries, but rather with the IMF article that allowed for adjustable parities. While Bretton Woods fixed foreign exchange rates to the U.S. dollar, it allowed for future adjustment to these rates. If a currency ran a persistent, or “structural,” trade deficit, it could be termed in fundamental disequilibrium with the IMF agreement. In such a situation, IMF members could agree to adjust, or devalue, the parity of the offending currency, with the goal of an eventual restoration of the trade balance. Unfortunately, the condition (a trade deficit) leading to such a devaluation was easily observed by market speculators, who in turn sold their holdings of the suspect currency.

The problem of adjustable parities was graphically illustrated by the experience of Britain from 1964 to 1967. A record trade deficit in 1964 led to widespread speculation that the pound would be devalued. Foreign holders of pound deposits sold massive amounts of currency (at the official Bretton Woods exchange rate), thus forcing the Bank of England to purchase pounds by selling official reserves. Such a situation was unsustainable and eventually devaluation suspicions by currency speculators became a self-fulfilling prophecy. As the loss of foreign reserves by the Bank of England continued, Britain had no choice but to devalue the pound in November 1967. Similar speculative attacks against the French Franc and the German Deutsche Mark (DM) in 1969 forced similar devaluations to those currencies.

Further undermining the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates were the economic policies of the United States from 1965 to 1968. Increased military spending to fund the growing Vietnam conflict, in conjunction with spending for President Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society” social programs, raised U.S. government expenditures considerably after 1965. Unfortunately, these spending increases were not matched by tax increases and the fiscal stimulus soon pushed American inflation rates upward as the Federal Reserve pursued an aggressive monetary expansion.

As the U.S. economy slipped into recession in 1970, the nation developed a trade deficit, quickly putting the United States in an untenable position. While any other country would simply be allowed to devalue its currency, the U.S. dollar, as the reserve currency in the Bretton Woods system, did not have this luxury. To achieve a similar devaluation of the dollar, currency speculators expected that simultaneous appreciations of all the major currencies would have to be undertaken.

By 1971, the pressures on the system became so severe that the U.S. was forced to halt gold convertibility (in theory temporarily) so as to stem the gold losses by the Federal Reserve. An attempt by IMF members in 1973 to fix the system by devaluing the dollar against most major European currencies failed to stop the currency speculators and on March 1, 1973, the world’s foreign exchange markets closed. When the markets reopened on March 19, the Bretton Woods system had been replaced. In the new system, the world’s major currencies were no longer fixed to the dollar; rather, their values “floated” in response to market forces.

The New Monetary Order: The Era of the “Dirty Float”

With the demise of the Bretton Woods agreement and the structure of fixed exchange values, a new system was born.
predicated on the concept of freely floating exchange rates. Rather than fixing rates against gold or a standard reserve currency, the floating system determined exchange rates on the open market in response to standard supply and demand.

In purely economic terms, floating exchange rates are better described as a non-system, where such rates are determined by the “invisible hand” of the marketplace without predetermined targets or supports by governments or central banks. In reality, however, today’s system of floating exchange rates represents an unusual synthesis of economic theory and the realities of international affairs.

Floating exchange rates provide a number of key benefits over the gold exchange standard. Foremost is monetary policy autonomy. Under the Bretton Woods agreement, governments within the system were obligated to pursue similar macroeconomic policies in order to ensure that their currencies remained at their target value. With floating rates, however, governments and central banks no longer face this constraint and are able to adopt policies more suited to their particular domestic needs. For example, recessionary economies can be stimulated by monetary growth without short-term concern over exchange-rate maintenance.

Another key advantage of floating exchange rates results from the obsolescence of the reserve currency. Without the need to fix exchange rates to a particular currency (the U.S. dollar under the gold exchange standard), no single currency must deal with a set of unique constraints. Rather, all globally traded currencies face, in theory, a level playing field. In practice, however, key currencies such as the dollar, the yen, and the DM continue to face somewhat more singular market conditions because of the size of their economies.

Finally, floating exchange rates provide a system of automatic stabilization through market adjustments to the exchange rates. For example, a country with a persistent trade deficit should be expected to experience a currency depreciation when foreign institutions sell their excess holdings of the currency. A depreciation in turn increases domestic prices of imports while decreasing prices of export goods. In time, these adjustments would tend to balance the trade deficit. For an economy running a persistent trade surplus, the reverse situation applies.

The quick adjustments of the system in response to the first price increase by OPEC in 1973 indicated that floating exchange rates dealt well with severe economic price shocks that caused trade imbalances. Such initial successes strengthened the case for floating rates and convinced IMF members against the return to a fixed exchange structure.

True to historical experience with other monetary systems, however, floating exchange rates suffer from considerable problems. For example, the advantage of monetary policy autonomy can quickly become a disadvantage. Without the discipline of a fixed exchange rate structure, central banks are free pursue a wide variety of monetary policies—including damaging ones. Policies that grow the money supply at excessive speed can fuel dangerous levels of inflation, unopposed by the checks and balances inherent in the need to maintain a fixed exchange rate. The lessons of many South American economies that have suffered from continual excessive inflation rates are proof of the dangers of a lack of monetary discipline.

Another key problem of floating exchange rates lies in the damaging effects on international trade. Without fixed values, corporations are continuously exposed to potential losses from exchange rate fluctuations. For example, the past year has seen a significant depreciation of the U.S. dollar against the Japanese yen. For Japanese exporters, this results in significantly lower revenues, as dollars have become worth less in terms of the yen. While some of the dangers of unanticipated exchange rate fluctuations can be offset by short-term rate agreements between buyer and seller (hedging), the inability of exporters to anticipate exchange-rate movements makes long-term planning a difficult, inaccurate, and potentially expensive process.

Speculative currency transactions continue to trouble floating exchange rates. Current estimates indicate that some ninety-five percent of the nearly $1 trillion traded daily in for-
The electronic superhighway: billions of dollars in currency traded each day.
[Christopher Travell]

Foreign exchange markets is for speculative purposes. The root of the problem continues to be central bank intervention in currency markets. Since traders are aware that political pressures to maintain exchange rates may force intervention, executing trades in expectation of such an event can produce a self-fulfilling prophecy. Furthermore, the increased sophistication of the foreign exchange market allows these trades to be conducted more quickly and efficiently than in the past.

Another Option: The European Exchange Rate Mechanism

The long-term goal of greater integration among the members of the European Economic Community (EEC) led to the formation of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979, eventually supplanted by today's Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). Through a mix of policy coordination and frequent but minor exchange rate adjustments, the ERM provides for a system of fixed exchange rates among Community members as part of the first step towards a common EEC macroeconomic policy and a common currency, the "ecu" (European Currency Unit).

Unlike Bretton Woods, however, exchange rates for most currencies in the EMS are allowed to fluctuate 2.25 percent above or below the fixed target rate. Other currencies with histories of significant exchange-rate movements are allowed a larger "band" of 6 percent. Currencies' ability to fluctuate within these bands eliminates the need for constant central bank intervention to support a suspect currency.

Unfortunately, the ERM suffers from the same systemic weaknesses as the Bretton Woods gold-exchange system. Countries within the ERM that demonstrate structural trade deficits or consistent inflation are still the target for currency speculators who anticipate an impending devaluation. For example, the last eighteen months have seen extreme cases of speculation of some key ERM currencies because the German central bank, the Bundesbank, resisted requests from ERM members to lower interest rates. These speculative attacks culminated with the withdrawal of the British pound and the Italian lira from the ERM after a futile attempt by the Bank of England and the other ERM members to prop up the pound with massive open-market purchases.

Future Policy Implications

The lessons learned from the failure of the Bretton Woods agreement and from subsequent experience with the floating exchange rate system suggest that both systems suffer from numerous flaws. Both share the common government tendency of pursuing its own economic agenda without coordinating with other members of the international community. For example, long-term weaknesses in the Bretton Woods system were exacerbated by the United States' unilateral fiscal expansion. Similarly, the most serious problems with the floating exchange system and the European ERM have occurred when central banks pursue different strategies to common macroeconomic problems.

The need of modern businesses for a stable exchange rate environment in conjunction with the growth of free trade and economic cooperation zones would indicate that the future of the global currency market may lie with a single currency managed by the equivalent of a world central bank. That such a system could provide international trade free of exchange rate costs and a monetary policy immune to political pressures or intervention are clear advantages over today's monetary structure.

Unfortunately, the experience of the EEC and the slow, painful steps toward adoption of the ecu indicate that a global currency may not appear for some time. Such a step, however, may be a necessary component of a truly global economy.

Suggestions for Further Reading


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Less Bang For The Buck:
U.S. “Dollar Weapon” Policy In Historical Perspective

By Brahm Eiley

Like rocket science, knowledge of monetary policy does not often get you the best seat at a dinner party. However, much of our day-to-day existence depends on the ability of America’s central bank to affect exchange rates by setting interest rates and buying or selling currency in the financial markets. Every day, the U.S. Treasury Department (which issues bonds) and the Federal Administration (which overviews and directs economic policy) coordinate the nation’s competition within mammoth international financial markets.

Since 1971, when the Bretton Woods fixed-rate exchange system was terminated, we have lived in a world where currency movements have been floating—not tied to gold or to one currency. Such an arrangement has resulted in the huge growth of the financial sector of the economy, including its power to affect economic and social policy nationally and internationally. Since Nixon, then, global financial markets have been the major breadwinner of the world economy, far outpacing trade in profit and volume.

This floating “non-system” has been credited for the end of U.S. autocracy in financial relations. Although the U.S. continues to dominate the world in many ways, the past twenty years have seen the rise of other financial superpowers, while at the same time U.S. debt has grown exponentially.

In response to these shifting economic relations, the U.S. has failed to undertake long-term adjustments. Rather, since 1971 it has repeatedly turned to what I will call the “dollar weapon”—a cheap dollar intended to improve U.S. exports—in order to pull itself out of recession. The positive effects of dollar devaluation have rarely been anything more than short term. In the medium and long run, the dollar weapon has exacerbated many of the structural problems of the world’s most powerful economy.

Further, the U.S. has angered both the Europeans (especially the Germans) and the Japanese because of its weak dollar and expanded money supply. This has forced both of these nations’ currencies and inflation rates skyward—a direction to which their economies are not oriented. Because of dollar-weapon strategy, the European Economic Community’ European Monetary System, and to a lesser extent the Japanese yen, have developed rapidly to counteract U.S. manipulation.

A Short History Of Bretton Woods

The U.S. emerged from World War Two virtually unscathed. It had benefited greatly from the war, by 1945 controlling forty percent of the world’s exports and over seventy percent of the world’s gold reserves. It was the only international power with a trade surplus, large capital reserves, and nuclear capability. Any decision to reorient the world’s money matters were therefore heavily influenced by the world’s newest Great Power.

The overall objective of the 1945 Bretton Woods Agreement was to create a liberal economic structure in order to avoid the re-emergence of economic nationalism. It was generally believed that through increased international economic links and free trade, fastened to a fixed-exchange-rate system and gold convertibility, international war could be avoided. Thus, by reducing barriers to trade and capital flows, nations would have more freedom to pursue stability, growth and low unemployment.

Instead of the contending plan forwarded by British economist John Maynard Keynes, who called for massive unconditional lending and an international currency, the Bretton Woods Agreement followed U.S. objectives closely. The newly created International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank were to distribute limited funding based on a high level of conditionality, with U.S. veto power over any lending proposal. Rather than create an international currency, the U.S. dollar was to become the world’s central currency.

By 1947, the issue of lending came to a head when Bretton Woods capital could not meet demand. This was exacerbated by the IMF’s legal inability to loan money for reconstruction purposes. As well, World Bank borrowing, mainly from large U.S. banks, was severely hampered by a restrictive lending policy.

Insufficient liquidity led to a significant decline in U.S. exports and the recession of 1948-49. Concurrently, and as importantly, Europe and Japan faced political and economic
strife both internally and through pressure by the U.S.S.R. If the U.S. vision of a liberal economic order were to survive and the world economy improve, a new loan program was necessary.

Enter the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, which changed the face of modern relations between the U.S. and Europe. Marshall Plan aid had significant ramifications. First, it abrogated the official Bretton Woods system of multilateral aid. Second, it facilitated the entrance of American multinationals into Europe on the back of U.S. government programs. Third, it meant that the U.S. now had greater influence over its allies’ economic, political, and military policy. Fourth and most critical, European and Japanese currencies became nonconvertible. Only the U.S. dollar could now be exchanged in international trade and payments. Instead of the international management implicit in the Bretton Woods Agreement, the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine ushered in an era in of U.S. hegemony.

The transition to non-convertibility insulated the damaged European and Japanese currencies from further speculation and helped the rebuilding of their economies. However this insulation came at a cost, since the Marshall Plan was indirectly used to devalue European currencies, especially Britain’s. These devaluations, by twenty-five countries in 1949, resulted in a rapid and total flight to the U.S. dollar. In a few short years, the dollar became not only the world’s safest currency, but in essence the world’s only currency.

How and Why The U.S. Avoided Adjustment

From the fifties until 1971—when President Richard Nixon (1969–1974) suspended the gold-based system of Bretton Woods—the U.S. extracted perks from the world economy by its inflated dollar. As producer of the world’s dominant currency, the U.S. could overspend virtually without worry. Because all international trade and finance was still carried out in dollars, foreign countries had to hold an abundant supply of dollars even as they began to lose value in the late 1960s. Moreover, the U.S. as an export market and security blanket were two further reasons to continue to use and support the dollar. Thus, in 1971 the Europeans and Japanese remained beholden to the dollar as the world’s central currency.

Nixon’s 1971 closing of the “gold window” introduced a new American trade policy: the “dollar weapon.” Throughout Nixon’s tenure the dollar was continuously devalued in order to improve the U.S. trade balance. The effect of dollar depreciation on other strong currencies was to push them up, lessening these nations’ exports and creating inflationary pressures. The unsteady dollar played havoc on accounting procedures and profit for the

export-based Western European and Japanese economies. But there was little these economies could do since dumping dollars would only improve the U.S. trade balance. Besides, hurting the U.S. economy was equivalent to self-mutilation: Western Europe and Japan needed the U.S. consumer.

During Jimmy Carter’s Presidency (1977–1981), the deficiencies of U.S. dollar weapon strategy became graphically visible. The Federal Reserve Board continued to exceed money-supply targets by pumping too much currency into the economy and driving up inflation. The trade balance—despite zealous but ineffective efforts by the Carter Administration to coax the West Germans and the Japanese into expanding their economies—continued to decline. Also, high fiscal spending (a bipartisan addiction) persisted unabated. By the autumn of 1978, the already much devalued dollar began a steep decline in the rapidly deregulated and growing international financial markets. Saudi Arabia and West Germany in particular were lukewarm to U.S. calls to come to the dollar’s rescue.

Thus began a difficult period in the U.S. economy. For the first time in postwar history, the collapsing U.S. dollar required support in international financial markets from the Federal Reserve, now managed by Paul Volcker. Moreover, on the Treasury side, “Cartier” bonds—denominated in European and Japanese currency—were also minted in an attempt to restore confidence in the falling dollar.

American expansionary monetary and fiscal policy raised the value of the German mark and other Western European currencies too high for the good health of their export-based economies. In 1979, the Western Europeans, scarred by their experience with U.S. dollars, initiated a plan for monetary union.

Dollars in the Recent Past

In the 1980s, the administration of Ronald Reagan (1981–1989) introduced the “strong” dollar weapon, thereby reversing past principles of dollar weapon strategy while retaining the arsenal itself. In order to satisfy U.S. military borrowing, the Federal Reserve—buoyed by interest rates well above the international market—overvalued the dollar and kept the money supply tight. At the same time, the Treasury began to issue bonds at twice the rate of previous years and Congress further deregulated the financial markets, creating an even larger U.S. market for financial instrument.

In response to the administration’s bond and financial market promotion frenzy, the purchase of U.S. Treasury and corporate securities by foreigners, especially the Japanese, doubled between 1983 and 1986. The U.S. was thus able to draw in vast amounts of money at the expense of the U.S. borrower and investor.

Word Watch

Exchange Rate: The price at which one currency is exchanged for another.

Money Supply: The stock of liquid assets in an economy that can be freely exchanged for goods and services.

Interest Rate: The proportion of a sum of money that is paid over a specific period of time in payment for a loan.

Monetary Policy: Central government policy with respect to the control of the quantity of money in the economy, the interest rate and the exchange rate. The three variables are simultaneously determined. If money supply is increased, for example, the exchange rate will fall, unless interest rates are raised.

Fiscal Policy: The budgetary stance of the central government. Government can raise fiscal spending by lowering taxes or by increasing public expenditures. Decisions to raise taxes and lower public spending will tighten fiscal spending.
Moreover, Europe and Japan ultimately were to enjoy significant increases in their exports to the U.S., as their currencies were greatly lowered in value by U.S. policy. Instead of creating an economy based on industrial production and exports, the Reagan entourage launched a recovery built on paper.

The "strong dollar" weapon fell from grace in 1986, when the dollar’s value—having appreciated sixty percent between 1980 and 1985, and then declined by the same amount the next year—could no longer hold. The U.S., saved by global consternation over the looming financial-market crash, was able to elicit international support not just in bringing the dollar down without immediate disruption, but also in returning to the monetary and fiscal policy of Nixon and Carter’s weak dollar weapon strategy.

However, the nasty side effects of Reagan’s policies could not easily be swept under the carpet. The spring bond downturn and autumn stock market crash of 1987 came on the coattails of the U.S.’s expansionary monetary errors. Since this crisis, the Germans and Japanese have been less inclined to go along with the U.S.’s erratic economic policies.

George Bush’s tenure (1989-1993) brought further to light how far the U.S. had declined in the economic sphere. Each meeting of the world’s economic superpowers produced little agreement on international macroeconomic coordination. Meanwhile, the Europeans and Japanese continued to intensify their development of economic zones separate from the North American bloc. Domestically, Bush’s support of dollar devaluation and the traditional dollar weapon formula did little to bring the U.S. out of recession.

The dollar remains the world’s center currency. But while


U.S. dollars composed 80 percent of the world’s official reserves in 1976, today they constitute just over 51 percent. At the same time, Germany and Japan’s presence in the world’s official reserves has risen from 7 and 0.7 percent respectively (in 1976), to 17 percent for the former and 10 percent for the latter.

Current Problems

Today, the U.S. dollar-weapon strategy is proving especially ineffective in the face of the simultaneous economic problems of Germany, Japan, and the United States. In Germany, there is little room for increased fiscal spending and monetary expansion without triggering more inflation. The Bundesbank’s historic July 1992 decision to increase its discount rate (the lending rate to its private banks) to the highest level in sixty years, clearly shows that the Bundesbank is committed to squelching inflationary pressures. Because German monetary policy dominates European Community monetary policy, a Germany with high interest rates, appreciating exchange rates and low money supply growth will perpetuate sluggish economic performance throughout the European Community—bad news for U.S. exports.

Historically, even when Germany has gone along with the expansionary macroeconomic platform of the U.S., its effort has been tepid at best. Disagreements between Bonn and Washington over coordinated monetary policy were one factor leading to the October 1987 stock market crash. The Western Europeans, led by the Germans, wanted to avoid the monetary manipulation of the dollar weapon strategy. The Reagan

President Ronald Reagan (1981-89): the “dollar weapon” with a twist, a strong dollar. [U.S. Embassy, Ottawa]
Administration saw the situation differently. They continued to favor the expansionary fiscal and monetary policies which many economists believe helped trigger the crash.

In Japan today, the credit structure is cautious and weakened. Like the U.S., Japan faces corporate and private debt crises. The recession, the stock exchange fiasco, and falling property prices have hit Japanese banks hard and subsequently led to higher lending rates. Coupled with this has been Japan’s April 1993 adoption of the Bank of International Settlements’ capital adequacy ratios—mandatory international agreements which increase the amount of money banks must put aside to cover each new loan. Japan’s bubble economy has also been popped by the continual efforts of the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan to create deregulated Western-style competitive interest rates, a task begun less than fifteen years ago.

On top of this, Japan is no longer experiencing spectacular economic growth rates. Falling asset prices have damaged the wealth base, which in turn has lowered consumer spending. The current situation has made Japan far less willing to allow the U.S. to affect its monetary and fiscal policy. Since 1989, Bank of Japan Governor Mieno has kept monetary policy tight. In terms of international macroeconomic coordination, Japan resembles independent Germany far more than it did in the past.

In the United States, the stagnating effects of government and trade deficits emphasize just how long the nation has been without real economic leadership. If the U.S. were a household, then over half of it would be in the pawn shop, while the other half digging deeper into debt. The U.S. can no longer jump-start the economy and begin recession recovery by increasing fiscal spending because total government borrowing today amounts to fifty percent of U.S. domestic savings. In 1988 and 1989, borrowing was only twelve percent. Even if consumer confidence picks up and the Federal Reserve continues to ease the money supply, the nation will remain in crisis for a long time.

Looking Forward

The Clinton Administration is handling the recession in the manner of its predecessors by relying on a weapon that has been losing its potency for over twenty years. The American dollar weapon has been nationally and internationally disruptive. Both Republicans and Democrats have bowed to financial market power, satisfying U.S. borrowing costs and financial-sector profit at the expense of the rest of the economy. Policymakers have supported the deregulation of domestic and international financial markets and given them liberty in setting exchange and interest rates in order to satisfy these prerogatives.

The U.S. has been able to avoid monetary and economic adjustment because of the sheer size of its consumer market, military capability and its vast pools of wealth. These global advantages have been augmented by the U.S.’s ability to borrow in the increasingly deregulated world of international finance. Today, despite lower export prices and interest rates, borrowing and investment are lukewarm and there has been little change in U.S. exports. For all its extolled virtues, the dollar weapon has rarely been anything more than a short-term solution.

The current recession graphically reveals why Americans cannot flaunt the dollar weapon forever. Each use of the weapon threatens further the health of the U.S. economy. Weakening the dollar might ultimately set off a stock and bond crash on par with 1987. On the other hand, attempts by the government to bolster the dollar’s value by raising interest rates will only result in depression. Yet, as the dollar continues to decline, real value ebbs away.

If the U.S. can no longer improve its economic well-being with a cheap dollar, then what can it do? Easing government debt by cutting social spending is politically infeasible, as is a complete overhaul of the U.S. economy. Most reasonably, the U.S. can stop playing the weak-dollar game and begin concentrating on real changes to its monetary policy.

Suggestions for Further Reading


Thurgood Marshall: A Justice For All

While Carl Rowan colorfully traces Justice Thurgood Marshall’s fascinating life from beginning to end, he has much to learn from the judge about the complexities of race in late twentieth-century America.

*Dream Makers, Dream Breakers: the World of Justice Thurgood Marshall*

by Susan M. Schulten

It has been ten months since Thurgood Marshall’s death, but the former Supreme Court Justice continues to demonstrate a remarkable talent for controversy. In keeping with his wishes, Marshall’s papers—including all his personal notes and draft opinions—were released to the public in June, an unprecedented step for any justice to make. Their release raised much curiosity outside the Court and anxiety within, making Marshall’s move almost as controversial as Bob Woodward’s 1979 exposé of the supreme judicial body, *The Brethren*.

Marshall’s decision to make his papers public reflected his unwillingness to shy away from controversy, a quality that was evident throughout his long career. In fact, there are few problems facing American life and politics today that he did not confront at one time or another. Such seminal issues as racial discrimination, affirmative action, the debate over racial separatism and integration, the death penalty, and abortion were crucial to Marshall. They formed the backbone of a legal legacy that was built over a long career both as a lawyer and a justice. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that to understand twentieth-century law, particularly civil rights, one must first grapple with Thurgood Marshall.

To students of American history he is the hero who won legal desegregation of American public schools in the landmark 1954 Brown v. Topeka Board of Educa-

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*The First Dream Maker*

Marshall’s life and legal legacy are explored in Carl T. Rowan’s 1993 biography *Dream Makers, Dream Breakers*. Rowan was privileged enough to personally know Marshall for forty years, giving him an insight into the man that many other biographers have not had. Rowan enjoys Marshall’s confidence and trust, and their conversations have a candid quality.

Through oral interviews, we learn that Marshall was frequently ill as a child, a condition that would haunt him throughout his life. In high school however, he was spry enough to spend most of his time as a “ne’er do well”, getting by with as little effort as possible, only to move on to a college life of booze and women.

But having experienced the racism of the South firsthand, Marshall was also motivated to enter Howard Law School, and there was fortuitously discovered by Charles Hamilton Houston, the renowned NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) lawyer who taught Marshall the strategy of the adolescent civil rights movement. Though his frenetic pace as a civil rights advocate took its toll on Marshall’s health, it also instilled in him a passion for the cause that would stay with him throughout his years as a attorney and then as a justice.

Rowan is best in this book when he is a biographer, allowing Marshall to speak for himself in uninterrupted, unedited passages. Good biography can give one insight not only into an individual’s life, but also into oneself, and here Rowan’s talents are evident. He shows us Marshall’s immense public achievements.
and influence, but also gives us an endearingly human, fallible man. Little came easy to Marshall, least of all his victories as a lawyer: the mention of cases lost decades ago continue to upset him, due less to personal pride than to the consequences suffered by his clients.

Like many public figures, Marshall's status has given him a mythical, inaccessible quality, but Rowan raises the curtain to reveal a man that is a lot more like us than we might have imagined. He drinks, he swears, he is often sick; yet he also fights tirelessly for civil rights. In fact, as Rowan suggests, it might be his drinking and swearing that enables him to fight so tirelessly. To see this more private side of Marshall is inspiring because it proves the cliché that greatness derives from many molds.

Never a Devil's Advocate of this Justice

Yet while Rowan is a skillful biographer, he is a less satisfactory critic of the larger issues found at the heart of Marshall's work. Rowan is unabashedly sympathetic to Marshall and his views, calling him "one of the great human beings of our time." Though this may be true, it is perhaps more important that Rowan show us why, and this involves a rigorous analysis of Marshall himself. He rarely takes the opportunity to challenge Marshall on his views (though to his credit Rowan does repeatedly point out Marshall's sexist remarks), so anyone inclined to oppose abortion, support the death penalty, or who remains undecided about affirmative action is alienated rather than invited into the debate. A more provocative and challenging treatment of Marshall's ideas would have given us a rare chance to go head to head with a master of legal philosophy and policy. Instead, Rowan reflexively lionizes Marshall's legal opinions on some of the most controversial issues of this century. Surely it is not this simple.

But as the title suggests, Rowan does see it in such terms; there is a clear divide between those on the right and wrong sides of history. For him, "dream makers" include those who fought for civil rights, such as head of the NAACP Walter White, First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Chief Justice Earl Warren, Lyndon Johnson, and the countless individuals who brought personal and professional injustices into the courts. The "dream breakers" are those who have hindered what Rowan sees as a clear progression towards racial and gender equality, including southern racists, J. Edgar Hoover, Clarence Thomas, the Republican Party, and most egregiously Ronald Reagan and George Bush.

To his credit, Rowan indicates that many of these "dream makers" were historical surprises, or late converts to the cause, such as Earl Warren, who gave little indication that he would be one of the most active advocates for civil rights when President Eisenhower named him to the Court.

The Return of Uncle Tom

But while Rowan accepts that whites sympathetic to civil rights will adhere to a range of political stances, his standard for African-Americans is much more rigid. At times he suggests that to be black and conservative indicates a weakness of character or a neglect of racial pride, because the Republican Party has for so long ignored the plight of African-Americans. But, as many activists and journalists have pointed out, the Democratic Party has also failed to consistently address the concerns of all black constituencies.

Titillation aside, one thing the Thomas-Hill hearings demonstrated so vividly was that African-Americans in the public sphere hold a wide range of political ideas and agendas, not simply those tied to the liberal wing of the Democratic Party. While Rowan has every right to criticize conservatives of all races, he is less credible when questioning the integrity of African-American conservatives because of their race, rather than the persuasive power of their thought. Referring to the conservatism of African-American Republicans during the Reagan and Bush years, Rowan writes: "selling out by blacks was selling in white bookstores."

He is right in the sense that many white conservatives have absurdly held up African-Americans such as San Jose State English Professor Shelby Steele and former Civil Rights Commissioner Clarence Pendleton as models of their political program and philosophy. Pendleton and Steele are exalted by both economic and social conservatives because they have criticized the philosophical underpinnings of such programs as welfare and affirmative action, calling them degrading to blacks and counterproductive.

These two certainly do not speak for their race, nor even for their class, and their representativeness has been severely overstated for political purposes. But as Cornell West has pointed out recently in his book Race Matters, they have invigorated the debate, and forced the Democratic Party to address the limits of welfare and affirmative action, and this can only be a good thing. By contrast, Rowan's references to African-American conservatives as "stooges" and "sycophants" does nothing to elevate the debate.
Moreover, Rowan has harsh words for African-Americans such as Pendleton, Steele, and Clarence Thomas who claim to have "made it on their own," calling them "superblacks." While Rowan is right to point out the debt that blacks owe to civil rights leaders who helped open the doors, one wonders at what point this "debt" will be paid off: at what point African-Americans can make legitimate claims to their own success, or to their own political agendas. Certainly, we are all a product of external support as much as internal ambition, but at times Rowan's reminders of past debt sound more like a punishment for those blacks who have come to different conclusions about politics and racial issues.

Not Simply Black and White

This complaint about the book extends to a more general contention about Rowan's approach—in the final analysis, it is too simplistic. Issues such as racial quotas are complicated, bringing advocates and foes from all over the racial, ethnic, and political spectrum. Nor, for that matter, can these policy problems be easily divided into "conservative" or "liberal" camps. To discuss an issue such as affirmative action—as Rowan does—without at least acknowledging the complicated moral implications is disappointing, especially at a time when we need so desperately to discuss these issues honestly.

And Rowan does show an appreciation for complexity when he explores the messy internal politics of the NAACP, tracing the division between those who fought for unconditional racial integration and equality and those willing to settle on the "separate but equal" doctrine. Surprisingly, the villain of the story is W.E.B. DuBois—taught in history classes as the African-American leader who fought unflinchingly for integration. By his own historical legwork, Rowan has found evidence that casts doubt on the sincerity of DuBois commitment to desegregation.

However, this alleged "villainy" of DuBois may need to be re-thought when one realizes that the debate over integration versus separatism rages on within the black community today. African nationalism, Afrocentric curricula, and even campus politics have all reflected the different ideals of many younger African-Americans who feel—that after only a degree of integration into white society—that their identities are overshadowed.

Recently, cartoonist Garry Trudeau devoted a few weeks of Doonesbury to just these conflicts, depicting students who have inherited a complicated conflict between the ideal of social integration and the reality of racial identity. In one of these strips, a white college dean is accused of racism (by students of all races) for demanding that different student groups integrate into the mainstream of campus life. The dean recalls that only a generation before, he would have been called a racist for denying these groups the opportunity to integrate. Trudeau's strip is just one example of the gulf that exists between many younger students (of all races) and their older counterparts who fondly remember the social ideal of integration—not separation—that reigned in the 1950s and early 1960s.

Though not a strictly generational problem, Trudeau's strips reflect the changing definitions of racial equality and justice. By contrast, Rowan sees the battle lines relatively unchanged throughout the latter half of the twentieth century—what defined racial justice then, defines it today. And this is not simply a criticism of Rowan. We all need to adopt a more flexible understanding of what racial, ethnic, and gender equality mean. With this, a more productive and meaningful debate will emerge, one which looks beyond simple categorization.

This should not be seen as a dismissal of the continuing threat of racial and gender discrimination—it still remains all too real. But little will change unless we begin to question exactly what race, ethnicity, and gender represent. To Rowan, the advancement of the politically unpalatable Clarence Thomas to the highest court in the land as Marshall's "successor" means African-American regression, not progress. The author skirts the issues and leaves the basic questions unanswered: what defines progress in light of past injustice?

Marshall: The Last Word

The last few chapters of Rowan's biography focus on the post-Marshall Court, where it is and where it is headed. Rowan repeatedly asks Marshall what positive decisions can come from a Court largely nominated by Reagan and Bush, especially given the recent nomination of Clarence Thomas. And here Marshall surprises us: he has confidence in the Court, he says, because the justices are nominated for life, and are bound to no one.

Marshall vindicates the power of law to withstand political pressure. Yet, Rowan is skeptical, wondering aloud how hopeful Marshall can be of a court so dominated by conservatives. And in a way, Rowan's confusion exemplifies the overall flaw of his biography, for all his empathy, Rowan does not see what Marshall grasps intuitively. The future belongs to those who recognize the complexities of race and ideology.

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On Teaching Feminism: 
A Speech by Robin Morgan

At a speech given by Ms. magazine’s Robin Morgan, the author witnessed a confrontation between genders and generations that underscored the need for teaching and communication, not condescension and accusations.

by Sara Borins

Almost a year ago, Robin Morgan, editor of Ms. magazine, spoke at my brothers’ (all male) high school. The event was part of their International World Affairs Conference. Morgan had been invited to deliver the keynote address on the topic, “Gender Roles in the Wake of the Women’s Movement.” She began her lecture by offering a definition of feminism.

The editor stated that feminism is a politic of hope for intelligent life in the future. A dominant characteristic of patriarchy, Morgan explained, “is the disconnection of individuals from one another and from their environment.” In contrast, feminism is about humans working towards a greater connection with their surroundings. Morgan continued by reminding her audience that all issues—including the economy, politics, ethnicity, and racism—are women’s issues because in any country, women are the majority of the population.

In her conclusion, Morgan remembered the 14 women who were murdered by Marc Lapine at the University of Montreal in 1989. His action, she stated, was a dangerous consequence of a disconnected society, ignorant of feminism. And a society which, unless changed, “will watch females continue to be killed... hideously, pitilessly and continuously.”

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I sat elated throughout Morgan’s eloquent address. Finally, a powerful speaker was standing in one the country’s oldest, conservative and most exclusive high schools spelling out what feminism is and why it is important. At last, my brother was hearing from an authoritative source what I had been trying to explain to him for over five years. I was so moved by Morgan that I imagined the audience would do little other than cheer for her and then walk out, arm in arm, united by a warm feminist harmony.

“Never once, while I was learning about feminism, was I told that my questions were ignorant, or that my behavior didn’t fit into an ideologically correct mold. The students at the World Affairs Conference were not so lucky.”

My expectations could not have been further from the truth.

From jeers to hissing, from the sublime to the ridiculous, Morgan was engulfed by a sea of anger. Her teenage audience cried out that she was the sort of feminist who gave the movement a bad name. One individual simply got up and bellowed into the microphone that she ought to “get a life.” Dumbstruck, I sat through the audience’s outrage, lamenting the future of feminism as I listened to the youth of today. Robin Morgan made so much sense and such little impact.

To make matters worse, my careful efforts at introducing my brother to feminism had backfired. Before the conference he had been dubious, though inquisitive about feminism—inquisitive enough to help organize the event. After Morgan my brother didn’t even wish to mention the topic, except to say, “Well, that’s the last time I go out of my way to do anything for gender equality.”

When I asked him what had gone wrong, my brother explained, “She made us feel stupid. Morgan told us, ‘that in over twenty years as a lecturer she had never heard such ignorant questions.’

‘Simple, defense tactic,’ I thought. ‘Morgan was challenging my brother’s power as a privileged white male so he responded by refusing to deal with the reality of the situation; blaming Morgan when he should really be blaming all...’
men.” For days we didn’t speak, for days I wrote off my brother as a typical male, for days I tried to understand why he couldn’t see what I could see.

A few weeks passed and then something happened. My brother turned nineteen. “Nineteen, so young,” I thought as I imagined myself at that age. Suddenly my brother’s anger became clear. Around nineteen I thought all feminists were lesbians and that the movement was about scary women with short spiky hair. Remembering my nineteenth year made me blush, it also reminded me that I was not born a feminist.

Rapidly, images began flooding my mind. First the memory of my friend’s face as she told me of being sexually abused as a child. Then the recollection of my own anger when a university professor told me that women’s history wasn’t relevant enough to be brought into his course curriculum. Finally, the feeling of complete despair after hearing that fourteen women, at the university down the road were murdered because of their sex.

As these thoughts flashed against the empty panel of my mind so did the realization that the process through which I became a feminist was gradual and painful. It was one in which I had to comprehend and accept that men and women do not have the same opportunity and safety. Personal, sad experiences ushered me into the world of feminism.

That, and the nurturing of feminist friends, parents and teachers who taught me that this ideology did not mean that I couldn’t love men, nor celebrate my femininity, but that it would allow me to fulfill my greatest potential. Feminism, I learnt, would encourage me to have strength. Never once, while I was learning about this philosophy, was I told that my questions were ignorant, or that my behavior didn’t fit into an ideologically correct mold.

The students at the World Affairs Conference were not so lucky. From the first moment of Morgan’s address, they were put on the defensive. Their questions were labelled as ignorant and their behavior as something out of the “twilight zone.” Morgan told the students that she was critical of them because, although it is an honor to address the young, “to face those who have not done their homework is a disappointment.”

When I reflect upon what occurred that evening, I wonder how much homework Morgan had done before speaking to her audience. Did she know its age? Was she aware that most of the students had never heard a live feminist before her? Morgan scolded the students without offering an explanation as to how they might alter their behavior and left out the critical advice of how they might build a better world. And like unfairly punished children, many students left that evening angry for not knowing what they had done wrong.

I know that in the next few years a number of those students will go on to witness events which will allow them to understand Morgan’s rage and the importance of feminism. I know that in time a number of those students will look back at the evening and feel embarrassed about comments they made. But between that time and now a number of those students, including my brother, will have unnecessarily to regain their faith in feminists because they witnessed a scrap fight where cheap shots were thrown—from both directions—which, like angry punches, offered a fleeting sort of satisfaction, but solved nothing.
AIDS Education in Bombay’s Red Light District

As Brad Gillings made his way through the rows of brothels that lined the streets in Bombay’s red light districts, he witnessed many of the cultural, economic and institutional forces that unwittingly help to spread the AIDS virus. He also witnessed the courageous efforts of social workers to stem the ever advancing tide of HIV, and the lives of the prostitutes caught in between.

by Brad Gillings

Maronesha sits wedged between crumbling walls. For the past year her illness has rarely allowed her to move from this corner. One stone tile is shifted higher than the next below her sagging body. The stench of urine is stifling. On the concrete wall behind her, the paint has faded to many different shades of green, a slow process that parallels Maronesha’s own deterioration.

Her future has been stolen by a past that never offered much hope. Born to a prostitute and raised in a brothel, her mother started her in the business at the age of 18. But, at 28, she can no longer work. Instead, she stays in her corner, listening to the other women lead their customers up a creaking narrow wooden stairway through the darkness. Stepping around her, the men are told not to mind the girl in the corner. She is mad, they say, knowing that the truth would cost them business. Maronesha is dying of AIDS.

In Bombay’s largest Red Light District, Maronesha sits lonely, but is not alone. More than 35 percent of Bombay’s prostitutes are infected with HIV. Every hour there are three to four new cases of the virus transmitted in these streets. Maronesha’s corner lays at the epicenter of a major catastrophe. India is in the beginning stages of an AIDS pandemic.

For the prostitutes there is no real law, the government’s own sources estimate that up to 85 percent of donated blood is still not tested. In a country with the size and diversity of India, where the demand for blood outnumbers its supply more than 25 times, effective administration of these tests is virtually impossible.

The Impending Avalanche

The obstacles that hold India back from addressing the spread of HIV—blood banks and sex workers—are vast. The nation is now racing to catch a rolling,
ever-increasing, ever-accelerating snowball that will soon become an avalanche.

Government studies show that during 1992 India recorded more cases of HIV than in the previous six years combined. The official number of positive HIV carriers stands at 11,071, though other estimates range from 500,000 to one million. The Indian Health Organization (IHO) believes these figures will multiply to nearly 50 million by the turn of the century—a number equal to five times the total number of HIV infection cases in the entire world today.

In response to the critics, government sources maintain that they have improved their efforts, most notably through the formation of the National AIDS Control Organization (NACO). NACO has developed a state management program and an advertisement and education campaign.

Dr. Alaka Deshpande, head of the Department of Medicine at J.J. Government Hospital in Bombay, pointed out that developing nations like India face many more health problems than countries in the West, due to malnutrition, malaria, tuberculosis, and the scarcity of clean drinking water. “You must look at the entire health picture,” said Deshpande. “We cannot possibly focus all our efforts on AIDS like some people would like us to.”

The Indian government is also preoccupied with a wide range of non-health related problems unique to developing nations. Poverty is widespread and the illiteracy rate remains about 75 percent. However, a population explosion inflating the country by more than one million a month is possibly India’s biggest impending nightmare. Soon after the turn of the century the country will be struggling to sustain more people than any other nation on earth, while living on only a fourth of the world’s land mass.

According to Deshpande, these barriers mean that the Indian government cannot afford a full commitment to the fight against AIDS. Others have been left to pick up the slack.

“The bulk of this work is being done by private non-government organizations (NGOs), who are largely funded by foreign interest groups and have the freedom to focus specifically on AIDS. A present leader in this campaign is the IHO who believes that there is no time to waste and that drastic and direct measures must be taken.

“The future is bleak,” said Dr. I.S. Gilada, founder and honorary secretary of the organization. “We wasted at least five years of precious time which was available to us and not available to other countries. That was one of our greatest blunders. We simply waited for the problem to come our way. Nature had given us a chance, but we did not take up the opportunity.”

Education at the Source

The IHO has now started an aggressive campaign aimed at the main source of AIDS escalation: prostitution. Focusing on education and condom distribution for sex workers and their clients, IHO social workers take their work into the side streets and alleyways of Bombay’s Red Light Districts. In its first year the NGO conducted a day-long free health camp for the women. “It was a shocking experience for our members and had shown us altogether a different world of its own,” Gilada remembered.

The IHO’s mobile clinic van rounds the corner toward Kamathipura, Bombay’s largest Red Light Community, housing over 600 prostitutes. The front of the van reads “Sex Thrills, AIDS Kills.” The vehicle creeps slowly ahead, wedging through a solid mass of life. Prostitutes line both sides of the street; clumped together in doorways, cooking over open fires, and lounging on beds, sometimes four and five to one. They fix an expressionless gaze on the van. Others peer down from three stories of windows where a wall of hanging laundry creates a colorful facade against the blackened, decaying buildings.

Across the street, some live in a makeshift dwelling, thrown together from sheets of plastic, rags, branches, and scraps of lumber. The laughs and cries of naked children playing in the street are barely audible as the high pitched screech of Hindu music compete with the monotonous whining of loud speakers from a nearby mosque calling the Muslims to prayer.

Seven social workers pile out of the van, unloading two huge cardboard boxes full of condoms. Three prostitutes greet the workers with smiles and help them carry the boxes.

IHO has come a long way in breaking down barriers between the sex workers and themselves. Today the relationship is open and trusting. “Dialogue and placing facts squarely at them is the approach we have taken,” said Gilada. “Mobile clinics are seen as an essential attempt to outreach into the community and develop constructive relationships with them.”

Lata and the Sahelis

Lata is a good ambassador of this
relationship. She welcomes the IHO people into her brothel. The flesh of this jolly woman spills from the sides of her bright purple sari. A red dot decorates her forehead between big brown eyes, slightly shaded from five years of living in the night. She wears a nose ring and several bangles on her right arm. She spits and stuffs more tobacco into her mouth as she follows the social workers inside the "cage" and offers them tea.

All told, the "cage", another name for the brothel because of the prison-like bars found in front of most doors and windows, is no more than 200 square feet, partitioned into four separate bedrooms and one kitchen. This is home to 12 prostitutes.

Prostitution in India is legal for those over the age of 18, if done individually and privately. However, exploitation of the women in commune setups, like Lata's, is not legal—though allowed to continue through a labyrinth of police corruption that reaches to the highest levels.

Lata speaks openly about the circumstances that led her to this life. Her husband left her five years ago when she was 22. With no money, job, skills, or education she was lured to Bombay from her rural home by someone who promised her a good job. However, like many women in the same situation, she was sold to a brothel with a price tag of $300. To gain her freedom she must pay back this debt, an unrealistic endeavor.

Even on a busy day when she serves five customers, her earnings total no more than $3.25, fifty percent of which is paid to the brothel owner. In all likelihood, Lata will never go home. Education has become her only defense against the AIDS threat.

IHO is reaching out to around 4,000 prostitutes, no mean feat considering the high rates of illiteracy. The program's success relies on the hierarchical system which already exists in the brothel network. Certain prostitutes, called Sahelis, have a higher rank and are responsible for a number of other women. The IHO concentrates their efforts on the Sahelis, who then pass on their knowledge and the condoms. As an incentive, the IHO pays these women for their efforts, based on the amount of time they contribute.

A monthly meeting has been called for the Sahelis. Thirty five of them crowd into a small, stuffy room, pushed up against each other on the bare, concrete floor. It is hot. Sweat flows from their faces. There is a sense of community amongst them. Women laugh and slap backs as hands go up aggressively and enthusiastically to answer questions.

"How can AIDS be transmitted?" asks one social worker. "Through blood and bodily fluids," answers a Saheli. Debate and chatter fill the room over this response. Another question is posed. "What are medicines for this disease?" A different woman jumps to her feet. "No medicine, except for the use of a condom," she says.

As the Sahelis file out, they are given 100 rupees ($3.25); payment for the hour each day that they give to these meetings over a month's time. Their signature is recorded by an inked thumb pressed onto paper, since none know how to write.

It is the IHO's mission to raise the awareness of the prostitutes. If nothing else, the education has brought about the use of condoms. The women know not to accept any client who refuses to wear one and are instructed to prove they have done so by showing the used condom after finishing with each man.

There is no way, however, for the IHO to prove that what is said is actually being done. With the desperation that exists in the brothel districts it may be na"ive to think that a prostitute would ultimately turn down a customer and lose money if he refused to wear a condom.

"One out of five clients refuses to wear a condom," said Sanegaeta, an 18-year-old prostitute from Kamathipura district, in an India Today article. "If he pays his payment, I accept him and just pray that he is not infected."

**Educating the Clients**


The man shows interest and confers with Bublo, making it clear that he does not want to use a condom. "No condom, no problem," said Bublo. "Medical check up girls. Condom no."

Educating the prostitutes alone is not enough. Clients must also be made aware of the risks. "This is obviously more complex than it appears," said Dr. Gilada at the Second International Conference on AIDS in Asia and the Pacific. "Specific targeting, locating them, and access to their interest and atten-
tion seems an arduous task that somehow needs to be done.”

The IHO has taken it upon themselves to try. They now hand out free condoms and conduct informational meetings with customers right in the streets of the brothel neighborhoods. Programs have also been taken into the workplace of groups known to have a large number of employees who frequent the Red Light Districts. The truckers association, the police force, colleges, factories, and construction sites have all been targeted and flooded with posters, pamphlets, presentations, talks, videos and dramas.

Changing Perspectives

But education remains difficult, even among those in the medical field. India Today recently published the story of a woman whose baby was abandoned on the delivery table when doctors discovered that she was HIV positive. The child was finally delivered by the nurse in the AIDS ward, one of the few people in the hospital who knew that the risk of AIDS is avoided by wearing gloves.

According to Deshpande, awareness has improved tremendously within the medical profession and situations like this are rare today. Among the general populace, however, fear and ignorance remain high. An important start in battling this may be to concentrate on educating the young. Pressure is being put on the schools to introduce sex education into the curriculum, but this will undoubtedly be introduced slowly, as Indians generally consider the subject of sex to be taboo.

A recent advertisement campaign by NACO used the slogan “One sure way to stop AIDS. Use a condom while having sex.” The organization was bombarded by complaints. Parents were outraged, arguing that the advertisement was effectively condoning sex among the young.

These social barriers to controlling the spread of AIDS will not change overnight. Such ignorance has led many AIDS victims through the trauma of being rejected by their friends and families. “I have been ostracized by my brother and not allowed into the house,” said Vijay Kapoor, from his bed in Bombay’s G.T. Hospital. Kapoor is a professional blood donor, who was diagnosed with the disease two and a half years ago. He comes from an educated background, but still his family has remained ignorant about AIDS. Like many, he has been cast out. Kapoor explained that when he leaves the hospital he will have to survive by sleeping and eating at temples.

The IHO continues to make headway in this direction. Dr. Gilada, however, feels overwhelmed by the momentum that AIDS is gathering in his country, and seriously disadvantaged in the battle against it. “What we are doing is not a drop in the ocean,” he said, “it’s a drop in the desert.” Pushing forward, they attempt to chip away by making a difference in as many lives as possible. Unfortunately for some like Maroresha, India’s response to AIDS was too little, too late.
Five years ago, in response to a professor’s pedagogical challenge, an entire class of sociology students organized themselves and skipped their final exam. The author, a leading conspirator, recounts the tale.

by John Kellogg Werner

"If no one shows up to take the final exam, everyone in the class will get an 'A'. If anyone shows up and takes it, that person gets their grade, and everyone else gets an 'F.'" This was the challenge sociology professor Dan Chambless at Hamilton College (in Clinton, New York) had posed to his introductory sociology classes for eight years in a row. For seven of those years, students dutifully came and took the final exam. Most years, they did not even think he was serious.

However, in the eighth year (fall, 1988), all sixty-two students in the class-half of them in their first semester of college-skipped the exam. And for their truancy, an 'A' magically appeared on their transcripts.

"It looks easy, but it isn't," says Chambless. "It only takes one person, showing up for any reason, to blow it for the entire class. And an 'F' on the final is a serious risk."

The challenge, reminiscent of the famous "Prisoner's Dilemma"—where distrust is fostered and used by the police to play on the fears of two co-criminals that their partner has confessed, in order to make each one confess to the crime—is intended to actively teach students the difficulties of organizing coalitions under dangerous conditions. "Dictators, or any unpopular leaders, often remain in power not because everyone likes them, or even because anyone likes them," says Chambless. "It only takes one conspirator who panics and turns everyone else in to the secret police."

Nonetheless, five years ago, a group of conspirators believed that they could galvanize their fellow students towards unified action. Soon after Chambless issued his challenge, they set about to convince their classmates that it was possible. After laying their hands on a copy of the official class list from the college registrar, the plotters began to discuss the project with individual students. Despite a strong front of willing supporters, even the self-appointed ringleader had his uncertainties. "I didn't take on any real partners," he says. "I was afraid that if anyone knew I had doubts, everyone else would panic and the whole thing would fall apart."

To secure total boycott participation, the plotters toyed with a variety of strategies. They held meetings for the entire class, but people did not show up. They thought about chartering a bus to take the whole class to nearby Albany on exam day. They even considered just hiring a bouncer to stand outside the door to keep people out of the exam room.

Through all these schemes, most students remained skeptical, if not actually afraid, of attempting the boycott. As a senior student put it: "this wasn't announced three days before the exam. You had twelve weeks to sit around worrying about what the other guy would do."

One woman, planning to transfer to another college, could not afford to lose the course credit. A few other students were in danger of failing, and needed to do well on the final in order to pass. Two star students were ranked highly in their respective classes and while getting an 'A' would not be any special event for them, an 'F' could destroy years of hard work. Still another student, with less honorable motives, gleefully suggested that he would reschedule to take his test after the official date and then blacklist the rest of the class into paying him $10 each not to show up.

In one particularly tricky case, a hockey player from Canada would actually end up potentially worse off by receiving a guaranteed 'A', than if he took the exam. He had performed poorly on the first two tests but had a chance to redeem himself on the final because of Chambless' "2X" policy. By writing 2X on a completed final exam, the student would have the final exam counted twice and would replace the worst of the previous tests. For the hockey player, a simple 'A' on the final was not enough, the 2X was his only hope of a passing grade.

Even with all of these obstacles, the conspirators—with the help of a book of legal forms—finally hit upon a possible solution. It was a contract, a legal document that became valid only when all parties to the agreement had signed. The contract stipulated that all agreed not to take the exam, and that anyone who reneged on the agreement would be legally liable to everyone else. Copies of the contract were passed around; eventually everyone signed; and a photocopy of the contract with all sixty-two signatures appended and a wallet-sized photo of every student next to her or his signature (just to reinforce the commitment) were distributed and posted on the wall.

That did the trick. As Chambless says, "[the conspirators] had to create that entire scenario just to convince everyone that no one else could back out." On December 7, ten days before the scheduled exam date, sociology student Heather Russel went home for the vacation—and everyone else knew it. Her actions signaled that the boycott was for real.

On December 17, the plotters—still fearful that someone might succumb to last minute nerves and appear for the final—milled about in the building near the classroom where Chambless sat with the exam. Half an hour after the appointed exam time, with no student having come in the door—not even the failing hockey player—Chambless got up and left. The last essay on the test that no one took read: "Why did the boycott fail?"

John Kellogg Werner graduated from Hamilton College in 1992 and now works with special needs children in Boston.
Who Should You Thank When You Zip It Up?

It was in late August 1893 that American inventor Whitcomb Judson first received the patent for his "clasp-locker." Today, after years of struggle for acceptance, few of us could survive without the zipper.

by Alison Pion

When you think of all our miraculous modern gadgets, the zipper, surprisingly, does not come readily to mind. But the zipper’s struggle for recognition is a courageous tale, full of hope, tragedy, and profit: not to mention utility, you could not zip up your pants, seal your pencil case, or snugge into your sleeping bag without it.

In its beginning, the zipper was conceived as a replacement for the long button-hooked shoelaces of the 1800s by a prominent mechanical engineer in Chicago, Whitcomb Judson. His idea for the zipper was not the stroke of sudden genius but a thirty year experiment, one full of as many failures as successes.

Judson—who had already proven himself as an inventor of motor and rail brakes—was awarded a patent for the "clasp-locker" on August 29, 1893. Prior to this, the patent office held no records even remotely resembling Judson’s prototype.

His bizarre creation of sequential hook-and-eye locks was intimidating enough, but the gadget went unnoticed and unappreciated. Even an attempt by Judson to interest people in his invention at the 1893 Chicago’s World Fair was a flop.

Nevertheless, in the same year, the United States Postal Service did order twenty “zipper” mail bags from Judson, but the clasp-locks jammed frequently and the order was eventually rescinded. Though Judson continued to improve his prototype over the years, acceptance and fame remained out of reach. Our hero died in 1909, quite unaware of his clasp-lock’s legacy.

In 1913, a Swedish-American inventor, Gideon Sundback, adopted Judson’s dream. By abandoning the hook-and-eye design, Sundback was able to create a smaller, simpler, more reliable fastener. These changes improved the appeal and the popularity of the zipper.

The first requests for Sundback’s fasteners were from the U.S. Army. They ordered zippers for use on clothing and equipment during World War I and for the fastening of boots, money belts, and tobacco pouches. In the 1920s zippers made their widespread debut on civilian clothing.

Still, all was not yet a bed of roses. Garments with zippers were difficult to care for in the early stages of their development. Because the metal zipper rusted easily, it had to be unstitched before a garment was washed and restitched afterward.

The concept of a zipper was initially so difficult to master that each garment came with a small instruction manual detailing its operation and maintenance. But the craze for gadgetry in the early part of the century gave the awkward zipper a chance to fasten itself onto the popular consciousness.

The term “zipper” was not coined until 1923, when the B.F. Goodrich Company developed rubber galoshes with the new “hookless fasteners” and renamed them “Zipper Boots”. Mr. Goodrich himself is credited with the name, based on the “z-z-zip” sound made when using the hookless fasteners to close his boots. The unusual name along with improvements in the zipper’s durability secured its place in mechanical history.

By the late 1920s, the zipper was a common fastener on clothing. Then in 1935, the famous designer Elsa Schiaparelli transformed the zipper into a fashion accessory with the introduction of a spring line of clothes that The New Yorker described as “dripping with zippers.”

And though the 1980s brought a new nemesis—velcro—and the rebirth of an old one—“button fly jeans”—the survival of the zipper attests to our loyalty. A century after its shaky beginnings in the Chicago patent files, the zipper’s hard-won fame is a victory for all of us who zip up without a second thought.

Alison Pion works for the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities specializing in welfare reform and low income issues.
Accessorizing Ken

by Alison Pion

There comes a moment in every person’s life when she or he must contend with the forces of change or be swept away. It appears that this moment of reckoning has arrived for the blond-haired, blue-eyed Ken doll that runs around with Barbie.

Since the birth of Barbie in 1958, she has continued to develop new looks and fashions at a dizzying pace, based on the demands of the moment. So much so that Barbie’s best beau and long time close companion, Ken, has struggled to keep up.

Introduced in 1961—and named after the son of Mattel founders Ruth and Elliot Handler—Ken has appeared in the garb of a sailor, soldier, athlete, doctor and surfer. He has ranged in personality from macho All-Star Ken to sensitive Animal Lovin’ Ken to glitzy Rocker Ken. Through it all, though, Ken has kept that “clean-cut, innocent, never-slept-with-Barbie look,” as bookstore owner Mark Stewart puts it.

However, Ken’s most recent incarnation—Earring Magic Ken—has caused all sorts of uproar. Two years ago, having decided it was time to bring Ken into the 1990s, Mattel surveyed a variety of different little girls from all over the country to find out what they thought about Barbie’s pal. A summary of the results by Lisa McKendall, manager of marketing and communications of Mattel Toys Inc., revealed that these girls called for Barbie to stay with Ken, but “wanted Ken to look a little cooler.”

With Ken’s love life in less jeopardy—but still not in the clear—Mattel conducted further research to identify specific changes that could be made in order to improve his popularity. The results were astounding.

Ken now sports a fine two-tone hair cut, an earring, black leather pants, a mesh shirt, purple vest, and most controversial of all his new apparel: a metallic silver necklace accessorized, in true to life form, by a device originally found only in sex shops—a “cockring.”

Initially worn by the gay leather crowd on either shoulder of their jackets to reveal a preferred sexual position, the rings became an increasingly popular fashion accessory among young activist gay men in the late 1980s. It was not only fashionable to own one, but also to wear one—or two or three or four—as zipper pulls, bracelets, and most often as a necklace.

Well, after this, it was not long before these symbols of chic became a part of mainstream culture. Suddenly having a necklace with a ring on it was as fashionable as ripped jeans. In fact, it is such a common accessory these days that some people who sport them on their clothing seem not to know exactly what they are wearing. Apparently, the designers of the new Ken doll have fallen into this category.

One look at the new necklace adorning Ken and it is clear that he is now equipped for more than a nice Sunday drive with Barbie. However, Mattel ardently insists that the pendant on Ken’s necklace is and never was a sex toy. Angry at the suggestive winks about Ken’s new style, Lisa McKendall has publicly stated, “We’re not in the business of putting cockrings into the hands of little girls.”

But it is not only for the necklace rings that the new Ken has felt public ire. Toy store owner Adriana Kanter of La Grange Ill. refuses to stock the new doll because she feels “that earrings on men and boys are on the wrong side of the road.” Accountant and mother of three Gale Vaupell echoes these sentiments, “there’s no way you would sell me a Ken with an earring—it wrecks the whole all-American image.”

Many people feel that Ken’s new style—“you can’t look at Earring Magic Ken and not think gay,” points out Rick Garcia, director of Chicago’s Catholic Advocates for Lesbian and Gay Rights—combined with the distinct lack of wedding bells in Ken and Barbie’s future, are veiled, and improper, messages about Ken’s true sexual orientation.

Mattel insists that Ken’s changes were the direct result of specific suggestions by little girls. Apparently the girls surveyed are a lot more savvy about the American nineties than the makers of Ken. Or maybe not. After all, sales of the Ken doll have increased substantially and line ups to buy Ken have been reported around the country. But, it appears that many of today’s buyers are “no-longer-so-little” girls and boys.