Postwar Decolonization and its Discontents

Nicholas Breyfogle: Hello and welcome to "Postwar Decolonization and Its Discontents." Brought to you by the History Department and the College of Arts and Sciences at the Ohio State University and the magazine Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspective. My name is Nick Breyfogle. I'm a professor of history and director of the Goldberg Center for Excellence in Teaching, and I'll be your host and moderator today. Welcome to everyone, and thank you so much for joining us. 

After the Second World War national self-determination became a recognized international norm. Yet it only extended to former colonies. Groups within the post-colonial states that made alternative sovereign claims were disregarded or actively suppressed. Our talk today showcases their contested histories, highlighting little known regions in South Asia and Southern Africa, marginalized individuals and their hidden or lost archives. Personal connections link disparate national struggles across across the globe through advocacy networks. However, these advocates had their own agendas and allegiances, which could undermine the autonomy of the claimants they supported. 

This webinar features material from Lydia Walker's new 2024 book, States In Waiting, which illuminates the unfinished and improvised ways that the state centric international system replaced Empire, which left certain claims of sovereignty perpetually awaiting recognition. Her book is available for free download, and we'll send you a link at the end of the talk to be able to access the book. 

Let's take a moment to get to know our speaker. Lydia Walker is a historian of 20th century global decolonization. She has broad interests in the international history of South Asia, southern Africa, military intervention and insurgent resistance. She is a provost scholar assistant professor, and the Seth Andre Myers Chair in Global Military History in the Department of History at The Ohio State University at Ohio State. She is also director of the Non-state archive and a faculty affiliate at the Russian Center for International Security Studies. She is the author of States in Waiting from Cambridge in 2024, and her scholarship has appeared in the American Historical Review, Past and Present, and The Washington Post, among other venues. With that introduction, let me mention the plan. 

Professor Walker will open with a presentation on postwar decolonization, and then she'll take your questions. If you're interested in asking a question, please write it in the Q&A function at the bottom of your screen on zoom. We'll do our best to answer as many questions as we can. As a reminder, this event is being recorded and will be posted at a later date on YouTube and made available to everyone who has registered for the webinar. Also, we'd like to take a moment to acknowledge that the land the Ohio State University occupies is the ancestral and contemporary contemporary territory of the Shawnee, Potawatomi, Delaware, Miami, Peoria, Seneca, Wyandot, Ojibwe, and Cherokee peoples. Specifically, the university resides on land ceded in the 1795 Treaty of Greenville and the forced removal of tribes for the Indian removal Act of 1830. We want to honor the resiliency of these Tribal Nations, and recognize the historical context that have and continue to affect the Indigenous peoples of this land. Now, let me pass you over to Professor Lydia Walker. Over to you, Lydia. 

Lydia Walker: Thank you so much, Nick. And thank you, Alex and the rest of the team, for producing this event and for inviting me, to share my work. So as, Nick, in his generous introduction mentioned, in this talk today, titled Postwar Decolonizing and Its Discontents, I'm going to feature, some bits of my new book States in Waiting, which is available for free download, and you may be able to use the QR code, hopefully through your screen if you're interested because the book is available, open access, due to the Ohio State Libraries. So my talk today is organized, my talk today is organized around three elements. Because postwar global decolonization is a big topic even when focusing on its discontents. And those are big words that need explanation. So the elements I'm going to hone in on are that of global processes, nationalist claims making and transnational advocacy, and how they all fit together. So global processes. I'm here today to talk about postwar decolonization, which is the process where empires were transformed into states after the Second World War. The map I'm showing here is a map I like to show a lot when I discuss decolonization. And that's not just because of what it shows. It's also because of what it hides. This map is from 1962, produced by the US Central Intelligence Agency, and it maps in teal countries that have become independent since from 1943 to 1962. And it hides in white countries that are still colonies. Like much of southern Africa and countries that are still empires. Like much of Europe or Metropolis, as we often refer to them, meaning the center of it, of imperial rule. And what this map shows is the international order after 1945, as kind of understood by the United Nations. Now, the United Nations, which is the name for the allies during the Second World War, became an international institution after the Second World War at San Francisco in 1945. And as the years went progressed through the early to the mid 20th century, the UN grew and grew with members states. The height of this expansion was 1960, when the UN recognized 17 new states. I don't know if you've been noticing, but I'm using the passive voice here. Recognized states. Decolonization is the process in which empires were transformed into independent states, and all of the people, when they discuss decolonization, use such constructions. Such grammatical constructions. And that's again about hiding agency in this very, very complicated process. So. 

What about countries that didn't become independent, during decolonization? And here is where we get to nationalist claims making and the discontents of my talks title, or as I call them in my book, states in waiting states and waiting for communities left, liberated by decolonization and the literal. And what the book does is it views this process from this window, which looks out on, to the, into the hills of Naga land at the junction of China, Burma and India, or in northeast India. When I first started, writing about Nagaland, I, in my first article on the topic included the open with the sentence Nagaland in Northeast India. And one of my Naga interlocutors said, no, no, no, we're not in Northeast India. That's from the perspective of New Delhi. We're at the junction of China, Burma and India. And that's a very that's a very different way of thinking about the critical geopolitics of nation making and decolonization being at a strategic junction rather than attenuated, from the center of Indian rule, the northeast, of course, is from the perspective of the Indian capital of New Delhi. So I wouldn't expect really very I wouldn't expect very many in the audience to have heard of Nagaland, let alone Northeast India. And when we think about the process of decolonization from this place, I want you to sort of I want you to learn about three different elements, three different ways of understanding Nagas. The first is war. The second is religion, and the third is anthropology. So war, not the land, becomes actually a literal strategic junction. 

During the Second World War, when the British colonial army, with support from the US force, the Japanese Imperial Army at the battles of Imphal and Kohima. Oh, Hema is the Naga capital. And these are months long sieges that really radically transform the landscape. And Nagas actually fight on both sides. Many a form partizan units allied with the British, while the man who becomes the primary Naga nationalist leader during this era and comes up with theso allies with the Japanese. So the Second World War is important because of becoming a center, a center of, international politics. And also because of the, literal devastation on the land. It again, Nagas fight on both sides. So it's not so much about who the Nagas ally with, rather the experience of war and invasion. 

The second element I wanted to discuss is, that of religion. Now the land is incredibly Baptist. The most recent, figures we have, which are from the Indian census of 2011, list Naga land as, 90% Christian and 75% Baptist. This is very, very Baptist. So comparison. The American state of Mississippi is 34% Baptist. Now, these figures, in relation to Nagaland, are, not necessarily specifically fact, factually accurate because we haven't had a census in quite some time, and it's very difficult to, count Nagas, because as you can see in the map I'm showing, there are different conceptions of Nagaland. There is the literal Indian state of Nagaland, which became a state in the Indian Union in 1963. And there were many different, not nationalist imaginaries of a greater Naga land. And Nagas live across national boundaries. So these figures are meant to be ballpark figures, and to think about how difficult it is to know certain things about certain regions. But Nagas are very Christian through the original efforts of American Baptist missionaries, though conversion rates really skyrocketed after the Second World War. And in the decades after the American missionaries, were no longer, present. So, a lot of this conversion was really, led by, Naga missionaries. And it's not surprising that the, you know, conversion rate skyrocketed after the Second World War because the experience of being bombed is a, you know, quite a, traumatic one. 

The third, way of under of element to understand about Nagas is that of anthropology. And not sure if we'll have very many anthropologists in the audience. But for those who, are Naga land, was really well studied during the British colonial period by a handful of British anthropologists, many of whom were also colonial civil servants. And it's an example of what the anthropologist Bernard Cohen called anthropology land, a place that is really kind of understood, particularly in, Western, political imagination. Through the lens and study of its people, through anthropology. And this becomes, really important for how Nagas are understood because one of these anthropologists ends up becoming, the advisor, for the independent Indian government dealing with, what in India are called tribal peoples, which and others are, and he wrote this this man very or Elwyn wrote the list. That is how, now that is, are understood by the Indian government. They are not listed as Nagas. They are listed as kami sama, al and other Naga tribes. So tribe becomes the unit of analysis for how Nagas are understood by the Indian state, not that of nation. And so you have the tension between these two ways of thinking about, Naga land as Nagas, as, a political unit, that of tribe and that of nation and that of being a supposedly uncivilized tribal people and that of being a sort of more modernized, westernized, Christian, community. And Christianity gives them, a way of plugging into other global networks. 

So. The view through this window, is one that includes really decades of violence that begins, after Indian independence in 1947. Really? Accelerating in the 1950s. In the mid 1950s, after the first Indian general election in 1951. And you have and there is a long term Naga insurgency in the region and, the Indian and the Indian military comes in and engages in, the very much the kind of counterinsurgency activities that are happening at the same time in Malaya, contemporary Malaysia. And that will happen later in the American war in Vietnam. And while, the, violence in the region really continues, through, the late 1990s, you still have, as you can see in this image, you still have the remnants of, you of, what? Of how these, nationalist movements, interacted with the Indian state and control territory. This is an image of a, of a nationalist camp called Peace camp because the land has been ceded to them, by the Indian government through one of the many, sets of, peace negotiations that have happened across the decades. 

I mentioned the Naga nationalist leader and coming up with Feisal, who allied with the Japanese during the Second World War. And when he, launched outright insurgency in the mid 1950s, the war in the region did not go in his favor. And he ended up walking, to what was then, East Pakistan, present day Bangladesh. And he eventually made his way, to first Switzerland and then the UK and eventually New York, because he wanted to bring his people's nationalist claim to the world, and he wanted to work through transnational advocates to do that. So now we come to the third element, transnational advocacy. In that map I showed about what about the process of decolonization and and how state centric it was and how it showed as much as it showed independence and also, kind of hid continued imperial rule in many places. I want to say, one aspect about that state centric ness of international order, after 1945, if you were a people, it was really hard to get to the United Nations unless you were brought into the room by a state. The UN is a very state centric institution, and if there's interest in the Q&A, I can talk a bit a bit about that transition. 

From the League of Nations, before the end of the Second World War to the United Nations, after the Second World War, that meant that communities, like Nagas, like decolonization discontents that were states in waiting had to work through networks of transnational advocates. Advocates were individuals with knowledge and interest of these particular communities, who also, had access to circles of power, governments, non-governmental organizations, and even corporations. The network I track in my book states in Waiting is drawn from the international peace movement, and it's called the World Peace Brigade. And when Faisal, reaches the UK, he, makes attempts to make contact, with this sphere of advocacy, the World Peace Brigade, which is formed, in 1961. And I should mention that Faisal arrives in London, in 1960, that year, when 17 countries are becoming independent. The summer of 1960 is a moment where it almost seems as if the country is becoming independent every week. So these those arriving in that moment and the World Peace Brigade is being founded as a result of that moment in the following year to help in their own words, decolonization escape what it terms. It's in what they termed it's entrapment in violence. That's their explicit aim. And they have three founders. 

The first is the American, pacifist AJ Masti. Some in the audience may have heard about him in other contexts. Musty was also very active in the US civil rights movement and was a mentor figure for, such prominent civil rights advocates, such prominent civil rights activists as Bayard Rustin and Bill Sutherland, who were also part of the world Peace Brigade. 

And then, the, the Indian, leader was Orion, which some in the audience may have heard of in other contexts, because he is a major figure in the Indian independence movement and also emerges as Indira Gandhi's opponent during the Indian emergency in the early 1970s. This period, though, we're still in the 1960s, and JP is outside of formal politics. One characteristic of these advocates is while they have access, to political leaders in their own, national governments, they themselves are not that. 

And then the third leader of this of the World Peace Brigade is Reverend Michael Scott of the UK, not the character in the office. But instead he is a quite prominent anti-apartheid activist during this period. Working against, the, government of South Africa, in international forums. And I want to focus a little bit on, Michael Scott here because he is really a huge figure in that. He is he ends up, making contact with Feisal, first in Switzerland, bringing physio to London and attempting to, support the Naga claim in international politics. Scott, as I mentioned, worked against apartheid South Africa and he ended up being the spokesman for the Herero people of South West Africa, Namibia, which was a former German colony that became a League of Nations mandate after the First World War and administer, administered by South Africa. And so Scott spoke for the Herero people of southwest Africa at the United Nations. Because Southwest Africa was a former League of Nations mandate. They had access to the United Nations, in a way that Nagas did not. So, Scott and then first access the United Nations, though, through the support of the Indian delegation there, working against apartheid. 

So, he had long term friendships, with, Indians in government as well as Indians in civil society like Jayaprakash and Orion and their work for the World Peace Brigade. Which first was primarily in, East and Southern Africa. Support supporting countries and supporting nationalist movements there. Become independent countries, and then eventually, in Nagaland, where JP and Scott, are part of a peace mission that brokered a ceasefire between the Indian government and Naga nationalists and attempts to hammer out a lasting peace. Scott, support of Naga nationalist claims making ends up really kind of fracturing this network of advocacy and ending, his friendship with JP. So the, you know, the arc of this book is about the formation and dissolution of this transnational advocacy movement drawn from the World Peace Brigade and how they, attempt to support particular nationalist claims. And then, and and then at times, and then really are not they're not able to continue their work as they fall, afoul of state governments. Scott ends up being deported from India because of his advocacy, for Naga nationalists. And this happens in 1966. And when you think about how he arrived at the United Nations in the late 1940s, brought into the room by the Indian delegation, it's really, those 20 years are showing, the rise and demise of an advocacy network that supported nationalist claims in international politics, during the during the really, intense, political transformation of postwar decolonization. Now I'm going to look at these three elements nationalist claims making its international advocacy and the global process of postwar decolonization. All next to each other. How do they fit? How do these big isms operate? So I discussed the long sort of narrative of how the Naga claim intersected with the World Peace Brigade. But I want to think a bit about, how we how this actually, like, looked in practice. And so here are two images that show elements of it. The first, in red, is an image, from one of the, magazines at the World Peace Brigade community. That AJ must've was the editor of Liberation magazine. It's a cover image by the artist Vera Williams from the early 1960s. And it really shows, to some degree, the relationship between claims making and its advocacy. 

These are two circles, that are that overlap but are not aligned. And they are also racial marked, showing both the hierarchies with between claimants and their advocates and, that their interests were not necessarily the same. The second is of a street corner of and street intersection between Reverend Scott Street and Sam Nyama Drive in Windhoek, Namibia. That images from 2015, almost ten years ago. Sam Yoma, was the leader of the dominant Namibian nationalist movement and eventually became president of an independent Namibia in 1990. It took Namibia a long time to become independent. When I saw that image, during my research for states in waiting, I was very excited. Here was a literal intersection between claims making Sam Noma and its advocacy Michael Scott. And it was at a construction site. Which was exactly what I was working on. I was constructing a book, and then several years later, I asked in Namibia, Ernest colleague, who was living in Windhoek, what happened with that construction site at that intersection? And he said, oh, well, you know, it actually became a dead end because they constructed a parking lot. And as much as that made this a bit of, a bit of a downer in terms of I wanted that intersection to be a strategic intersection teeming with traffic. It also shows what can happen, at the intersection of claims making and advocacy that real claims making for that that's heading towards the ends up becoming independent, ends up becoming an independent state. Needs independence, also means independence from advocacy and the long term, role that someone like Michael Scott may play, supporting particular nationalist movements, ends up can even undermine the autonomy for the claims he's seeking to represent. And therefore this intersection, can in some times actually become a dead end. It can also become the end of friendships. 

Scott's friendship, with many nationalist leaders arose because they either becoming dependent and no longer need him. Or, they, continue to rely on him, but find, it, you know, less and less useful over time. So the, the, this the the relationship between, claims making and its advocacy is not so smooth, and is often unaligned because in the long term, they do not necessarily share interests. So, in conclusion, these global processes, especially that of decolonization, which I've been discussing today, does not necessarily lead to liberation for all. In fact, in some ways, every liberation includes a subjugation. And that's why this book, the subtitle of it is A counter-narrative of global decolonization. Because this is, you know, in sort of kin more conventional narratives. This, great moment of decolonization is, set of moments, that we're, you know, nationals movements overthrow empire. But they're it still includes its own subjugation regarding nationalist claims making communities within states. We'll we'll rely on a whole set of, surprising and practical alliances in order to enter politics. 

And that leads us to transnational advocacy, which in the end, requires its own decolonization, because independence also means independence from advocacy. Thank you very much. And please download the book. 

Nicholas Breyfogle: Lydia, thank you so much for your fascinating talk. I think we've all learned a tremendous amount, about aspects of this story that, I'm sure many of us were unfamiliar with. Let me remind everyone who's with us today. If you have questions, for Professor Walker, please, pop them into the Q&A and, just type them in, and we will be happy to pass those on, and, and, and, get some of your questions answered. While we're waiting, I thought I would just ask, 1 or 2 to kind of get us, started. 

One question I have has to do with the kind of long term impact, of these sort of states and these states in waning or these states that, weren't invited to be part of the club of, of new nations after, after the war, for example. So what role does Nagaland play now within, the sort of, within India's kind of political situation, particularly the nationalist politics? What role does it play in, in the, in the larger geopolitical world in which it's inhabits, particularly in terms of Indian relationships with China? And so the separate question but related to today is do we still have advocacy groups, like the like the International Peace Brigade that are playing the kind of roles that you talk about here, or have they been gone by the wayside now? Is this an international actor? That was peculiar, or to the this postwar moment? 

Lydia Walker: Thank you Nick. So long term impact. I noticed that you opened our, our, our seminar with a, land acknowledgment because of the history of, empire and colonialism in North America and in specifically in Ohio, where, we both are zooming from today and, now does still attempt to operate, in international politics. But they but those who do and get the most traction, often use often make Indigenous claims and use the language of Indigeneity, to access in the United Nations. 

There were Naga representatives, at, you know, who were part of the 2007, declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and that this and not all Nagas do this, within all claims, there are fractures. But that is, you know, really from, the late the 1970s onwards as the window closes on the kind of decolonization I'm discussing, here today, peoples, you know, are quite practical and, and about finding other ways as one door closes, another opens. So indigenous claims making. And that's really, where, my book ends, is on, how, you know, beginning in the 1970s, but really accelerating in the 1990s. Indigeneity, becomes a way of states in waiting, accessing international politics, within India. So it's quite interesting. So there's been much more peace in the region, since 2001, that facilitated, the kind of, travel I was able to do, for, my scholarship. At the same time, not the land is regions of it are still ruled, under the armed forces special powers Act, which is a, British colonial law that is still, part of the, independent Indian state, that, rules certain regions under forms of martial law. So they still have a specialized, relationship, with the Indian government. Many, younger Nagas are, working in, major Indian cities, New Delhi, Bangalore, and, sending, money, back home on the form of remittances. And so they themselves feel more Indian, than, their than their, than their elders. So there's definitely, a generational shift, going on in the region. At the same time, there is also, the, legal dynamics of, how not the land is ruled, have not changed much at all. 

Your second question, Nick, about do we still have advocacy groups? Yes, we do. But, and and, most of my, scholarship on this is on, questions of indigeneity, which, because I track them forward, related to particular states in waiting. And they're what's really interesting about, the UN working group of UN indigenous populations that then eventually, crafts the UN declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007 is you have the same politics of sort of accreditation, like how indigenous communities actually access this working group, that I have tracked in states and waiting. You have large, primarily Western NGOs that will, give, sort of status at the committee, at the working group, to particular, indigenous organizations. And so there's very much a, a personal politics of who, you know, in order to, access these international forums and at the very practicality, who's providing visas, who's providing funding for plane tickets, who's providing accommodation. These are the things that advocacy, groups and advocates themselves, do to facilitate, these kinds of unofficial politics. And by unofficial, I mean communities that do not have international recognition. And when they are searching for it, through forums like U.N. committees, they then still, rely on the politics of advocacy. Wonderful. A question about kind of Christianity and particularly the, the, the really large numbers of Baptists, in the Nagaland region. Could you elaborate a little bit more on how the Christian tradition in particular, I suppose the Baptist tradition in Nagaland, may have affected the processes of advocacy and nationalist claims. How does that affect their story? In all sorts of ways. So. Well, I get the most basic level Christianity and also specifically, Global Baptist. And global religious networks allow many Nagas today access to international, forums, international training, international connection in ways that bypass New Delhi. Billy Graham goes to Nagaland in the early 1970s as part of one of his crusades. And that's a time of extraordinary violence in the region. It's still quite well remembered. And he his whole travel is facilitated by the Indian government. He's actually on, I believe, Indian military helicopter is getting in and out. So, you know, there are complicated relationships there, but this is, you know, this is a way of religion remains a way for many Nagas, to, to have, connections, with, Western organizations, in ways that, do not, we are not reliant on the Indian government, though, of course, my, Billy Graham example showed that the Indian government is still, still, participating in elements of this. There's real debate today, about, whether, and this is whether Christianity was an important part of Naga nationalism and to what degree, the Indian government certainly thought it was. And they thought that American missionaries, with their sort of pernicious ideas of national self-determination, I'm giving a gloss of some, Indian government documents were kind of spreading nationalism and that's part of why, the Indian government does not renew visas for American missionaries. And by 1953, there are no more American missionaries in the region, which is part of why, I wanted to emphasize how the real, upsurge in conversion rates, was the work of Naga missionaries. However, in my archival research, in the papers of particular American missionaries, they were not supportive of independence for Nagas, and they were also not in support of independence for Indians. In general, they were not supportive of independence for non-Western peoples. 

So, the idea that they were actually actively supporting the nationalist movement, is not, supported by the existing archival record that said, you know, those Christian networks mattered for how Nagas, made their claims. Indian, politicians will complain that Nagas who are and who are in London are dressed like, YMCA salesmen. You know, they're not looking kind of appropriately Indian as the way the Indian government understands them. As I mentioned, the the sort of tribal list and, that, relationship with the Indian state is predicated on tribal status. Tribe is a, a a constitutional category in India, and I'm using it in that way. It has different connotations in North America and also, in the African continent. So, this the so Christianity, I think matters quite a lot, but not in a kind of determining factor, related to the nationalist movement. 

Nicholas Breyfogle: Just to to to follow up on what you just said, we have another question from from the audience. And here I'll just I'll read, in, in, in its entirety, in North America, there are resources to assist anyone interested in learning more about Indigenous territory claims, for example, native Lanka. Are you aware of resources for getting started in identifying indigenous claims in other parts of the world? And I'm assuming you are. Yeah. Given the focus you have on Indigenous theory. 

Lydia Walker: I am and I'm not, I must say, and this is a really great question. Thanks a lot. And part of that is because, the, indigenous, the category of indigeneity is, quite fraught. In outside of on North America and also Australia. There is so let's backtrack a bit. So the, sort of international legal category of indigenous or indigenous deity really is coming, in the 1970s from, North America, in North American, lots of Canadian and also, also later on, Australian, international legal theorists, many, many of whom are from indigenous communities themselves. And then, later on, it becomes globalized and it really changes, as Scandinavia in groups, particularly Sammy's, join in, which you have the issue of how the welfare state changes indigenous communities, a relationship, with their ruling government, and then it becomes, globalized, as communities, in Asia, are also and later, even later on, on the African continent, start finding the label. Illuminating and useful, for their, own, for their own operations. 

In international politics, there's a lot of debate within India about the use of the term indigenous. And part of this is also where you get into, Adivasi communities in India, which are very different than, tribal communities in the northeast, which include Nagas and, this idea of and then today in conversations about, decolonization, the Indian government is also trying to look back to an indigenous India before, Mughal Muslim rule, in the 1500s. So this is all a very long, complicated historians answer basically saying began earlier and it's more complicated for why the indigenous label in India particularly is quite fraught and doesn't really fit the same kinds of constructions, that we have, in North America. So, no, there are not the same kinds of sort of structured resources, which are ways of understanding, which I, you know, in some ways have been, you know, created, by, by, you know, the relationship between claims making and advocacy, those, kinds of structured resources, don't yet, exist, in India in particular. And I do not believe also in elsewhere in regions that are called upland Southeast Asia include, Myanmar, regions that the anthropologists, will invent chendol and James Scott, popularized or called Zofia, that these, tribal communities in those regions are not, labeled, and sort of understood in the same way they are in North America. And, I mean, I got it this a little bit, with the discussion about how difficult it was to have accurate numbers, for this region. But there's just quite a lot, we do not know, about, and not just literal knowledge, but the kind of the way knowledge gets packaged and codified, so that it, so can inform. So it's part of, international policy. So, you know, we we want figures and census data, for communities, in order to and, and labels and when those labels are contested, and they seem to be external and not necessarily, those of the communities themselves, or at least all of them would ascribe to it becomes very difficult to have the same sort of structures of recognition that we have for indigenous groups in North America. 

Nicholas Breyfogle: Up on that, we have a question of the audience, which is a comparative question within, India itself, post, post independence. So I read this question to you, along with Naga Lens, push for a nation, another well known national project within India is was the push for a Tamil homeland. What distinctions and connections have you found between these? For lack of a better way to say it, within India movements, is there a line of continuity between these struggles and other within India movements like those in Kashmir or maybe even the Naxalite movement? 

Lydia Walker: Thank you so much. That's a really, really important question. So from the perspective of the Indian state, it it's, Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, whose government, during this period, India is full of what Nehru calls in a phrase I quite, quite enjoy. The sipper is tendencies, you know, the that that it could fragment, at any point in these sort of, anti central, anti-government and neighbors understanding, movements. I mentioned, very briefly that nog that a portion of the region that Naga nationalists claim becomes the Indian state of Nagaland in 1963, as I'm sure you know, but many listeners may not. It's fairly easy to create a new state in the Indian Union much easier than it is in the United States. But and you do it through a constitutional amendment, another constitutional amendment in 1963, bans out, political parties that have a secession, an outright secessionist, platform from, you know, being able to, run for elections. And this is specifically targeted at the DMK in Tamil Nadu in 1963. And so this is very much, from the the perspective of the Indian state. They are concerned with, with Tamil nationalism. They are also, concerned with, sick or Sikh nationalism. They're also concerned, you know, this is in 60, 61 with, Goa and, and the remnants of, Portuguese Empire on, the subcontinent. So from the Indian status perspective, all these movements are their primary concern. And, the, the Naga problem from the perspective of the Indian government, is one of many. And even making it making Nagaland an Indian state is quite, a quite radical, sort of choice. By end, critics of, neighbors decision to do that will say that that's why you end up with so many northeastern states, that Nagaland is kind of the thin end of the wedge and of giving it that the degree of autonomy of statehood in the Indian Union is sort of too much and kind of opens the door, for other groups in the northeast and the communities to, launch their own, secessionist movements. It's important to note that Nagas do not consider themselves a secessionist movement, because they declared independence the day before Indian independence. So in their own nationalist imaginary, they are not, and they are the first, the first to declare independence. But they are one of many, within the Indian Union. 

Now, in my research, I found a sort of shocking lack of solidarity between other of these, for suppressed tendencies and also other, movements, you know, that share, regional propinquity, share a regional closeness, Tibetans, Chittagong Hill people, the many, many of these subnational movements in Myanmar, today then Burma, instead Naga nationalists were making analogies to what was happening, on the African continent in the early 60s. And that was because the window of political possibility of independence during that period was open on the African continent, while it remained. And while it had already closed, in, much of Asia. 

Nicholas Breyfogle: We have time for just one more quick question would you be able to just talk about, so what are the communities that they did connect with in, in, in southern Africa? What were the ones that they saw as a sort of kindred spirits in this whole process where the groups that they were connecting with there, and did they share similar types of of situations? And were the, were the groups in South Africa reaching out as well? To other groups in South Asia? 

Lydia Walker: So a clarification that this is from the Naga perspective, this is a politics of analogy and emulation and not necessarily solidarity between movements. I found a shock in my research. I found much less solidarity than I expected, even when, Naga National. So actually sharing office space and Michael Scott's NGO called the Africa Bureau with Southern African nationalist movements, actual connection between them. I was not something I found in the archives. I used. And this in part is because, you know, nationalists are focused on the uniqueness of their claim and not necessarily, in, you know, working, you know, this these are individual projects. These are not, these are not, they're not pan movements. That said, you know, the reason why, feasible the Naga national leader makes contact with Michael Scott is because his nephew reads an article in the New York Times. His nephew is actually an epidemiology student in Chicago, in the early 60s, who made his way to the United States, through missionary networks. Reads an op ed in the New York Times, or sorry, an article on on Scott's work for on behalf of Herreros in Southwest Africa and thinks that's how a people, a small people in a, you know, so supposed peripheral region far from global centers of power and governance can access international politics through an advocate like Michael Scott or maybe even him himself. So that politics. And that's actually how I ended up, following, activities on Southern Africa. That's how I tell my research went from northeast India to southern Africa, was following those not just analytical connections, but archival connections at the individual people. But the actual sort of solidarities between movements are strikingly absent, and not in not what I would have expected when I started my research. But I just to repeat that, that's because the nationalist claim is predicated on a people's uniqueness and is not part of a sort of pan or federal movement. 

Nicholas Breyfogle: Wonderful. And as with all things in life, all, all good things must come to an end. And we have reached our time here. I want to thank you. So much, Lydia, for, for your marvelous talk today. And I want to thank everyone who has joined us, for coming today and for your excellent, excellent questions. We're really grateful to you, Lydia, for sharing your expertise and, everything you've learned about the postwar decolonization and its and its many discontents. I hope everybody here will join me in giving, Professor Walker a virtual round of applause. Thank you all so very much. And if you'd like to learn more about this topic, we'll send out an email soon with information about how to access the book, and a link to a recording of this event. We'd also like to thank the College of Arts and Sciences, especially Alex Stackland, the Department of History, the Goldberg Center, and Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspective for their support of this event. Again, thank you all for coming. Stay safe and healthy and we'll see you all next time. Thanks. Goodbye.