Tragedy in Somalia: Clans, Colonizers, Superpowers, and the Cult of Personality

Famine and civil war rage today in the southern regions of Somalia. Much attention has been given to Somali clan relations as the root of the tragedy. However, while drought and clans are repeated themes in Somali history, famine and anarchic civil war are not. A specific confluence of external forces (along with external arms) and internal disruption of the clan system were necessary to create the extreme disintegration that is witnessed today.

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By Fraser Brown

On January 19th, 1991, Mohammed Siad Barre, President of Somalia since the military coup of 1969, former ally of both the Soviet Union and the United States, and member of the Marehan clan, fled the capital city, Mogadishu, with the armies of the United Somali Congress (USC) hot on his heels. He had been successfully ousted by a rebel coalition made up of the USC, the Somali National Movement (SNM) and the Somali Patriotic Front (SPF).

Over the course of the next few months, these three groups, which had come together only in the final stages of the rebellion, in the decisive push to depose Siad Barre, could not agree upon new leadership for Somalia. The northern SNM was the first of the rebel groups to be formed (in 1981) and the Isaaq clan that was its power base had been the primary recipient of the violent repression of President Siad Barre. They were not consulted about the composition of the new government by the southern USC and SPF. Faced with the fact that a united Somalia would most likely be dominated by the southern factions, the North seceded and declared the Republic of Somaliland on May 18, 1991. By November 17, the current civil war in the South had begun and Somalia had ceased to exist.

Despite the nationalist or “Somali” trappings of each faction’s name, they were essentially confined to one geographic region and consisted primarily of one clan. The Hawiye, who inhabit southern and central Somalia (including the area around Mogadishu) made up the largest part of the USC. The Ogaden, inhabiting southwestern Somalia and Ethiopia, formed the majority of the SPF. The Isaaq composed the SNM.

The Somali clan structure has been scrutinized by the West as the wellspring of today’s horrors. Yet, clans are not necessarily the cause of the contemporary violence. Rather, they are the vehicle through which it is being carried out. That Somalia has been reduced to famine, civil war, and division into two nations results from a complex interaction of colonial history, superpower interference, and the internal policies of Siad Barre. His cult of personality, his efforts to promote Somali (as opposed to clan) nationalism and, as he grew older and his power weakened, his cynical manipulation of traditional clan rivalries caused the fragmentation of the long-standing clan structure and with it, the built-in checks and balances.

Clans, Somalis, and the Turn to Violence

The Somali people are among the most homogeneous in Africa, both ethnically and religiously (Islam is prevalent). However, they are strictly divided by an ancient family or clan system that developed in response to the needs of survival in the relatively barren Horn of Africa. These structures stand at the foundation of political and social life. In a nomadic society in which individuals maintained no fixed address, and in which boundaries were by nature fluid, clan allegiance was the only form of identification outside of one’s name. It was the means to place someone, to determine their social standing, their region of origin and who their family and friends were. Clans are named for their founding male and, in fact, the name Somalia derives from an ancient progenitor. Until recently, clan structures were generally static. Divisions into sub-clans did occur but these sub-clans remained intimately tied to one another.

The clan structure has existed for thousands of years. Its relatively peaceful history demonstrates that the system is not inherently given to inter- or intra-clan fighting, and especially not to anarchic violence. Today’s clan warfare is unusual because of the prevalence of intra-clan fighting (i.e. between sub-clans) which is traditionally unheard of. The most prominent figures in the current civil war that rages around Mogadishu, Mohammed Farrah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohammed, are both members of the Hawiye clan. There is no history of intra-clan fighting among the Hawiye, nor are Mahdi’s sub-clan, the Abgal, and Aidid’s sub-clan, the Habr Gidir, traditional enemies. It appears that they are fighting over which Hawiye sub-clan will run the Mogadishu government, and therefore reap the spoils of war. Control of the government apparatus means access to arms supplies as well as to printing presses to make money—money that will enable the victor to pay off war debts.

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The Colonial Period: Beginnings of Foreign Interest

During the colonial period of the nineteenth century, the area in which ethnic Somalis were found was divided between Great Britain, Italy, Ethiopia, and France. Colonial boundaries were generally arbitrary and only on rare occasions followed clan lines. However, these divisions have left their mark. The 1991 breakup of Somalia fell uncannily along the colonial British and Italian borders.

The rivalry between the north and south, which has always existed to a certain extent because of clan differences, was accentuated and increased during the colonial period. The south, colonized by the Italians, speaks Italian (if any European language) and had an Italian-style government and education system. The north, on the other hand, the current Republic of Somaliland, was colonized by the British, speaks English if any European language and had a British-style government and education system. The West was engulfed by Ethiopia and the region around Djibouti became French.

British interest in Somalia dates back to 1839, when Great Britain captured the port of Aden on the Arabian Peninsula for use as a station on the short route to India. The area around Aden was mostly barren and the British establishment there was dependent upon northern Somalia for supplies of meat. British interest in Somalia was initially limited to ensuring a steady supply of food for its Aden station. As such, they remained primarily on the coast and made few inroads into the Somali interior. From 1877 to 1908 a series of treaties were signed between Great Britain, Italy, France, Egypt, and Ethiopia that delineated the boundaries between colonial holdings, such as the British Somaliland Protectorate, as well as the current boundary line between Somalia and Ethiopia.

It is crucial to any understanding of Somali history to recognize the importance of the long-standing conflict with Ethiopia. With the exception of a small period of time during the twentieth century, when Ethiopia fell under Italian jurisdiction, the ancient Christian kingdom has been one of Somalia’s worst enemies.

The emergence of Ethiopia in the 1890s as a powerful nation rather than just another African region to be colonized meant that the division of the Horn of Africa had four participants: British (in the North — the current Isak-declared Republic of Somaliland); Italian (southern Somalia — the current arena of famine and fighting); French (Djibouti) and Ethiopian. Ethiopia was able to stake its claim upon territory that was not traditionally Ethiopian—the Ogaden clan, wholly ethnically Somali, today resides almost entirely within the boundaries of the Ethiopian state—and thereby lay the roots of some of the current difficulties in Somalia. (Moreover a great deal of northeastern Kenya is ethnically Somali.)

Experiments with a Pan-Somal Movement:
The Precedent of Famine, 1912

Drought is relatively common in Somalia, famine is not. Historically only the confluence of drought with warfare and/or other kinds of organizational disruption have created such alarming food deprivation. The last serious famine in Somalia occurred in 1912, when approximately one-third of the population of the Somaliland Protectorate, the northern region colonized by the British, died of starvation in what was called “the time of eating filth.” At that point, Mohammed Abdille Hassan, known to the British as the “mad Mullah” was leading a rebellion against for-
the British (expanded markets) and had yet to experience many of the negative aspects of that contact (colonization and exploitation) since the British presence was still quite small. Few Somalis who benefited from this new prosperity cared to listen to Sayyid Mohammed’s message of austerity and piety.

In 1898, Sayyid Mohammed moved from the coast into the interior to settle with the Dulbahante, his maternal clan. Significantly, the region he moved to, although entirely ethnically Somali, is part of present-day Ethiopia. Unlike the coastal dwelling Isaak and Dir clans, the Dulbahante had not signed a treaty with the British. They had gained none of the wealth that the Isaak had and they had had little contact with the British. Sayyid Mohammed was able to travel widely, preaching to pastoral nomads against Christian missionary efforts. He exploited the external threat of Christianity to encourage peace between warring clans. Everywhere along the way he enhanced his image. He acquired a reputation as a gifted poet and gathered a cult of personality around him.

In response to the increasing encroachments onto Somali territory by the British, the Italians and the Ethiopians, the twenty-year (1900-1920) jihad (Islamic ‘holy war’) of the ‘Dervishes’ began. (The term “dervish” was used to describe any adherent of the Salihiya Order and therefore applied to the followers of Sayyid Mohammed). The jihad was conducted against all Christian colonizers, but the British and the Ethiopians were the primary targets.

**The Mad Mullah’s Success, Northern Somaliland’s Catastrophe**

The successful results of Sayyid Mohammed’s campaign were disastrous for northern Somaliland. By 1908, having spent funds totally out of proportion to the Somaliland Protectorate’s strategic and colonial importance as beef supplier to the port of Aden, the British decided to abandon their settlements and operations in the interior and withdraw entirely to the coast. The British Protectorate Administration (BPA) also armed the Isaak clan and left them to protect themselves against the Dervishes. These actions were decried by *The Times* (April 8, 1910) as “one of the most deplorable acts ever committed by the British government.” The withdrawal met with Italian protests, as it effectively left the Sayyid Mohammed problem solely in Italian hands. Italy and Ethiopia were further concerned that the British withdrawal would result in a time of uncontrolled clan warfare. Which is, in fact, exactly what happened. The BPA misunderstood Sayyid Mohammed’s movement. They saw him as an ordinary clan leader acting within the usually balanced system of inter-clan struggle. They assumed, quite mistakenly, that in response to the impending Dervish threat, the Protectorate clans would unite, as was the norm among Somalis, and a leader would emerge to guide them. But Sayyid Mohammed’s movement had, to a degree, transcended the traditional clan structures. Religion provided Sayyid Mohammed with a pan-Somali appeal. While the clan system could not be avoided altogether—his support was limited primarily to the Ogaden region; inter-clan rivalries did threaten the brittle unity he had created among the Dervishes; and his followers were of a different religious order than most Somalis—nevertheless, the members of the Salihiya Order were Muslims. To attack them would have been to adopt the role of the Christian colonizer. In spite of the threat that Sayyid Mohammed posed to the coastal clans, his jihad was against Christians, not against fellow Muslims. The Protectorate clans did not band together to fight the Dervishes. In fact, the polar opposite occurred.

The presence of the British colonial government had temporarily halted most inter-clan antipathies within the Protectorate. However, after the British pulled out, bequeathing a supply of British arms, the clans were free to pursue old feuds. They did so with vigor. Any kind of social organization disintegrated, reducing much of the population to starvation. At the end of 1912, the British felt compelled to restore an active presence in the interior to re-establish order. Sayyid Mohammed’s jihad continued until its abrupt end with his death in 1920. Yet, after the decade of 1910-1912, the British maintained an active force in the Protectorate, even from 1914-1918, despite heavy military commitments elsewhere imposed by World War I.

Contemporary analysts have often drawn comparisons between 1912 and today (comparing Sayyid Mohammed to Siad Barre) to demonstrate Somalia’s penchant for famine and civil war. Although they are not directly analogous—the earlier famine took place in the north, today’s is primarily in the south; and Sayyid Mohammed was fighting against the foreign political entity of the British Somaliland Protectorate—the combination of internal disequilibrium and external impact is instructive. The balance traditionally inherent to the clan structure was put off-kilter. Sayyid Mohammed used Islam to cut across clan divisions while the British presence had put clan rivalries and their resolution on hold. At the same time, the BPA had armed the clans, hoping to use them as mercenaries to fight their battles.

A similar convergence of internal and external factors spawned the present horrors. Most significant to Somali history is the lasting nature of inter-clan rivalry and what happens when they are bottled up and then suddenly released. Siad Barre used the tenets of socialism to do away with clan rivalries and forge a Somali consciousness in much the same way that Sayyid Mohammed used Islam. Moreover, Siad Barre’s reliance upon his own clan and the persecution of other clans in the latter years of his Presidency—in other words, his disruption of the equilibrium between clans—aided and abetted by the superpowers, who gave Somalia billions of dollars of military hardware and who used Somali turf to play out their cold war battles, proved disastrous for Somalia’s political organization and has led to the contemporary tragedy.

**Somalia’s Nationalist War: Superpower Rivalries in the Horn of Africa**

One of Siad Barre’s primary goals was to establish a “Greater Somalia”—one whose boundaries would have pre-dated those of the colonial partition; would have included the Ogaden, some of Kenya and the whole of Djibouti; and would have encompassed all ethnically Somali territory. However, these efforts were coldly regarded by other African nations, the majority of whom are multi-ethnic conglomerations. Despite the fact that these conglomerations are the result of colonial interference, a recognition of Somali claims would implicitly have recognized the right of every minority ethnic group to declare independence—declarations that would massively, and probably disastrously, destabilize Africa.

Siad Barre’s ambitions led to the calamitous (for Somalia) Ogaden War during 1977-78 which cost Siad Barre his friendly relationship with the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. briefly sup-
ported both his “Scientific Socialist” government and Colonel Mengistu’s Ethiopian Marxist government. The political events in the Horn of Africa over the next nine months would be a distillation of years of cold-war jockeying for position.

Since the withdrawal of British forces in the 1950s, Ogaden Somalis had been waging a constant guerrilla war against Ethiopia with few formal peace agreements. In the 1960s a group headed by Wako Guto called the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) was officially organized. As a political entity it dealt independently with the Ethiopian government and without the support of the Somali government. However, in the mid-1970s, disorder in Ethiopia along with more strident popular support for the WSLF in Somalia itself led to Siad Barre’s taking a more favorable attitude towards the WSLF.

In anticipation of an advance towards the Ogaden by Ethiopia—which now had strong Soviet support and a newly Soviet-supplied and Cuban-trained army—the WSLF moved first. They disrupted Ethiopian communications in the area and prepared to attack Ethiopian garrisons. Ethiopia accused Somalia of instigating an unprovoked war and looked for external help. An attempted mediation by the Organization of African Unity in August bogged down when Ethiopia refused to consider Somali self-determination and refused to allow WSLF representatives to attend the talks.

Cold War Jockeying: Siad Barre Turns to the U.S.

Siad Barre, cold-shouldered during his visit to the Soviet Union at the end of the month, embarked on a tour of Arab states in September. During this tour, Saudi Arabia apparently promised hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid to Somalia on the understanding that Somalia would no longer be linked with the Soviet Union. However, it was not until November 13, two months after Ethiopia formally ceased diplomatic relations with Somalia, that the Somali break with the Soviet Union was announced. Siad Barre accused the Soviets of violating the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the two nations. He pointed to their generation of false propaganda about Somali aggression in the Ogaden, the giving of military aid to Ethiopia and the mobilization of Cuban troops to help Ethiopia. With a huge influx of military aid (total Soviet aid is estimated to be in the billions), Ethiopia was able to launch a successful counter-attack on the Ogaden region.

Although Siad Barre was willing to allow the U.S. to take over former Soviet installations in Somalia, especially its facilities at the port of Berbera, which could be used for surveillance of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, his reluctance to abandon his designs upon the Ogaden stalled the eventual treaty. The United States ambivalence towards aiding Somalia (it risked friendly relations with Kenya and potentially messy involvement in the local politics of the Horn for bases of dubious strategic value) was primarily dispelled by the fall of the pro-Western Shah of Iran and the resultant seizure of American hostages in Teheran. The aid package agreed upon in August, 1980 was small—much smaller than Siad Barre had hoped.

Nevertheless, the United States proved to be a faithful supplier of military hardware for the next ten years, until Siad Barre’s aggressive and violent persecution of the northern Isaaq clan became too great to ignore. Then, at the insistence of Congress, President Bush halted all aid to Somalia in 1991.

Over the course of thirty years, superpower support in the Horn of Africa completely flip-flopped. The possibility of one gaining the upper hand, as the Soviet Union came close to doing in March 1977 with the Cuban sponsored “socialist federation” between Ethiopia and Somalia, was enough to send the United States scrambling to at least open up discussions and ease Somali fears about the loss of Soviet patronage. The collapse of the Soviet Union completely removed the necessity of any U.S. efforts to maintain a presence to counter-balance the Soviet position. The stabilizing external influence of the superpowers—the influence that had enabled Siad Barre to maintain his dictatorial position for some twenty years—vanished more or less overnight. However, that same influence left most of its hardware behind.

Forging Somali Nationalism: Siad Barre and the Cult of Personality

As long as Somalia’s geographic location remained important during the cold war, Siad Barre was able to obtain enough money and weaponry from the superpowers to keep rival clans from overpowering him. However, it is not strictly due to the end of the cold war that Siad Barre’s enemies increased their efforts against him. Over the course of his Presidency, Siad Barre built a cult of personality, re-creating himself as the father of Somalia. Radio newscasts and public appearances would begin with a song dedicated to “Our Father, the Father of Knowledge.” Initially, Siad Barre constructed a multi-clan framework.
that strove to develop Somali national consciousness and end clan importance. However, as his power waned later in his rule; he came to rely more and more heavily on his own clan for support, persecuted certain clans, and played games of divide and rule with the others.

In October 1970, on the first anniversary of the military coup that brought Siad Barre to power, he announced that Somalia would in the future, follow the doctrine of “Scientific Socialism.” This announcement—foreshadowed by the after-the-fact transformation of the coup into a “Revolution”—reflected the army’s increasing dependence upon the Soviet Union for equipment and advisers. The doctrine of Scientific Socialism (literally in Somali “wealth-sharing based on wisdom”) was closely related to the newly-proclaimed ideals of “togetherness,” “self-reliance” and “self-help.”

It was also coupled with a denunciation of tribalism which, as the official slogan went, “divides rather than unites.” Siad Barre also outlawed clan identifications—a crucial attack on nomadic Somali culture. Somalis engaging in traditional clan activities were subject to fine and/or imprisonment. The government also took over communal activities such as funerals and marriages forcing Somalis to hold these ceremonies at state orientation centers.

The importance of the clan (and a corresponding ambivalence towards nationalism) may be indicated by the method used towards the end of the colonial period and during the first nine years of independence (1960 - 1969) to establish clan relationships. It had become fashionable etiquette among the European-educated Somali elite not to reveal one’s clan in favor of the all-purpose appellation “Somali,” referring to clan loyalties in the past tense. While it was simple enough to reject the supposedly primitive, pre-colonial identification system, this rejection then posed the problem of a new method of identification. Rather than create or discover an entirely new system, Somalis increasingly accepted the term “ex-clan” as a way of politely inquiring into or replying about family allegiance.

However, Siad Barre’s subsequent actions—empowering his clan, the Marehan, at the expense of other clans and exploiting clan rivalries—would seem to indicate his cynical manipulation of socialist rhetoric to prevent sectional conflicts from interfering with his rule over Somalia. Indeed, although it was illegal to mention clan affiliations publicly, Siad Barre’s power base was a tripartite clan allegiance known by the code-name M.O.D. It consisted of the Marehan, his own clan, the Ogaden, his mother’s clan, and the Durbahante clan of his son-in-law, head of the National Security Service (NSS), the Somali secret police.

The M.O.D. configuration, serendipitous or not, was cunningly constructed to maintain a tight grip upon the sectional tensions that could divide the Somali state. The Ogaden inhabit western Somalia and Ethiopia. Through his mother’s kin ties he
could control Somali relations with Ethiopia. The Durbaha
occupy both sides of the boundary between former British and
Italian Somaliland. Through his son-in-law he could minimize
friction between north and south and the Italian and British colon-
ial traditions.

Dissension In the Ranks: The Cult of Personality Dam-
aged
In May, 1986 a near-fatal car accident shattered the long-stand-
ing illusion of invincibility of the 'Great Leader' persona Siad
Barre had so painstakingly constructed. Consistent with the
Somali Constitution, Senior Vice-President General Mohammed
Ali Samatar stepped forward to be interim leader and declared a
state of emergency. Much to the consternation of those close to
Siad Barre, Samatar's regency was supported both by the mili-
tary and by the Central Committee of the Somali Socialist Revo-

dutionary Party. The President's intimates worried that they
would lose a great deal of influence if Siad Barre was unable to
return to the Presidency.

Effectively, the government was divided into two groups.
The first was the Dastouri (the constitutional faction), a multi-
clan group consisting of members of the Central Committee as
well as Samatar himself. The second was the so-called 'Gang of
Five' from Siad Barre's immediate family; his wife, her eldest
son, a cousin and others. Under pressure from his clansman,
Siad Barre returned to Somalia from his Saudi Arabian hospital
bed in June, 1986. Samatar promptly handed back the reins of
the government.

Despite the fact that Samatar had not tried to undermine
Siad Barre's position, the damage had already been done to the
President's authority. For the first time in Siad Barre's reign
there was open speculation about who would succeed him. Fur-
thermore, the prematurely de-hospitalized Siad Barre was still
physically weak and vulnerable to his own kinsmen who were
frantically trying to shore up their own positions should Siad
Barre lose control of Somalia. In September 1986, the Central
Committee of the Party proposed another seven years for Siad
Barre as President. He won 99.9% of the vote in the national
elections on December 23.

After the election, Siad Barre promoted a number of Mare-
han to the senior ranks of the army and reshuffled the cabinet to
give the Marehan stronger control of the Ministry of Defense. In
February 1987, General Samatar was appointed 'First Minister'
in the new government. Because the vital ministries of Foreign
Affairs and Defense reported directly to the President instead of
the newly-created 'First Minister,' Samatar was effectively
removed from the chain of command. In fact, his office and offi-
cial residence were quickly taken over by the new Minister of
Defense. Siad Barre had constructed two governments, one offi-
cially constituted around General Samatar and the other conduc-
ed around the final authority, the President himself.

Siad Barre's increasing reliance upon the Marehan
destroyed the fragile poly-clan framework he had formerly con-
structed, leaving him open to opposition from every clan other
than his own. This alienation led to brutal repression of opposi-
tion, which, combined with the loss of strategic value after the
cold war, led to the United States' termination of economic and
military aid to Somalia. Without a superpower ally to support
him, Siad Barre quickly fell.

Many Weapons, Little Food

No one clan was powerful enough to unseat Siad Barre. It ulti-
mately took an alliance of clans to defeat him, one that disinte-
grated soon after that defeat. Currently, there is no group strong
enough to establish a stable political state. The United Nations,
following the recommendations of the United States, has refused
to supply the force necessary to politically reconstruct Somalia.
They are providing humanitarian aid instead. This aid is helpful,
but it is a temporary salve which does not address the larger ques-
tions. While the present situation is certainly a result of internal
disequilibrium, other nations are also partly responsible.
Many of the weapons currently used in Somalia were supplied
by the United States and the former Soviet Union. Somalia at
this point has little but military hardware, enabling soldiers to
use starvation as an even more powerful weapon to enforce their
political power.

Suggestions for Further Reading

Of the books, the best are those produced by I.M. Lewis,
who is the pre-eminent scholar on Somalia. Samatar's book is a
little too Marxist to be very useful, although it has some interest-
ing facts. Ray Beachey's book is fascinating, but less academic
than Lewis'.'

Of the articles, Rakiya Omaar's is definitely worth looking
at. She is a Somali and was, as of May '92, the Executive Direc-
tor of Africa Watch (Human Rights Organization)

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