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Alfred L. Malabre, Jr. has covered the economy for nearly four decades and has been economics editor of *The Wall Street Journal* since 1964. Among his recent books are *Understanding the New Economy* and *Beyond Our Means*, awarded the George S. Eccles Prize from Columbia Business School as the best book on economics in 1987.
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Front cover: Londonderry (left) & Belfast (right), Northern Ireland. [Wally Thiessen]
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It's a Disney World, After All

by Steven Conn

The Walt Disney Company has announced its ambitious new plans for an American history theme park where learning will be fun. Yet, Disney CEO Michael Eisner insists that this will be no sugar-coated version of American history. Park General Manager Mark Pacala probably had it closer to the truth when he described the concept: “The idea is to walk out of Disney’s America with a smile on your face. We don’t want people to come out with a sour face. It is going to be fun with a capital ‘F’.” It’s an amusement park, after all—save those sour faces for history class.

Years away from opening, the park is already rich with irony. After all, what could be a better act of historic respect than to bury the more or less undeveloped tract of land surrounding the site of a real Civil War battle in a concrete and asphalt historical fantasy? And in planning the “Family Farm” site, someone in the corporate offices forgot to notice that the period being sentimentalized—1930 to 1945—saw a record number of foreclosures on small family farms due to the Depression and the Dust Bowl. Yet these are but nagging details, which undoubtedly won’t interfere with history as Disney wishes to portray it.

The proposed project startled some observers, who pointed out that Disney might want to first stop the breathtaking financial hemorrhaging at its Euro Disney disaster before embarking on any new theme park adventure.

Other pundits, though, pointed to the wisdom of the plan: 3,000 acres of choice, undeveloped real estate outside Washington D.C., with the Northeast’s millions of potential visitors nearby. Rather than make all those complicated arrangements to fly to Florida, Disney—

Steven Conn is a graduate student in History at the University of Pennsylvania, and will never take his kids to a theme park.
crazed families from New York or Baltimore will soon be able to simply jump in the car.

On another level, however, Disney’s America is as logical as whistling while you work: having already appropriated the present and the future in its existing parks, all that remains for the purveyors of Disney-think is to put mouse ears on the past. An American history theme park helps Disney complete its take-over of the human imagination.

The impulse behind the Disney fantasy, as manifested in Disneyland, Disneyworld, Epcot etc., is at once utopian and insidious. Disney parks are perfect places, separate from the rest of the world—which is, after all, decidedly messy. The Disney impulse carries on a long tradition in America, which stretches back at least to the 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition in Chicago. The designers of that fair, which was known as “The White City”, presented a dazzling, utopian vision of what a city could be which stood in stark contrast to the real Chicago just outside the fair gates.

But utopia comes at a price. In Chicago, the World’s Fair was rooted in racist ideas about Anglo-Saxon supremacy—it was a White City through and through. At Disney, the price is more subtle, but still significant. To enjoy their day at Snow White’s castle or at Space Mountain, visitors to Disney submit to a startling amount of social control. Disney tells people where to walk, where to snap pictures, how to behave; those who transgress are thrown into “Disney Jail”.

There are few places more meticulously controlled and manipulated than Disney’s refuges. This is the world as we only wish it could be: no dirt or trash (it is all dealt with through a network of subterranean passages and the garbage crews are not allowed to come above ground when the park is open); no injustice or poverty (with prices as steep as they are, poor people can’t make the trip). Nothing but highly orchestrated fun.

At parks like the Epcot Center, Disney’s monument to science and its advances, the future is portrayed as something to look forward to without hesitation. It is a benign future, with beneficent technology making everything better for everyone—antiseptic, non-threatening, anesthetized. The more the real world crumbles and the more the future seems mortgaged to debt and toxins, the more people run to Disney.

Americans seem to have a particular fondness for theme park escape. Already the 18th century is on display in a theme park at Williamsburg, where they have only recently begun to acknowledge that colonial Virginia was built on the backs of slaves.

Los Angeles, on the cutting edge of so much, has probably taken the theme park idea further than anywhere else. Universal Studios opened “City Walk” earlier this year, where for the price of parking your car, you can have the experience of walking down a Real City Street. (There aren’t any in LA, apparently, hence the need). Well, it’s almost real. It’s actually a city street theme park, where Universal controls everything that goes on. To a frightening extent, reality and Disney’s America are already one.

As the next logical step, then, why not take on the challenge of controlling history? The real question is whether the past, with all of its contentious characters and controversial events, will prove as easy to control as a set is to build. It is too early yet to tell, but the description of the attraction “Enterprise”, a site in Disney’s America, provides a clue.

At “Enterprise” visitors will be able to ride the roller coaster “Industrial Revolution”. Rather than organize the ride from the perspective of the industrial workers, who struggled bitterly against their exploitation, or from the point of view of, say, Andrew Carnegie, a deeply complex robber baron, the ride is intended to make you experience what it was like to be a piece of steel going through the smelting process.

Herein may lie the secret to Disney’s historical strategy: having created a present devoid of any of life’s real conflicts, and having projected a future without any ambiguities, Disney now proposes to create a history without any humanity.

A depiction of the proposed “Crossroads U.S.A.” section of Disney’s America: will provide a spirited portrait of mid-19th century commerce. [The Walt Disney Company]
Disney’s America
Tomorrow’s Schoolhouse

by J. Quaid Loebbecke

Mickey Mouse will soon be teaching your kids American history, and for that you should be grateful. In a departure from their four currently operating parks, “Disney’s America” will not be serving as a home for cartoon characters, but rather, will take American history as its theme.

Disney executives estimate that the park will draw 30,000 people a day and have gone on record stating their hope to make it as much an educational as an entertainment experience. One Disney vice president said that the park will not just be “a Pollyanna view of America”, but will also be “fun”, “entertaining”, and “exciting”.

If those last words give you pause, you are not alone. To the dismay of many, the information age is giving way swiftly to the “infotainment” age. More and more, people are turning to talk shows, television docudramas, tabloids and movies instead of newspapers or teachers for education and information about the world around them.

Unlike the university or the newsroom, where professional guidelines establish standards of objectivity and research, entertainment companies adhere only to the dictates of either profit or their own personalities. They are free simply to be “fun, exciting, and entertaining”. As the next step into the era of infotainment, Disney’s America can be viewed as a threat to our understanding of history.

But that is not the whole story. Those who dismiss Disney’s America as crass commercial exploitation are doing a great disservice to history and to themselves. They fail to recognize the educational opportunity that it represents. The advent of the infotainment age—though necessitating zealous protection of history from misrepresentation and manipulation—indicates that now, more than ever before, the public at large is hungry to know more about the past.

There is a mass audience for what used to be considered high-brow or intellectual: the one proviso is that people want to laugh while they learn. Talking heads and sterile lecturing will not suffice. But a creatively executed historical project like Ken Burns’ exceptional documentary, The Civil War, has the power to captivate millions.

Disney’s America certainly has the potential to reach millions in the same way, and, more importantly, it will attract children as its primary audience. At its best, Disney’s America will offer kids what traditional education cannot: the chance to experience history firsthand. By giving them the opportunity to see history as something living, and to relate to historical figures as real people like themselves, Disney’s America will inspire children to return to school enthusiastic about learning history—and about learning in general.

A theme park can never replace the schoolhouse as the primary center of children’s education, but it can be a vital supplement to traditional forms of enlightenment. Disney executives have stated that, in part, the park will be located near Washington in order to give families the chance both to experience history as recreated at Disney’s America, and to visit some of the sites where American history has actually been made—and continues to be made.

At the very least, Disney should be commended for taking a bit of a gamble in departing from the surefire Disneyland concept (surefire outside of France, that is), and offering families an entertainment alternative which attempts to educate and inspire. If you need convincing that children’s entertainment is not always conceived with such a social conscience, I have two words for you: Beavis and Butthead. Or, alternately, consider the video game recently on the market in which a scantily-clad woman is assaulted by four men in her bathroom.

The future presents consumers of entertainment both with promise and potential danger. Just as readers and viewers question news media biases in presenting information about the day’s events, visitors to Disney’s America will have to question—and teach their children to question—the version of history with which they are being presented. If they are vigilant, there is the possibility that millions will discover that learning history can in fact be “fun, entertaining, and exciting.” And that is something for which to be grateful.

J. Quaid Loebbecke lives in Washington, D.C. and counts among recent thrills passing the California Bar exam and riding on Disney’s “The Pirates of the Caribbean”.

“...recognizing the “courage and triumph” of the American immigrant heritage...”

[The Walt Disney Company]
For the last forty years, the issue of violent programming on television has been researched by psychologists, debated by legislators, and rationalized by the networks. And though viewers consistently complain about surging levels of TV violence, they continue to watch.

The Long Story of Violence on TV

by Robert Anderson

The scene was a hearing room on Washington D.C.’s Capitol Hill. A Senate subcommittee investigating the effect of television violence on young viewers had just released a report that drew some damning conclusions. After a three year investigation, the findings “conclusively” established a relationship “between televised crime and violence and antisocial attitudes and behavior among juvenile viewers.”

Robert Anderson is a lawyer who, if research estimates are correct, has been exposed to violent acts on television numbering in the millions.
According to the report, over the previous seven years the number of television shows featuring violence and crime during prime-time viewing hours (7:00 to 11:00 pm) had increased by 200 percent. Pulling no punches, the document accused television networks of broadcasting a "clearly excessive" amount of violence. The subcommittee chairman, Senator Dodd from Connecticut, voiced his "earnest hope" that the national television networks would follow recommendations to take steps to lower the amount of violence on TV. Dodd threatened the networks with congressional regulation if they did not comply, remarking that "[t]he patience of Congress, though considerable, is not endless."

This harsh rebuke of the television networks sounds much like recent headlines. Yet, what makes the report amazing is that it was released October 27, 1964, and that the Senator Dodd referred to was not current Connecticut Senator Christopher Dodd, but rather his father and former Connecticut Senator Thomas J. Dodd. In the 29 intervening years, Congress has exhibited more patience and television has shown more violence.

Recently, Senator Kent Conrad of North Dakota characterized the May "sweeps" period of 1993 as "one of the bloodiest months in TV history." Eighteen of 29 network movie slots were filled with films or miniseries containing "significant levels of violence". According to the National Coalition on Television Violence, 25% of prime time shows in the 1992 fall season contained "very violent" material. When asked about this bloodletting, 72% of Americans polled in a recent Times Mirror survey thought that "television entertainment shows contain too much violence."

In the last year, Congress responded by convening more hearings on television violence. But in contrast to 1964, Congress has more to report to the public than its own threats. First in December, 1992 and then again in July of 1993, the broadcast television networks, ABC, NBC, CBS and (in July) Fox, issued unprecedented joint statements concerning violence in their programs. And in July they began issuing viewer advisories prior to particularly violent shows.

On August 2, 1993 several hundred of the nation's top television executives met in a first-ever industry conference on television violence, where they discussed with academics and lawmakers the questions which have provoked debate and inquiry for more than forty years: is viewing television violence harmful and, if so, what should be done about it?

**Research into Television Violence: Begging the Question**

TV. Is it the reflector or the director? Does it imitate us or do we imitate it? Because a child watches 1500 murders before he is twelve years old. And we wonder how we've created a Jason generation that learns to laugh rather than abhor the horror

-lyrics from "Television: The Drug of the Nation"
by Michael Franti

Critics of television violence often quote statistics correlating the amount of violent programming to the amount of time Americans spend watching TV. The numbers are startling. Nielsen reports that the average American child will watch 15,000 hours of television by the time he or she graduates high school, as opposed to 11,000 hours spent in the classroom.

Combine that with the reports from the University of Pennsylvania, where the Annenberg School for Communication has been conducting an ongoing study of violence on television since 1967. In 1990, Dean emeritus George Gerbner reported that "[t]he percent of prime-time programs using violence remains more than seven out of ten, as it has been for the entire twenty-two year period" of the study. Drawing on these statistics and the results of other studies of television viewing and violence, the American Psychological Association estimates that a typical child will watch 8,000 murders and 100,000 acts of violence before finishing elementary school.

Reading these statistics is like contemplating the number of stars in the night sky, and are out of our human capacity to fathom. But what do the statistics mean? What is the effect of watching 8,000 enacted killings on a television screen before leaving elementary school?

There have been as many as 3,000 studies in the past four decades on essentially that question, and answers have been wide-ranging. In the 1950s, before television sets were ubiquitous fixtures in North American living rooms, social scientists generally agreed that television had little effect on viewers. But as more work was done, it became clear that TV violence did have an impact. One group
of researchers has argued that television violence actually has a calming effect on its audience. "By having television entertainment with adequate sex and violence," writes Jib Fowles, University of Houston-Clearlake Media Studies Professor, "Americans are nightly able to empty their subconscious; aggressive fantasies produce tranquil minds."

But the vast majority of research into the effects of television violence suggests that watching violence on television is harmful, and most often studies conclude that watching television violence leads people to act violently. In 1982, a report by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) concluded that "the consensus among most of the research community is that violence on television does lead to aggressive behavior by children and teenagers who watch the programs."

This consensus was slow in coming, despite the many studies which had been done, because researchers found it especially difficult to measure something so abstract and elusive as the motivations behind an act of violence, and to say definitively that watching television plays a part. "It's like watching rain fall on a pond and trying to figure out which drop causes which ripple," says University of California at San Diego sociologist David Phillips.

Despite the difficulties, some studies managed to limit the variables and reach broad conclusions. University of Washington Professor Brandon Centerwall noted a dramatic rise in homicides in the United States and Canada beginning in 1955 and continuing through the 1950s and 1960s. He hypothesized that it could be explained by the fact that the first generation exposed to television violence in large numbers was coming of age.

What Centerwall needed was another example that would eliminate other possible causes of the increase unique to the North American experience. He found a third sample in the nation of South Africa, where the government had banned television until 1975. Eight years after television was introduced, showing mostly American-made programming, the number of murders in the country accelerated dramatically. Centerwall also noted that, just as in North America, the rate increased first in ethnically white communities, which in all three nations were the first to get television.

While further substantiating the claim for TV violence, Centerwall could not settle the question permanently. Increasing levels of violence in South Africa, especially after the 1977 assassination of black leader Stephen Biko, can just as easily be attributed to rising ethnic tensions over the government's apartheid policy.

Besides contributing to violent behavior generally, television violence has also been blamed for many "copy-cat" incidents which have occurred over the years. One of the most famous examples concerns the broadcast of The Doomsday Flight on NBC in the 1960s. In the movie, a character hides an altitude bomb aboard an airliner, and then calls the airline saying that he will divulge the location of the bomb in return for ransom.

While the show was being broadcast, one airline received an identical bomb threat, and by the end of that week, eight similar threats were reported. Though none of the threats proved genuine, one airline paid $500,000 to protect its passengers. Another airline beat the copycat at his own game. Presented with a "Doomsday" threat, airline officials followed the script of the movie by rerouting the plane to an airport located at high altitude.

Tragically, following the script has proved fatal to children attempting to mimic what they see on television. One child, after viewing a stunt on The Tonight Show in which a performer appeared to hang himself, died when he tried to repeat the feat in his room. His parents sued the network on which the show aired, and ultimately lost their case in the Rhode Island courts. The state supreme court, in ruling on the case of DeFilippo v. NBC, said that "[t]o permit plaintiffs to recover on the basis of one minor's actions would invariably lead to self-censorship by broadcasters in order to remove any matter that may be emulated and lead to lawsuit." Nonetheless, in 1993 the programmers at the music video network MTV decided to move the popular Beavis and Butthead cartoon show to a later time period after the show was blamed for a child setting fire to the family home, killing his younger sister in the process.

Research has also suggested that, in the words of Annenberg Dean Gerbner, "the most pervasive long-term consequence of growing up in a media cult of violence is a sense of pervasive insecurity, what we call the 'mean-world syndrome.' It's a sense of feeling vulnerable, of dependence, of needing protection."
Congress Watches Television

"My general impression is that congressional hearings are sort of like television reruns: same characters, same plot, same outcome."

- Albert Bandura, TV violence researcher, in 1972

Congress began holding hearings on the issue of violence on television in 1952, when a subcommittee on juvenile delinquency examined TV violence in conjunction with a look at violence broadcast over radio. Beginning in 1954, television violence merited its own investigations separate from radio, and Congress has periodically returned to the issue ever since.

A look at the proceedings over the last forty years reveals a repeating storyline similar to that of the 1964 Dodd hearings described above. The recurring characters include: the somber academic, reporting that television is more violent than ever, and that the research linking TV violence to real violence is stronger than ever; the contrite television executive, explaining to committee members that his network avoids violence for the sake of violence, and that several actions have just been taken to reduce the amount of violent programming; and the committee chair, who reports that proposed legislation imposing government regulation of television is being delayed until the next session to give the networks a chance to clean up their act.

Those people who believe that Congress should act to reduce violent programming often consider the legislators' record wanting. Congressional efforts in the past forty years have had little lasting impact in terms of reducing the amount of violence on television, though publicity from government attention has generated a great deal of research. Congress has also twice taken steps which led to a change in network policy, though not to a reduction in the amount of violence shown. In 1974, another time when television violence was receiving a great deal of attention, Congress leaned on the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to do something.

The FCC issues licenses to all television broadcasters in the U.S., and its congressional mandate includes regulating television "in the public interest." According to Thomas Krattenmaker, a Georgetown University Law Professor who worked in the Commission in the late 1970s, the FCC has generally resisted calls to regulate television violence. In the spring of 1974, however, Congress forced FCC officials to sit up and take notice when it threatened to cut the Commission's budget if it did not take action on television violence.

Over the summer of 1974, FCC director Richard Wiley responded by personally influencing the broadcasters to draft a new policy concerning violence. In the fall, the networks and, soon thereafter, the National Association of Broadcasters adopted the family viewing policy. Programs telecast during the first hour of prime time would be suitable for viewing by the entire family, unless the network broadcasted advisories warning that the program might not be suitable for younger family members.

Whereas research has explored the effects of TV violence on both adults and children, public discussion has focused on the latter almost exclusively. This emphasis reflects the common perception—not always borne out in research studies—that while media violence is excessive in general, its impact is greater on younger, more "impressionable" viewers.

The "family viewing hour" concept lasted for only two years before a federal district court struck it down for violating the free speech clause of the First Amendment. In the case of Writers' Guild of America, West v. FCC, television writers claimed that the family viewing policy, though adopted by the networks voluntarily, was actually the result of government pressure applied by FCC Director Wiley. The court agreed and ruled that the policy was a government attempt to censor the networks in a way that the Constitution would not allow.

In practical terms, the ruling changed little because the family viewing policy was already proving itself unworkable. In its first season, the scheme led network programmers to cram essentially the same amount of violent shows into the remaining three hours of prime time. In the second season, NBC blatantly disregarded the policy by scheduling Baa Baa Black Sheep, one of its most violent shows, during the family hour. Whether viewed as government regulation or industry self-regulation, the family viewing policy failed to make fami-
ly viewing of television any less violent.

**Current Legislation**

In 1990, Congress passed what is to date the only substantial legislation on the subject of television violence. Co-sponsored by Senator Paul Simon and Representative Dan Glickman, the measure granted the television networks an antitrust exemption for the purpose of meeting together to discuss TV violence. Out of these talks came the viewer advisory policy that the networks announced in July.

That forty years of Congressional attention to the issue of TV violence would have resulted in research studies, a failed family viewing hour, and a three year antitrust exemption measure is—depending on your level of cynicism about Washington—either shocking or par for the course. There is a more fundamental reason for Congressional inaction on this issue, however, and it goes back to the failure of the family viewing policy.

Almost any attempt by government to limit violent programming, even an indirect effort like the family viewing policy, is bound to be stymied by First Amendment free speech considerations. Georgetown Law Professor Krattenmaker co-wrote a 1978 law review article with University of Texas Professor L.A. Powe, Jr. examining possible avenues for regulation of television violence by the federal government.

“The odds are heavily in favor of the Supreme Court striking down any law which bans or limits TV violence,” he wrote. Congress itself admitted as much in 1977, when a subcommittee reported that any attempt to directly regulate television programming was a violation of the First Amendment.

Consequently, stripped of its trump card of regulation, Congress has been forced into a bluffing contest. Currently, the most influential Congressional player in this high-stakes poker game is Senator Simon. In addition to guiding the antitrust exemption through Congress, Simon has kept a spotlight on the issue for much of the last four years. He is the latest version of Thomas Dodd, threatening the networks with government intervention if they do not take action.

At a Congressional hearing held in October, 1993 Simon announced that he was giving the television industry until January 1 to establish its own panel to make recommendations on curbing TV violence. If they failed to take action, he proposed that Congress should legislate a solution.

**The Failure of Industry Self-Regulation**

“I remember so many times coming [to the Warner Brothers lot] and pitching [scripts to executives]. Pitching and thinking, 'I've got to sell this, no matter what, I have to sell this, I've just got to sell this. It doesn't matter. Ask me to put in a scene of torturing nuns, I'll do it. I'll do anything to make this sale.'”

- Ben Stein, writer and actor

Congress, knowing that its own hands are tied, has cajoled, threatened, shamed, and pleaded with the television industry to police itself, but with little success. Some have suggested that television executives have made it their business to corrupt the values of the nation. But Brandon Centerwall, author of the

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**South Africa study and an unlikely apologist for television executives, argues that programmers do not lack values, but rather that values are irrelevant to what they do.**

“The television industry is not in the business of selling programs to audiences. It is in the business of selling audiences to advertisers. Issues of 'quality' and 'social responsibility' are entirely peripheral to the issue of maximizing audience size within a competitive market—and there is no formula more tried and true than violence for reliably generating large audiences.” Television produces violent programming because violence sells.

Recognizing that—like it or not—mayhem is its meal ticket, television has consistently defended itself from the accusation that its violent programming promotes violence. In the beginning, the industry argued that violence on television served as a release for its audience. Then, when the majority of the studies suggested otherwise, it said that there was not enough research to draw a conclusion. When more research was done, the networks criticized it as flawed and biased.

The networks also feel that they are being made the scapegoat for a problem of violence which is more directly traceable to other causes. At the August industry conference on TV violence, cable executive Geraldine Laybourne won a huge ovation from her colleagues when she said that she had recently spoken to some kids about the issue and that, “[T]hey just wondered how come it’s so easy for people to get guns in this country.”
to a limited degree at the networks, cable programming is almost entirely unregulated and is stealing audiences from the networks by the millions every year.

In 1976 and 1977, the combined network share of the total U.S. television audience peaked at 91%. In 1983, the networks had dropped to 80%, while a still infant cable industry was garnering 4% of the audience. By 1992, the network audience share had dropped further to 73%, while cable skyrocketed to 22%. Today, 62% of American homes with television sets receive cable programming.

The cable industry has argued that it does not produce as much violent programming as the networks, and points to a recent industry-funded study. The study, however, failed to include the violence shown on cable in non-original feature films. In one week of programming in December 1993, the premium cable channels HBO, Showtime, and The Movie Channel showed such unedited feature films as Terminator 2 and Hellraiser. As the titles alone might indicate, such films contain more graphic violence than the networks allow on any of their programming.

Congress is only now beginning to address the issue of violence on cable, and without licensing power Capitol Hill wields even less influence with cable programmers than it does with the networks. However, one piece of legislation concerning violence on cable which does not run afoul of constitutional restrictions has already been passed.

The 1984 law deregulating cable mandated that cable companies provide lock-boxes upon request, which allow parents to restrict children’s access to certain shows. The cable companies have argued that this protection, which is not required of the networks, protects viewers “against unwanted exposure,” and that further restrictions are not necessary. Nevertheless, in the face of public pressure, fifteen cable channels
announced in late July that they would join the networks in offering viewer advisories before particularly violent programs.

**Getting the Problem Under Remote Control**

"It is not reasonable to address the problem of motor vehicle fatalities by calling for a ban on cars. Instead, we emphasize safety seats, good traffic signs and driver education. Similarly, to address the problem of violence caused by exposure to television, we need to emphasize time-channel locks, program rating systems, and education of the public regarding good viewing habits."

-Brandon S. Centerwall

The First Amendment stops Congress from curbing television violence through legislation. The television industry’s own economic imperatives make it unlikely that it will ever regulate itself effectively. However, Congress is currently considering two pieces of legislation which may not solve the problem entirely, but do help address it. More importantly, neither of these bills threatens the First Amendment.

One option requires television manufacturers to install devices giving parents greater control, like the lock box which cable companies are required to offer. Representative Thomas Markey has sponsored a bill which would require a “V-chip” to be installed in all new sets sold in the United States. The V-chip would allow parents to block the reception of programs carrying the violence advisory from broadcasters or cable programmers. However, this option still leaves the fox to guard the chicken coop, as Gerbner warned, because it leaves the television industry to decide what is and what is not violent programming.

A second option is to require by law that the industry provide viewer advisories, as it is now doing voluntarily, or even a rating system such as the motion picture industry now uses.

Researchers have established to some degree of certainty that viewing TV violence is harmful, especially to children. But proving that violent shows are harmful does not make them go away. Congress is barred from taking action which would inhibit free speech. Television programmers, though they schedule the shows which cause the harm, risk economic disaster and the certainty that someone else will provide what the market craves if they fail to deliver the gore. The viewing public recognizes its own power; nearly one-half of the people polled in a 1989 Los Angeles Times survey held audiences responsible for the amount of violence on television by creating a demand for it. It seems unlikely, however, that a nation raised on video violence will ever wield the power it has by simply turning off the set.

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**Suggestions for Further Reading**

Carl M. Cannon, "Honey I Warped the Kids" and “Passing the Buck in Tinseltown” in Mother Jones. (July/August 1993, p.17-21).


“TV Violence” in Congressional Quarterly Researcher. (March 26, 1993).

New from broadview press...

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The Rise of the Reform Party
The Changing Face of Canada

In the wake of the 1993 federal elections, the six-year-old Reform Party of Canada has emerged as a forceful presence in Canadian politics, determined to restructure the Canadian Confederation and to implement its ultra-conservative ideology. The radical proposals of this young party have found considerable electoral support; in the coming years it may succeed in shaking up the Canadian nation and its entire political system.

by Kristina Soutar

The 1993 federal election in Canada will long be remembered for the nation's overwhelming statement of discontent with traditional politics and its endorsement of fringe parties. October 25, Election Day, marked the worst defeat in history of a governing party in Canada: the Progressive Conservatives (PCs)—the party of Confederation and “Founding Father” Sir John A. Macdonald—lost 155 seats. Now, with only two seats, the Conservatives have lost their official status as a parliamentary party. A minimum twelve seats are required to qualify for research funds or automatic recognition in parliament. The New Democratic Party (NDP), a smaller though consistent presence in the federal political arena, faces a similar fate with only eight seats. The benefactor of the Conservative debacle was the Liberal Party led by Jean Chrétien. With 178 seats—nearly double what they previously held as Official Opposition—the Liberals sit firmly entrenched in power.

Many analysts have argued that the Liberals owe their astonishing majority to factors other than their own policies: they have the Conservatives to thank for self-destructing. Fringe parties new to the political landscape took up the lost PC votes which did not go to the Liberals. Remarkably, Chrétien faces a House of Commons where his Liberals are the only party with national representation. The separatist Bloc Québécois, whose political platform is built around the secessionist lobby in French Canada, took 54 seats in Quebec—two thirds of the province—to become Official Opposition.

And at 52 seats—up from one seat at dissolution, and now almost equal to the Bloc’s strength—will sit Preston Manning’s Calgary-based Reform Party. Firmly rooted in the regional discontent of the West, but with a national agenda (despite running no candidates in Quebec), the party claimed 24 of British Columbia’s 32 seats and an additional 23 from Alberta. Besides earning a decisive Western protest vote, the Reform Party has emerged as the strongest politically conserv-

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Unleashing a Political Whirlwind

Founded in 1987 as a populist Western protest party operating only in the four western provinces, the Reform Party entered the political mainstream in a time characterized by Canadians’ growing discontent with politicians. In 1991, realizing that issues which concerned Westerners affected all of Canada, Reform decided to expand to a national level; it shed its motto “The West Wants In”, and turned its attention to addressing the problems of the Canadian nation as a whole.

The Reform Party’s governing principle—ideologically far to the right—is that the government which governs least, governs best. Yet, Manning’s vision for a “New Canada” also includes proposals to restructure power in Canada so that all provinces would be treated “equally”. In this marriage of regional concerns to conservatism lies the Reform ideology.

Though critics are skeptical about the simplicity and lack of sophistication in Reform’s proposals, Preston Manning’s success in the elections and his growing sup-

Preston Manning: “balanced federalism” and minimal government. [The Reform Party]
port base indicate that his vision is one which is shared by many Canadians.

The 1993 Election: Reform Party Platforms

Many of the key issues in the 1993 election campaign centered around the contemporary concerns of Canadians that their country is in a decline. Unemployment, a mushrooming deficit of close to $500 billion, a growing crime rate, a national unity crisis following a decade of failed constitutional reform attempts—the Reform Party offered a fresh response in all these areas.

The Deficit: Manning pledged to deal with the deficit in three years by implementing massive spending cuts. Among the victims were foreign aid, direct subsidies to businesses, and—one of the most painful proposals to Canadians—old age security benefits of those other than the most needy. Other social programs Reform proposed to slash were unemployment insurance, provincial transfer payments and any government funding for day care.

Jobs: Rather than relying on job creation schemes, Manning put forth a solution which stems from his conservative ideology. The Reform Party believes that high taxes and a high deficit are what destroy jobs, and with these burdens reduced, the private sector would be able to function freely. The natural result: growth, jobs, prosperity.

Medicare: Under Reform leadership, Canada would decentralize medicare, thus allowing provinces to administer that service as they see fit—including the right to charge user fees. For a population that regards the health system as one of the cornerstones of Canada, this proposal frightens many into thinking that Canada would soon have an elitist, “Americanized” health system—one without universal good quality and equal access to all.

Law and Order: In terms of crime and punishment, Manning proposed to flex an iron fist, and vowed to emphasize victims of crime. His proposals appealed to many who believe that the Canadian justice system is too soft on criminals. The Reform Party outlined plans to eliminate automatic parole for repeat offenders, deport non-citizens other than refugees for indictable offenses, and apply adult laws to repeat adolescent offenders.

Political Reform: One of the key elements of the Reform Party is its grassroots approach to politics. Manning proposed sweeping reforms to democratize the parliamentary process, including measures to ensure that MPs were directly accountable to their constituents or else could be recalled. The Triple-E Senate—elected, effective and equal—is another key part of Manning’s Western support base. It forms the basis of “balanced federalism”: a nation built of ten equal provinces. Manning rejects definitions of Canada that work around the notion of two founding nations, or which run along demographic lines, neglecting the less populous West. By restructuring government so that the Commons represents people, and the Senate represents provinces (similar to the relationship between Congress and the Senate in the U.S.), the West would gain equality in the Confederation. This goal strikes a chord with many Westerners who feel they have a limited voice in the nation’s policies.

The Reform Party came to life on the populist swell of Western discontent. But Preston Manning’s theory of government non-involvement, fiscal conservatism and grassroots politics draws heavily on the influence of his father, Ernest Manning, a founder of the Social Credit Party in Alberta and premier for 25 years. The Social Credit government under Manning Sr. was responsible for the making of Alberta as a modern, urban society, and its ideology is often echoed in the younger Manning’s political identity.

The Roots of Social Credit

The Social Credit Party in Alberta emerged in
the middle of the Great Depression of the 1930s as a radical reform movement dedicated to the abolition of poverty in the midst of potential plenty. Its founding father was a Christian fundamentalist named William Aberhart—better known as Bible Bill, the radio evangelical Baptist preacher, and founder of the popular Calgary Bible Institute. In 1932, a personal loss suddenly made Aberhart vow to fight the abject poverty of people in his ailing province. He discovered the remedy in the economic reform theory of Social Credit pioneered by Scottish Engineer Clifford Douglas.

Though Douglas’ theories were the result of years of study to understand how to measure the credit of a nation, Aberhart popularized Social Credit based only on Douglas’ notions of Basic Dividend and Just Price. Basic Dividend was a set sum in credit which was to be distributed to every citizen of Alberta, in order to guarantee life’s necessities. Just Price was a method of reducing prices in order to increase consumption to the level of production. Only when these two were equal would the total sale of goods cover the total cost of production.

The Rise of Social Credit

When the widely popular Aberhart and his young assistant Ernest Manning began broadcasting Social Credit to the people of Alberta, it quickly caught fire. In the 1935 election the Socreds swept to power because of the idyllic promises they made to a destitute population—though they lacked technical details and knowledge about how those promises were to be implemented.

The province was already bankrupt, and Aberhart failed to distribute the Basic Dividend as the first months passed. Financial problems, the difficulties facing implementation of lofty principles, and internal party struggles characterized the Aberhart Socred government from the outset. Yet they managed to hold on to power through the 1940 election, at which point World War II began to absorb the Depression economy with increased employment and rising grain prices. With the death of Aberhart in 1943, Ernest Manning was chosen leader by the party caucus. At 34 he became the youngest premier in Canadian history.

The Transformation of Social Credit

With the Depression over, Aberhart dead, and the Socred Party rife with problems, the end seemed near. But Manning gave the party life by introducing a new enemy to replace that of poverty: socialism. “Big government” replaced the old foe “big bank”. The business community, in light of Social Credit’s new political slant, was quick to support it. In the 1944 election Manning regained lost ground and found himself with a new mandate.

To complement his individualistic business politics, Manning introduced the Alberta Bill of Rights in 1946 which carried on the spirit of the Basic Dividend by guaranteeing education, medical care, and social assistance. He purged the cabinet of anti-semitic, racist and otherwise intolerant elements which had been brewing in some Socred circles.

Then, in 1947, oil was discovered, and for the next twenty years Manning’s party coasted along on oil boom prosperity. Thousands of people immigrated and Alberta grew into a prosperous, urban, secularized society—far from the rural, Christian roots of the old Socreds. Doors opened to U.S. owned corporations who sent exploration crews, built roads, and employed Albertans in the process. By 1966 oil revenues formed one third of the money for provincial expenditures. Throughout these decades the government poured money into the province’s education, transportation, and medical systems. Care for the elderly, housing plans—all of these Manning’s rich government could easily afford. It was a time of development and expansion, and Manning built up the province while adhering to a conservative ideology favorable to the creation of individual wealth.

Though the government seemed infallible for decades, decline was inevitable. Infighting began to plague the party, and the Socreds of Ernest Manning grew old in office. In 1967 Tory Peter Lougheed, promising to revitalize Alberta, pulled much of Socred support from under their feet. Manning retired in 1968, and in 1974 the Conservatives took Alberta, ending the Socred era.

It was in these surroundings that Preston Manning, riding on today’s prairie populist movement, developed his political principles of minimal government. He is clearly his father’s son in his commitment to free enterprise and individualism. And at the moment the followers of the Reform Party are the trusting followers of Preston Manning, just as Socred followers put their faith first in Aberhart, then in the elder Manning to lead them.

And yet Preston Manning has gone much further than his father ever did: he has created a party which appeals to people everywhere, unlike the Socred movement which was narrowly rooted in the Depression era politics of the West. Manning now wields considerable power in parliament and views his
party as a national government in waiting. In the federal arena, Reform has inextricably linked the old populist conservatism with a vision to address the problems of Canadian national identity, and the integration of Canada's West into a new federal structure.

The problems of the West in Canadian Confederation have a long history in the gradual formation of the nation. With the passing of the British North America Act in May, 1867, the federal Dominion of Canada was born, comprised of Quebec, Ontario, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Often described as a marriage of convenience, Confederation came to pass as a gentlemanly agreement in response to the immediate needs of the parties involved: the French-English impasse was relieved by the creation of provinces with separate powers, and the threat of American invasion was lessened. The constitutional document itself was moderate, and it did not incorporate any national aspirations or principles. The seeds for a modern national identity crisis were sown at the very birth of the nation.

The West in Confederation

When a united Canada was created, provisions were made for other territories to join Confederation so that one day a dominion could exist from coast to coast. The Prairie West represented important resources which, when harnessed, would be crucial for Canada's prosperity. At the outset, the Prairies entered Confederation as a sort of colonial possession of the federal government. British Columbia —vital to Confederation for economic and military reasons as the gateway to the Pacific—was the only western province to negotiate the terms of Confederation as an independent British colony.

Manitoba, accepted as a province in 1870, did not receive control over its crown land and resources until 1949; Ottawa retained these rights of power so long for financial purposes. B.C. joined in 1871, one of the agreements being that the federal government would complete the transcontinental railway by 1881 (not actually done until 1885). Ottawa's policy of holding land "for the purposes of the Dominion" was applied to Alberta and Saskatchewan, who were granted provincial status after much difficulty in 1905.

The Sources of Western Discontent

The West has held many different grievances about its treatment within the Canadian Confederation. For the most part, problems revolve around the fact that theirs is a resource-oriented economy, which has been exploited by the bankers and manufacturers of Central Canada—the economic and demographic heart of the country.

Tariff Policies: Regional inequities and dissatisfaction began as early as 1879 with the National Policy implemented by Sir John A. Macdonald. The aim of the National Policy's tariff feature was to encourage manufacturers from Ontario and Quebec. For example, it placed a 20% tariff on farm equipment in order to penalize competing products from the United States and Britain. As a result, Western farmers, who depended on farming equipment, had to pay either high duties on imports or substantially higher prices for domestic products. Any Western opposition to the tariff policy met with formidable opposition from Central Canadian manufacturers, merchants and bankers supporting it. By the 1930s, worldwide trade wars and the Great Depression caused Canadian tariffs to rise by 50%. Only in the 1970s, after GATT negotiations, did agricultural tariff barriers begin to go down.

The West has argued that it has been forced by the realities of world trade to sell its agricultural products on very competitive world markets, while at the same time being forced by Ottawa to buy equipment in the higher-priced, uncompetitive domestic market plagued by tariffs. The populous East, home of the manufacturers, has always had the electoral clout to keep such policies in place.

The Railways: Canadian railway rates were another source of Western discontent. At the start of the 1880s, when the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) began freight operations, its rates were twice as high as the Grand Trunk Railway's rates in Central Canada for the same service. While the CPR's income and expenses were pooled nationwide, bushels of wheat nonetheless travelled in the Prairies for twice the price they did in Ontario and Quebec. Westerners deeply resented the fact that they were subsidizing the building and maintenance of the less used CPR line west of Sudbury. For the better part of the century they argued for the equalization of rail rates, and the process of rate equalization was long and slow.

The Pattern Continues: The National Energy Program

In 1980 the federal Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau proclaimed that with the National Energy Program (NEP) it would Canadianize the oil and gas industry, creating greater self-sufficiency in energy, and would reorganize energy industry ownership. A program designed and implemented by the Liberal Cabinet in distant Ottawa, the NEP was soundly condemned by western provinces.

Incentives in the form of grants were introduced to encourage development of oil reserves—but criteria for giving these grants favored areas in Canada's North, and off-shore sites. Until the introduction of the NEP, the energy industry was based primarily in Western Canada. The move of control to Ottawa was regarded as anti-Western. It was loathed even by those not involved in the industry for its blatant discrimination against the West, since it maintained domestic prices of oil and gas resources at half the world price.

The NEP drove exploration and drilling companies south of the border by discriminating against foreign-owned compa-
nies through tax incentives and prohibitions. The number of wells drilled dropped drastically, and thousands of jobs were lost in the drilling and service sectors of the energy industry. The perceived ill treatment of the West by Ottawa strengthened Westerners' feelings of alienation.

The reality of Canadian politics is that Quebec and Ontario determine elections and policies. But the West "wants in"—or else it may decide to embrace the separatist elements that want out. It wants equality, and this is why Preston Manning and the Reform Party are so appealing. Yet Manning's intention is not simply to put Westerners in power; his aim is to implement the national agenda of parliamentary reform in order to do away with the regional inequities that threaten to tear the country apart.

**Constitutional Discord: The Identity of a Nation**

Recent constitutional debates exemplify the extent to which Canadians and Canada lack a cohesive national identity. The paperwork for the creation of Canada was merely a brief shell of the country it would create, and lacked, among other things, a formula for amendment. It was not until 1982 that Canada's constitution "came home" from Britain. This occurred, despite Quebec's strong objections, after several hectic weeks of into-the-night bargaining by Pierre Trudeau, creating a constitution package that included the now controversial Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The unhappiness of Quebec over its exclusion has played a major role in constitutional debate ever since.

Brian Mulroney's Meech Lake accord of 1987 was designed to convince Quebec to accept the Constitution. Much of the accord centered around the separation of federal and provincial powers: it provided an opt-out program for provinces who preferred to create their own programs compatible to national standards while receiving full funding, and it allowed provinces to provide lists of Senate nominees. A great deal of the controversy sparked by Meech centered around the issues involving Quebec: Quebec would be a "distinct society", and it was reserved three places on the bench of the Supreme Court of Canada. The West was fiercely anti-Meech: what is perceived as special demands by, and special treatment of, Quebec has not a sympathetic ear across the prairies and into the Rockies. The Reform Party has always stated very bluntly that it represents English Canada and is committed to countering French demands which so infuriate Westerners—and, increasingly, many other Canadians as well.

As the Prime Minister pleaded with the provincial premiers to accept the deal in the name of Canadian unity, the shaky foundation of Canada as a nation was exposed more clearly than ever. And so Meech Lake fell, unratified in two provinces, paving the way for two more years of Canadian constitutional debate.

Leaving behind the back room bargaining methods that angered Canadians already fed up with politicians, Mulroney ushered in a talking phase. The new Charlottetown accord was designed to take everybody into account—to write the constitution around the people. The result was a process which strove to meet the demands of every special interest group in Canada.

Endorsed in August of 1992 by all ten provinces, two territories and four aboriginal groups, the 60 clauses were presented to the nation. In the weeks leading up to a national referendum on the proposal, the accord was either publicly rejected or accepted by interest groups on the basis of what it did, or, more often, what it did not, offer them. It was this bickering, and the lack of a comprehensive definition of Canada that ultimately caused the Canadian majority to reject the accord in the October, 1992 referendum.

The Charlottetown accord contained the contentious Canada Clause, which was intended to supply the poetry and references to national identity that were missing from the original Constitution Act. The agreement had complicated proposals for political reform that attempted to address the demands of both the

The West for equality, and of Quebec for a special place as a founding nation. New guidelines for federal/provincial power divisions in the areas of immigration, labour-market development, culture, and regional development were established. The accord also worked out the basics of Native Canadian self-government.

The Reform Party vigorously campaigned against the accord. True to his party's ideals and his grassroots support, Manning rejected the deal as he rejects special status for any province—balanced federalism is his primary goal. Manning's stand on the constitutional issue and his fresh approach to politics gained him much support in the 1993 election campaign.

**Criticisms and Challenges Facing the Reform Party**

Reform's youth as a political party is a large hurdle Manning will have to overcome. Critics point out that Reform's
policies are theoretical and ideological, and the party must substantiate its proposals and show that they are workable.

Until now, “Reform” and “Manning” have been interchangeable words. Yet if the party is to succeed, it will have to stop being a one-man show; a broader base of people must be able to speak for Reform authoritatively. And many critics accurately point out that Reform’s candidates are a very motley and volatile bunch. Already certain individuals have embarrassed the party with racist statements or ignorant ravings unfit for a national party which views itself as a government in waiting. The basic warning is that the Reform Party had better grow up fast, or else self-destruction could be imminent.

The most serious charge of intolerance—toward minorities, the needy, immigrants, alternative lifestyles—will have to be addressed. Many interpret Reform’s proposed immigration policies, for example, (which would see numbers drastically reduced, and based on economic criteria) as having a hidden racist agenda. Reform’s stated animosity towards multiculturalism as a government policy draws similar responses.

Manning’s “New Canada” has been called the Canada of the white, privileged male. Indeed, as Manning crossed the country during his election campaign, the majority of Reform’s supporters in fact turned out to be white, middle class males. In light of Manning’s fervent belief in the literal truth of the Bible and his espousal of traditional families, another real concern is that a Reform government would quietly send women back into the domestic subservient roles of yesterday.

If Reform is indeed the national party it claims to be, it will have to create fiscal policies, as well as social ones, that do not frighten people into thinking that the social net of Canada will be taken out from under their feet. Manning and his party have a lot of work to do to inspire trust in their ideals.

A Simple Solution, A Complex Marriage of Ideals

In defense of his proposals to remove government funding from many sectors such as bilingualism and multiculturalism, Manning argues that he works from the notion of unconditional equality of all people: since the Reform Party is committed to this ideal, no minority or special interest group in Canada should need or receive special support. One of the goals of the Reform Party is to create a Canada where people are individuals and Canadians—all defined the same way and with the same opportunities. This type of simplicity and purity of political dogma are what characterize the Reform Party, with its agenda made up of a list of basic principles.

One important Reform ideal is freedom from government and the consequent freedom to individuals that forms the basis of conservative ideology.

Another principle is Manning’s envisioned grassroots political democracy: out goes the big, bureaucratic middleman of parliamentary procedures, thus making the democratic process of Canada truly democratic.

These goals are married to those which stem from Manning’s regional base where the Western protest vote supplied him with much of his power. Manning claims the Canada of two nations created at Confederation has failed, and he seeks to replace that with the “New Canada” built around his ideal of balanced federalism. Ultimately, an ideal Canada would be composed of equal provinces inhabited by equal citizens—Reform’s stated goal is as simple as that.

It all seems so easy: unconditional equality needing no supporting action, individual freedom, grassroots democracy, and little government, which all add up to a united, fair, prosperous Canada. But as yet it is unclear whether this will work—whether a functioning political system can be built around this complex combination of basic principles.

In such a pivotal time for the politics of Canadian politics, and the future of the nation, the Reform Party is a force to watch. If Manning builds up his party and its support, and finds himself in office next term as he so confidently predicts, these musings may turn out to be more than a leisurely, distant look at the growth of a regionally based fringe party.

Suggestions for Further Reading

Free Trade and NAFTA
An Economic Overview

Both NAFTA and the recent GATT talks symbolize the international resurgence of free trade as a guiding economic principle. This overview of past agreements sheds light on the potential of free trade today. However, new technology may soon challenge contemporary notions of trade.

by Geoff Day

Nineteen ninety-three was a high water mark in the contentious field of free trade negotiations. In November, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was passed by the United States Congress after a bitter and divisive battle. In December, the latest round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) limped to a conclusion with a series of compromises and side agreements that have created a somewhat flawed deal, but a deal nonetheless.

Unique among economic concepts because of the intense debates that surround it, free trade remains a political litmus test for economists, politicians, labor leaders, and the general public alike. Fortunately for political pundits, the free trade debate remains complicated and inexact. The difficulty in predicting the future under a free trade regime creates an atmosphere where nearly any point of view can be supported by questionable truths.

However, an understanding of the arguments for and against free trade, along with an overview of recent trade agreements, can clarify the confusion. Certainly, this debate is far more complex than Ross Perot’s “giant sucking sound” of American manufacturing jobs disappearing to Mexico.

The Case for Free Trade

What exactly are the economic theories behind free trade? Any graduate of Economics 101 will recall the supposed truism that “free trade is good” and Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” of the free market. An application of economic theories to the modern international economy illustrates several points.

The key argument for free trade is that improved efficiency increases economic output, to the benefit of all members of a free trade agreement. Efficiency expands because free trade, with its level playing field, allows countries to specialize in what they do best—what is often called “comparative advantage”. At the same time, inefficient or artificially competitive industries must adjust to survive.

The move to specialization and efficiency is not, in theory, a zero-sum game in which benefits accrued to one side represent losses to another. Nonetheless, during the NAFTA debate many critics argued that Mexico’s substantial gains would translate into corresponding losses for the U.S. and Canada. But experience from the European Union (EU) has shown that free trade leads to greater specialization among all countries and thus to higher efficiency in producing those goods. Invariably, total output after a free trade area is established shows growth for all trade members.

A second argument for the efficiency of free trade points out that tariffs, quotas, and other import restrictions create distortions in consumer choices. By applying tariffs to certain products and thereby raising prices, consumers make different

“No doughnuts for them.”
-Dee Dee Myers, Press Secretary for President Clinton, in reference to the anti-NAFTA Congresspeople partaking of a White House breakfast the morning after the bill’s passage

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consumption choices than would be the case in a free trade environment. For example, in Japan, tariffs and other import restrictions on most agricultural items have imposed such exorbitant prices on fruit, rice and meat that standard western fare such as apples and oranges are treated as delicacies.

The extreme prices in these cases cause consumers to make what economists call “non-optimal consumption decisions” which cause an aggregate reduction in national welfare. Removing the tariffs would obviously have negative impacts on Japanese agricultural producers, but would allow consumers to make more efficient choices.

Arguments in defense of free trade also come from the political perspective. Recently, these arguments have gained increasing credence. The power of special interest groups, lobbyists, and Political Action Committees can overemphasize the importance of small groups of people or industries at the expense of the under-represented public.

For example, while the recent GATT negotiations legislated the end of any agriculture supply management systems, Canadian consumers have for decades paid prices nearly 50% higher than world levels for dairy, egg and poultry products. These costs were instituted in an effort to provide a stable price environment for some 37,000 farmers. Since these farmers can provide a cohesive lobbying front which is weakly opposed by unorganized consumer groups, the Canadian supply management system has survived far longer than it might have otherwise. Unfortunately, the concept of the greater public good and increased national welfare confronts a difficult foe in bankrupt farmers.

The Case for Tariffs

Economic and political arguments against free trade, and in support of tariffs, exist as well. First, the concept of an “optimal tariff” suggests that large economies, by virtue of their size and influence, can actually increase national welfare by imposing carefully calculated tariffs. However, such tariffs are generally consigned to the academic’s chalkboard since they are essentially impossible to implement, as they rely on an inordinately sophisticated understanding of both global and domestic economies.

The second argument against free trade regards tariffs as a remedy for domestic market failures. In economic terms, a market failure exists when a specific market behaves in a non-optimal manner: be it improperly allocated capital or inefficient labor markets. In such cases, it has been argued that carefully applied tariffs can resolve the market failures and increase national welfare. However, as in the case of an optimal tariff, such calculations are unrealistic in today’s complicated and interdependent international economy.

Unfortunately for economists, the world does not always behave like an economic model. As in most good things, there are hidden costs to free trade that were rarely if ever mentioned during the NAFTA debate or the recently concluded GATT talks. State Representative David E. Bonior (D) said in an anti-NAFTA speech before the bill was passed: “The working people who stand against this treaty don’t have degrees from Harvard. They don’t study economic models. And most of them have never heard of Adam Smith. To them, NAFTA isn’t just some economic theory. It’s real life.” National welfare cannot realistically be measured by a single statistic such as gross domestic product (GDP), and it must reflect life’s complexities.

As tariffs are removed over time, industries that previously were protected from foreign competition must either adapt or go out of business. In many cases, this means job losses. For example, the agricultural provisions of the latest GATT talks will cause significant problems for farmers in Europe, Japan, and Canada. While job gains from other industries will most likely provide a net increase in employment, the individuals that suffer the most are generally the ones least likely to find employment in a growth sector of the economy.

Free trade proponents tend to accentuate the positive and neglect the restructuring and retraining costs that accompany any free trade agreement. And the more significant the scope of the treaty, the higher the restructuring costs. Furthermore, most economists tend to downplay the significance of social costs when developing free trade models. “Economists might not approach with such ferocity, without any understanding of the human cost involved, the view that flux and labor turnover promote economic efficiency if they themselves were subject to the same flux,” commented Jagdish Bhagwati, a professor at Columbia University and free trade supporter.
A Modern History of Trade Agreements

Though economists have recognized the benefits of free trade since Adam Smith, the modern concept of global free trade was born during the Great Depression. Particularly important were the lessons of the United States after the passage of the Smoot-Hawley Act in 1930. By drastically increasing average tariffs on imports to 59%, the act effectively created a tariff wall around the United States, slashing imports and deepening an already serious recession.

By the time the U.S. government realized the seriousness of the problem and the need to cut tariffs, special interest groups and certain congressional districts had entrenched themselves against unilateral tariff cuts. The only solution left was to pursue bilateral trade agreements.

After successfully negotiating a series of bilateral deals with key American trade partners, tariffs in the U.S. fell to an average of 25% shortly after the end of World War II. However, the growth in international trade in the postwar era made bilateral trade agreements increasingly complicated. Thus was born the concept of multilateral negotiations under the auspices of GATT in 1947. Since that time, there have been eight significant multilateral trade discussions. The latest is known as the “Uruguay round,” named after the location of the initial negotiation sessions.

GATT governs the conduct of international trade through a series of rules. The signatory nations of any GATT treaty (of which there are now 117) agree to follow the regulations and amend domestic laws to conform to the treaties. There are several basic components to the GATT structure.

First, any new tariff must be offset by other tariff reductions to compensate trading partners. Second, export subsidies are forbidden except for certain agricultural products—an exception to be phased out as part of the Uruguay agreement. Third, import quotas cannot be imposed unless certain imports threaten “market disruption.” Finally, GATT encourages signatories to grant trading partners “most favored nation” (MFN) status, where bilateral tariff cuts—exclusive of regional trade deals—are extended to nations with MFN status.

While the central purpose of the GATT agreements has been to lower aggregate tariffs, they do not address non-tariff barriers (NTBs), which include voluntary export restraints, supply management organizations, and trade laws unfairly applied to foreign competitors. These NTBs are addressed through a process called tariffication, which quantifies their strength as an import barrier, allowing tariff reduction schedules to be applied and permitting domestic consumers and corporations to measure the true costs of import restrictions.

For example, the Canadian dairy, egg, and poultry supply management system will be dismantled as part of the Uruguay agreement, to be replaced by tariffs ranging from 182% on turkey to 351% for butter imports. While seemingly excessive, these tariffs can be gradually phased out over time to provide a transition period for farmers and a reliable progress indicator for aggregate tariff reductions.

The successful conclusion to the Uruguay round on December 15, 1993 is a landmark in reducing global trade barriers. The GATT will be transformed from a provisional agreement into a full international institution called the Multilateral Trade Organization, thus providing the basis for a trade dispute settlement mechanism. Furthermore, for the first time agricultural and service trade was included in the negotiations.

However, contentious issues such as cultural exports—which pitted France and the United States against each other in the final round of negotiations—remain to be addressed. Also, the United States appeared to have been successful in exempting tax from the deal, thus allowing differential tax rates for foreign and domestic corporations—a thinly disguised NTB. Still, the benefits from the deal are likely to be significant, with the World Bank and OECD (the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) providing conservative estimates for increased annual worldwide output of some $200 to $275 billion annually.

Regional Trade Deals: NAFTA and CAFTA

While GATT addresses the issue of global trade, the rules specifically allow so-called regional trade deals, which are agreements among two or more nations to pursue free trade on a more aggressive scale than the globally binding GATT. Regional deals are generally among nations that share geographic proximity, and include the European Union, Canadian-American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), and most recently, NAFTA.

However, diligent free traders continue their opposition to regional trade deals in the fear that they will weaken GATT. To a certain extent, this is possible. A common pro-NAFTA argument proposed by the North American auto manufacturers during the debate was that the signing of the deal would keep Japanese auto producers out of the potentially lucrative Mexican market. Clearly, such sentiment contravenes the spirit of GATT and global free trade.

In broad terms, NAFTA will phase out nearly all trade barriers between Canada, the United States, and Mexico over a period of 15 years beginning January 1, 1994. By addressing
tariffs on nearly all manufactured items and including for the first time trade in services, agricultural products, and rules concerning taxation and intellectual property. NAFTA will create a free trade zone that includes some 375 million consumers—comparable in size to the European common market. Beyond straightforward tariff cuts, NAFTA will end current investment restrictions and will theoretically allow companies to operate in the same way regardless of location.

For the United States and Canada, NAFTA supersedes the 1988 CAFTA agreement that provided the model for NAFTA. As such, CAFTA can provide lessons regarding the new free trade alliance. While the CAFTA debate within Canada was every bit as contentious and emotional as the American NAFTA debate, free trade has started a significant process of economic restructuring within Canada for older industries that had traditionally enjoyed high levels of protection. This has allowed smaller, more nimble competitors to increase exports to the United States.

Certainly, free trade opponents continue to point to Canada’s persistently high unemployment levels—currently 11%—as evidence of CAFTA’s problems. But the fact remains that Canadian exports to the United States have risen by over 30% since 1991, a figure unimaginable without CAFTA.

But there are important differences between CAFTA and NAFTA, most notably the inclusion of intellectual property items, which was also a hot topic in the Uruguay round. Also included are new rules on transportation services. For example, while Canadian auto manufacturers will be rewarded with more secure access to American and Mexican markets, more stringent domestic content rules—which are already a source of trade friction for Japanese plants based in Canada—will be in place.

A key part of both CAFTA and NAFTA is the binding arbitration in cases of trade disputes. In effect, the trade tribunal initiated as part of CAFTA and composed of five members—two Canadian, two American, plus one other—gives the deal its teeth. For example, the tribunal recently ruled against the United States over punitive tariffs that had been imposed on Canadian softwood lumber. The panel’s decision forces the U.S. Commerce Department to reconsider the tariffs and reach a conclusion in accordance with the panel’s findings.

Both CAFTA and NAFTA are not without their faults, however. In particular, numerous concessions were made by Bill Clinton in order to ensure passage of the bill. These side deals included a development bank for the Mexican-American border, and agreements to assuage American wheat farmers near the Canadian border, wine producers in California, and citrus and vegetable farmers in Florida, to name just a few. As The Economist wrote, the arm-twisting to pass the deal was “a war of attrition where the chief weapon was pork.”

Finally, some industries will receive special protection under NAFTA. The Canadian culture industry, American airline and telecommunications sectors, and Mexican energy and railway industries all receive exemptions from key aspects of the deal.

Next Steps for Free Trade

The past year has been a hectic one for trade negotiators. The accomplishment of NAFTA, the GATT Uruguay round and other deals to cut tariffs and trade barriers is obvious: since GATT was established, average tariffs have fallen from 40% in 1947 to little over 5% today, and even less within regional trade deals such as CAFTA, NAFTA, and the European Union.

While the successful conclusions to NAFTA and GATT provide a significant step forward for free trade, there remains considerable work to be done. Such contentious international issues such as trade in culture, harmonized patent protection, and further progress in addressing trade in services remain. Moreover, as we embark into the information age, issues of intellectual property, copyright and information access loom ahead for future GATT and other trade discussions.

Also likely is the further development of regional trade alliances. Already, NAFTA’s expansion into Chile and other South and Central American countries has been predicted for the near future. Furthermore, the liberalization of former Eastern Bloc countries will no doubt mean further expansion for the European Union and its associated free trade zone, the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). Economic arguments will dictate that such growth will foster significant increase in global welfare. However, the social costs of unemployment, worker dislocation, and retraining must be considered in order to ease the pain in any move towards a truly international economy.

Suggestions for Further Reading

Richard Lipsey, Two Views on Dispute Settlement and Trade Laws in the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. (C.D. Howe Institute, 1988).
Fighting for Peace in Northern Ireland

Among the last remaining sites of long-standing violence in the Western world is Northern Ireland. Politicians have struggled for years to end the fighting in this small section of the Emerald Isle, but they are straining against centuries of history marked by terrorism and sectarian passions. In December, 1993, filled with hopes of creating a lasting peace, the English and Irish Prime Ministers signed a joint declaration engineered to bring all conflicting parties to the bargaining table.

The cycle of violence continues to drain the lifeblood of the people in Northern Ireland. In October of 1993, an IRA bomb exploded in a crowded Belfast market, killing nine Protestants and injuring 57 others. One week later, in retaliation, two Protestant terrorists operating as part of the Ulster Freedom Force walked...

by Steven Bright

Steven Bright recently received his M.A. in Journalism from the University of Western Ontario. His fascination with Ulster comes from a trip through Belfast and reading Leon Uris' Trinity.
into a Catholic pub on Halloween and murdered seven people with automatic weapons. Yet, amidst some of the bloodiest sectarian violence Northern Ireland has seen in the last twenty years—where 23 civilians died in one week at the hands of extremists of both religions—politicians were drafting a proposal for peace to end this destructive pattern.

In December, 1993, British Prime Minister John Major concluded a deal with his Irish counterpart, Albert Reynolds, which many observers feel is perhaps the best chance for peace ever. The deal—which may ultimately lead to referenda in both sections of Ireland on the fate of the British-controlled North—is a joint declaration about the freedom of self-determination of peoples North and South.

The past 25 years of sectarian violence—known as “the Troubles”, a name borrowed from the turbulent time leading up to Ireland’s independence in 1921—has left the population war weary. People want an end to a conflict that has seen more than 3,000 killed and countless others injured since 1968. It is a “war” being fought not only among terrorists like the Irish Republican Army (IRA), related Catholic groups, and various Protestant factions, but also between these terrorists and British security forces.

The modern conflict in Northern Ireland is essentially over politics and national identity, though these issues are inextricably tied to long standing religious divisions. At issue are the six British counties known as Ulster, or more formally as Northern Ireland. Republicans, or Irish Nationalists, want Northern Ireland to unite with the heavily Catholic Republic of Ireland to the south. Loyalists, or Unionists, wish to remain part of Great Britain; they are loyal to the Crown and largely Protestant.

The ultra-Republican IRA seeks a reunited, Catholic Ireland and has chosen to wage a campaign of violence towards that end. Though this dream is shared by the Irish Catholics living in Northern Ireland, the IRA’s terrorism and murdering of innocents draws condemnation from the vast majority of its countrymen. Irish Catholics, too, live in fear of the IRA, who murders suspected police informants and has made the revenge tactic of “kneecapping” a virtual form.

At one time the IRA concentrated on “military targets”—British soldiers and symbols of the British presence in Northern Ireland. However, it has long since abandoned these limited targets. Children and other innocent civilians are regularly killed by IRA operations—a strategy intended to force the British government to concede to its demands. IRA bombing targets may include anything from Belfast shops or British pubs, to the busy London Underground. Loyalist paramilitaries, as Protestant terrorists are called, have demonstrated an equally cold-blooded willingness to kill and maim, though with a very different goal in mind: keeping Ulster under British control. The outlawed Ulster Freedom Force is one such group, though others exist.

The recent December accord, reached in such a turbulent climate, underlines two important features of Irish history. First, it shows the degree to which terrorism and politics are inextricably connected. Political change invariably results in violence, which in turn forces politicians to act. Second, reactions to the agreement highlight the “zero-sum” nature of negotiations about Northern Ireland: all parties involved consider that concessions granted to one
side come at the expense of the other. Since the remaining options are either complete victory or utter defeat, neither side has ever been satisfied.

The Seeds of Violence are Sown

The burden of history, it has been said, lies heavy upon the Irish. England first sent troops across the Irish Sea with Henry II in 1170 to establish a strong presence among feuding Irish lords. Anglo-Irish relations were further strained by Henry VIII who declared himself King of Ireland in 1541, ushering in Anglican English rule and many restrictions on members of the Catholic faith regarding education, the right to bear arms, and land ownership. In the years following, Irish history was marked by the colonization of Ireland with English and Scottish immigrants, particularly in the North. This large wave of immigration established the predominantly Protestant Northern Irish population.

Struggles to overthrow English rule were not long in coming. One of the most famous uprisings occurred in 1798 when Wolfe Tone, a Protestant lawyer, sought to break Ireland from the shadow of Britain in an age that also witnessed the American War of Independence and the French Revolution. Tone’s uprising failed, and he himself died in jail after cutting his own throat. Yet despite its ignominious ending, the uprising is viewed by historians as a seminal event in the movement toward Irish liberty from Britain. As analyst Edgar Holt wrote, “Tone’s unsuccessful revolt had a profound effect on the development of Irish history, for it established a tradition of revolutionary violence which became a permanent feature of Irish life.”

The Islands United: A Battleground Forms

In 1801 the British Parliament passed the Act of Union between England and Ireland. Union was intended to defuse the potential for nationalistic uprisings by allowing Irish MPs participate in the House of Commons. However, by the latter half of the nineteenth century, many Irish MPs in Westminster supported a new idea for Anglo-Irish relations known as “Home Rule.” Proponents of Home Rule called for Ireland to have its own government with control over all domestic affairs, leaving imperial defense and foreign policy in the hands of London. Two Home Rule bills, in 1886 and 1892, failed to become law. The majority of British MPs and peers in the House of Lords felt Ireland should remain completely under London’s purview. Yet while the politicians bargained and made speeches in Parliament, much stronger forces were mobilizing in the streets of Ireland.

In the late nineteenth century, and often in response to Home Rule debates, the two communities—Irish Catholic Nationalists and Protestant Crown Loyalists mainly in the North—began to develop large-scale movements to further their causes. The former typically joined the Irish Republican Brotherhood, or various other populist leagues dedicated to promoting Catholicism. At the same time, Protestants massed their numbers in the face of the anti-Britain, pro-Vatican tide which they feared was a threat to 300 years of Protestant supremacy. Their rallying cry was “Home Rule is Rome Rule.” Lord Randolph Churchill phrased it succinctly in 1886 when he told a huge Protestant crowd that, “Ulster will fight, and Ulster will be right.”

When the passage of Home Rule appeared to be imminent in the years leading up to World War I, Loyalist opposition to the idea was formidable. It galvanized in the form of the Ulster Covenant, a petition signed by more than 400,000 men and women dedicated to keeping Ireland fully under British control. Out of the Covenant they formed the Ulster Volunteer Force in 1912, a paramilitary group designed to give bite to loyalist bark. In what was becoming a potentially explosive situation, Catholics formed their own paramilitary group, the Irish Volunteers, and in the summer of 1914 began to build up arms. Ireland seemed destined for civil war until Austria’s Archduke Franz Ferdinand was shot, pulling Europe into the “War To End All Wars”. The problems in Ireland were at least temporarily averted.

Revolution Bears Fruit:
The Easter Rising and Sinn Fein

Thousands of Irishmen, both Catholic and Protestant, joined the British war effort in the fall of 1914. Left behind were radical Irish Nationalists who saw any attempt to help Britain as counterproductive to their cause. On Easter Monday, 1916, a
rebel faction marched through Dublin and declared the birth of the Irish Republic on the steps of the General Post Office.

British troops quickly moved in, and after five days of heavy fighting more than 1,800 Irish rebels were interned without trial. In a show of British supremacy over insurgents, the ringleaders were summarily executed. Yet in the aftermath of the uprising many innocent civilians suffered as well. The heavy-handed government tactics only served to blow oxygen on a smoldering fire. Executed rebels quickly became martyrs and the Republican cause grew stronger. Irish poet William Yeats immortalized the landmark event in his poem “Easter, 1916”: “I write it out in verse/ MacDonagh and MacBride/ And Connolly and Pearse/ Now and in time to be/ Wherewher green is worn/ All changed, changed utterly:/ A terrible beauty is born.”

By 1918, Irish Nationalists had united under the banner of the recently formed political party, Sinn Fein, to seek complete independence from Britain. Seventy-three Sinn Fein Irish MPs were elected in December, 1918, who then boycotted the London Parliament and instead created the Assembly of Ireland—the Dail Eireann—in Dublin in 1919. Eamon de Valera, the only surviving commander of the Easter Rising who had spent the previous few years in jail, escaped to become president of the new, illegal and unrecognized “Republic”. In de Valera, Republican aspirations found a leader with political aptitude and strong ties to rebel fighters. The increased pressure from Irish demands, and the continued refusal of the British government to recognize Sinn Fein’s Dail, set in motion two years of intense violence. Once again, underlying the political activity was a powerful undercurrent of guerrilla muscle.

In 1918-19, Nationalist might was applied by the Irish Republican Army, newly formed from the Irish Volunteers. The IRA’s activities were guided by an effective underground network which was an extension of Sinn Fein’s cabinet and the Irish Republican Brotherhood. According to scholar J. Bowyer Bell, the IRA’s chief strategy as the military might of the Dail was “assassination in the cities and ambush in the country.” The main targets were symbols of the Crown, and Irish policemen who were employed by it.

A similar relationship continues to this day—despite the IRA’s status as an illegal terrorist organization—whereby the IRA wages its campaign of violence while Sinn Fein acts as the political arm of the movement for a united Ireland. The two are married, though Sinn Fein claims legitimacy as a political and democratic force.

To counter these guerrilla activities, the British government reinforced the increasingly powerless Royal Irish Constabulary with former soldiers (1919). The latter force became infamous as the Black and Tans, named for the colors of their uniforms. These men were so embittered and traumatized by their time in the trenches that they could not integrate into civilian life, and lacked respect for the lives and property of ordinary citizens. Notorious for their cruelty and bloody reprisals, they were virtually impossible to control. The atrocities committed by the Black and Tans were considered by the
British public among the worst committed by any of the terrorists these soldiers were commissioned to confront.

“Troubles”: The Irish Free State Created and the North-South Divide

As a full-fledged guerrilla war tore through the hills and streets, politicians searched for ways to end the violence. The British government attempted to institute a compromise to heal the divided nation. In 1920 a bill was drafted which called for separate Northern and Southern Irish parliaments and the representation of all-Ireland MPs in London. Not surprisingly, elections produced a largely Unionist Northern Parliament and a Nationalist Sinn Fein Assembly in the South. But while the Protestant Unionists accepted the two Parliament plan with some hesitation, the Catholic Sinn Fein unequivocally rejected it, demanding no less than complete independence.

The pressure was great on the British government to resolve the conflict, and finally, in 1921, a treaty was signed which recognized the Dail Eireann as the official government of the Irish Free State, composed of 26 southern counties. The Northern Parliament and its remaining six counties were exempt from the laws of the new state, thus retaining their ties to England. One stage of “Troubles,” at least, had ended.

In the eyes of many, the partitioning brought to a close a centuries-old chapter in Anglo-Irish relations. The Protestants in the northern counties maintained their links to the Crown, and the Catholics in the South gained freedom from London. But there remained an obvious wound in the belly of the new province of Ulster: the Catholics in the North were made a minority in their own land. Many of the Protestant Unionists who held the reigned of power were just as anti-Catholic as the signatories of the Ulster Covenant.

From Old Troubles to New: 1922-1968

The new province of Northern Ireland, which bound together two communities with a bellicose history, was plagued by religiously-motivated violence beginning in the mid-1930s. Trouble began to flare up in 1932 when de Valera’s newly formed Fianna Fail party won the Dail election in the South. De Valera was firm on his intent for a united Ireland. His victory sparked Unionist concern that the IRA, which had close connections to de Valera though they had been declared illegal 1931, would start to rekindle terrorist tactics in Ulster.

In an effort to bolster Loyalist strength to counter the apparently surging Catholic storm, the Protestant government regulated the labor force according to religion. As a result, many Catholics in Ulster were trapped in poverty—already dire from the protracted depression of the early 1930s—by highly selective hiring and firing practices. The situation deteriorated rapidly, and by 1935 widespread sectarian riots were ravaging the streets of Belfast. Tensions grew worse two years later with de Valera’s declaration that the Irish Free State had become the Republic of Ireland, thereby denouncing loyalty to the English crown. In the articles of the newly created Republic’s constitution, de Valera made claims to the whole island of Ireland, an act which inflamed Ulster Protestants.

After a relative calm during World War II, there was a return of heightened Catholic-Protestant anxieties. Once again the impetus came from the South when the Republic formally dropped the Union Jack in favor of the Irish tricolor flag, and then withdrew from the British Commonwealth. The 1950s ushered in more violence, primarily in the form of a prolonged IRA border campaign which hit hundreds of targets between 1956 and 1962.

“The Troubles”

The sectarian pressures in the six counties finally blew up in the summer of 1968 when hundreds of Catholics took to the streets. In American-style civil rights protests, they sought an end to institutional discrimination against the Catholic minority. A police attack on the march brought widespread media attention and shocked the world. Under pressure from London, the Unionist government gave a few concessions to the Catholics with the hope of averting a civil war.

But this political move, like several others before it, only led to increased anxieties on the street. Any concession given to the Catholics was seen by some Protestants as a surrender to the Republic. Thousands of Unionists marched in protest in August of 1969; the IRA and Ulster Defense factions re-mobilized. Finally, British troops were deployed in Northern Ireland to curb a cycle of violence which victimized Catholic and Protestant civilians alike. Though British security forces were introduced to quell insurgency, their
A Brief History of Ireland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1541</td>
<td>England’s King Henry VIII proclaims himself King of Ireland.</td>
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<td>1690</td>
<td>Protestant King William of Orange (later King William III) defeats English Catholic King James II in the celebrated battle on Irish soil.</td>
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<td>1801</td>
<td>Constitutional Union of England and Ireland.</td>
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<td>1916</td>
<td>The Easter Uprising of Irish nationalist rebels in Dublin, led by Eamon de Valera, is crushed in a bloody crackdown by British soldiers.</td>
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<td>1921</td>
<td>Ireland is split into the Irish Free State (an independent Catholic state) and the British province of Northern Ireland, (also known as Ulster).</td>
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<td>1931</td>
<td>IRA declared illegal in Irish Free State.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>The Irish Free State becomes the Irish Republic.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>The modern “Troubles” begin with the police storming of a civil rights march calling for an end to discrimination against Catholics.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Britain deploys troops in Northern Ireland.</td>
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<td>1972</td>
<td>The most violent year of “the Troubles” begins with “Bloody Sunday”, when 12 unarmed men are killed by soldiers. Direct Rule from London is introduced.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>IRA begins vicious bombing campaign.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>IRA Prisoner Bobby Sands dies after a 66 day hunger strike. Nine others also die during hunger strikes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Gerry Adams elected leader of Sinn Fein, a political party with ties to the IRA.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Breakthrough Anglo-Irish agreement signed, giving the Republic a voice on the future of Northern Ireland. This is followed by riots set off by Loyalist hatred of the accord.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Moderate nationalist leader John Hume comes to agreement with Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams. Prime Ministers John Major and Albert Reynolds sign new Anglo-Irish agreement—the Downing Street Declaration—designed to begin talks that will result in a lasting peace for Northern Ireland.</td>
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In 1972 the most violent years of “the Troubles” began on “Bloody Sunday” (January 30), when 12 unarmed men were killed by British soldiers. That same year the British government dissolved the Northern Irish Parliament and installed a Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to govern the province directly from London. [This remains the situation in 1994]. The lot of the Ulster Protestants did not change dramatically: they lost their Belfast-based government, but remained under the rule of Britain. For the Catholics, however, replacing Belfast with London did introduce a new challenge. Direct British rule seemed more damaging to the dream of a re-united Catholic Ireland. Ulster fell into another seemingly endless wave of violence.

Throughout the 1970s the IRA waged a particularly vicious campaign of “no warning” bombings on civilian targets in several English cities. The many lives claimed in these attacks won the IRA worldwide notoriety for its blatant disregard for human life. In the wake of 19 deaths in the infamous Birmingham pub bombings in 1974, the British government toughened its Prevention of Terrorism Act so that suspects could be held without charge for up to seven days. In that same year, another notorious “no warning” explosion rocked a Guildford pub. Public outcry following these murderous events demanded that the British government act swiftly to stop the terror and find the bombers. Ironically, those convicted for the bombings—the Birmingham Six and the Guildford Four—were innocent people who went to prison branded as horrifying terrorists. They remained in prison for many years before the truth of their innocence was made public. Many argue that they were used asscapegoats by a government that was desperate to appear in control of IRA terrorism.

In 1981, the IRA once again basked in the global media spotlight with the death of Bobby Sands, a jailed IRA member who conducted a highly publicized hunger strike. Sands lasted 66 days before he died. Nine others also went on hunger strikes and died. While these deaths of IRA prisoners drew a good deal of media attention, they accomplished nothing for the cause. The British government stood firm in its intention not to make concessions to convicted terrorists.

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who came to power in 1979, was especially firm in her resolve never to deal with terrorists. She sought political agreements only with democratically elected MPs—with the exception of Sinn Fein. In fact, one of her last acts of government was to make it illegal to broadcast the face and/or voice of any Sinn Fein representative. Her determination hardened after she and members of her Cabinet narrowly avoided death in 1984, when a massive IRA bomb attack killed four people in Brighton. Shaken but not seriously
injured, the Iron Lady vowed that “all attempts to destroy democracy by terrorism will fail.”

Yet the violence forced her to take political action, and in 1985 Thatcher and Irish Prime Minister Dr. Garret Fitzgerald signed the Hillsborough Agreement. The deal gave the Republic a voice in Ulster’s political, security and legal affairs through an intergovernmental committee. It also promoted cross-border co-operation. In the words of historian J.J. Lee, the Hillsborough Agreement “recognized the legitimacy of the Republic’s concern with Northern Ireland and its political contribution to the resolution of the Ulster question.”

Not surprisingly, Protestant Ulster MPs in London vociferously condemned the deal. They felt that any attempts to include the South in Ulster’s affairs was a step towards realizing the Republic’s ultimate goal of a re-united, Catholic Ireland. With such rigidity in place on either side, political compromise appears far from reach.

What lies ahead?

Late in the fall of 1993, John Major secretly embarked on the journey to peace by launching three sets of talks: discussions between London and Belfast, London and Dublin, and amongst the various Belfast parties. The Downing Street Declaration, publicly agreed to and signed by Major and Albert Reynolds, represents the fruit of these labors.

Though the agreement is sound in theory and spirit, no amount of political cooperation can guarantee that the terrorists will lay down their considerable arsenals. Extremists on both sides have yet to show explicit support for the declaration. As part of the accord, the outlawed Sinn Fein will be allowed to enter directly into negotiations if the IRA agrees to renounce violence for at least three months. Gerry Adams, leader of Sinn Fein, has a good deal of influence over the actions of the IRA, though to date it has not dropped its bombing campaign. Adams himself recently added another element to the negotiations by demanding that all IRA political prisoners (approximately 1,600) must be released in order to ensure a cease-fire.

Hopeful though the political process towards peace may be, it has met with violent opposition from Loyalists in Northern Ireland. The Loyalist paramilitaries, for their part, have made it clear that they will not stand idle while the Republic is given any more influence over the future of the North. What is perhaps most troubling about the Loyalists is that there is no Protestant equivalent to Gerry Adams—someone who speaks for the extremists, and at the same time can temper their terrorist activities.

The head of Ulster security forces has admitted that the Loyalist threat is becoming a grave concern of both the province and the Republic. In fact, in the last 18 months, Loyalist groups sworn to keep Northern Ireland part of Britain have killed more people than Republican groups. The possibility of “the Troubles” moving south in the form of Loyalist attacks on Dublin is yet another possible burden to be born by those living Irish history today.

Suggestions for Further Reading


The More Things Change...
Patterns of Power in Haiti

Cycles of political violence and instability stretch back to Haiti's independence in 1804. As deposed President Aristide and his successor, General Cedras, confront each other in the latest act on this stage, both the Haitian population and the rest of the world have been left wondering what they can do to end the bloodshed.

by Brian Coutain

Eighteen hundred and four was a glorious year in Caribbean history. For the first time in the history of the world, a successful slave rebellion had taken place. That rebellion—a revolution contemporaneous with the American and the French—was in Haiti.

Up to the revolution, Haiti had been one of the world’s richest colonies, and by far the most prosperous French colony. The future looked promising for the new nation after its independence, and many hoped that Haiti would become an affluent black democracy in the New World. So how did a country with such encouraging beginnings become the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere? What went wrong along the way?

The answer, paradoxically, lies in the success of the Haitian revolution itself. Haitians did not secure independence through diplomatic negotiations with the French, but rather through armed resistance. The revolutionaries set aside little time for constitutional engineering or the codification of democratic principles in a formal constitution. Consequently, political intrigue, violence and power struggles soon became hallmarks of the Haitian political structure.

One leader of the revolution—Jean Jacques Dessalines—proclaimed himself emperor in 1804 and was assassinated within two years, beginning a long line of presidential power struggles. Added to the nation’s woes was the increasing role played by outsiders. Abraham Lincoln’s recognition of Haiti’s independence in 1862 was a source of pride for Haitians, but the increasing commercial and political interference in its affairs by the United States, Spain, England, and France were less welcome advances.

Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries both of these chronic problems—the constant threat of foreign intervention and the country’s weak internal political structure—stretched and enlarged the Haitian military. Power struggles within Haiti involved the military both as an instrument of political terror and as a source of political power itself. The military was essentially the power broker and “kingmaker” in Haitian affairs. Furthermore, the threat of external involvement ensured a privileged place for the military as a bulwark against the prospect of recolonization. However, much like the political system itself, Haiti’s military was rife with internal feuds and divisions—factionalism which further fuelled the country’s political instability.

At the same time, the Haitian state, its resources, and its economy were often mercilessly exploited. In 1925, some 120 years after independence, Haiti won official French recognition by promising a large indemnity to former French planters. The required money was borrowed of necessity from France, but at usurious rates. The “double indemnity” further weakened the economy, already under severe strains due to the maintenance of large armies. Moreover, several Haitian presidents were all too willing to embrace foreign economic agendas if these consolidated their own power within the country.

American Intervention

After more than a century of precarious independence, Haiti abruptly lost its freedom when U.S. Marines seized the capital, Port-au-Prince, on July 28, 1914, occupying the country until 1934. The assassination of President Jean V.G. Sam—the sixth Haitian president since 1911 to meet violent death at the hands of local opposition—and the massacre of political prisoners in the Presidential Palace, combined to provide President Woodrow Wilson with a humanitarian justification for intervention. However, Wilson also had a strong stake in protecting American investments in Haiti, as well as in safeguarding the geopolitical value of a friendly government in the Caribbean.

During the years following occupation, movements towards Haitian insurrection grew in size and intensity, but were crushed by U.S. armed forces in the early 1920s. Thereafter, the United States sponsored a series of puppet presidencies, ruled the nation through a military high commissioner,
and left Haitians minimal voice in their government. In 1922, a large U.S. bank loan to Haiti was arranged, providing for generous interest payments to foreign bond holders (mostly Americans). However, little of the principal was invested in public works projects or productive enterprises to enhance Haiti's infrastructure. The cost of redeeming the balance of the loan drained the Haitian economy for a quarter of a century.

However, American policy in Haiti changed in 1930. The legislature elected Stenio Vincent, one of the most ardent opponents of American occupation, to the presidency. Though the U.S. refused to abandon its sway over Haiti's economy until 1947, it did promise to end the armed occupation of the republic, and the last American Marines were withdrawn in August of 1934.

By June 1935, President Vincent, considering himself “indispensable,” had the constitution amended to extend his term in office for five years, and refused to step down after his term expired. In the face of these actions, a triumvirate of military leaders forcibly announced his resignation. It is worth noting that only two presidents in Haiti's history have ever relinquished power voluntarily. The second did so in 1879, and by that time Haiti had sustained 69 "revolutions."

This pattern of succession through violence, assassinations, and coups became the institutionalized means of political change in Haitian politics, and exemplifies the structural problems that Haiti continues to face. The military, with its monopoly on violence, increasingly became Haiti’s only source of power and legitimacy, a development that has had profound consequences.

The Duvalier Era

In 1957, Dr. François "Papa Doc" Duvalier, a medical doctor trained in Haiti who had studied public health at the University of Michigan, was elected president of Haiti. Like so many before him, he too refused to leave office when the time came, declaring himself “President for life” in the new constitution of 1964. Though he was more successful than his predecessors in maintaining power, his success came at a high price for the Haitian people.

Duvalier's first hurdle was to come to terms with the pivotal role of the military. By organizing loyalists into a paramilitary guard known as the "Tontons Macoute", bolstering the secret police, and later establishing the Leopards, a U.S.-trained counterinsurgency force, Duvalier was able to counterbalance traditional military strength. In the process, however, he further complicated the power structure by playing the military and the Tontons Macoute against one another while keeping both under his control. At the same time, he gained the military's direct support through a combination of carrot and stick. He controlled the appointment of high military officials, granted privileges to army supporters, condoned the military's long-standing control of political terror, and dealt severely with potential oppositionists.

Duvalier also maintained control through institutionalized nation-wide intimidation, widespread espionage, strict censorship, allegations of internal communist plots and invasion, murders, torture, imprisonment without trial, and enforced exile of potential presidential rivals. To balance the army's power, Duvalier assigned a share of the task of terrorizing the population between the three existing branches of military force. Complicating the picture were the constant public reminders of the mystical powers that Duvalier took on as the high priest of Haiti's Voodoo religion.

No tyrant can live forever, and in 1971 Duvalier died, but perpetuated his authoritarian regime by bequeathing the state to his son. Only 19 at the time, Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier survived for 15 years, but not without the help of a powerful internal security apparatus behind him. Jean-Claude was not the shrewd and calculating manipulator that his father was and, in the end, could not survive a popular uprising in 1986. With Jean-Claude Duvalier deposed and in exile, the predictable cycle of coups and counter-coups returned. A succession of six military-backed regimes governed the country in the four year period leading up to the election of Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1990.

The Aristide Years

Father Aristide, born in 1954, was the son of an educated and devoutly Roman Catholic Haitian family. He joined the Salesian teaching order and pursued advanced studies in the Dominican Republic, Israel, and Canada. More influenced by radical Liberation Theology than by traditional Catholicism, Aristide was known for citing the Gospel of St. Luke, where Christ is quoted as saying: “And he that has no sword, let him sell his garnering as usual: downtown Port-au-Prince during the Duvalier era. [Columbus Memorial Library, O.A.S.]
ment and buy one.”

This encouragement of rebellion through biblical passages antagonized the established church hierarchy, who eventually expelled Aristide from the Salesian order for inciting violence and class struggle. But Aristide continued preaching in the slums of Haiti, becoming increasingly popular among the nation’s poor. Even so, he surprised everyone when he declared his candidacy for the presidency. On December 16, 1990, in the first free election in the nation’s history, he was chosen President of Haiti, garnering almost 70 percent of the popular vote. Yet, even before his inauguration, he survived three assassination attempts and an attempted coup.

While in power, Aristide dismissed a number of the senior army officers in the hopes of reducing the military’s influence, and appointed Brigadier General Raoul Cedras as Commander-in-Chief of the army. He began to work on the legacy left to him by 29 years of Duvalier tyranny, which included (and includes) high unemployment, an average yearly wage of about US$350, a 70 percent illiteracy rate, and an infant mortality rate that runs well over 100 per 1,000 births—double that of the neighboring Dominican Republic. Under Aristide, the economy improved and human rights abuses declined. His social reform programs—in particular minimum wage laws and higher taxes on the rich—earned him the enmity of Haiti’s elite.

In September, 1991, after eight months in power, the Aristide government was overthrown by General Cedras. Though the coup is largely explained by the power aspirations of the military, and Cedras in particular, support for Aristide was particularly weak among the business community, whose political interests have historically allied them with the military.

Ultimately, the rebels decided to let Aristide live in order to avoid unwelcome international attention. According to an independent radio station, 250 people died during the coup when soldiers fired into crowds of Aristide supporters. The international reaction was swift and unanimous: the coup was condemned in every capital. The United States, Canada, France, and other countries immediately suspended economic aid to Haiti, and many other leaders, including Venezuela’s President Perez, declared their willingness to take part in “the severest action” to reestablish democracy in Haiti.

The U.S. Reaction

The overthrow of Aristide confronted America’s Bush administration with a foreign policy dilemma: where did Haiti fit into the “New World Order?” The initial response was moderate—primarily, critics argue, because Haiti did not have the strategic importance of Kuwait. The administration ruled out military intervention almost immediately, opting instead for the trade sanctions proposed by the Organization of American States (OAS). America’s tepid response only emboldened Haiti’s new military leaders.

Back in the United States, Haiti quickly became an issue in the 1992 presidential campaign, and Bill Clinton promised that if elected he would end the Bush policy of returning fleeing refugees to Haiti. But the potential for a massive wave of illiterate immigrants, many of whom might die before they even reached American shores—coupled with the stereotypes of Haitians as AIDS carriers—proved more than the Clinton administration could shoulder. After the election, President Clinton announced that he would continue the Bush policy of economic sanctions.

In June 1993, the Clinton Administration pushed for United Nations (UN) sponsored oil embargoes to complement the sanctions already in place—a move that some argued was designed to placate the Congressional Black Caucus after his reversal on the refugee issue. The sanctions and oil embargo had devastating effects on Haiti’s already fragile economy. Though they failed to stop the flow of goods through Haiti’s porous border with the Dominican Republic, they did succeed in doubling prices, which mostly hurt the nation’s poor. But as unemployment neared 50 percent, the business community began to feel the pinch and pressured the military to negotiate.

The military capitulated and took part in a series of meetings with representatives of Aristide’s government on Governors Island in New York. The meetings culminated in the Governors Island Accords, which called for a four-month transition period, beginning no later than October 30, 1993, during which Aristide would return to power to serve out his term. In return for lifting the embargo and an amnesty clause, the military high command agreed to resign. Aristide was forced to sign the accord by U.S. and UN mediators, despite what he considered to be its flawed nature. The Haitian military was confident that the U.S. would not intervene with force, and left the meeting feeling that they maintained the upper hand. Aristide was left with few options.

Analysts have been quick to uncover the flaws in the Governors Island Accords and point to five problem spots. First, the accord lifted the UN/OAS embargo and resumed economic aid before Aristide returned to Haiti. Second, they left General Cedras in charge of the military during the transition period. Third, they left ambiguous the future role of the Chief of Port-au-Prince Police, Michel Françoise, one of the most brutal supporters of the coup. Fourth, they gave far reaching amnesty for the military and its supporters for the crimes committed during Aristide’s exile. Finally, the accord simply required the retirement (with pension) of Cedras, although according to Haitian and international human rights groups, more than 3,000 people died during his reign of terror.

Despite the exceedingly generous nature of the Governors Island Agreement, the military leaders refused to honor the accord and reneged on each promise. Instead, they unleashed the Zinglando—a paramilitary force of armed supporters controlled by Police Chief Françoise. The Zinglando terrorized the population into submission, and also succeeded in shutting out UN and OAS human rights observers by murdering the Minister of Justice as well as one of Aristide’s major financial supporters.

When the Zinglando began broadcasting strongly anti-American rhetoric and challenging American motives, the U.S. became increasingly wary of direct involvement. For example, the navy vessel Holland County turned back on its assignment to help professionalize the Haitian military. Recently, Secretary
of State Warren Christopher has acknowledged that American policy in Haiti has failed, and many are skeptical not only of the Haitian military, but of Aristide's chances for success as well.

Reports coming out of Haiti suggest that the military is consolidating its power by systematically murdering Aristide supporters. With no on-site observers to count the bodies, no one knows for sure how many people are being killed. What is certain is that General Cedras and his 7,000 man army have defied the world and emerged victorious, just as the Haitian military has done for years.

**Options for the International Community**

Debate rages over the appropriate response to the crisis in Haiti—and especially over the issue of foreign intervention. Arguments against outside interference come from both Haitians and Americans, and are all premised on concepts of national sovereignty. Some opponents point to the bitter legacy of U.S. involvement in Haiti and the region. They argue that the end of the Cold War should signal a time to end America's direct presence in the Caribbean. These opponents claim that neither Haitians nor the people of the Caribbean are political children incapable of resolving their internal affairs. They point out that the U.S. itself has historically had periods of tremendous instability, such as the Civil War, Shay's Rebellion, and innumerable moments of internal conflict. Even Great Britain, some argue, had a military dictatorship during her transition to parliamentary democracy.

Foes of direct involvement also point to hopes for a Haitian future that is more distinctly their own. They claim that the time is ripe for Haiti to recreate the polity according to Haitian national interests. Allowing the United States to intervene once again would only result in a modern precedent and further inhibit the ability of Haitians to solve their own disputes. Americans have their own reasons for opposition. Many are gun-shy from recent mishaps in Somalia and Bosnia. Others, such as Senator Jesse Helms, are wary of Aristide's anti-American rhetoric, his tacit approval of violence against political opponents, and warnings about his anti-democratic tendencies.

Those who support intervention in Haiti, by the U.S. or other nations, generally invoke Haiti's long and troubled democratization movement. The military, they argue, has been used by a tiny elite to veto the will of the people. Given the internal political dynamics, the distribution of power, and the political culture of fear and mutual distrust, no group will give up power since its very survival is at stake. Military dominance and quicksand-like politics, they argue, have an inertia that internal forces will not be able to dislodge. Any agreement involving the military will inevitably leave them with substantial power. It would then be only a matter of time before the abuse of power and privilege would return.

Also, an agreement with the military would essentially condone their actions in the brutal coup by failing to punish those involved. This would set a damaging precedent, not only excusing the individual military leaders responsible for killing thousands of Haitians, but also ensuring their early retirement and pension. Other proponents of foreign intervention point to the end of the Cold War. The removal of the geopolitical stakes from the region has freed the only remaining superpower, the United States, to intervene constructively and multilaterally with the United Nations.

Many in the Caribbean, however, remain cautious about unilateral American intervention. Grenadian Ambassador to the UN, Eugene M. Pur soo, is a good example of this wariness. When asked what the Caribbean leadership was doing about the Haitian crisis, he replied: "The Caribbean leaders have clearly expressed their abhorrence at the behavior of the Haitian military and their determination to see the duly elected Government of Father Aristide restored. The question is whether they have the military might to effectuate such desires." When asked, given the lack of military capability in the Caribbean, whether there would be support for a US invasion of Haiti, he added: "A UN or OAS military force with contributions from the Caribbean and US would be the ideal situation."

Some of those favoring intervention stand firmly unconcerned about the nationality of any possible military force. One Haitian student summed up this sentiment when he stated that "I don't care if the devil himself goes in and takes care of the army. I'll support him." Comments like this suggest that the only way to break the cycle of violence in Haiti will be if the military is dealt with severely and seriously.

Critics fear that any pact involving the military would leave Aristide greatly constrained, allowing them simply to wait out his term, get rid of him, and return to military rule. They point out that it has happened before and it could happen again. Of course, there is equal precedent that Aristide, should he return, may be reluctant to relinquish power. His past acceptance of violence as a viable political option reflects his deep roots in Haiti's turbulent past.

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**Suggestions for Further Reading**

Jean-Bertrand Aristide, with Christophe Wargny, Aristide: an autobiography. (Maryknoll, 1993).


Anne-Christine D'Adeky, Under the Bone. (Farrar-Strauss & Giroux, 1993).


David Nicholls, Haiti in the Caribbean Context. (St. Martin's Press, 1985).

Nationalism & the Twentieth Century

Nationalism has been the dominant political and social phenomenon of our time—so argues John Lukacs in *The End of the Twentieth Century and the End of the Modern Age*. Throughout the European continent and in the former Soviet Union, nationalist forces are today placing heavy strains on traditional multiethnic states. Lukacs analyzes the fundamental role of nationalism in Europe and North America through the twentieth century.

*The End of the Twentieth Century and the End of the Modern Age.*

by Jeffrey Thomas Kuhner

Professor John Lukacs, author of seventeen previous books on twentieth century American and European history, has written a timely and incisive book. In his work, *The End of the Twentieth Century and the End of the Modern Age*, Lukacs argues that the twentieth century is, for all intents and purposes, over.

Beginning in 1914 with the onset of the First World War and ending in 1989 with the collapse of Communism in Central-Eastern Europe, the twentieth century was marked by two watershed events: World Wars I and II. Everything else—the Russian Revolution, the dissolution of colonial empires, the establishment of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, the division of Europe and Germany, and the Cold War—was a direct result of the wars. With the retreat of the Soviet Union from Europe, the resulting reunification of Germany and the end of the Cold War, the historical consequences of the World Wars have ended—and with them, so has the “twentieth century”.

Lukacs goes on to assert that this century’s dominant political and social force has been nationalism. It has not been, as many analysts have argued, an age of ideology, pitting totalitarianism, be it Communism or Fascism, against liberal democracy.

Stalin and the Origins of the Cold War

Lukacs argues that American policymakers misunderstood Stalin’s actions and intentions following the Second World War—a result of their inability to comprehend the phenomenon of nationalism. The Soviet leader was essentially a Great Russian nationalist who desired a Soviet sphere of security in Central-Eastern Europe. However, the Truman administration mistakenly believed that Stalin, after imposing Communist states in Eastern Europe, wanted to spread communist ideology further and conquer Western Europe.

John Lukacs, author of *The End of the Twentieth Century*. (Jerry Bauer)

In Lukacs’ opinion, Stalin correctly understood the limits of Soviet power and desired only to advance Russia’s historic national interests. International Communism was peripheral to the Soviet dictator’s geopolitical objectives. A Russian nationalist, Stalin understood that Communism had a weak appeal outside of the Soviet Union. As a result, he forcibly imposed subservient regimes in Central-Eastern Europe and would not accept Roosevelt’s proposal that East European governments remain pro-Russian but non-Communist (as in Finland).

For Lukacs, it was precisely because the appeal of Communism was weak in Eastern Europe that Soviet control of the region could not endure for a protracted period of time. The incongruence between means and objectives, and the overextension of their sphere of interest, slowly compelled the Soviets to retreat from Europe. Yugoslavia under Tito’s guidance broke with the Soviet Union in 1948. The U.S.S.R., along with the United States, withdrew from Austria in 1955.

Furthermore, after Stalin’s death in 1953 the Soviet leadership was periodically plagued by “violent disorgements” such as the revolts in East Berlin (1953) and Poland (1956), the massive Hungarian rebellion in 1956, and the Czechoslovak uprising of 1968. Gradually, the independence of Eastern European governments increased until, finally, Gorbachev was compelled to relinquish control of Central-Eastern Europe.

I believe that Lukacs’ interpretation of Soviet Cold War intentions towards the West as non-threatening is highly problematic. However, his work is important because it identifies the fundamental role played by nationalism throughout the Cold War and the twentieth century. Not only was Russian nationalism the driving force behind Stalin, but throughout the Cold War “tribal nationalisms” erupted in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. (Vict-
From the rubble of the former Soviet empire, numerous nation-states have emerged which are plagued by ethnic conflict. An important example is the Ukraine. Lukacs believes that ultimately Russia will not allow Ukraine to maintain its independence and territorial integrity. There is a very strong temptation for radical Russian nationalists to demand the incorporation into a single unitary state of ethnic Russians living outside the borders of Russia proper. For this reason, the attempt of Serbia’s Slobodan Milosevic to create a Greater Serbia in the Balkans establishes an ominous precedent for the post-Communist European order. Success leads to imitation, and if Serbia is allowed to enlarge its borders, other ultra-nationalists—perhaps Russia—may be encouraged to do the same.

In Lukacs’ eyes, the Russian retreat from Eastern Europe produced a power vacuum in the region that will increasingly be filled by a resurgent and economically dynamic Germany. German influence will prove to be not only financial, but also political and cultural. Anti-Russian states such as Ukraine, Poland and Slovakia will increasingly come to depend on Germany’s power.

Lukacs does not see Germany’s expansion throughout the region as inherently dangerous. Germans have repudiated their Nazi past and Germany today is a stable democracy with well-established bourgeois traditions. Nonetheless, it means that Germany is once again the dominant power on the European continent. More importantly, Germany’s political and economic resurgence in Central-Eastern Europe likely signifies the end of a United States of Europe.

The “Fantasy” of a European Federation

Many commentators have stated that the inability of the European Community (EC) to intervene effectively in the war in Bosnia revealed the illusion of a federal European state. In reality, it was the previous war in Croatia in 1991 which not only destroyed Yugoslavia, but also delivered a fatal blow to the establishment of a United States of Europe. The question of Croatia’s and Slovenia’s independence, and of a coherent and common foreign policy towards the Serb-Croat war, created deep fissures within the EC. Germany’s decision to grant Croatia and Slovenia recognition against the wishes of the United States, Britain, and France demonstrated German desire to enlarge her historic sphere of influence in southeastern Europe. As well, it indicated her refusal to subordinate her geopolitical imperatives to Brussels.

Here we come to the heart of the matter. Lukacs argues that the EC’s attempt to construct itself politically based on the model of the United States is destined to fail. The American system depends on the majority of its inhabitants speaking English—a powerful homogenizing factor—and on political and constitutional structures that are abstract, legalistic, and mechanical.

In Europe there exist profoundly different nations each predicated on different national characters. According to Lukacs, it is the distinct and particular
character of a people that molds their institutions, values, and political systems. The differences between European nation-states are historical and organic, and any attempt to create a common European federation or confederation must of necessity be based on a highly decentralized model such as Switzerland. The multiethnic and multilingual Swiss state has evolved organically and historically, taking over six hundred years to develop. The forces of history are presently fracturing and sweeping away the dream of a bureaucratic, highly centralized continental European super-state.

Not only are nationalisms erupting throughout the former Soviet Union and Central-Eastern Europe, but they are resurfacing throughout the West as well. Ethnic, nationalist, and regionalist passions plague Corsica, Ulster, Basques Spain, Belgium, Scotland, Italy, and Canada. As Lukacs notes, the strong showing by the “American Firster” Patrick J. Buchanan in the Republican Presidential primaries in 1992, attests to the upsurge of nationalism in the United States.

Buchanan is neither a neo-isolationist nor a genuine American conservative. Rather, he is a nationalist who throughout his campaign called for a “new nationalism”, seeking a moratorium on immigration, the repudiation of continental free trade, and the termination of American globalism and foreign military intervention. Buchanan also strongly supports Lithuanian, Slovak, Croat, and Ukrainian independence and backs Quebec’s drive for secession. Many political pundits believe that Buchanan has a strong chance of seizing the Republican party candidacy and perhaps the presidency in 1996. His victory would be celebrated by nationalists throughout Europe.

**Lukacs’ Oversight: Differing Types of Nationalism**

If the principle strength of Lukacs’ interpretation is his emphasis on the power and relevance of nationalism throughout our age, the central flaw in his work is his characterization of all nationalisms as destructive and antithetical to civilization. Lukacs argues that the greatest threat to present-day Europe is the continued existence of nationalism because national self-determination frequently leads to a state of perpetual warfare and conflict.

The first problem is that this argument is but a superficial analysis of nationalist ideology; an oversight not endemic to Lukacs alone. The study of nationalist ideology has greatly been ignored by scholars who have instead concentrated their energies on other political ideologies such as conservatism, liberalism, socialism, or fascism. As such, there is a lack of understanding among the political and intellectual elites on the topic of nationalist ideology and an inability to recognize the phenomenon of nationalism.

Lukacs is right to argue that one of the reasons there is no first-rate work on the history of nationalism is because nationalism differs from country to country. However, he fails to understand that it is precisely because nationalism varies from country to country, that it is logically flawed and empirically invalid to pronounce sweeping negative generalizations. The fact that Slovak nationalism differs from American nationalism or from Polish nationalism should mean that judgement of each particular brand of nationalism must be based on its political and historical merits.

Normative political, legal, and moral standards should be applied when judging the validity of different types of nationalism. Besides appreciating and respecting the power of nationalism in motivating peoples and driving history, Western political and intellectual elites should discriminate between the variants. They should encourage and support nationalist movements infused with liberal and democratic components, while refusing to sanction nationalisms that possess authoritarian or irredentist qualities. As long as the rights of ethnic minorities are protected—and the principle that borders can only be altered through peaceful and democratic means is respected—it will only enrich our world to have numerous nations and nation-states simultaneously existing each with their own religion, identity, and culture.

**Part of a Larger Movement**

Moreover, as Lukacs himself mentions, a major reason for the contemporary nationalist forces shaking the Western world is a recognition that large bureaucratic units are inefficient and undemocratic. Diminished prestige and faith in the effectiveness of wealthy, centralized political entities is a reflection of the popular desire to make government more local, accountable, and responsive to the electorate.

Hence, the nationalist uprisings that have led to the breakup of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, and which are now threatening well established countries in Western Europe and North America, form part of a larger democratic revolution that seeks to create self-governing and efficient political units. For some nations such as Canada, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Belgium, however, the solution to their separatist problems does not have to be the granting of outright independence. Indeed, a variety of decentralized federation or confederation in which political power is dispersed to regional and local authorities is certainly an option.

Nevertheless, nationalism will remain a powerful political and social phenomenon for the foreseeable future. The challenge for our time is to distinguish between the different forms of nationalism; to encourage the progressive and democratic nationalistic movements, while discouraging and, if necessary, repelling the authoritarian, xenophobic or revanchist ones.
Battling in the Painkiller Trenches

The aspirin industry’s large companies, “selling equally effective products with big potential profits,” act as an excellent laboratory for understanding the machinations of the free market. In *The Aspirin Wars*, Charles Mann and Mark Plummer provide a lively and informative account of the business end of aspirin’s history.

*The Aspirin Wars: Money, Medicine, and 100 Years of Rampant Competition*  

by Shari Rudavsky

When people talk about the drug wars these days, they are rarely referring to aspirin. In fact, of all the contentious legal and illegal drugs on the market, aspirin appears to be one of the more innocuous members of the pharmaceutical cornucopia. Yet, Charles Mann and Mark Plummer have managed to write a gripping account of the internecine struggles among the various pharmaceutical companies that have produced aspirin and other painkillers over the course of this century. The more-than-300-page culmination of Mann and Plummer’s effort, *The Aspirin Wars: Money, Medicine, and 100 Years of Rampant Competition*, takes the reader from the first marketed aspirin medicine to today’s debate on what the “miracle” drug can and cannot treat, all with a concerted attention to detail and style.

Mann and Plummer have done an exhaustive job of research, combining personal interviews, company archives, court decisions, and a host of other sources to compile a history of a product that for many readers will be a staple of their medicine cabinet, desk drawer, or purse pocket. This book could have been of the boring take-two-aspirin-and-wake-up-the-next-morning variety. But *Aspirin Wars* has a feel of fictionalized non-fiction that keeps you swallowing the story.

In The Beginning: Bayer

After a brief modern-day prologue, Mann and Plummer take the reader back to late nineteenth century Germany where Carl Duisberg, a young executive of a local dye company, Farbenfabriken Bayer, was troubling over how to expand the company’s business into some venture that offered greater success than a new shade of dye. His answer: a promising new compound that seemed to alleviate fever and pain. From this proto-aspirin grew what was in 1990 a $2.668 billion painkiller industry.

Duisberg, whom Mann and Plummer paint as the father of aspirin, transported U.S.—did not deter Sterling in the least. Thus was fired the first salvo in what Mann and Plummer refer to as the aspirin wars: the constant competitive struggles among the makers of this cure-all drug, as well as between the producers and the government agencies that have regulated its marketing.

Adam Smith Would Have Been Proud

As Mann and Plummer show, the history of aspirin competition provides an object lesson in abject capitalism. They write: “In capitalist societies, such a situation—companies selling equally effective products with big potential profits—virtually guarantees furious competition, the type Adam Smith had in mind when he wrote of the awesome powers of the ‘invisible hand,’” the free market. And, indeed, the ten firms [that currently produce analgesics]...have a record of industrial warfare that could serve as a chapbook to the means—honest or unscrupulous as they may be—by which modern corporations vie for superiority. Their struggle provides a vest-pocket history of the mixture of marketing, litigation, technology, and competition that characterizes so much of business, and of life, in this century. Another way to put it is that the annals of aspirin give a glimpse of the incredible lengths to which people will go to put something in a box and sell it.”

*Aspirin Wars* is by no stretch of the imagination a vest-pocket history (unless one wears a very large suit) nor is it a story of people merely putting drugs in a box and selling them. Rather, the book includes tales of international maneuvering, a variety of courtroom battles, and medical breakthroughs all under the

In Canada, “Aspirin” is still used as a brand name.  
[Sterling Health]

Shari Rudavsky is a doctoral candidate in History and Sociology of Science at the University of Pennsylvania.
rubric of tracing aspirin’s career trajectory through pharmaceutical history. In the interest of enlivening their tale, Mann and Plummer have ferreted out minutiae about the history of aspirin that would make for good cocktail conversation at almost any gathering.

Even more amazing is that every one of these seeming asides has a role to play in the drug’s ascension to public prominence. Consider, for instance, the patent business in general, rife with such anecdotes as Sterling’s origins, which Mann and Plummer describe in an appropriately dry tone: “a producer of No-To-Bac, a nicotine cure that left users constipated; and the California Fig Syrup Company, producers of a laxative. (The pieces of the infant company were, one observes, synergistic).”

Behind such quips one can sense a synergistic collaboration between the two authors. Mann, a freelance journalist, and Plummer, an economist, have drawn upon the assets of each of these professions in the Aspirin Wars. Mann’s journalistic training reveals itself in the extensive interviews woven artfully into the text that help bring much of the recent dry economic history to life. Only occasionally does one sense a tension in style that might arise from the somewhat uncommon literary marriage of an economist and a journalist.

Outside the Business Arena

Certain oversights in Aspirin Wars may prove problematic to some readers. Mann and Plummer say in their acknowledgments that they were attempting to examine the “history of a commodity.” There are several ways to go about such an investigation, and the tack the authors take at times may not necessarily be the most intriguing. From its opening in an unabdomed Food and Drug Administration conference room, the book follows the history of aspirin primarily through drug developments, corporate competition, scientific studies, and political permutations. The authors pay close attention to the personalities involved in each stage of these games: we learn the motives of the pharmacists who devised the various pain relievers, the company executives who marketed them, the physicians and researchers who tested their efficacy, and the government officials who attempted to determine their safety.

Missing from this broad picture, however, are the consumers. To their credit, Plummer and Mann do discuss various advertising campaigns that took place throughout the century. But these campaigns arise in the context of competitive maneuvering between companies, rather than as a pitch to the stressed-out office worker or housewife choosing how to get “fast relief.” Nor do they spend much time discussing the way physicians might decide which “two aspirin” to prescribe before seeing their patients in the morning. The reader is left wondering whether the drug companies ever received any written feedback from their customers (before the 1-800 hotline) and subtle tale of aspirin’s appeal.

For instance, Mann and Plummer mention the medicine show-esque promotions of aspirin in Latin America, but do not delve into the deeper meaning of such cultural clashes. The image of company trucks equipped with movie projectors touring rural Andes village to host outdoor viewings of the film “Agile Patinadores” (Agile Skaters—as in ice skaters) suggests that the story of aspirin is more than an economic and political struggle among pharmaceutical companies; it has cultural and social ramifications that Mann and Plummer unfortunately leave unexplored. What cultural attitudes towards pain does the use of aspirin over the past century conote? Why is aspirin so readily marketable wherever it goes?

Of course, the easy answer to this question lies in the medical fact that aspirin works. It alleviates not only headaches but a host of other ills, from fevers to menstrual cramps to swollen joints. In addition, as Mann and Plummer detail at the end of the book, in the past five years aspirin has been heralded as a potential preventive drug for heart attacks. Mann and Plummer do an excellent job of describing the physiological aspects behind aspirin’s success. Their descriptions of the pathways of aspirin and the numerous medical studies done on it convey the science without sacrificing style. But in the end, their emphasis, like that of their subjects the drug companies, remains on the market share figures. Aspirin may contain all these wonderful properties, the authors conclude, but the predominant question is still which brand moves fastest off drugstores’ shelves and why.

“Brane Fude”

At the beginning of this century, Washington D.C.’s commissioner of pharmacy, Robert N. Harper, began marketing his own version of a pain reliever, billed as “Cuforhedake Brane Fude.” The Commissioner ran into trouble with the law in a landmark case that would act as a precedent for scores of false promotion suits against pharmaceuticals. After hearing presentations from a number of scientific experts, the jury concluded that Harper’s home-brewed pain remedy was in fact misrepresenting itself as having nutritional value, a decision that set a new standard for accuracy in advertising. Mann and Plummer’s book does not purport to be a cuforhedake; but with its fine writing and thorough research no one could dispute that it is brane fude.


Dinner With Lady Agnes
Culinary Delights for the Historian at Heart

For the gourmand and history-buff alike, Macdonald was late for Dinner is a delectable romp through the culinary arts of nineteenth century Canada.

Macdonald was late for Dinner: A Slice of Culinary Life in Early Canada

by Margaret Sloan

I love cookbooks. I take them to bed as night time reading, imagining all the lovely menus and exotic concoctions that I might produce. A good cookbook is as fascinating as a good spy story. I love cooking too, and don’t mind spending time experimenting with recipes that look interesting and possible. I say “possible” because one of the problems with cookbooks today is that the ingredients have become more and more exotic and difficult to find. If one doesn’t have a convenient little corner store that stocks lemon grass or fresh okra out of season, the recipe must be filed away for a more propitious time, and generally is forgotten. Furthermore, I don’t like recipes that tell you to mix all the ingredients with a tin of canned tomato soup. If I am going to cook, I want to start at the beginning.

And this is precisely where Patricia Beeson’s new cookbook, Macdonald was late for Dinner, commences: at Canada’s early beginnings. Here is a cookbook that combines recipes with history, mixing the ingredients with the historical occasions when they might have been used. The accompanying photographs bring the individual situations to life. Set in early Eastern Canada, Ms. Beeson has really done her homework in researching historical moments as well as the possible recipes that might have accompanied the festivities.

Bringing The Cuisine To Life

The title essay, “Macdonald was late for Dinner” is a touching quote from Lady Agnes Macdonald’s diary in which she describes a New Year’s reception at her home, Earnscleugh. Her husband, Canada’s first Prime Minister, Sir John A., was called away to a council before the first guest arrived. He returned much later, only to be called away again before he had time to eat—much to the Lady’s chagrin. The recipe for the dinner’s oyster soup is complimented with photographs of the Macdonald house and of Mrs. Macdonald.

Another incident describes a garden party given by Professor and Mrs. Goldwin Smith for the Governor General and Lady Aberdeen. Professor Smith was apparently a strong republican and not happy with vice-regal society in Canada. Nonetheless, he entertained the Governor General’s party in the most formal and correct manner possible. As Lady Aberdeen wrote in her diary: “It is a curious fact that [Goldwin Smith] should also be the man to receive us in the most royal manner, every point of etiquette being formally observed—special gate reserved for our carriage alone to enter, band ready to strike up...red cloth—the Goldwin Smiths themselves on doorsteps and hat in hand...ready to fetch anyone we wanted to speak to. It was all very funny.” Two of Mrs Smith’s recipes are provided along with photographs of the Smith house dur-

Margaret Sloan is an avid cook from Vancouver, B.C. who really does read cookbooks in bed at night. Her father taught her to make bannock bread and she learned the rest of her cooking skills by watching her mother.

Canada’s first Prime Minister, Sir John A. Macdonald.
[Metro Toronto Reference Library]
ing the garden party and of Mrs. Smith herself.

These are only two of the many vignettes of early life in Upper Canada during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which portray early life from vice-regal society in Toronto and Ottawa to the huntsman in the backwoods. Although the majority of the recipes and the accompanying photographs depict the British tradition, the prominent ethnic groups of that time are also included—Serbs, French, Finns, Germans, Swiss, Poles, Greeks, Italians, Central and East European Jews, and aboriginal Ojibways.

There are two photographs of Grey Owl taken during his stay in Temagami and recipes of two of his favorite foods—bannock and boiled trout—which were written down for Ms. Beeson by “Madeleine”, the Indian wife of one of his old friends.

No Quick-Mart For Lady Agnes

On reading the recipes I was constantly reminded that, for the most part, basic food supplies were seasonal and local. There was no supermarket at the end of the block stocking exotic supplies from all over the world, and no refrigerated transports from Florida or California supplying fresh fruit and vegetables out of season or of the type that cannot be grown by local farmers. On the other hand, there was plentiful use of regional wild produce such as cranberries, gooseberries, blueberries, currants, venison and game. Included is an interesting recipe for fruit soup, a compote which can be served either hot in winter or cold in summer because all the fruit in it is dried.

One must also remember that there were very few previously prepared foods to make life easier for the cook. If one made “Vol-au-Vent of Eggs”, a recipe from Earnsliff, one was forced to begin by making the puff pastry since there were no ready-made puff pastry shells from the local bakery. The major exception at this time in Ontario was Mr. Christie, who baked biscuits. This was the famous Mr. Christie of Christie Brown Biscuits who began life as a baker’s apprentice in Scotland.

I was struck by the simplicity of most of the recipes—I say most, because there are a few, such as haggis, that will never be simple. However, Beeson does presume that anyone using the recipes is already familiar with the rudiments of cooking and knows how to proceed. For instance, when mixing dough, one would add a bit more flour if necessary, in order to make a “nice bun dough”. Oven temperatures are of necessity approximate as the stoves in early Canada were fueled either by wood or coal. (All the measures in the cookbook are Imperial).

My one criticism is the difficulty of re-finding a favorite recipe or vignette. The recipes are listed in the index at the back and the vignettes are outlined by title only in the front. As a case in point, Catherine Parr Traill is mentioned on three pages, but if one doesn’t remember that she had a recipe for tea cakes, rice pudding or venison, one is hard pressed to find her name in either of the indexes. However, to simplify the situation, a great deal of cross-referencing would be needed—not necessary in this sort of book. It means that one must simply go over the pages again—by no means a difficult or unrewarding task.

Some Madeira, My Dear

Two items thrilled me personally. Accompanying Mrs. Nordheimer’s marvelous Christmas suet pudding is her recipe for a white sauce (with almost as much Madeira as milk and many egg yolks as well). My sister-in-law, who comes from Ottawa, said her grandmother had such a recipe but had never written it down. So next year we will have white sauce with our carrot (not suet) pudding. I have another friend, who also comes from Ottawa, whose family is mentioned in one of the vignettes. There are two birthday presents solved.

I have enjoyed reading this book immensely. The recipes are such that I won’t rush to prepare them for my next dinner party, but most are indeed worth trying. As an indication of colonial life in Eastern Canada at that time, however, Macdonald was late for Dinner is a mouth-watering feast.
The Mists of Todos Santos: Photographs of a Guatemalan Village

by Max Page

Guatemala is a land of intense beauty and intense pain. With its sharp, young mountain ranges, volcanoes rising straight out of lakes, mystical Mayan ruins, and rainbow-dressed peoples, it is an almost paradisiacal place. Yet, the continuing poverty of the Indians and the more recent mass murders in the countryside can make a mockery of this sumptuous visual landscape.

Recently I traveled through Guatemala, from the great Mayan city of Tikal in the northwestern province of the Peten, to Lake Atitlan in the highlands and Quetzaltenango, capital of the western provinces. But it was in the quiet village of Todos Santos Cuchumatanes that I spent my most rewarding week.

This village, reached by a windy, heart-stopping three-hour drive up and over the highest mountain range in Central America, is in many ways frozen in time. The Catholic Church made one desperate attempt to spread its teachings there in the 16th century, but only the church building remains. And the Spanish too gave up their attempt to colonize the area, leaving the town in relatively peaceful isolation.

Remarkably, the village has managed the pressures of colonization, integrating its own traditions with those of the Spanish conquerors and settlers. The Todos Santeros, like Mayan Indians throughout Guatemala, have created a hybrid religion incorporating elements of traditional Mayan and Catholic or evangelical Protestant rituals. And they have learned Spanish where necessary, but retained their native Mam dialect.

However, over the past fifteen years Todos Santos has been brought into the center of the civil war which has raged in

(continued on page 44)

Max Page is working on his Ph.D. in American History in New York. He also jointly maintains a photography business, Iguana Photo.
Right and Below Right: Children on hillside, tree planting—Community leaders have begun to address the dire environmental depletion caused by overpopulation and lack of land. Here, school children plant young trees to replenish the supply of wood for fuel. At the same time, children are often sent on day long journeys to get wood. Supported on their heads, they carry bags of wood weighing up to 100 pounds from the remaining forests, several thousand feet above the town. [Iguana Photo]
Right: An evangelical church—In recent years the evangelical missions have made great inroads, converting upwards of 50% in small towns throughout central America. [Iguana Photo]

Above Right: Corn is the staple of the villagers; in the background a burned out bus next to the unnaturally large cemetery with 1982 on far too many grave stones—a sign of the early 1980s. [Iguana Photo]
Guatemala. In 1982, when the government suspected that the Indians were harboring guerrillas, some fifty or more of the villagers were murdered, and many more fled for refuge in Mexico.

The experience of the Todos Santeros is similar to those El Salvadorans of El Mozote who were so brutally murdered a decade ago, and whose tragic story has been publicized recently. (The massacre in El Mozote, denied by the Reagan Administration when it was first reported, has now been thoroughly documented by Mark Danner in the New Yorker, December 6, 1993.) The villagers of Todos Santos, like those of El Mozote, were caught between the Army and the guerrillas, desperately trying to walk the fine line between offending either side.

Today, all seems quiet and serene. The mists for which Guatemala is famous still float up the valley and envelop the town. But the many new graves, a burned-out bus, and the local militia (the government requires all men to “volunteer”) are daily reminders of the brutality which Todos Santos has experienced. It is a brutality that threatens it still.

Even though the civil war has eased in recent years—the overthrow of President Jorge Serrano Elias and the conciliatory efforts of his successor Ramiro De Leon have made a peaceful conclusion possible—inequalities continue to plague Todos Santos.

Most families subsist on corn and other traditional crops. But, as with approximately 85% of Guatemala, inhabitants of the village are desperately poor. For many, the land they own or rent is simply not sufficient to support their families—especially when the children reach the age to begin their own families and have their own children. As a result, Todos Santeros rely increasingly for their survival on sales of their fine woven goods to tourists, and on pilgrimages to the coast for seasonal field work on cotton, coffee, or sugar plantations.

The 1992 Nobel Prize was awarded to writer Rigoberta Menchu, who comes from a town in the Guatemalan highlands not far from Todos Santos. The award has brought attention to a country that was virtually ignored in the 1980s by the media. More people are traveling to Guatemala to experience the rich human and natural rewards of the country. Hopefully, their presence and awareness will make it more difficult for the abuses of the past to occur.

These portraits of Todos Santos—the people, the town, and the land—try to capture the nobility of the people, the eerie serenity of the environment and perhaps also the lingering memory of tragedy.
Henry Ford

Henry Ford in his first experimental car, the 1896 Quadricycle. [Ford of Canada Archives]

“and a Car in Every Garage”

by Mark W. Meier

On January 5, 1914, the Ford Motor Company issued a typed, two-page press release that company officers, and particularly Henry Ford, were well aware would create a considerable stir. Henry Ford had already captured the national limelight for himself and his company six years earlier with the introduction of the Model T. This utilitarian vehicle was aggressively priced and marketed for a less wealthy clientele than the typical car buyer of the time. Now Ford was carrying the democratization of car ownership one step further and, in the process, was providing a vivid demonstration of the relationship between mass production and mass consumption.

The press release, in sometimes overwrought language, announced that Ford intended to institute a minimum wage of five dollars a day for even its least-skilled employees, carry out a pro-

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gram of profit-sharing among all Ford employees over the age of twenty-two, and change from two nine-hour shifts per day to three eight-hour shifts. The announcement was greeted with near-unanimous approval among the nation's newspapers (The Wall Street Journal excepted) and brought "instant celebrity" to Ford.

In the decade before Ford's announcement, a typical Detroit auto worker put in fifty-four to sixty hours per week, at wages ranging from $1.90 to $2.50 per day. In one sweeping decision, Ford doubled the going wage rate for workers in the automobile industry—an industry rapidly coming to symbolize America's manufacturing power.

Some of Ford's competitors claimed that the $5.00 daily wage was designed to squeeze them out of business, bleeding them through escalating labor costs or bribing away their labor supply. Other critics charged that Ford hoped to pacify his work force, and then exact a higher toll in demands for greater productivity. Some truth exists in these accusations, but they do not do justice to Henry Ford's vision of the interrelationship of production and consumption in America's "second industrial revolution."

The automobile industry was one of the principal beneficiaries of new technology and methods in machine tooling and metalworking—two activities in which the United States enjoyed unquestioned superiority in the early twentieth century. The Ford Motor Company led American auto makers in adapting new technologies and processes, the most famous of which was the moving assembly line. From 1907 to 1914, Ford gradually adapted most of its production to the moving assembly line, and consequently reduced the production time for a Ford Model T chassis from 12.5 hours to 1.5 hours.

As a result of this advance, Ford could produce automobiles faster and cheaper: production at the massive Highland Park, Michigan, plant grew from 19,000 cars in 1910 and 1911 to 78,000 cars in 1912 and 1913, while the price dropped from nearly $1,000 to around $500 in 1914. The Ford Motor Company was achieving mass production in a spectacular fashion, and now turned its attention to the problem of mass consumption. Who would buy all these cars?

**Producers Creating Consumers**

Henry Ford understood the need to find new consumers for the flood of new American products. His solution, quite simply, was to create consumers from his own work force. At the time of Ford's wage announcement, automobile ownership was out of the question for the bulk of America's factory workers, and was a dearly priced dream for most of the middle class as well.

Henry Ford's vision of a mass-production, mass-consumption society demanded that those who made the products must also be buyers of the products. Industrial workers had to rise to the middle class in order for the economy to run on all cylinders. Higher wages were critical to this plan, as were lower prices.

The final element, so Ford thought, was free time. Price made a car attractive, and wages made it obtainable, but without the opportunity to use it, a family might see little point in the purchase. Beginning with the 1914 announcement, Ford launched a campaign to shorten the work day to eight hours, and the work week to forty hours. Henry Ford argued that "it is the influence of leisure on consumption that makes the short day and the short week so necessary." He presented this relationship to his fellow businessmen as a "cold business fact."

Indeed, one of the most obvious factors contributing to the economic growth of the United States in the first half of the twentieth century was the expansion of leisure and the increase in ways to spend money in enjoying that leisure. The automobile industry led this development, as expanding car ownership gave rise to phenomenal growth in car-related industries and services. For whatever resistance and criticism Ford met in 1914, by the late 1920s most sectors of American business had been won over by the principles which lay behind higher wages and shorter work weeks.

**Advertising and Marketing Take Off**

Perhaps the biggest winner in the "second industrial revolution" was the advertising industry. Money and time could not guarantee the level of consumption that American manufac-
turers desired; demand had to be created through the advertising medium. While industry churned out ever-greater quantities of goods, the advertising industry tackled the manufacture of desire. Ironically, Henry Ford’s failure to accept the power of the marketing techniques born in the 1920s cut into the Ford Motor Company’s sales in the late 1920s.

Ford himself advocated a utilitarian type of consumption in which goods and services would serve their buyers and might even improve them in some way. The Model T embodied such utilitarianism—basic transportation to serve man’s needs. By the late 1920s, however, other automakers were developing increasingly more sophisticated marketing programs, introducing new and flashier models each year to force older models into obsolescence (at least in the consumers’ minds), and providing increasingly generous credit terms.

Other industries followed suit, and while Henry Ford decried these developments throughout the 1920s, by the end of the decade his company succumbed, introducing a new Model A and widening the selection of colors available (from Ford’s original “any color so long as it’s black” scheme).

Ford encountered other problems in the late 1920s as well. The wage levels at Ford now existed throughout American manufacturing, but wages were not the only point of conflict between labor and management. Ford resisted attempts to unionize his plants, which resulted in a bitter struggle that tarnished the reputation of a company once celebrated for increasing pay and leisure.

U.S. Workers: Ups & Downs

The Great Depression interrupted the economic boom of the early twentieth century. Some economic historians blame at least some of the Depression to concentration of spending power in the hands of the wealthy—precisely the problem that Ford had pointed out two decades earlier.

However, the post-World War II boom once again brought wide distribution of spending power, and a generation of Americans found their place in the middle class by holding manufacturing and industrial jobs. New industries such as electronics and aerospace joined the automotive industry in providing high-paying blue-collar and white-collar work.

Over the past two decades, America has experienced a marked and painful decline in manufacturing jobs. From New England, to the “Rust Belt” of the upper Midwest, to the Pacific Northwest, factory jobs that provided a middle-class living for fifty years are growing more scarce. Americans still live in a mass-production society, but many fear that the production has permanently moved across the border or overseas, and with it the prosperity of a broad cross section of the nation.

Visitors to the Detroit area receive a first-hand look at the displacement of the past twenty years. Henry Ford would barely recognize the city that tens of thousands of industrial workers once called home. The story is largely the same in Lowell, Massachusetts, Moline, Illinois, or countless other communities. It is true that some areas of the nation, particularly the South, have benefitted from this displacement, but the net effect has been a drain upon the American economy.

In these days when some Americans worry about the “giant sucking sound” that NAFTA may bring, and when the phrase “good jobs at good wages” has evolved from campaign sound-bite to mantra, it may be a good time to mark the anniversary of the five dollar a day wage. It was not earth shattering, but it spread a way of life to millions of Americans that seems now to be contracting. One need not lionize Henry Ford to recognize that American producers and consumers alike converted, at least partially, to his vision. Oddly, there may be something we can learn from the man who told us “history is bunk.”
Oh, the Irony of it All

by Samantha Colvin

No one has ever charged television sitcoms with over-intellectualism, but even an ugly duckling does on occasion produce a swan. NBC’s The John Larroquette Show recently served up a pearl of wisdom to die-hard viewers. Set in a “hollywood” bus station, the resident homeless man approaches his friend working behind the food counter. In reply to the demand for a dollar, the concessioneer laments, “the last time I gave you a dollar you called me four times from that phone over there.” Gazing back, the beggar retorts in his best midwestern accent, “everyone loves irony, but no one is willing to pay for it.”

It is true. Irony rests close to our hearts.

The United States Armed Forces—certainly no strangers to irony—recently unveiled plans for future beach exercises in North Carolina. As part of a military-funded scientific project to research the changing shoreline, technicians will construct transitory coastal fortifications made from the finest local stone. (That’s “sandcastles” to civilians like you and me). To date, castle designs remain classified.

For thousands of Florida retirees the beach remains off limits to the military. But if the Canadian government has its way, they may soon be spending less time stretched out on the sand. In an effort to encourage affluent middle-aged and senior citizens to spend their savings in Canada, the Canadian Ministry of Tourism has replaced image-oriented television advertising spots with glossy brochures, ads in such publications as Modern Maturity, and even 1-800 numbers.

Since eighty percent of all visitors to Canada come from south of the 49th parallel, Canada’s tourism industry has felt the pinch of European and Asian appeal to adventurous Americans. Rather than targeting the international traveler, Tourism Canada hopes to entice the domestic voyageur. Said Debra Ward, spokeswoman for the Tourism Industry Association of Canada: “Put Canada up against a Kenyan safari or the Eiffel Tower and it’s a hard sell. Put it up against Cleveland, and Winnipeg starts looking really good.”

Despite its good intentions, Tourism Canada appears to have misjudged its target audience, and its snazzy new brochures ran head on into an optical hurdle. Now, to help readers with the finer print, a small plastic magnifying glass is included along with the information package. But just think of all the trees the government saved by not printing the materials in large print to start with.

If the Ministry of Tourism provides a magnifying glass to travelers flocking to Canada, I would suggest they also remember to pack a toothbrush. Dental hygiene giant Oral B recently conducted a study in which they uncovered a perhaps not surprising fact. Ninety-seven percent of those surveyed reported that, having forgotten to bring a toothbrush with them on an overnight stay, they would most definitely not borrow a friend’s.

Some of you may or may not be happy to hear the results of another survey, this one by the American Hospital Association in Chicago. Forty-seven percent of Americans replied that, yes, they would indeed donate without permission the organs of a dead family member.

Yet heartening, rather than ironic, is the fact that a home- less person asking for change nowadays may be after more than a cup of coffee. Three years ago, the Worker Center of Seattle instituted a program—Community Voice Mail (CVM)—providing voice mail boxes for the city’s homeless. Using a combination of public and private funding, such voice mail has become increasingly ubiquitous around the United States.

Many otherwise employable homeless people are often overlooked for jobs because they have no phone. With voice mail, not only can they be reached but, perhaps more importantly, they can avoid the social stigma tied to homelessness by giving the impression of having an address. The pilot project met with staggering success: of the 148 homeless involved, all 126 found work and 78 were able to find new housing. Moreover, average time spent on welfare dropped by two weeks, from eight to six.

With the system now in place throughout many American cities, debates are raging over whether these boxes should be used only for employment and housing calls or whether personal messages are permissible; how much the homeless themselves should pay for the system; and whether 1-800 numbers would be better than requiring participants to find a quarter to call their voice mail. All in all, while homelessness remains a tragedy, having a phone does open doors for a way out.

Speaking of extrication, in the November 2, 1993 municipal elections, 65% of Staten Island’s residents voted to secede from New York City. With its 380,000 inhabitants, an independent Staten Island would become the state’s second largest city.

Staten Islanders are tired of what they believe is exploitation by the other boroughs. Not only do they feel that they pay more in taxes than they receive in services, they are also irate about the mountains of city garbage that pile up on their island and on barges in their surrounding waters. The tension has by no means been defused by City attempts to raise the price of the Staten Island ferry which, at 50¢ a ride, remains the cheapest form of public transportation.

Is this the Balkans in our backyard?
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South Africa: Democracy & The End of Apartheid
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